APA RESOURCE DOCUMENT ON PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DEATH

Council on Psychiatry and Law

(Task Force: Stuart Anfang (chair), Richard Bonnie, Rebecca Brendel, Donna Chen,

Vivek Datta, Tanuja Gandhi, Steven K. Hoge, Robert Weinstock)

Approved by the Joint Reference Committee, October 2017

The findings, opinions, and conclusions of this report do not necessarily represent the

views of the officers, trustees, or all members of the American Psychiatric Associations.

The views expressed are those of the authors. –APA Operations Manual

INTRODUCTION

The legalization of PAD has a variety of implications for psychiatrists and

psychiatric patients. First, current and recently proposed statutes require patients

to have the capacity to make the decision to die. In some cases, the attending

physician will refer patients of questioned capacity to psychiatrists for consultation.

In addition, recognizing that end-of-life decision-making may be complicated by

depression or other mental impairments, these laws require the attending physician

This is a controversial topic, evoking broad ethical debate within the medical profession, and within society

at large. The language used---ranging from “physician-assisted suicide (PAS)” and “euthanasia” to

“physician-assisted dying” and “death with dignity”---can color the underlying moral and advocacy

perspectives. For the purposes of this document, we will use the term “physician- assisted death (PAD)” in an

effort to find more neutral language.

As used in this document, PAD does not include activities currently considered as acceptable medical

practice within standard palliative and hospice care (i.e., terminal sedation, withdrawal of life support, DNR

orders).

Over the past two decades, a number of US states have enacted statutes

legalizing the practice of physician-assisted death (PAD).

In 1997, Oregon passed

the first statute that legalized PAD. Washington (2008), Vermont (2013), California

(2015), and Colorado (2016) have followed suit. In addition, a state court ruling in

Montana legalized PAD in 2009. In 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled PAD

to be legal and the Canadian Parliament subsequently enacted a law to implement

PAD. In February 2017, PAD was legalized in the District of Columbia. Legalization

of PAD has been proposed in about half of all states in recent years (for details, see

www.deathwithdignity.org). There appears to be a broad movement to consider

legalization of PAD that may lead to legislation in other states. In the United States,

PAD statutes have been restricted to patients with terminal illness, typically defined

as an illness that is irreversible and likely to lead to death within six months.

Internationally, countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg have extended PAD to non-

terminally ill patients.

to evaluate patients with suspected mental disorders and, when indicated, refer

patients for psychiatric assessment.

The American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics has taken

the position that PAD “is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as

healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal

risks.” (Opinion 2.211, issued June 1994; reissued in 2016 as Opinion 5.17, available

at https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-

ethics-chapter-5.pdf). APA members are bound by the AMA Principles of Medical

Ethics (Chapter 7, Section 1 of the Bylaws of the APA, May 2003). The American

College of Physicians has also taken a position against the legalization of PAD (ACP

Ethics Manual, Sixth Edition, 2012 available at https://www.acponline.org/clinical-

information/ethics-and-professionalism/acp-ethics-manual-sixth-edition). In

December 2016, the APA adopted a position statement on medical euthanasia

holding “that a psychiatrist should not prescribe or administer any intervention to a

non-terminally ill person for the purpose of causing death.”

In view of these developments, this Resource Document was developed to

provide background and relevant information to APA members regarding PAD. As

policymakers consider proposed PAD laws, APA members, state associations, and

district branches will likely play an important role in the legislative process.

This resource document provides a summary of the current legal status of

PAD in North America, followed by a review of the reported experience to date in

American PAD jurisdictions. We then discuss assessment of decision-making

capacity to choose PAD, and assessment of depression in the context of terminal

illness and requests for PAD.

This resource document should not be interpreted as stating an official APA

position on PAD.

SUMMARY OF CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF PAD IN NORTH AMERICA

As of April 2017, PAD has been legalized in six US states, the District of

Columbia, and Canada. The statutes are summarized below.

- Oregon Death With Dignity Act

- Washington Death With Dignity Act

- California End of Life Option Act

- Vermont Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act

- Canada: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related

amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying)

- Montana effectively legalized PAS through court ruling in Baxter v. Montana

(2009); however, there is little regulatory guidance.

- District of Columbia: Death with Dignity Act

- Colorado: End-of-Life Options Act

Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act serves as a framework for later Acts, which

largely mirror Oregon’s statutory scheme. Some minor differences have emerged.

Eligibility Criteria

PAD statutes consider an individual to be “qualified” to choose to end his or

her own life if he or she meets specified requirements. All five states and the District

of Columbia require that the individual be a capable/competent adult (18 years of

age or older), who is a resident of the state; be determined by medical evaluation as

suffering from a terminal disease; and to have made a voluntary expression of the

desire to die. California further requires the individual to possess both the physical

and mental ability to self-administer the lethal drug.

Canada considers a person eligible for assistance in dying if he or she is 18

years or older; eligible for government-funded health services (or would be eligible,

but for any applicable minimum residency requirement or waiting period); suffering

from a “grievous and irremediable medical condition”; capable of making decisions

regarding his or her health; and has both made a voluntary request for aid in dying,

and given informed consent to receive this aid.

Residency

An individual requesting a drug for PAD must currently be a resident of the

state in which he or she requests the drug. Oregon, Washington, Vermont, District

of Columbia and Colorado require a physician to verify residency (Oregon and

Washington specifically reference the patient’s attending physician, or the doctor

with primary responsibility for the patient’s care). Non-exclusive lists of factors

demonstrating residency are set out by Oregon, Washington, California and

Colorado. These include driver’s license, voting registration and evidence of

property ownership or lease in the state. Only Oregon and California also list the tax

return for most recent year, although this is presumptively acceptable elsewhere

since valid proof is not limited to enumerated items.

In Canada, the primary medical practitioner or nurse practitioner and an

additional practitioner must provide written confirmation of the patient’s residency

and eligibility for government-provided health services.

Terminal Disease

All US states define a “terminal disease” as a medically confirmed disease

which is incurable and irreversible, and which will, within reasonable medical

judgment, produce death within six months. The attending (primary) physician is

responsible for making the initial determination that the patient is suffering from a

terminal disease, and that determination must be confirmed by a consulting

physician who is similarly qualified to make a diagnosis and prognosis of the

patient’s disease. California emphasizes that a consulting physician should be

independent from the attending physician.

Canada utilizes the term “grievous and irremediable medical condition”. One

exists if the person has a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability, and is in

an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; the person is enduring

physical or psychological suffering as a result of the condition, which is intolerable

and cannot be relieved under conditions they feel are acceptable; and their natural

death has become “reasonably foreseeable” (which does not require a prognosis

with any specific length of time). Importantly, the clause regarding psychological

suffering introduces an ambiguity regarding whether physician-assisted suicide

would be permissible for a patient suffering from intractable depression.

Two

medical or nurse practitioners are required to confirm in writing that such a

condition is present.

Decisional Capacity

Oregon, Washington and Vermont utilize nearly identical language to define

capacity to decide to request and use PAD medications. Oregon, Vermont and the

District of Columbia use the term “capable” while Washington uses “competent”.

