The University of New Hampshire Law Review The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 20 Number 2 Article 8
3-1-2022
After the War on Drugs: Challenges Following Decriminalization After the War on Drugs: Challenges Following Decriminalization
Tom Lininger
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Tom Lininger,
After the War on Drugs: Challenges Following Decriminalization,
20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 375
(2022).
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375
Tom Lininger
After the War on Drugs: Challenges Following
Decriminalization
20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 375 (2022)
AUTHOR.
Orlando J. and Marian H. Hollis Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. The author
formerly served by gubernatorial appointment as the chair of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
®
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INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 377
I. OREGON’S DECRIMINALIZATION OF DRUG OFFENSES ................ 379
II. CHALLENGES FOLLOWING DECRIMINALIZATION ..................... 385
A. Logistical Difficulty of Transitioning from Punitive Model to Health Model . 387
B. Problems Experienced by Drug Users Following Decriminalization .......... 394
C. Complications for Enforcement of Remaining Criminal Laws after
Decriminalization of Some Offenses .............................................. 399
D. Need to Codify Protections Against Police Misconduct as Fewer Cases Go to
Court Due to Declining Prosecutions .............................................. 401
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 404
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
377
INTRODUCTION
I appreciate the opportunity to take part in this symposium at the Franklin
Pierce School of Law on October 29, 2021. Thanks to Symposium Editor Cory
Greenleaf and the rest of The University of New Hampshire Law Review staff for inviting
me to make a presentation on your beautiful campus.
I am aware that your region has suffered a great deal of tragedy due to the drug
epidemic.
1
In fact, it was only two months ago that I passed through Concord on
my way to attend the memorial service for a young man who had died of a drug
overdose. I know that advocates in New Hampshire have played a role in the
national conversation about the efficacy and the fairness of the so-called War on
Drugs.
2
I am here today to discuss the experience of my home state, Oregon, which
recently became the first state in the nation to decriminalize possession of “hard
drugs” in certain circumstances.
3
Some commentators have opined that Oregon
has ended its War on Drugs.
4
While that characterization is perhaps unduly facile,
1
Casey Leins, New Hampshire: Ground Zero for Opioids, U.S. News & World Rep. (June 28, 2017,
4:57 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-06-28/why-new-hampshire-
has-one-of-the-highest-rates-of-opioid-related-deaths (“Though other New England states such
as Vermont and Maine have seen spikes in opioid-related deaths, the granite state ranks No. 2 in
the nation, behind West Virginia, for the number of opioid-related deaths relative to its
population.”).
2
See, e.g., Ryan Fowler, Ryan Fowler: New Hampshire Casualties of the War on Drugs, Concord
Monitor (Apr. 14, 2018, 12:20 AM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/The-human-cost-of-the-
war-on-drugs-16841617 (urging an end to drug prohibition); Behzad Mirashem, N.H. Takes Stock of
“The War on Drugs”, NHPR.com (May 24, 2017, 7:26 AM), https://www.nhpr.org/the-exchange/
2017-05-24/n-h-takes-stock-of-the-war-on-drugs [https://perma.cc/7SJZ-WHEQ] (discussing
both human cost and due process cost of War on Drugs). The New Hampshire authors taking part
in this symposium are presenting cogent critiques of the drug war.
3
Andrew Selsky, Oregon First State to Decriminalize Possession of Drugs, L.A. Times (Feb. 1,
2021, 3:04 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-02-01/oregon-1st-state-to-
decriminalize-possession-of-drugs [https://perma.cc/G49N-G7VG]. For the specific provisions
of Ballot Measure 110, approved by Oregon voters in November 2020, see infra Section I.
