TermLimitsforMunicipalElectedOfficials:
ExecutiveandLegislativeBranches
preparedfortheNewYorkCityCharterRevisionCommission
June2010
PatrickJ.Egan,Ph.D.
AssistantProfessorofPoliticsandPublicPolicy
NewYorkUniversity
1
ExecutiveSummary
TermlimitsforelectedofficialsarepopularwithvotersbothnationwideandinNew
YorkCity.Butempiricalscholars—whoseresearchhaslargelyfocusedonthe
effectsoftermlimitsonthelegislaturesofstategovernments—arenotsosanguine.
Termlimitshavenotappreciablyincreasedtheracialorgenderdiversityofelected
officials,norhavetheyhadanyeffectonthetypeofpeoplewhoseekelectionto
office.Surveysofelectedofficialsindicatethatthosewhoaretermlimitedpayless
attentiontotheirgeographicconstituenciesandmoretostatewidematters—
perhapsbecausetermlimitsforceofficialstoanticipaterunningforhigheroffice
morequickly.
Scholarshiphasidentifiedoneconsistenteffectoftermlimitsthatmostwillagreeis
deleterious:whentermlimitsareappliedtoboththeexecutiveandlegislative
branches,theyweakenthelegislativebranchinasignificantfashion.Termlimits’
systematicremovalofexperiencedmembersfromthelegislaturehandicapsitvis‐à‐
vistheexecutivebranchwithregardtoexpertiseandthusinfluence.Thisfinding
hasparticularimplicationsforNewYorkCity,whichinvestsitsexecutivebranch
(theMayor)withaparticularlystrongsetofpowers,makingtheroleofits
legislature(theCityCouncil)asacheckonexecutivepowerallthemoreimportant.
Furthermore,NewYorkCity’ssheersizeputsthemembersofCityCouncilata
disadvantagewithregardtotheMayor.MembersoftheCityCouncilhavemore
constituents—andonaperson‐for‐personbasisareresponsibleforoverseeingthe
spendingofmoregovernmentdollars—thanlegislatorsinallbutoneofthenation’s
2
fiftystates.Termlimits—which,byconstruction,meanthattheaveragetenureof
CityCouncilmembersatanygiventimecanbenomorethansixyears—makeit
evenharderfortheCounciltohandletheseoutsizedresponsibilities.Withsmall
staffsandlimitedexpertise,theserelativelyinexperiencedlegislatorsfacean
executivebranchstaffedbyhundredsofmayoralappointeeswhoareexpertson
localpolicymaking.ItisnowonderthatmanyobserversofNewYorkCitypolitics
havenoticedamarkeddeclineinrecentyearsofCouncil’sabilitytofulfillitsroleas
ademocraticcheckontheMayor.
Toleveltheplayingfieldbetweentheexecutiveandlegislativebranches,amajority
ofthenation’smostpopulousstates—andseveralofthenation’sbiggestcities—
haveeitherappliedtermlimitsonlytotheexecutivebranch,orappliedtermlimits
inastricterfashiontotheexecutivebranchthanthelegislativebranch.Asthe
CharterRevisionCommissiondeliberatesoverthestatusoftermlimitsinNewYork
City,itmaywishtoconsiderasimilarapproach.Settinglessstricttermlimitsfor
CouncilthantheMayor—forexample,limitingmembersofCounciltothree,four‐
yeartermsbutlimitingtheMayortotwo,four‐yearterms—couldhelpre‐establish
thebalanceofpowerbetweentheexecutiveandlegislativebranches.
Politicalscientiststendtobeskepticalabouttheextenttowhichtermlimitsactually
liveuptothepromises—andwhethertheysolvetheproblems—thatspurtheir
adoption.Nevertheless,theyremaindeeplyresonantwithvoters.Paradoxically
(andcontrarytotheclaimsofterm‐limitproponents)theadoptionoftermlimits
3
canweakenthelegislature’sabilitytoserveitspurposeinachecks‐and‐balances
system.TotheextentthatNewYorkCitymusthavetermlimits,itisreasonablethat
theybelessstrictforitslegislativebranchthanitsexecutivebranch.
TheenduringpopularityoftermlimitsinNewYorkCityandnationwide
NewYorkCityvotersapprovedlimitsoftwo,four‐yeartermsforvirtuallyallofits
electedofficialsinacitywideballotmeasureheldin1993,andreaffirmedtheir
supportfortheselimitsbyrejectinga1996ballotproposaltochangethem.As
showninFigure1,recentsupportamongNewYorkersfortermlimitsremains
strong,withsurveysconductedbylocalpollsterstypicallyfinding60to70percent
ofthecity’sresidentsinfavoroflimitsonforthecity’selectedofficials.