Colorado specifies “in the opinion of an individual’s attending physician, consulting

physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, the individual has the ability to make and

communicate an informed decision to health care providers.”

A person will be considered capable or competent if, in the opinion of the

attending and/or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, the patient has

the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers,

including communication through people familiar with that patient’s manner of

communicating. In Oregon, Vermont and Washington, the attending physician is

responsible for the initial determination of capacity or competency, and the

consulting physician confirms this determination. In Oregon and the District of

Columbia, a court may be called on to determine competence, but is not required to

do so as a matter of course.

California defines “capacity to make medical decisions” as the patient’s

ability—in the opinion of the attending or consulting physician, psychiatrist or

psychologist—to not only make and communicate health care decisions, but also to

understand the nature, consequences, benefits, risks and alternatives of those

decisions. This determination is made by the attending physician and confirmed by

Another section of the Act states: “9.1 (1) The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Health must, no

later than 180 days after the day on which this Act receives royal assent, initiate one or more independent

reviews of issues relating to requests by mature minors for medical assistance in dying, to advance requests

and to requests where mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition.”

a consulting physician. Canada’s Act does not address decisional capacity aside from

requiring a patient to be “capable” of making health care decisions.

Informed Decision

Each state requires that a patient’s decision to request and ingest life-ending

medication be informed. In all cases, the attending physician must discuss certain

subjects with the patient in order for him or her to be fully informed, and it is this

physician’s responsibility to decide whether the patient is making an informed

decision. These critical subjects for discussion are enumerated in each state statute:

the patient’s medical diagnosis and prognosis, the potential risks and probable

result of taking the medication to be prescribed, and the feasible alternatives to

taking the medication, including hospice care, comfort care and pain control.

California also requires the physician to discuss with the patient the possibility that

he or she may choose to obtain the medication but ultimately not take it.

Vermont includes in its statute a patient “right to information”, which states

that the patient is entitled to receive answers to any specific questions about the

foreseeable risks and benefits of the medication without the physician withholding

any information, and without regard to the purpose of the inquiries. In this way,

Vermont ensures that a physician may provide complete information to the patient

without being “construed to be assisting in or contributing to a patient’s

independent decision” to self-administer the medication.

Canada requires that two medical or nurse practitioners confirm in writing

that the patient wrote and signed his or her request for aid in dying after he or she

was fully informed that he or she has a grievous and irremediable medical condition.

Mental Health Assessments

Oregon, Washington, California, District of Columbia and Colorado direct the

attending or consulting physicians to refer patients for mental health assessment

under specified circumstances. The Oregon, Washington and District of Columbia

statutes require the attending or consulting physician to refer a patient for mental

health assessment if either believes that the patient may be suffering from a

psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment. The

Colorado statute specifies that if an attending or consulting physician does not

believe an individual to be mentally capable of making an informed decision, then

they must be evaluated by a mental health professional. California requires

physicians to refer patients “if there are indications of a mental disorder”, and is not

restricted to only patients with evidence of impairment. All five jurisdictions

emphasize that no medication to end life shall be prescribed until a professional

determines that the patient is not suffering from a disorder causing impaired

judgment.

Vermont’s statute places less emphasis on mental health assessments. It

simply states that before a prescription is written, a physician must either verify

that the patient’s judgment is not impaired or refer him or her to a psychiatrist,

psychologist or clinical social worker for confirmation that his or her judgment is

not impaired. Canada’s law does not address mental health assessments.

Legal Requirements for Requests

All five states and the District of Columbia require an oral and a written

request for the prescription, and a subsequent reiteration of the oral request.

Written requests must be signed and dated by the patient and witnessed by at least

two individuals attesting that to the best of their knowledge, the patient is capable,

acting voluntarily and not under coercive pressure to request the medication.

California’s language diverges slightly, requiring attestation of knowledge that the

patient is of sound mind and not under duress, fraud or undue influence.

In all five states and the District of Columbia, at least one of the two

witnesses to the patient’s written request must not be what Vermont calls an

“interested person”—the witness cannot be a relative; entitled to a portion of the

patient’s estate under will or law; the patient’s physician; or the owner, operator or

an employee of the health care facility in which the patient is receiving care. Only

Vermont specifies that the witnesses must be at least 18 years of age. Oregon and

the District of Columbia require that if the patient is in a long-term care facility, one

witness shall be an individual designated by the facility and having qualifications

specified by rule by the Department of Human Services.

Each state directs the attending physician to offer the patient the right to

withdraw or rescind his or her request at any time and in any manner, regardless of

his or her mental state. This is a right which does not lapse. The offer to rescind

must be reiterated after the patient’s second oral request for the prescription.

Canada requires a written request, signed and dated by either the informed

patient—or, if the patient is unable to sign, by another person on the patient’s behalf

(so long as that person is 18 years or older, understands the nature of the patient’s

request and does not know or believe he or she stands to benefit financially or

otherwise from the patient’s death). The patient must be informed that he or she

may withdraw the request at any time and in any manner. Immediately before

medication is provided, the patient must again be notified of the opportunity to

withdraw, and subsequently must expressly consent to receiving aid in dying if he

or she chooses to continue with the process.

Waiting periods

Oregon and Washington require that 15 days elapse between the patient’s

initial oral request and the writing of the prescription. Vermont, California, Colorado

and the District of Columbia specify that the 15-day waiting period is measured

from the initial oral request to the time of the reiterated oral request.

With respect to written requests, Oregon and Washington require a 48-hour

waiting period between the patient’s signing of his or her written request and the

writing of the prescription. Vermont’s statute states that the physician must write

the prescription no fewer than 48 hours after the last to occur of the patient’s

written request, his or her second oral request, and the physician’s reiterated offer

of the opportunity to rescind the request. California does not specify the time frame

that must elapse between written request and prescription, but a California patient

must complete and execute a “final attestation” form within 48 hours of scheduled

administration of the drug. The District of Columbia statute states that a written

request must be submitted at least 48 hours before the covered medication may be

prescribed or dispensed and before the patient makes his or her second oral

request.

Canada imposes a 10-day waiting period between the day the patient signed

his or her request and the day medication is provided. Deviation is permitted if the

two medical or nurse practitioners attesting to the patient’s condition and

qualification for aid in dying are of the opinion that the patient’s death, or loss of

capacity to provide informed consent, is imminent—any period shorter than that

10-day window.

Methods of Dispensing Medication

The five states and the District of Columbia have nearly identical provisions

regarding medication dispensation. So long as the attending physician complies with

applicable state licensing and certification requirements, he or she may directly

dispense both the end-of-life prescription and any ancillary medications prescribed

to minimize the patient’s discomfort. Alternatively, with the patient’s consent, the

attending physician may contact and deliver the prescription to a pharmacist, who

will dispense the medication to the attending physician, the patient or an agent of

the patient.

Canada’s Act does not address the precise methods of dispensing aid-in-

dying medications, but it does require the prescribing physician to notify the

dispensing pharmacist of the intended use for the medication prior to dispensation.