4
E.g., German Lopez, America’s War on Drugs Has Failed. Oregon Is Showing a Way Out, Vox
(Nov. 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/21552710/oregon-drug-
decriminalization-marijuana-legalization [https://perma.cc/LEA2-YNSF] (“Oregon’s voters have
forced significant reforms to end the war on drugs”); The Times Editorial Board, Editorial: Oregon
Voted to End the War on Drugs. California Should Watch and Learn, L.A. Times (Nov. 25, 2020,
3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-11-25/oregon-decriminalize-drugs
[https://perma.cc/RNH4-LCBE] (describing Oregon as “the first state to exit the nation’s long war
on drugs”); Kristian Foden-Vencil, Oregon Takes a Sharp Turn Away from the War on Drugs as Measure
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it would be accurate to say that Oregon has repudiated its reliance on the traditional
criminal justice system as the primary means of addressing low-level violations of
drug laws. Other jurisdictions are considering whether, and to what extent, they
should emulate Oregon’s approach.
5
My focus today is on challenges following decriminalization in Oregon. Four
categories of challenges are particularly noteworthy: 1) the logistical difficulty of
transitioning from a punitive model to a health model; 2) the harms that drug users
continue to experience after decriminalization; 3) the complications for
enforcement of remaining criminal laws following decriminalization of some
offenses; and 4) the need to codify protections against police misconduct when the
lack of criminal prosecution reduces officers’ incentives to comply with the Fourth
Amendment (because the sanction of excluding evidence no longer seems
consequential).
6
I need to be clear that I am not taking a position on the merits of
decriminalization. I respect advocates on both sides of this debate. Given the page
limits for a symposium piece, the most I can hope to accomplish here is to flag
certain issues that deserve attention when states or localities consider the possibility
of adopting decriminalization measures.
7
110 Kicks In, OPB (Feb. 1, 2021, 9:01 AM), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/02/02/oregon-takes-
turn-away-from-war-on-drugs-as-measure-110-kicks-in/ [https://perma.cc/FNM3-43NR].
5
Sophie Quinton, Oregon’s Drug Decriminalization May Spread, Despite Unclear Results,
Pewtrusts (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2021/11/03/oregons-drug-decriminalization-may-spread-despite-unclear-results
[https://perma.cc/CEG8-G6LX] (“Democratic lawmakers in Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island
and Vermont all proposed decriminalization bills this year”); The Times Editorial Board, supra
note 4 (“California and other states would be wise to watch and learn what goes right, or wrong,
in Oregon”); Tatiana Parafiniuk-Talesnick, Starting Monday, Oregon Spearheading Drug
Decriminalization: Here’s What You Need to Know, Eugene Register-Guard (Jan. 31, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.registerguard.com/story/news/2021/01/31/faq-measure-110-goes-into-effect-feb-1-
need-know-drug-decriminalization/4235674001/ [https://perma.cc/Y8DA-4AUQ]
(“Ballot Measure 110 goes into effect Feb. 1, and all eyes are turned to Oregon as it embarks on
being the first state in the nation to decriminalize the personal possession of hard drugs.”).
6
For a more thorough discussion of these four challenges, see infra Section II.
7
Cities and counties, as political subdivisions of states, generally cannot redefine offenses and
thereby decriminalize conduct that constitutes a crime under state law, but cities and counties
can change enforcement priorities in a manner that amounts to de facto decriminalization. See,
e.g., Justin Jouvenal, No Charges for Personal Drug Possession: Seattle’s Bold Gamble to Bring ‘Peace” After
The War on Drugs, Wash. Post (June 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/no-charges-for-personal-drug-possession-seattles-bold-gamble-to-bring-peace-after-
the-war-on-drugs/2019/06/11/69a7bb46-7285-11e9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7M27-YVNV] (noting that, late last year, prosecutors in King County, which
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
379
One other point needs emphasis at the outset. There is no place for
perfectionism in the evaluation of drug policy. Most of us would agree that the War
on Drugs has failed in several important respects. With this troubled history as a
baseline, it is unreasonable to expect that the next iteration of drug policy will be
flawless. A more reasonable expectation is that states will experiment with different
approaches that depart from the War on Drugs, and over time the incremental
adjustment of these approaches will hopefully come closer to an optimal drug
policy.
I.