Figure1.OpiniononTermLimitsforNYCElectedOfficials,2008‐present
Questionwordingandsourcesfordata:seeAppendix.
QUIN
MARIST
NY1QUIN
QUIN
QUIN
QUIN
QUIN
QUIN
MARIST
NY1
QUIN
QUIN QUINQUIN
QUIN
INFAVOR
OFTERMLIMITS
FORNYCOFFICIALS
OPPOSED
TOTERMLIMITS
FORNYCOFFICIALS
0
20
40
60
80
100
%ofNewYorkers
7/08 1/09 7/09 1/10
4
Inthisregard,NewYorkersaresimilartovotersnationwide,whohavebeen
consistentlyandsubstantiallyinfavoroftermlimitsforCongresssincethemodern
movementfortermlimitsbeganinearnestinthe1990s.AsshowninFigure2,over
thepasttwodecades,Americans’supportfortermlimitshasremainedremarkably
steady—acrossdifferentquestionwordingsandpollsters—atslightlyabove70
percentonaverage.
Figure2.AmericanOpiniononTermLimitsforCongress,1992‐present
Questionwordingandsourcesfordata:seeAppendix.
ANES
ANES
GALLUP
ANES
GALLUP
FOX
FOX
ANES
ANES
GALLUP
ANES
GALLUP
FOX
FOX
INFAVOR
OFTERMLIMITS
FORCONGRESS
OPPOSED
TOTERMLIMITS
FORCONGRESS
0
20
40
60
80
100
%ofAmericans
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Theconsistent,overwhelmingsupportfortermlimitsnationwidesuggeststhat
institutionalrules—notpublicopinion—determinewhethertheyareimplemented
inanyparticularjurisdiction.Forexample,termlimitsontheserviceofmembersof
CongresswouldrequireanamendmenttotheU.S.Constitution—asstatelaws
5
imposingsuchlimitsweredeclaredunconstitutionalandstruckdownbytheU.S.
SupremeCourtinU.S.TermLimitsv.Thornton(1995).Theinstitutionalrule
relevanttotermlimitsinNewYorkCityisNewYorkState’sHomeRuleLaw,which
allowsmunicipalcharterstobeamendedbyvoterinitiative.Giventhepopularity
oftermlimitsamongNewYorkers,thismeansanyfuturemovetoeliminateterm
limitsinNewYorkCitywouldlikelyberolledbackviaacitywideballotmeasure.
Termlimits—inoneformoranother—areprobablyheretostayinNewYorkCity.
NewYorkCity:SuiGeneris
Asdiscussedbelow,mostoftheempiricalscholarshipontermlimitsfocusesonthe
effectsoftermlimitsonstatelegislatures.
1
Asweconsidertheimplicationsofthis
researchforNewYorkCity,itisworthnotingthatthestates—nototherbigcities—
areprobablythemostappropriategroupofjurisdictionsforcomparativepurposes.
AsshowninTable1,ifNewYorkCitywereastate,itsestimatedpopulationof8.4
millionpeoplewouldrankit12
th
onthelistofthenation’smostpopulousstates.
(ThenextlargestcityintheUnitedStates,LosAngeles,wouldbefardownthelistat
number27.Noothercitywouldcrackthetop40.)Furthermore,thescopeofNew
YorkCity’sgovernmentisimmense.Servicessuchaseducation,publicwelfare,
healthandhospitals,corrections,andhighwaysfallundertheaegisofNewYork’s
municipalgovernmenttoadegreethatisunmatchedbyanyotherbigcityinthe
nation.ThusNewYorkCity’s$82billionbudget(itstotalgovernmentexpenditure
1
Thisispartlybecausetermlimitsareactuallyquiteunusualatthemunicipallevel.Arecentsurvey
ofmunicipalgovernmentsbythenonpartisanInternationalCity/CountyManagementAssociation
foundthatonlyninepercentofmunicipalgovernmentsplacetermlimitsontheirchiefelected
officials,andonlyninepercentlimitthetermsoftheircouncilmembers(Moulder2008).
6
in2006,thelatestyearforwhichcomparisondataareavailable)placesitsecondon
thelistofstates.Noothercitycomesclose:thecitywiththenextlargestmunicipal
budgetisagainLosAngeles,withcitywidetotalgovernmentexpendituresof$12
billion.
2
ThustheelectedofficialschargedwithoverseeingtheoperationsofNew
YorkCity’sgovernmenthaveresponsibilitiesattheleveloftheircounterpartsinour
nation’sstatecapitols,ratherthanitscityhalls.
2
SeeU.S.CensusBureau2010(Table446).Theconclusionsdrawnherearesimilarifcalculations
aremadeusing“directexpenditures”insteadof“totalexpenditures.”