Administration of Medication

The Washington, California, Colorado and Vermont statutes contain language

referring to the ultimate “self-administration” of the prescribed drug, which

involves the actual act of ingesting the medication. Although Oregon’s Act lacks

explicit references to self-administration, it contains provisions similar to ones

espoused by Washington and Vermont barring “mercy killing” and “active

euthanasia” by a physician or any other third person. California specifically states

that while a person shall not be subject to liability for assisting a patient in

preparing the aid-in-dying drug, assistance with ingestion is not permitted. The

District of Columbia says that no person shall be liable criminally or civilly for being

present when a qualified patient takes the medication. Canada’s bill explicitly

permits euthanasia by including in the definition of lawful medical assistance in

dying “the administering by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner of a

substance to a person, at their request, that causes their death”.

Additional Responsibilities of Attending Physician

Along with making determinations about the patient’s qualification for PAD

and handling drug requests and dispensation, there are other responsibilities the

attending physician must fulfill. All five states and the District of Columbia require

that before the attending physician writes the prescription, he or she recommends

that the patient notify next of kin (but the Acts also specify that no request for PAD

shall be denied if the patient is unable or refuses to do so), and counsels the patient

of the importance of having someone with them when they ingest the medication

and not doing so in a public place. California requires that the attending physician

counsel the patient about hospice program participation and the importance of

maintaining the drug in a safe and secure location until he or she chooses to ingest

it. The California attending physician is also obligated to obtain confirmation from

the patient outside the presence of other parties that the patient’s request for

medication did not arise from coercion or undue influence.

The attending physician must fulfill state-specific medical record

documentation requirements throughout this process, and sign the patient’s death

report. Canada similarly requires physicians to provide medical records in

accordance with regulations promulgated by the Minister of Health.

REPORTED EXPERIENCE TO DATE IN CURRENT PAD JURISDICTIONS

As of April 2017, published data and literature is available only from Oregon

and Washington, the first two jurisdictions to enact PAD statutes. There is no

published literature or collected data from Montana or Vermont (Vermont

maintains a general informational website:

http://healthvermont.gov/family/end_of_life_care/patient_choice.aspx), likely

reflecting the small population and infrequent use of PAD in those jurisdictions. The

statutes in California, Colorado, the District of Columbia and Canada have only

recently been enacted, so data has yet to emerge from those jurisdictions. Over the

next several years, we can anticipate significant data and published literature to be

available from California (39 million residents) and Canada (36 million residents)

given their large populations.

Reported Experience with PAD in Oregon

In 1997 following a three year process, Oregon adopted the Death with

Dignity Act (DWDA), becoming the first American state to legalize PAD. The DWDA

allows terminally ill Oregon residents to obtain and use prescriptions from their

physician for self-administered lethal medications. Under the Act, ending one’s life

in accordance with the law does not constitute suicide. The DWDA specifically

prohibits euthanasia, where a physician or other person directly administers a

medication to end another’s life. The DWDA mandates that physicians and

pharmacies provide data to the Oregon Health Authority regarding prescriptions for

lethal medications. As a result, Oregon maintains the largest and most

comprehensive database regarding PAD in an American state, publishing annual

statistics

(http://public.health.orgeon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/D

eathwithDignityAct/Documents/year19.pdf).

As of January 2017, nearly 1750 people have received prescriptions written

under the DWDA, and more than 1100 patients have died from ingesting the

medications. From 1998-2013, the number of prescriptions written annually

increased at an average of 12%; however, over the past three years, the number of

prescriptions written increased by more than 30%, indicating a significant increase

in requests under the DWDA. In 2016, 102 physicians provided prescriptions to 204

patients, ultimately resulting in 114 deaths (an additional 19 people died in 2016

ingesting medications prescribed in previous years). More than three quarters

(77%) of the patients requesting PAD had cancer; 8% had amyotrophic lateral

sclerosis (ALS). The three most frequently mentioned end-of-life concerns were:

decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life enjoyable, loss of

autonomy, and loss of dignity.

Few patients have been referred for psychiatric assessment. Between 1998-

2016, a total of 57 patients (5.1%) out of 1127 who completed PAD under DWDA

were referred for psychiatric evaluation; in 2016, 5 patients (3.8%) out of 133 were

referred for evaluation. Oregon does not publish data regarding patients who were

referred for psychiatric evaluation, but were then found ineligible or who did not

ultimately receive a prescription for lethal medication under DWDA.

The Oregon Health Authority maintains a comprehensive website

(http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/D

eathwithDignityAct/Pages/index.aspx) regarding the DWDA, including a detailed

guidebook for health care professionals updated in 2008. As the state with the

longest experience with PAD, Oregon provides the context for most of the published

medical literature describing the experience of American physicians and patients

(Hedberg 2009; Hedberg 2003).

Psychiatrist Linda Ganzini MD has published several articles relating to

physician experience with requests for PAD, including frequency of initial requests

compared to final actual deaths (Ganzini 2000; Ganzini 2016). Ganzini and

colleagues have published the only articles looking at the impact of depression in

Oregon requests for PAD and the attitudes of Oregon psychiatrists. Nearly all (95%)

of the psychiatrists were “confident” that they could determine whether a mental

disorder was impacting the decision for PAD in the context of a long term treatment

relationship, but only 6 per cent were “very confident” that they could make this

assessment in a single evaluation (Ganzini 1996). In a 2008 study of 58 Oregonians

who requested PAD, 18 received lethal prescriptions including three patients who

had met rigorous criteria for major depression. All three died by lethal ingestion

within two months of the research interview, although in one case the depression

was successfully treated before death and in the other two cases the patients denied

that depression was influencing their decision. The authors concluded that the

current practice of DWDA may fail to protect adequately some patients whose

choices are influenced by depression from receiving a lethal prescription,

supporting the need for more active and systematic screening and surveillance for

depression to determine which patients should be referred for further mental health

evaluation (Ganzini 2008). While advocating for systematic screening to determine

need for further expert evaluation, Ganzini has argued against mandatory

psychiatric evaluations for all individuals requesting PAD, citing challenges of true

need, access, cost, and specialized expertise (Ganzini 2014).

Reported Experience with PAD in Washington State

Washington State’s Death with Dignity Act, which came into force in March

2009, allows adult residents in the state with six months or less to live to request

lethal doses of medication from a physician. Importantly, the law states that

medications must not be prescribed to individuals “suffering from a psychiatric or

psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment” (Steinbrook

2008). In cases where there is concern that the patient has impaired judgment due

to a psychiatric disorder, the attending physician who would prescribe the lethal

medication must request a psychiatric or psychological evaluation. Otherwise, no

psychiatric or psychological evaluation is routinely required. Since the law’s

enactment, there has been a steady rise in the number of prescriptions dispensed

for PAD. In 2009, medication was dispensed to 63 individuals, 36 of whom died after

ingesting the prescribed medication. By 2015 this number had risen to 213

individuals who were dispensed medication, 166 of whom died after ingestion of the

medication (Washington State Department of Health data, http://www.doh.was.gov

/portals/1/Documents/Pubs).