OREGON’S DECRIMINALIZATION OF DRUG OFFENSES
Liberals and conservatives in Oregon do not agree on much, but substantial
constituencies on both sides agree that they do not want the government to dictate
what substances they must or must not put in their bodies. Whether the substances
at issue are fluoride,
8
vaccines,
9
or even suicide drugs,
10
a large segment of Oregon’s
encompasses Seattle prosecutors, “became the first in the nation to stop charging people for
possessing small amounts of drugs heroin, meth and crack included in virtually all cases.”).
8
A significant number of Oregon communities have decided against fluoridating their public
water supplies. Saerom Yoo, Oregon Ranks in Bottom Three in Fluoridated Water, Statesman J. (Apr.
29, 2015, 8:39 PM), https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/health/2015/04/29/oregon-
ranks-bottom-three-fluoridated-water/26618785/ [https://perma.cc/YK7K-22J4] (noting that
while 75% of all Americans have access to fluoridated water, in Oregon “the figure is about 23
percent among the worst in the country.”).
9
Oregon parents may exempt their children from school vaccination requirements simply by
citing philosophical objections and watching a brief video. The exemption rate in Oregon is very
high. JoNel Aleccia, 95% of Oregon Parents Who Exempt Kids from Vaccinations Use Do-It-Yourself
Option, New Data Shows, OregonLive (Apr. 5, 2019, 3:52 AM), https://www.oregonlive.com/news/
2019/04/95-of-oregon-parents-who-exempt-kids-from-vaccinations-use-do-it-yourself-option-
new-data-shows.html [https://perma.cc/7FU4-VSZN] (indicating that Oregon “has the highest
kindergarten vaccine exemptions rate in the U.S.”). So great is Oregon’s aversion to mandatory
vaccinations that the state has the nation’s only statute forbidding mandatory vaccinations for
health care workers, firefighters and law enforcement personnel. Or. Rev. Stat. § 433.416 (1989);
Fedor Zarkhin, “Why The Hell Did We Do That?”: How Unique Oregon Law Prevents COVID-19 Vaccine
Mandates for Health Care Workers, OregonLive (Jul. 17, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.oregonlive.
com/coronavirus/2021/07/why-the-hell-did-we-do-that-how-unique-oregon-law-prevents-
covid-19-vaccine-mandates-for-health-care-workers.html [https://perma.cc/Y47P-ZF2G]
(“Oregon appears to be the only state in the country that explicitly prohibits health care
organizations from mandating vaccinations for workers.”).
10
In 1996, Oregon voters approved a ballot measure allowing the use of suicide drugs by certain
categories of people suffering from terminal illnesses. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 (2018). This law
was the first of its kind in the United States. Id. (codifying Death with Dignity Act).
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population prefers individual autonomy over government mandates.
11
In addition,
citizens of this state tend to share a distrust of law enforcement, a faith in parents
to set appropriate boundaries for children, and a belief that many lawbreakers who
have not victimized any third party deserve rehabilitation rather than retribution.
12
Oregon’s distinctive political ideology makes it an attractive testing ground for
national advocacy groups seeking to decriminalize recreational drugs.
13
Some of
these groups have spent significant resources on decriminalization campaigns in
Oregon, with the hope that Oregon’s approval of such initiatives might lead other
states to follow suit.
14
Decriminalization in Oregon dates back to the inception of Richard Nixon’s
War on Drugs. In the early 1970s, shortly after Nixon began using his bellicose
metaphor, Oregon became the first state to decriminalize the possession of
marijuana in small quantities.
15
The new law transformed marijuana possession
from a crime to a violation akin to a low-level traffic offense.
16
In 1998, Oregon
became the second state in the United States to approve marijuana for medicinal
11
See, e.g., Taylor Purvis, Debating Death: Religion, Politics, and the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
85 Yale J. Biol. Med. 271, 27284 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3375669/ [https://perma.cc/2RRH-5YQY] (discussing distinctive political culture of Oregon
that enabled passage of a ballot measure authorizing physician-assisted suicide; noting
Oregonians’ strong preference for self-determination and distrust of authority).
12
By contrast, Oregonians have approved a ballot measure establishing significant mandatory
minimum sentences for offenders who commit certain person crimes” (i.e., crimes with victims).