7
Table1.NewYorkCityandthe20MostPopulousStates:
Population,TermLimits,andGovernmentExpenditures
StaterankJurisdiction
Population,
2008
(1)
#of
Legislators
(2)
Populationper
Legislator
Totalgov't
expenditure,
2006
($millions)
(3)
Annualgov't
expenditures
per
legislator
($millions)
1 California36,756,666 120306,306 225,317 1,878
2 Texas24,326,974 181134,403 85,514 472
3 NewYork19,490,297 21291,935 142,853 674
4 Florida18,328,340 160114,552 76,142 476
5 Illinois12,901,563 17772,890 55,768 315
6 Pennsylvania12,448,279 25349,203 64,917 257
7 Ohio11,485,910 13287,014 64,929 492
8 Michigan10,003,422 14867,591 53,087 359
9
Georgia9,685,744 23641,041 34,945 148
10 NorthCarolina9,222,414 17054,249 41,108 242
11 NewJersey8,682,661 12072,356 54,073 451
 NewYorkCity 8,363,710 51 163,994 82,454 1,617
12 Virginia7,769,089 14055,493 34,776 248
13 Washington6,549,224 14744,553 33,915 231
14 Arizona6,500,180 9072,224 25,731 286
15 Massachusetts6,497,967 20032,490 39,880 199
16 Indiana6,376,792 15042,512 26,959 180
17 Tennessee6,214,888 13247,082 23,968 182
18 Missouri5,911,605 19730,008 24,335 124
19 Maryland5,633,597 18829,966 28,966 154
20 Wisconsin5,627,967 13242,636 30,125 228

Sourcesfordata:
(1)U.S.CensusBureauestimates(U.S.CensusBureau2010,Table12,Table27).
(2)NationalConferenceofStateLegislatures,2009.(FigureistotalnumberoflegislatorsinstateSenate
andHouse,2008.)
(3)U.S.CensusBureauSurveyofGovernmentFinances,2006(latestdataavailable).(U.S.Census
Bureau,
2010,Table442,Table446).
8
TheEffectsofTermLimits
Themostprominentargumentsputforthbyadvocatesfortermlimitsarethatthey
changethecompositionofourgoverningbodiestomakethemmorerepresentative
ofeverydaycitizensandthattheychangethebehaviorofourelectedofficialsforthe
better.Butincomparingthetrajectoriesofthe15statesthathaveadoptedand
maintainedtermlimitsontheirstatelegislatorswiththosethathavenot,political
scientistshavediscoveredthatmanyofthechangesthatconventionalwisdom
assumesareassociatedwiththeadoptionoftermlimitsdonotactuallycometo
pass.
3

TheCompositionofLegislaturesandtheBehaviorofElectedOfficials
Termlimitshavenotledtotheelectionofmorewomenorracialminoritiesas
legislators,norhavetheybeenassociatedwithelectiontoofficeoflegislatorswho
areyounger,lesswealthy,lessideological,orlesslikelytoalreadybepoliticians
(Bernstein&Chadha2002;Careyetal,2006;Carroll&Jenkins2001).Inthemost
comprehensivestudyoftheeffectsoftermlimitsonstatelegislatorstodate,Carey
andhisco‐authorsfoundthatlimitshaveindeedchangedlegislators’behavior(that
is,howtheyspendtheirtimeandwhattheyconsidertobetheirresponsibilities),
butwhetherthesechangesareimprovementsareunclear.
4
Term‐limitedlegislators
aredecidedlylessfocusedontheirgeographicconstituentsthanthoseinstates
3
Ofthestatescurrentlywithlegislativetermlimitsinplace,thestatewheretheirimpactwasearliest
isMaine(wherelegislatorsbegantobe“termedout”in1996).ThemostrecentisNevada(wherethe
limits’impactbeginsin2010).SeeNationalConferenceofStateLegislatures2009.
4
Theresearchreferredtohereisco‐authoredbyUniversityofRochesterpoliticalscientistRichard
Niemi,whotestifiedbeforetheCharterRevisionCommissionatitshearingontermlimitsinMay
2010.
9
withouttermlimits.Thismeansthattheyspendlesstimesecuringgovernment
projectsandfundsthatbenefitonlytheirdistricts(atransformationconsideredan
improvementbymost)butthattheyalsospendlesstimeprovidingconstituency
service(whichmanywillcountasachangefortheworse).Furthermore,term‐
limitedlegislatorsaremorelikelytoreportthattheycareaboutstatewideconcerns,
whilenon‐term‐limitedofficeholdersaremorelikelytosaytheycareabouttheir
particulardistricts’interests.Nosignificantdifferenceswerefoundintheaverage
levelofelectioneeringefforts(suchasfundraisingandcampaigning)inlegislatures
thatareterm‐limitedcomparedtothosethatarenot(Careyetal2006).