Few patients have been referred for psychiatric assessment. The proportion

of those referred has remained roughly stable, at about 4%. Similar to Oregon, three

quarters of the patients completing PAD have cancer, while approximately 10%

have a neurodegenerative disorder.

Under the Washington State statute, attending and consulting physicians

must verify that the patient is competent to make an informed decision before a

prescription for lethal medication is written. The Washington State Psychiatric

Association does not provide any specific guidance for psychiatrists consulted to

evaluate patients’ capacity to participate in Death with Dignity. However, the

Washington State Psychological Association does provide such guidance, which

appears to be aimed at both psychologists and psychiatrists (Washington State

Psychological Association, 2009).

The WSPA guidelines recommend that the evaluating psychiatrist explore the

reason for the request, the patient’s expectations, fears and values, and their

personal assessment of quality of life. They further recommend that the psychiatrist

assess whether the decision seems authentic and in keeping with the patient’s long-

held values. Finally, the guidelines note the importance of distinguishing between a

mental disorder, such as major depression disorder or a cognitive disorder, and the

effects of the terminal illness, its treatment, or normal psychological reactions in the

face of terminal illness.

Washington State collects data on end-of-life concerns of participants, as

reported on the After Death reporting form which is completed by the attending

physician. In 2015, it was reported that 86% of patients were concerned with losing

autonomy, 86% with loss of ability to engage in activities making life enjoyable, 69%

with loss of dignity, 52% with being a burden on family and friends, 49% on losing

control of bodily functions, 35% with inadequate pain control or concern about it, and

25% with the financial implications of treatment. A study of those requesting Death

with Dignity at the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance between 2009 and 2011 found

that 97.2% cited loss of autonomy as a reason for participation (Loggers

2013).

Given the very low frequency of psychiatric evaluations requested, it is hard

to draw clear conclusions. Although the state keeps information regarding all

requests, the identity of the physicians involved is kept confidential. It does appear

that a disproportionate number of evaluations are requested from the consultation-

liaison psychiatrists at the University of Washington Medical Center and the Seattle

Cancer Care Alliance. When the law came into place, the psychiatry department

expected to receive a large number of referrals but, as noted above, psychiatric

evaluation is infrequently sought (personal communication, 2015). The

consultation-liaison service created an informal support system for psychiatrists

involved in these evaluations in order to provide consultation and support for difficult

cases, but in practice, this was hardly used. It was noted that in at least one case, a

patient died while awaiting psychiatric evaluation. In some cases, psychiatric

consultation appeared to be requested when the treating physician did not feel

comfortable with the patient’s request, where there was a history of psychiatric

illness, or where the patient did not wish their family to know (which though

encouraged, is not required by law).

REQUESTS FOR PAD: ASSESSING COMPETENCE

As described above, the six U.S. PAD statutes as well as Canada require that

the individual requesting a lethal prescription be capable of making medical

decisions regarding his or her health.

In order to be capable to request physician

aid-in dying through a lethal prescription, an individual must be able to make and

communicate health care decisions to health care providers. Assistance with

communication may be used. The California statute gives additional guidance

regarding the standard for capacity to include understanding the nature,

consequences, benefits, risks and alternatives of those decisions. The California

statute incorporates elements of the predominant standard for capacity assessment

for medical decision-making (Appelbaum 1988; Appelbaum 2007). Specifically,

decisional capacity for medical decisions requires expression of a preference, a

factual understanding, appreciation, and ability to rationally manipulate

information in coming to a decision. The Oregon statute similarly gives guidance

regarding an “informed decision” based on an appreciation of facts including

diagnosis, prognosis, probable risks and results of taking the prescribed medication,

and alternatives, incorporating key elements of information relevant to informed

consent (Brendel 2007; Weintraub Brendel 2011).

While concepts of capacity and informed consent are generally well

established, the evolution of newer practices with prominent legal and ethical

features, such as PAD, add complexity to these heretofore broadly accepted frames

of reference and were not well established as PAD became legally permissible

(Werth 2000). Specific guidelines regarding the content of capacity determinations

are absent from the Oregon statute. The Task Force to Improve the Care of

Terminally-Ill Oregonians has published a useful guidebook for health care

professionals, including a chapter on mental health consultation (Oregon

Guidebook, 2008). Attending or consulting physicians must refer an individual

seeking a lethal prescription for a mental health evaluation by a psychiatrist or

psychologist if the physician believes that the patient may be suffering from a

mental health disorder or depression causing impaired judgment. The task of the

psychiatric (or psychological) evaluator, then, is to determine whether the patient

has the ability to make and communicate health care decisions.

Amongst individual psychiatrists (and psychologists), there is a divergence of

opinion regarding the ethical permissibility of PAD (Ganzini 1996; Ganzini 2000;

Fenn 1999). Psychiatrists may object to participating in assessments of capacity for

assisted death for conscientious reasons. In addition, forensic psychiatrists who

described themselves as morally opposed to PAD were more likely to employ a

stringent standard for capacity for PAD and more likely to believe that the presence

of depressive symptoms would automatically render a patient lacking in capacity

compared to psychiatrists who did not oppose PAD on ethical grounds (Ganzini

2000). As with all other psychiatric assessments, psychiatrists should be aware of

the potential impact of both transference and counter-transference. Given the

possible “high stakes” outcome of the competence assessment, it is essential that

Washington uses the term competence, rather than capacity, but no substantial difference is apparent.

psychiatrists be aware of their own views regarding PAD and how those views

might bias an evaluation of capacity ---either as overly restrictive or overly

permissive. The Oregon Task Force’s guidelines for capacity assessment specifically

state that mental health professionals with strong personal biases for or against

PAD “should consider declining the consultation.” In addition, if the psychiatrist

perceives another type of conflict, financial or of another nature, the evaluation

should not proceed.

According to the Oregon task force, the mental health consultant has two

roles. The first role, determined by statute, is to assess the patient’s specific capacity

to make the decision to seek PAD. The task force also cites a second role, a

traditional or clinical role, to evaluate the individual for “any remediable sources of

suffering.” This may include discussion of palliative care options, which may be

complementary to curative and life-prolonging treatments. In the process of the

capacity evaluation, consulting psychiatrists must be attuned to both roles. From an

ethical perspective, this dual role is also critical to avoid the psychiatrist from

becoming a gatekeeper for PAD and focus primary involvement with patients on

their roles as healers (Sullivan 1998).

Performing the Capacity Assessment

In terms of the capacity assessment itself, the specific components of the

evaluation are not strictly defined. The Oregon Task Force describes the

components of the evaluation with broad guidance. The resource document

describes a process that will “usually include” record review, discussion with the

referring physician, patient interview and assessment, and collateral interviews

with family, caregivers, and other important persons in the individual’s life.

Collateral information may be critical to the evaluation, but should be obtained in

accordance with established rules governing confidentiality and consent.

Caregivers, especially those working in hospice settings, may be particularly attuned

to fluctuations in mental status, causes, and effective remedies.