For a list of such offenses and the accompanying penalties, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.700 (2019),
codifying Ballot Measure 11, approved in 1994.
13
According to Judge Eric Bergstrom, the American Bar Association’s Oregon State Judicial
Outreach Liaison, “Oregon was the obvious test state for a decriminalization initiative.” Eric J.
Bergstrom, Oregon’s Drug Decriminalization Law, ABA Highway to Justice, 4 (2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/judicial_division_record/2021-
sum-hwtj.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU67-4JPH].
14
The executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance (“DPA”) characterized the anti-drug
campaign in Oregon as a “domino” in the organization’s national strategy. Selsky, supra note 3
(reporting that DPA hoped its campaign in Oregon would set off a “cascade of other efforts” across
the nation).
15
In 1973, Oregon’s legislature approved House Bill 2936, known as the Oregon
Decriminalization Bill, which decriminalized possession of up to an ounce of marijuana. Noelle
Crombie, Legal Marijuana in Oregon: A Look at the State’s Pot History, OregonLive (Jan. 10, 2019, 12:43
AM), https://www.oregonlive.com/marijuana/2014/11/legal_marijuana_in_oregon_a_lo.html
[https://perma.cc/8XUK-5SGG].
16
Id. (stating that violators received a ticket and paid a small fine).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
381
use.
17
In 2014, Oregon became the third state in the United States to legalize
recreational use of marijuana and to permit widespread manufacture and sale of the
drug,
18
notwithstanding the continuing prohibition of these activities under federal
law.
19
While Oregon’s lenient approach to marijuana may no longer seem so unusual
in the United States today,
20
Oregon reclaimed the national spotlight last fall when
a statewide initiative, Ballot Measure 110, proposed decriminalizing “hard drugs.”
21
The primary architect and backer of Oregon’s campaign was the Drug Policy
Alliance (DPA), based in New York and funded by billionaire George Soros.
22
Oregon’s unique politics seemed to present the best possible opportunity for the
DPA to win approval of a decriminalization statute.
23
Virtually all of the
17
Id. (Oregon voters took this step by approving Ballot Measure 67).
18
Id. Again, Oregon resorted to the initiative process, as had Colorado and Washington in
2012. Oregon’s Ballot Measure 91 allowed citizens to use, posses, grow and sell marijuana,
provided that they paid certain taxes.
19
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 841 (2010) (criminalizing distribution, manufacture, and possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute); 18 U.S.C. § 844 (2004) (criminalizing possession of marijuana
for personal use).
20
See Claire Hansen et al., Where Is Marijuana Legal? A Guide to Marijuana Legalization, U.S. News
& World Report (Jan. 6, 2022, 3:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/articles/where-is-marijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuana-legalization (listing marijuana
laws in different states, and indicating that recreational marijuana is now “legal in 18 states,
Washington, D.C., and Guam”).
21
See generally Oregon Measure 110, Drug Addiction Treatment and Recovery Act (2020),
Oregon votes, http://oregonvotes.org/irr/2020/044text.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NU6-9WB7]
(including the full text of Oregon’s Measure 110 which spans nineteen pages).
22
Kathleen Davis, Oregon Just Decriminalized Small Amounts of All Drugs. Now What?, OPB (Mar.
5, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/03/05/science-friday-oregon-measure-110-
drug-decriminalization/ [https://perma.cc/PC86-JV85] (“Measure 110 was spearheaded by the
Drug Policy Alliance, a New York-based organization focused on reducing criminalization
associated with drug use across the country”); Madison Feller, Oregon Is the First State to
Decriminalize All Drugs. These Women Helped Make It Happen, Elle (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a35463141/oregon-decriminalize-drug-policy-
alliance-women/ [https://perma.cc/MMW5-P2WA] (“The New York-based non-profit wrote the
ballot measure, in partnership with Oregonians”); Poppy Noor, US Drug Laws Set for Sweeping
Overhaul as Voters Choose Decriminalization, The Guardian (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:49 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/04/us-drug-laws-decriminalization-voters-
us-elections [https://perma.cc/8DU7-NY9S] (indicating that DPA “drafted and funded” Measure
110 in Oregon).