TheEvidenceIsClear:TermLimitsWeakenLegislatures’Power
Thescholarshipdiscussedthusfarontheeffectsoflegislativetermlimitsindicates
thatchangeisminimal,andthatitisdifficulttosaywhetheranychangethatdoes
occurundertermlimitsisanetimprovement.Butwithregardtoonekindof
change,theevidenceisclear:thelegislativebranchlosespowervis‐à‐visthe
executivebranchundertermlimits,evenwhentheyareappliedequallytoboth
branches.Researchbypoliticalscientistshasfoundthattheadoptionoftermlimits
inthestatesistypicallyaccompaniedbyadeclineinthelegislativebranch’spower,
expertise,andoversight.InCalifornia,forexample,Kousser(2005)foundthatterm
limitsnotonlyledtohighturnoveroflegislators.Theywerealsoaccompaniedby
highturnoverinlegislativestaff,andfewerbillswereintroducedandpassedinto
law.Kousser’sconclusionisthattermlimitshave“dismantled”manyofthe
achievementsofthelegislativeprofessionalismmovementthatbeganinthe1960s,
10
whosechiefgoalwastotransformstatelegislaturestofulfilltheirrolesas
independent,competentpolicymakersinstategovernmentsthathadbecome
increasinglycomplexandgreaterinscope.Throughoutthecountry,instateswhere
termlimitshavebeenintroduced,thelegislatureactsmorelikea“rubberstamp”
thanacheckonthegovernor:itmakesfewerchangestothebudgetsproposedby
theexecutivebranch,andknowledgeableobserversreportadeclineinthepowerof
theselegislaturesrelativetothegovernorandthebureaucracy(Kousser2005;
Kurtz,Cain,&Niemi2007).InCareyetal’ssurvey,statelegislatorsinterm‐limited
statesweresignificantlymorelikelytosaythatthegovernorhadpowerover
legislativeoutcomes.Astheywrite,“aftertheaxe[oftermlimits]falls,thesurgein
gubernatorialinfluenceissubstantial”(Careyetal2006:124).Thisresultechoed
earlierfindingsfromasurveyconductedoflegislativeleadersbyPeeryandLittle
(2002).Careyetal’ssurveyalsofoundthatthelegislature’spowerand
effectivenessdeclinedonothermeasuresinterm‐limitedstates.Term‐limited
legislatorsaremorelikelytoreportthatunelectedbureaucratsenjoyinfluencein
theirstates’policy‐makingprocessesthandonon‐term‐limitedlegislators.Majority
partyleadersandcommitteechairs—theverypeoplethelegislaturereliesuponto
gotoe‐to‐toewiththeexecutivebranchanditsstaff—arealsoweakerinterm‐
limitedstates.Inearlierwork,interviewswithlobbyistsinstatecapitalsyielded
similarfindings(Moncrief&Thompson2001).
Insum,theempiricalevidencethattermlimitsweakenthelegislaturevis‐à‐visthe
executiveis“straightforward”(Careyetal,2006:129).Legislaturesinterm‐limited
11
statesplaya“diminishedrole”(Kousser2005:207),andtermlimits“contributetoa
migrationofpowerfromelectedrepresentativestononelectedofficials”(Powell
2007:146).Thisdevelopmentmustbeconsideredasetbackbyanyonewho
believeslegislaturesshouldchecktheauthorityoftheexecutivebranchandoversee
theactivitiesofunelectedbureaucrats.
TheOutsizedResponsibilitiesofNewYorkCityCouncilmembers
AnyconsiderationoftheimplicationsofthisresearchforNewYorkCityshould
beginbyacknowledgingthefactthatinmanyways,membersoftheNewYorkCity
Councilbeargreaterresponsibilitiesthandomoststatelegislators.AsseeninTable
1,comparedtothenation’smostpopulousstates—eachwhichhastwolegislative
houses—thenumberoflegislatorsinNewYorkCitywhoareavailabletoserve
constituentsandoverseethegovernment’sbudgetisstartlinglysmall.Thereare
164,000NewYorkersforeachCityCouncilmember—afigurethatislargerthanthe
population‐to‐legislatorratioforeverystateexceptCalifornia.AndifeachCity
Councilmemberwereresponsibleforoverseeinganequalshareofthecity’sbudget,
theseshares(i.e.,theexpenditure‐to‐legislatorratio)wouldtotalmorethan$1.6
billioneach.Again,thisamountofbudgetaryresponsibilitydwarfsthatfacedby
legislatorsinanystateexceptCalifornia.ThusthetypicalmemberofNewYorkCity
Councilisresponsibleforservingmoreconstituents—andmonitoringmore
governmentprograms—thanthemembersofallbutoneofournation’sfiftystate
12
legislatures.Andthegovernmentofthatstate—California—isroutinelycitedas
amongtheworstinthenationintermsofoverallperformance.