The Oregon Task Force recommends that the evaluation focus on assessment

for mental disorder, decision-making capacity, and factors limiting the individual’s

ability to make a decision (specifically, symptoms of mental disorder, coercion, and

knowledge deficits). The focus of the interview, therefore, should include particular

attention to understanding risks and benefits and other possible interventions,

including their likelihood of success. Capacity requires both a factual understanding

and an appreciation of how facts apply to the individual’s own situation (Appelbaum

1988; Appelbaum 2007; Guidebook 2008).

The Task Force reminds psychiatrists to be cognizant of how tiring an

evaluation may be for a terminally ill individual and also the importance of rapport.

Psychiatrists should maximize the patient’s comfort and ability to demonstrate

capacity and also consider the use of standardized instruments and tools. Useful

instruments, according to the Task Force, may include the Geriatric Depression

Scale, the Folstein MMSE, or the Neurobehavioral Cognitive Status Examination.

Ultimately, however, the Task Force concludes that, “In the absence of a mental

disorder, evidence of coercion, or knowledge deficits, most patients will qualify for

the Oregon Act.” Finally, according to the Oregon task force, when a psychiatrist

cannot make a determination of capacity with confidence, options include

recommending treatment, re-evaluations, and/or referral for additional capacity

assessment.

In contrast to the general guidance offered by the Oregon Task Force, Werth

and colleagues propose a more exhaustive set of guidelines for evaluation of

capacity for PAD (Werth 2000). Much of the structure of the evaluation is consistent

with the Oregon Task Force (e.g. record review, consultation, collateral information,

use of objective assessment instruments, clinical interview and diagnostic

assessment, and assessment of decisional capacity elements). However, Werth and

colleagues also advocate for an in-depth exploration of the PAD decision in the

context of the individual’s perceived quality of life, stated and implied reasons for

requesting PAD, and an inquiry into how the decision fits into the person’s value

structure and would affect others. The strength of the depth of this approach is

based on the notion that it is expected to prevent erroneous granting of lethal

prescriptions to incapacitated individuals. However, the specificity and depth of the

requirements may have the opposite effect of limiting the availability of PAD to

those who are held to too high a standard of capacity and meet adequate safeguards

for self-determination by PAD.

In response to what may be perceived as the overly-demanding nature of the

Werth guidelines, Stewart and colleagues (Stewart 2011) advocated for a standard

essentially consistent with that developed by the Oregon Task Force. This approach

draws largely on the Appelbaum-Grisso standard for capacity as well as the common

law tradition of informed consent, specifically, that patients must be able to

comprehend and retain information about the decision for PAD, to weigh the

information and reach a decision, express a consistent preference over time,

communicate choice, and be free from undue influence.

Ultimately, as PAD practice evolves, psychiatrists can play a key role in

elucidating the capacity assessment process and methods of developing rapport and

engaging with dying patients.

REQUESTS FOR PAD: ASSESSING DEPRESSION

While most individuals requesting PAD do not carry a diagnosis of

depression, studies suggest that between a quarter to a half of requests came from

individuals with depression (Wilson 2016; Levene 2011; Ganzini 2008). Presumably

most of these individuals were nevertheless considered by their attending and

consultant physicians to have decisional capacity without impaired judgment since

only 5% of cases in Oregon and 4% in Washington were referred for a mental health

evaluation. It is not clear if the rates of referral should be higher, or if these rates are

appropriate since these states’ statutes only require evaluation by a mental health

professional if there is concern that symptoms impair judgment. Nevertheless, given

what is known about under-recognition and under-treatment of depression

generally, more involvement with a mental health professional would likely be

beneficial.

As noted previously, approximately 75% of the individuals accessing PAD in

Oregon and Washington had cancer and approximately 10% had neurodegenerative

disease, primarily ALS. Similar patterns are seen in other localities with different

regulatory structures (Emanuel 2016). It is likely that similar clinical patterns might

emerge in other states that legalize PAD. Therefore, understanding features of a

desire for PAD, and more broadly a desire for hastened death, in these groups of

individuals in particular will become important. Psychiatrists who perform mental

health assessments for PAD will need to be familiar with the presentation of

depression in the relevant patient populations.

While PAD accounts for a relatively small proportion of deaths (less than

0.4% of all deaths in both Oregon and Washington in 2015) and requests for PAD

are relatively rare even in localities where PAD is legal, a more general desire for

death

is not uncommon in patients with advanced life-threatening illness. Wilson

and colleagues note that although studies range quite a bit in quality, researchers

have found that between 11-55% of patients in palliative care settings experience

such a desire at least transiently, and from 3-20% report a more pervasive and

apparently sincere wish to die (Wilson 2016). Hudson and colleagues note that

empirical studies of patients with advanced cancer found that approximately 8-15%

of patients express an interest or a desire for hastened death and that studies with

less rigorous approaches report higher levels (Hudson 2006). In two separate

studies, Rabkin and colleagues found that 19% of individuals with ALS expressed a

wish to die (Albert 2005; Rabkin 2015).

Regardless of the prevalence of a desire to die, depression appears to be

highly correlated with it, though not universally present. Wilson and colleagues note

that an association between depression and the desire for death has been found in

every study that has looked at this issue, citing the prevalence of diagnosed

depression among individuals expressing a desire for death has ranged from 47-

80% (Wilson 2016; Periyakoil 2012; Brenne 2013; Rosenfeld 2006; Lloyd-Williams

2003; Mitchell 2008). At the same time, they emphasize that the desire for death is

often surrounded by a broader context of clinically significant psychological distress

and note that studies looking more in depth at how individuals arrive at a desire for

The literature in this area refers to similar concepts with different terminology; for

example, different authors refer to “desire for death”, “desire for hastened death,” “thought

about hastened death,” “wish for death/hastened death” etc. These linguistic and in some

cases conceptual differences likely account for some of the different findings among the

many research studies addressing questions in this area. In this document, we use the

terminology used by the authors in the studies we cite.

death have found different pathways. They conclude that the expression of a desire

for death by a terminally ill patient should raise concern about the presence of

mental health problems, although it is not necessarily diagnostic of active

psychiatric illness (Wilson 2016). A similar conclusion is reached by Rabkin and

colleagues who find that of the 62 patients in their ALS study who expressed a wish

to die (19% of the study participants), only 37% (23 patients) were clinically

depressed. They conclude that a wish to die is not always expressed in the context

of depression and does not necessarily represent psychopathology in patients with

ALS (Rabkin 2015).