5

Bysimilarmeasures,theNewYorkCityCouncilbearsanimmenseamountof
legislativeresponsibilitycomparedtoothercouncilsinournation’sbigcities.There
arefourbigcitieswithrelativelysmallcitycouncils—Houston,LosAngeles,
Phoenix,andSanDiego—thathaveconstituent‐to‐legislatorratiossimilartoor
greaterinsizethanthatofNewYorkCity.ButnocitycomesclosetomatchingNew
YorkCity’sexpenditure‐to‐legislatorratio:thenextlargestisLosAngeles,whose
ratioisapproximatelyhalfthesize.Ifweconsiderthesetwomeasures—
constituentsperlegislatorandexpendituresperlegislator—asaroughindexof
legislativeresponsibility,wesee(inFigure3)thatNewYorkandLosAngelesarein
aleagueoftheirownwithregardtothecombinedamountofoversightand
constituencyresponsibilitiesbornebymembersoftheircitycouncils.(Notethat
whilethismeasureisrelatedtothesizeofacity’sbudgetanditspopulation,it
capturesaconceptthatisdistinctive.Forexample,Chicago—thecitywiththe
nation’sthirdlargestpopulationandfourthlargestbudget—scoreslowonthis
measureduetotherelativelylargesizeofitscitycouncil(whichhas50members).
5
See,forexample,PewCenterontheStates2008.
13
Figure3.GovernmentOversightandConstituencyResponsibilities
ofCityCouncilMembersinAmerica’sTwentyMostPopulousCities
sourcesfordata:seeAppendix.
ImplicationsofTermLimitsforLegislativeExecutiveRelationsinNewYorkCity
Empiricalworkbypoliticalscientistsshowsdefinitivelythatinthestates—an
appropriatecomparisongroupforacityofthesizeofNewYorkCity—termlimits
weakenthelegislatureinitsrelationshipwiththeexecutivebranch.GiventhatNew
YorkCity’slegislatorsareeachresponsibleforservingmorepeopleandoverseeing
moregovernmentactivitythanjustaboutanystateormunicipallegislatorsinthe
entirecountry,anintuitiveconclusionisthattheeffectoftermlimitsmaybeto
weakentoanevengreaterdegreetheinfluenceofNewYorkCity’slegislature
NewYork,NY
LosAngeles,CA
SanFrancisco,CA
Philadelphia,PA
Memphis,TN
Phoenix,AZ
Detroit,MI
SanAntonio,TX
Austin,TX
SanDiego,CA
Houston,TX
Baltimore,MD
Jacksonville,FL
Dallas,TX
SanJose,CA
Columbus,OH
Chicago,IL
Charlotte,NC
Indianapolis,IN
FortWorth,TX
INCREASING
RESPONSIBILITY
0
500
1,000
1,500
totalcitygovernmentexpenditures
permemberofCityCouncil(millionsofdollars)
0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000
citypopulationpermemberofCityCouncil
14
relativetotheexecutivebranch.Thatis,alltheevidenceandfactssuggestthatthe
experienceofterm‐limitedstatesisnotonlyrelevanttoNewYorkCity—butthat
termlimits’weakeningofCityCouncilmaybeparticularlyexacerbatedbythefact
thatindividualmembersofCouncilareeachresponsibleforsomuchoversightand
somanyconstituents.ManyobserversbelievethatCityCouncilhasdecreasedin
staturevis‐à‐vistheMayorinrecentyears.Thefindingspresentedhereprovide
goodreasontobelievethattermlimitsarepartlytoblame.
ReducingtheDebilitatingEffectsofTermLimitsonCityCouncil
Despitetheseconcerns,termlimitsarelikelynowapermanentaspectofNewYork
City’selectorallandscape.Giventheenduringpopularityoftermlimits—andthe
factthatanyefforttoeliminatethemcanbeoverturnedattheballotbox—itis
reasonabletopresumetermlimitswillcontinuebepresentfortheforeseeable
future.Onewaytoamelioratetheseconditionsistoimposetermlimitsmore
heavilyontheexecutivebranchthanonthelegislativebranch.InthecaseofNew
YorkCity,theobviouschoicewouldbetoreducetheMayor’sservicetoamaximum
oftwo,four‐yeartermswhilekeepingtheCouncilatitscurrentlimitofthree,four‐
yearterms.Ifitweretodoso,NewYorkCitywouldjoinamajorityofournation’s
mostpopulousstatesandseveralofourmostpopulouscitiesinimposingstricter
termlimitsonitsexecutivebranchthanitslegislativebranch.
6
AsshowninTable2,
ofthe20mostpopulousstates,14havelimitsplacedonthenumberoftermsserved
bytheirgovernors,butonlysixhavetermlimitsplacedontheirlegislators.
6
Ofcourse,thisisalsotrueforthefederalgovernment:theConstitutionlimitspresidentstotwo
termsbutplacesnolimitsonthelengthofserviceofmembersofCongress.
15
Table2.TermLimitsinAmerica’sTwentyMostPopulousStates
Notermlimits
Termlimits for
governoronly
Termlimits for
bothlegislature
andgovernor

Illinois Georgia Arizona
Massachusetts Indiana California
NewYork Maryland Florida
Texas New Jersey Michigan
Washington NorthCarolina Missouri
Wisconsin Pennsylvania Ohio
Tennessee
Virginia
Sourcesfordata:CouncilonStateGovernments2007;
NationalConferenceofStateLegislators2009.
Populationbasedon2008Censusestimates(U.S.CensusBureau2010,Table12).
Thepracticeofimposingstrictertermsontheexecutivebranchthanthelegislative
branchislessprevalentamongournation’slargestcities,butitisbynomeans
unusual.AsshowninTable3,ofournation’stwentylargestcities,only13have
termlimitsofanykind.Ofthesecities,threeplacestrictertermlimitsontheir
mayorsthanonmembersoftheircitycouncils.Philadelphiaimposesatwo‐term
limitonitsmayorsbutnolimitwhatsoeveronmembersofitscitycouncil.Los
AngelesandPhoenixeachlimittheirmayorstotwotermsoffouryearswhile
allowingtheircitycouncilmemberstoserveuptothreetermsoffouryears.(Itmay
benocoincidencethatallthreeofthesecitiesrankrelativelyhighonthemeasureof
individuallegislatorresponsibilitydisplayedinFigure3.)ThemovebyLosAngeles
16
toextendtermlimitsforitscitycouncilisquiterecent:thecity’sresidentsapproved
theextensionofaspartofapackageofgovernmentreformsinaballotmeasurethat
passedinNovember2006with59percentofthevote.Themeasurewaswritten
andpromotedbytheL.A.ChamberofCommerceandtheLeagueofWomenVoters
ofLosAngeles,whoarguedthatcouncilmembersneededmoretimeinofficeto
solvethecity’slong‐termproblems(Hymon2006).AcallforasimilarmoveinNew
YorkCityhasbeenmadebyEricLane,whoservedasExecutiveDirectorand
Counseltothe1988and1989NewYorkCityCharterRevisionCommissions(Lane
2004;2010).
Table3.TermLimitsinAmerica’sTwentyMostPopulousCities
Notermlimits
Termlimits for
mayoronly
Termlimits more
strictformayor
thancitycouncil
Termlimits
equallystrictfor
bothmayorand
citycouncil

Baltimore,MD Philadelphia,PA LosAngeles,CA Austin,TX
Charlotte,NC Phoenix,AZ Dallas,TX
Chicago,IL Houston,TX
Columbus,OH Jacksonville,FL
Detroit,MI Memphis,TN
FortWorth,TX NewYork,NY
Indianapolis,IN SanAntonio,TX
SanDiego,CA
SanFrancisco,CA
SanJose,CA
Source:CityofHoustonTermLimitsReviewCommission2010;additionalresearchbyauthor.
Populationbasedon2008Censusestimates(U.S.CensusBureau2010,Table27).
17
CitywideElectedOfficialsandBoroughPresidents
NewYorkCitycurrentlyimposeslimitsofthreetermsoffouryearsonapairof
additionalcitywideelectedofficials—theComptrollerandthePublicAdvocate—as
wellasonitsfiveBoroughPresidents.Therearedifferingviewsaboutwhetherthe
functionsoftheseofficialsaremoreakintothatofanexecutive(whocarriesoutthe
day‐to‐dayoperationsofgovernment)orthatofalegislature(whoseroleistomake
policy,serveasaconduitforconstituencyconcerns,andconductoversight).The
difficultyisthatthefunctionsofalloftheseofficialsareamixtureofbothroles.The
Comptroller,PublicAdvocateandBoroughPresidentsappointstaffandhave
executiveauthority.Buttoonedegreeoranother,alloftheseofficesalsohave
oversightfunctions(particularlytheComptrollerandPublicAdvocate)and
constituencyservicefunctions(particularlytheBoroughPresidents).Inthissense,
theydoserve—likeCityCouncil—asdemocraticchecksonthepoweroftheMayor.