Studies focusing in-depth on the wish to hasten death, as opposed to a more

general desire for death, concur. A review of the qualitative studies of patients

expressing a wish to hasten death concludes that such expressions do not

necessarily imply a genuine wish to hasten one’s death, but rather represent a

response to overwhelming emotional distress and carry with them a variety of

potential meanings (Monforte-Royo 2012). They identify six main themes giving

meaning to an expressed wish to hasten death (WTHD) which they suggest should

be taken into consideration when formulating treatment plans: (1) WTHD in

response to physical/psychological/ spiritual suffering, (2) loss of self, (3) fear of

dying, (4) the desire to live but not this way, (5) WTHD as a way of ending suffering,

and (6) WTHD as a kind of control over one’s life (‘having an ace up one’s sleeve just

in case’). Despite this, many studies indicate that depression, hopelessness and a

low sense of spiritual well-being are the strongest predictors of a desire for

hastened death in terminally ill patients (Breitbart 2000; Albert 2005; Rosenfeld

2006; Rodin 2009). Keeping in mind the many potential contributions (including

depression) to a WTHD provides for both better understanding of the context of the

request and better treatment planning.

The complexity of the desire to hasten death and the variable role played by

depression is just one among a variety of contributing factors, including physical

symptoms (either present or foreseen), other forms of psychological distress (e.g.,

hopelessness, fears, etc.), existential suffering (e.g., loss of meaning in life), and

social aspects (e.g. feeling that one is a burden) (Balaguer 2016). While treatment

for depression is effective at reducing the symptoms of depression in these

populations, it is not clear whether treating the depression changes the desire to

hasten death. Some studies suggest a strong correlation between ameliorating

depression and decreased desire to hasten death (Breitbart 2010; Rosenfeld 2006),

while others (conducted by the same research team) do not (Rosenfeld 2014).

Thus, all clinicians working with patients who express a wish for hastened

death should understand the complexity of this phenomenon and can prepare to

respond in a meaningful way to patients’ expressed desire for hastened death,

rather than avoiding it as many do. For example, a 2006 review suggests potential

approaches for health professionals to consider when faced with patients’ desire to

die statements (DTDS) that will enable them to manage the issue with confidence

(Hudson 2006). This review includes sample phrases and questions to use when

responding to a DTDS that are culled from the literature and expert opinion

covering different aspects of these expressed desires, including: (1) current feelings

of fears, (2) suffering distress—physical, spiritual, psychosocial, or existential; (3)

considering suicide, and (4) seeking health professional assistance with hastened

death.

Screening Tools

In light of the high correlation between depression and desire to hasten

death in individuals with advanced illness, screening for depression in these

individuals, and in particular those who express a desire for hastened death and/or

PAD, should be part of any program for providing general medical care for these

individuals. Indeed, though not required by statute, the Oregon Task Force

recommends screening with PHQ-9 though it is not clear how widely this

recommendation is followed. Other screening instruments are also available.

Vodermaier and colleagues provide an extensive review of assessment

instruments used to screen for distress in cancer patients. The definition of distress

includes affective disorders, anxiety disorders and adjustment disorders

(Vodermaier 2009). This paper includes a review of the psychometric properties of

a variety of screening tools with emphasis on their sensitivity and specificity. While

short verbal scales are helpful for quick screening of depression in hospitalized

patients who have difficulty with completing long questionnaires, the longer

questionnaires are valuable in their ability to address multiple domains besides

depression. The authors indicate that a large variety of scales of varying lengths,

including the CES-D, HADS, BDI and GHQ-28 are high quality scales for screening

emotional distress. They also note that while many screening tools focus on

symptoms of depression, screening measures that cover multiple domains are more

valuable because the psychological symptoms in terminally ill patients may vary

considerably from symptoms of depression, anxiety, adjustment disorder to mixed

states. They provide the psychometric properties of ultrashort, short and long

screening tools and discuss the pros and cons of the different instruments.

Some studies indicate that a single question, “Are you depressed?” is an

effective screening tool for depression in palliative care patients (Lloyd-Williams

2003; Chochinov 1997). However, other studies indicate that a two-question

approach that includes one question about ‘depressed mood’ and another about

‘loss of interest’ is more accurate than using either question alone; if using a single

question, the ‘loss of interest’ question is a better screening tool (Mitchell 2008).

However, neither the single ‘loss of interest question’ nor the two question method

had a case-finding accuracy of more than 60% and would thus need to be combined

with a second method with better positive predictive value. This could be a clinical

diagnostic interview or a structured and validated depression scale. The PHQ-9 is

another short screening tool for depression that is widely used in medical settings

and has been studied in the cancer patient population (Fann 2009). Thus, a step-

wise approach of first using a screening tool followed by an assessment using a

validated depression scale would be an effective approach for diagnosing

depression (Mitchell 2012). While the simple verbal questions and the PHQ-9 are

shorter screening tools for depression, a clinician can choose from a variety of

clinical tools with variable length, psychometric properties and strengths based on

the need, clinical setting and objective of use (Vodermaier 2009).

Screening for other mental illnesses could also be accomplished with tools

like PRIME-MD (all of these are tied to DSM-IV diagnoses). Determining an

appropriate instrument for routine screening involves trade-offs between tools of

reasonable length and those with adequate psychometric properties. Computerized

touch screen versions of screening instruments can be used successfully by patients

with advanced illness in hospice care and, when available, touch screen and

autoscoring technology ensures continuity and standardization, reduces costs, and

lightens the workload of clinical personnel (Vodermaier 2009). In any screening

process, a decision has to be made as to the correct balance between sensitivity and

specificity. Given the gravity of a PAD decision, the emphasis may be on sensitivity

to minimize the number of missed cases of depression.

Regardless of which screening tool is chosen, improved outcomes are

dependent on timely referral for treatment and adequate follow-up. Programs that

implement routine screening must have the ability to accommodate referrals for

specialty mental health care when indicated. For example, while all of the following

might result in a positive screen for depression, from a diagnostic and treatment

standpoint, it would be important to differentiate a diagnosis of depression from

somatic symptoms of a medical condition, medication side-effects, a grief reaction

and psychological distress due to the medical condition. Many health systems do not

have the ability to accommodate rapid referrals for specialty mental health care that

may arise from routine screening, thus complicating implementation.

As systems determine whether and how best to move towards routine

screening more generally, clinicians receiving a request from a patient for PAD

might consider certain “red flags” in addition to the typical neuro-vegetative

symptoms of depression when deciding about further evaluation by a mental health

professional. Examples include:

•

Psychological symptoms: including depressed mood, tearfulness, feeling of

helplessness, feeling of hopelessness, social withdrawal or isolation, lack of

interest, feelings of guilt, suicidal ideation, significant anxiety;

•

Somatic concerns/preoccupations which appear beyond what would be

expected from the patient’s physical condition;

•

Uncontrollable, poorly managed or intractable pain;

•

Distress due to loss of bodily function;

•

Feeling of loss of control;

•

Fear of becoming a burden on others;

•

Limited social supports, marital and family conflicts;

•

Functional decline out of proportion to the medical situation;

•

Preoccupation with financial concerns;

•

Sense of therapeutic nihilism, “quickly get it over with”;

•

Lack of participation in or refusal of treatment;

•

Fearful or loss of hope about their future;

•

Dignity related distress; and/or

•

Spiritual distress.