ThusastheCharterReviewCommissiondeliberatesoverwhethertoproposethat
thelimitsontheserviceoftheseofficialsbechanged,itmightfirstconsiderwhichof
thesefunctions—executiveorlegislative,operationsoroversight—bestdescribes
theroleseachofthemplayinNewYorkCity’ssystemofgovernment.Totheextent
thatanofficialisconsideredtohavemoreofanexecutive(oroperations)function,
thereasoningsetforwardinthisreportsuggeststhatlimitsonthatofficial’sservice
shouldbemorestrictthanthosedeterminedtohavemoreofalegislative(or
oversight)function.
18
Conclusion
ThechallengesfacedbytheCityCouncilarebiggerthanthosefacedbylegislatorsin
almosteverystateinthenation.Alawthatmandatesthatthebodyriditselfof
accumulatedexpertiseatregularintervalsinevitablymakesthischallengeeven
greater.TermlimitshaveexacerbatedtherelativedisadvantagefacedbyCity
CouncilinitsrelationshipwiththeMayor.ManyNewYorkers—including,
ironically,someofthestrongestproponentsoftermlimits—agreethatthepowerof
theexecutivebranchhasgrowninrecentyearsattheexpenseofCityCouncil.Term
limitsareonereasonwhythisisso.Althoughitwascertainlynotapopularmove,it
islikelythattheextensionin2008ofthenumberoftermsthatmaybeservedby
membersofCityCouncilfromtwotothreehashelpedreducethedisadvantagesat
whichCouncilfindsitselfrelativetotheexecutivebranch.Itincreasedtheamount
oftimethatCouncilmembershavetobuildrelationshipswithoneanotherandtheir
constituents.AnditallowedCouncilmemberstoacquiretheexperienceneededto
becomeexpertsonspecificaspectsoflocalpolicy.
TheappealoftermlimitsinNewYorkCityisasstrongasitisanywhereinthe
country.Giventhispopularity—andtheinstitutionalrulesmakingitpossibleto
changetheCharterviavoterinitiative—termlimitsonNewYorkCityelected
officialsarelikelytoexist(insomeform)fortheforeseeablefuture.Byputtinga
proposalbeforethevotersthatallowsmembersofCounciltoservemoretermsthan
theMayor,the2010CharterRevisionCommissionhastheopportunitytoeducate
NewYorkCity’sresidentsabouttheeffectsoftermlimitsandfinallysettleadebate
19
thathasconfused,angered,andalienatedvoters.Mostimportant,suchachangewill
helprestorethebalanceofpowerbetweenNewYorkCity’sexecutiveandlegislative
branchestoitsproperplace.
20
REFERENCES
Bernstein,RobertA.andAnitaChadha.2002.“TheEffectsofTermLimitson
Representation:WhySoFewWomen?”InTheTestofTime:Copingwith
LegislativeTermLimits,ed.RickFarmer,JohnDavidRauschandJohnC.
Green.Lexington,MA:LexingtonBooks.
Carey,JohnM.,RichardG.Niemi,LyndaW.Powell,andGaryF.Moncrief.2006.“The
EffectsofTermLimitsonStateLegislatures:ANewSurveyofthe50States.”
LegislativeStudiesQuarterly31(1):105‐134.
Carroll,SusanandKristaJenkins.2001.“UnrealizedOpportunity?TermLimitsand
theRepresentationofWomeninStateLegislatures.”Women&Politics23:1‐
30.
CityofHoustonTermLimitsReviewCommission.2010.“TermLimitsPractices:
Listingof33MostPopulousCities.”http://www.houstontx.gov/termlimits/
(accessedJune24,2010).
Hymon,Steve.2006.“EastingofTermLimitsinL.A.ReversesaTrend.”LosAngeles
Times,November9.
Kousser,Thad.2005.TermLimitsandtheDismantlingofStateLegislative
Professionalism.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Kurtz,KarlT.,BruceCain,andRichardG.Niemi,eds.InstitutionalChangein
AmericanPolitics:TheCaseofTermLimits.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichigan
Press,2007.
Lane,Eric.2004.“TheImpactofTermLimitsonLawmakingintheCityofNew
York.”ElectionLawJournal3(4):670‐684.
Lane,Eric.2010.“ForCharter,It’sAllintheTiming.”Crain’sNewYork.June6.
Moncrief,GaryandJoelA.Thompson.2001.“OntheOutsideLookingIn:Lobbyists’
PerspectivesontheEffectsofStateLegislativeTermLimits.”StatePolitics
andPolicyQuarterly1:394‐411.
Moulder,EvelinaR.2008.“MunicipalFormofGovernment:TrendsinStructure,
Responsibility,andComposition.”Chapter5inTheMunicipalYearBook
2008.Washington,DC:InternationalCity/CountyManagementAssociation.
NationalConferenceofStateLegislators.2009.“TheTermLimitedStates.”
HUhttp://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/about/states.htmUH(accessedJune
23,2010).
21
Peery,GeorgeandThomasH.Little.2002.“LeadingWhentheBellTolls:
PerceptionsofPoweramongTermedandUntermedLeaders.”InTheTestof
Time:CopingwithLegislativeTermLimits,ed.RickFarmer,JohnDavid
RauschandJohnC.Green.Lexington,MA:LexingtonBooks.
PewCenterontheStates.2008.“GradingtheStates2008.”
HUhttp://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/gpp_report_card.aspxUH ( (accessedJune
23,2010).
Powell,RichardJ.2007.“Executive‐LegislativeRelations.”InInstitutionalChange
inAmericanPolitics:TheCaseofTermLimits,ed.KarlT.Kurtz,,BruceCain,
andRichardG.Niemi.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress.
U.S.CensusBureau.2010.StatisticalAbstractoftheUnitedStates,2010.
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/(accessedJune24,2010).
22
APPENDIX
QuestionwordingandsourcesfordatainFigure1
Marist
Questionwording:“Currently,thereisaneightyeartermlimitforallelectedNewYorkCity
officialswhichmeanstheymaynotrunforre‐electionafterservingeightyears.Overall,do
youfavororopposetermlimitsforelectedofficialsinNewYorkCity?”
Source:MaristCollegeInstituteforPublicOpinion,2008.“IstheThirdTermaCharm?
MayorMichaelBloomberg’sBidforRe‐election.”October2.
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp‐content/misc/nycpolls/NYC081001.pdf
(accessedJune
23,2010).
NY1
Questionwording:“Generallyspeaking,doyoufavororopposesettinglimitsonthenumber
ofyearscityelectedofficialscanholdoffice?”
Source:NY1News,2008.“NY1NewsPoll:MostNYersWantPublicToVoteOnTerm
Limits.”October17.http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/87361/ny1‐baruch‐poll‐‐
most‐nyers‐want‐public‐to‐vote‐on‐term‐limits/(accessedJune23,2010).
Quinnipiac
Questionwording:“Generallyspeaking,doyoufavororopposesettinglimitsonthe
numberofyearselectedofficialscanholdoffice?”
Source:QuinnipiacUniversityPollingInstitute,2010.“NewYorkersNixFourthTermFor
MayorBloomberg,QuinnipiacUniversityPollFinds;VotersWantMayor5‐1toLead
GroundZeroRenewal.”March23.
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1302.xml?ReleaseID=1435
(accessedJune23,2010).
23
QuestionwordingandsourcesfordatainFigure2
AmericanNationalElectionStudies(ANES)
Questionwording:“AlawhasbeenproposedthatwouldlimitmembersofCongresstono
morethan12consecutiveyearsofserviceinthatoffice.Doyoufavororopposesuchalaw?”
Source:ANESCumulativeFile,2005.VariableVCF0840.AvailableattheSurveyData
Archive,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley.http://sda.berkeley.edu/cgi‐
bin/hsda?harcsda+nes2004caccessedJune23,2010).
FoxNews
Questionwording:“Doyoufavororopposelimitingthenumberoftermsmembersofthe
U.S.SenateandHouseofRepresentatives,includingyourownsenatorsandrepresentatives,
canserve?”
Source:AngusReidGlobalMonitor,2009.“ManyAmericansWantTermLimitsin
Congress.”March17.http://www.angus‐
reid.com/polls/view/32999/many_americans_want_term_limits_in_congress(accessed
June23,2010).
Gallup
Questionwording:“Supposethatonelectiondaythisyearyoucouldvoteonkeyissuesas
wellascandidates.Pleasetellmewhetheryouwouldvotefororagainsteachoneofthe
followingpropositions:Wouldyouvotefororagainstaconstitutionalamendmenttolimit
thenumberoftermswhichmembersofCongressandtheU.S.Senatecanserve?”
Source:Pollingreport.com,2010.“Congress:MiscellaneousQuestions.”
http://pollingreport.com/congress.htm#misc
(accessedJune23,2010).
SourcesfordatainFigure3
CityGovernmentExpenditures
:U.S.CensusBureauestimatesfor2006(U.S.CensusBureau
2010,Table446).
CityPopulation
:U.S.CensusBureauestimatesfor2008(U.S.CensusBureau2010,Table
27).
Numberofmembersofcitycouncils
:CityofHoustonTermLimitsReviewCommission
2010.