Even when further evaluation may not lead to a diagnosis of depression or

another treatable mental health problem, many of these distressing experiences

could benefit from specific attention by a mental health or palliative care

professional, or in some cases by a case manager or social worker. Sometimes,

clinicians focused on their patients’ medical problems forget that some of their

experiences may not be an inevitable part of their advanced illness and overlook the

possibility that their distress might be alleviated by specialty care.

CONCLUSIONS

This resource document is intended to provide a summary of existing PAD

statutes and states’ experience related to implementation. This information may

prove useful to psychiatrists, APA District Branches, and state psychiatric

organizations in the event that PAD legislation is considered in their jurisdictions.

We also offer a summary of relevant research on the psychiatric assessment of

capacity and of depression in an effort to assist individual psychiatrists who may be

asked to assess patients requesting PAD.

When reviewing this resource document, psychiatrists and policymakers

should note the following limitations of the information summarized:

1. All of the currently published data about the implementation of PAD comes

from Oregon and Washington State. In comparison to many other US states,

these jurisdictions are relatively affluent, white, educated, and culturally

homogenous.

2. The number of terminally ill individuals who have elected to seek out PAD

has been small.

3. In each of those states, a small select group of attending physicians and

psychiatrists has participated in PAD.

4. In those states, referrals to psychiatrists have been relatively uncommon (4-

5%).

It is not known how PAD would be employed in other jurisdictions with more

diverse populations. There are many potential reasons for concern. Terminally ill

patients who are not affluent may be motivated to seek PAD not because they desire

a more humane death, but because they cannot afford end-of-life care, have no

caregivers to provide assistance, or fear burdening family and friends. It is also

likely that among less educated and economically disadvantaged populations

(groups with a higher prevalence of depression and other psychiatric illness), the

frequency of concerns about decision-making capacity may be higher. Moreover, in

more populous states, PAD will involve a larger number of physicians with more

varied approaches to capacity assessment and relevant medical assessments.

Finally, we have little data about psychiatric assessments that lead to

recommendations against PAD due to decisional incapacity or treatable depression.

The small number of psychiatric referrals currently reported raises concerns that

some instances of treatable depression or decisional incapacity are not being

detected.

As our society continues to explore physician-assisted death as a legally

available option, collection and analysis of vital data will be essential. We

recommend that all jurisdictions follow a mandatory data collection model

exemplified by Oregon. Additional information should be collected about patients

referred for mental health assessment, their psychiatric diagnoses, the outcomes of

referral, and subsequent outcomes. Together with well-designed clinical and health

services research studies, this data will be critical to advancing our understanding of

the mental health presentation of patients requesting assisted death and best

practices in localities where the practice is legal.

REFERENCES

Albert SM, Rabkin JG, Del Bene ML, et al: Wish to die in end-stage

ALS. Neurology 2005; 65:68–74

American Medical Association. Code of Medical Ethics (Chicago, 2016).

Antunes B, Mutagh F, Bausewein C, et al: Screening for depression in advanced

disease: psychometric properties, sensitivity, and specificity of two items of the

Palliative Care Outcome Scale (POS). J Pain Symp Management 2015; 49:277-288

Appelbaum PS, Grisso T: Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to Treatment.

New Engl J Med 1988; 319:1635-1638

Appelbaum PS: Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment. New

Engl J Med 2007; 357:1834-1840

Balaguer A, Monforte-Royo C, Porta-Sales J, et al: An International Consensus

Definition of the Wish to Hasten Death and Its Related Factors. PloS One 2016;

11:e0146184

Baxter v. Montana (2009) 224 P. 3d 1211.

Breitbart W, Rosenfeld B, Pessin H, et al: Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for

Hastened Death in Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer. JAMA 2000; 284:2907-11

Breitbart W, Rosenfeld B, Gibson C, et al: Impact of treatment for depression on

desire for hastened death in patients with advanced AIDS. Psychosomatics 2010;

51:98–105

Brendel RW, Schouten RA: Legal concerns in psychosomatic medicine. Psych

Clin North Am 2007; 30:663-676.

Brenne E, Loge JH, Kaasa S, et al: Depressed patients with incurable cancer: which

depressive symptoms do they experience? Palliative and Supportive Care 2013; 11:

491-501

California End of Life Option Act. CMA Legal Counsel resource document. Jan 2016

(http://www.cmanet.org/resource-library/detail/?item=the-california-end-of-life-

option-act)

Chochinov HM, Wilson KG, Enns M, Lander S: Are you depressed? Screening for

depression in the terminally ill. Am J Psychiatry 1997; 154: 674-676

Chochinov HM: Physician-assisted death in Canada. JAMA 2016; 315:253-4.

Duffy OA: The Supreme Court of Canada Ruling on Physician-Assisted Death:

Implications for Psychiatry in Canada. Can J. Psychiatry 2015; 60:591-596

Emanuel E, Onwuteaka-Philipsen B, Urwin J, Cohen J: Attitudes and Practices of

Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States, Canada, and Europe.

JAMA 2016; 316:79-90

Fann JR, Berry DL, Wolpin S, et al: Depression screening using the Patient Health

Questionnaire‐9 administered on a touch screen computer. Psycho-Oncology 2009;

18: 14-22.

Fenn DS, Ganzini L: Attitudes of Oregon psychologists toward physician-assisted

suicide. Prof Psychol Res Pract 1999; 30:235-244.

Ganzini L, Fenn DS, Lee MA, et al: Attitudes of Oregon psychiatrists toward

physician-assisted suicide. Am J Psychiatry 1996; 153:1469-1475

Ganzini L, Leong GB, Fenn DS, et al: Evaluation of competence to consent to assisted

suicide: views of forensic psychiatrists. Am J Psychiatry 2000; 157:595-600

Ganzini L, Nelson HN, Schmidt TA, et al: Physicians’ Experiences with the Oregon

Death with Dignity Act. N Engl J Med 2000; 342: 557-563

Ganzini L, Goy E, Dobscha S: Prevalence of depression and anxiety in patients

requesting physicians’ aid in dying: cross sectional survey. BMJ 2008; 337:a1682

Ganzini L: Psychiatric evaluations for individuals requesting assisted death in

Washington and Oregon should not be mandatory. General Hospital Psychiatry

2014; 36: 10-12

Ganzini L: Legalised Physician-Assisted Death in Oregon. QUT Law Review 2016;

16: 76-83

Gopal A: Physician-assisted suicide: Considering the evidence, existential distress

and an emerging role for psychiatry. JAAPL 2015; 43:183-90

Hedberg K, Hopkins D, Leman R, Kohn M: The 10-Year Experience of Oregon’s

Death with Dignity Act: 1998-2007. J Clin Ethics 2009; 20: 124-132

Hedberg K, Hopkins D, Kohn M: Five Years of Legal Physician-Assisted Suicide in

Oregon. N Engl J Med 2003; 348: 961-964

Hudson P, Kristjanson L, Ashby M, et al: Desire for hastened death in patients with

advanced disease and the evidence base of clinical guidelines: a systematic review.

Palliat Med 2006; 20:693-701

Hudson P, Schofield P, Kelly B, et al: Responding to desire to die statements from

patients with advanced disease: recommendations for health professionals. Palliat

Med 2006; 20:703-10

Levene I, Parker M: Prevalence of depression in granted and refused requests for

euthanasia and assisted suicide: a systematic review. J Med Ethics 2011; 37:205-11

Lloyd-Williams M, Payne S, Reeve J, et al: Thoughts of self-harm and depression as

prognostic factors in palliative care patients. J Affect Dis 2014; 166:324-329

Lloyd-Williams M, Spiller J, Ward J: Which depression screening tools should be

used in palliative care? Palliative Medicine 2003; 17: 40-43

Loggers ET, Starks H, Shannon-Dudley M, et al: Implementing a Death with Dignity

program at a comprehensive cancer center. N Engl J Med 2013; 368:1417-1424

McCormack R, Flechais R: The role of psychiatrists and mental disorders in assisted

dying practices around the world: A review of the legislation and official reports.

Psychosomatics 2012; 53:319-326

Mitchell AJ: Are one or two simple questions sufficient to detect depression in

cancer and palliative care? A Bayesian meta-analysis. Br J Canc 2008; 98: 1934-1943

Mitchell AJ, Meader N, Davies E, et al: Meta-analysis of screening and case finding

tools for depression in cancer: evidence based recommendations for clinical practice

on behalf of the Depression in Cancer Care consensus group. J Affective Disorders

2012; 140: 149-160

Monforte-Royo C, Villavicencio-Chavez C, Tomas-Sabado J, et al: What Lies behind

the Wish to Hasten Death? A Systematic Review and Meta-Ethnography from the

Perspective of Patients. PloS One. 2012; 7:e37117.

Oregon Death with Dignity Act. Oregon Rev. Stat. 127.800-127.995 (1997)

Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A Guidebook for Health Care Professionals

published by the Task Force to Improve the Care of Terminally-Ill Oregonians,

Oregon Health and Sciences University, 2008.

http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/education/continuing-education/center-for-

ethics/ethics-outreach/upload/Oregon-Death-with-Dignity-Act-Guidebook.pdf

Orentlicher D, Pope TM, Rich BA: Clinical Criteria for Physician Aid in Dying. J Palliat

Med 2016; 19: 259–262

Periyakoil VS, Kraemer HC, Noda A: Measuring Grief and Depression in Seriously Ill

Outpatients Using the Palliative Grief Depression Scale. J Palliative Medicine

2012; 15: 1350-1355

Personal communication. Datta V, University of Washington Medical Center

consultation-liaison psychiatry faculty, 2015.

Rabkin J, Goetz R, Factor-Litvak P, et al: Depression and wish to die in a multicenter

cohort of ALS patients. Amyotroph Lateral Scler Frontotemporal Degener 2015;

16:265-73.

Rodin G, Lo C, Mikulincer M, et al: Pathways to distress: the multiple determinants

of depression, hopelessness, and the desire for hastened death in metastatic cancer

patients. Soc Sci Med 2009; 68: 562-569

Rosenfeld B, Breitbart W, Gibson C, et al: Desire for hastened death among patients

with advanced AIDS. Psychosomatics 2006; 47:504–512

Rosenfeld, B, Pessin H, Marziliano A, et al: Does desire for hastened death change in

terminally ill cancer patients? Soc Sci Med 2014: 111: 35-40.

Steinbrook R: Physician Assisted Death – From Oregon to Washington State. N Engl

J Med 2008; 359:2513-2515

Stewart C, Peisah C, Draper B: A test for mental capacity to request assisted suicide. J

Med Ethics 2011; 37:34-39

Sullivan MD, Ganzini L, Younger SJ: Should Psychiatrists Serve as Gatekeepers for

Physician-Assisted Suicide? Hastings Center Report 1998; 28:24-31

Vodermaier A, Linden W, Siu C: Screening for Emotional Distress in Cancer Patients:

A Systematic Review of Assessment Instruments. J Natl Cancer Inst 2009; 101:1464-

88.

Walker-Renshaw B, Finley M: Will the SCC’s decision on physician-assisted death

apply to persons suffering from severe mental illness? Health Law Canada 2016;

36:74-79.

Washington State Death With Dignity Act. RCW 70.245.010

http://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=70.245.010 (accessed 06/30/2016)

Washington State Psychological Association: Washington Death With Dignity Act:

WSPA Guidelines for Mental Health Professionals (2009).

http://endoflifewa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/WSPA-DWD_Guidelines_6-3-

09.pdf (accessed 06/30/2016)

Weintraub Brendel R, Schouten R, Levenson JL: Legal issues. In: Levenson JL, ed.

American psychiatric publishing textbook of psychosomatic medicine:

psychiatric care of the medically ill, 2

ed. Washington, DC: American

Psychiatric Publishing; 2011: 19-32

Werth JL: Mental health professionals and assisted death: perceived ethical

obligations and proposed guidelines for practice. Ethics Behav 1999; 9:159-83

Werth JL, Benjamin GA, Farrenkopf T: Requests for physician-assisted death:

guidelines for assessing mental capacity and impaired judgment. Psychol Public

Policy Law 2000; 6:348-72

Wilson KG, Dalgleish TL, Chochinov HM, et al: Mental disorders and the desire for

death in patients receiving palliative care for cancer. BMJ Support Palliat Care 2016;

6:170-7

ADDITIONAL SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Back A, Starks, H, Hsu C, et al: Clinician-Patient Interactions About Requests for

Physician-Assisted Suicide. Arch Intern Med2002; 162:1257-65

Brendel R, Epstein L, Cassem N: Care at the End of Life. In Stern T, et al. MGH

Comprehensive Clinical Psychiatry, 1

ed, 2008. Chapter 60.

Chochinov, HM, Johnston W, McClement SE, et al: Dignity and distress towards the

end of life across four non-cancer populations. PloS One 2016; 11: e0147607

Jamison S: Factors to Consider Before Participating in a Hastened Death. Psychol

Public Policy Law 2000; 6:416-33

Kolva E, Rosenfeld B, Liu Y: Using Item Response Theory (IRT) to Reduce Patient

Burden When Assessing Desire for Hastened Death. Psychol Assess 2017: 29: 349-

353

Monforte-Royo C, Villavicencio-Chavez C, Tomas-Sabado J, et al: The wish to hasten

death: a review of clinical studies. Psycho-Oncology 2011; 20: 795-804

Ohnsorge K, Gudat H, Rehmann‐Sutter C: Intentions in wishes to die: analysis and a

typology–A report of 30 qualitative case studies of terminally ill cancer patients in

palliative care. Psycho‐Oncology 2014; 23: 1021-1026

Smith K, Harvath T, Goy E, Ganzini L: Predictors of pursuit of physician-assisted

death. J Pain Symptom Manage 2015; 49:555-61

Tiernan E, Casey P, O’Boyle, C, et al: Relations between desire for early death,

depressive symptoms and antidepressant prescribing in terminally ill patients with

cancer. J Royal Soc Med 2002; 95: 386-390

Varghese FT, Kelly B: Countertransference and Assisted Suicide. Issues Law Med

2001; 16: 235-258