23
See Bergstrom, supra note 13, at 4 (quoting DPA statement that “Oregonians have always been
early adopters” of progressive drug laws).
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approximately six million dollars raised in support of Measure 110 came from
sources beyond Oregon, including the DPA and Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg.
24
The opponents of the measure only raised $167,000, mostly from in-
state donors.
25
Measure 110 proposed to decriminalize the possession of many drugs up to
certain specified limits. For cocaine, the limit was two grams; for heroin, one gram;
for LSD, forty units; for MDMA (“ecstasy”), one gram or five pills; for oxycodone,
forty pills; and for psylocibin, twelve grams.
26
Below these limits, a violation would
result in a $100 fine, and at or above these limits, Measure 110 classified
noncommercial possession as a misdemeanor offense.
27
Perhaps due to an
oversight in drafting, Measure 110 classified possession of fentanyl as a noncriminal
violation without specifying a maximum quantity, even though this drug ranks
among the deadliest in Oregon.
28
Certain drug offenses remained felonies under
Measure 110, but these were only a fraction of what Oregon law had previously
included on the felony list.
29
24
Oregon Measure 110, Drug Decriminalization and Addiction Treatment Initiative (2020)
Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Measure_110,_Drug_Decriminalization_and_
Addiction_Treatment_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/F4WG-MNXD] (summarizing state
records setting forth total raised by supporters and identifying largest contributors).
25
Id. (indicating total and identifying contributors). Michael Lewis, another author in this
symposium, made a sensible comment that while the proponents’ expenditures exceeded those of
the opponents in the Measure 110 campaign, the proponents’ spending was “a pittance when
compared to the millions, if not billions, of dollars spent in public misinformation about drugs
and the efficacy of the criminal law in response to drug usage, spent by government officials, over
the past century.” Email from Michael Lewis, Adjunct Professor of L., Univ. of N.H. Franklin
Pierce Sch. of L., to author (Nov. 1, 2021) (on file with author).
26
Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, §§ 1117. Sections 1117 are codified at Or. Rev.
Stat. § 475.752 (2021), et seq.
27
See id. § 19.
28
Contra id. §§ 1117. Oregon’s legislature later addressed this issue with a series of
amendments in the summer of 2021. See S.B. 755, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021) (setting forth a
maximum quantity for fentanyl beyond which possession would not be a mere violation).
29
Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, §§ 1117 (removing felony classification for drug
possession under many circumstances, but preserving this classification for, inter alia, certain
drug offenses involving distribution, manufacture, or other commercial activity); see supra text
accompanying note 26; see also Noelle Crombie, Police Issue Few Tickets under Drug Decriminalization
Law; Most People Ignore Court, Hotline, Oregonlive (Oct. 25, 2021, 6:16 AM),
https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2021/10/police-issue-few-tickets-under-new-drug-
decriminalization-law-most-people-ignore-court-hotline.html [https://perma.cc/F83C-8X4P]
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
383
Some provisions of Measure 110 focused on treating drug abuse as a public
health issue rather than a criminal issue. The measure’s title and preambulatory
language emphasized this theme.
30
One way in which Measure 110 sought to
implement a public health approach was by steering violators to drug treatment.
The measure authorized courts to waive fines for violators who called a telephone
hotline and completed a health assessment that could lead to a recommendation of
drug treatment (there was no obligation for the violators actually to seek
treatment).
31
The measure mandated the establishment of centers to provide
screenings.
32
Other provisions in Measure 110 set up a process to provide grants for
treatment centers,
33
but did not necessarily specify a strategy for funding
treatment,
34
and did not mandate an increase in Oregon’s total number of treatment
(noting that Measure 110 “reduced penalties for what were previously felony drug possession cases
involving larger quantities . . . most of these crimes are [now] misdemeanors.”).
30
The authors of Measure 110 gave it an appealing title: “Drug Addiction Treatment and
Recovery Act.” The seven “whereas” clauses at the start of the measure focused primarily on the
benefits of a health-oriented approach to drug addiction, and did not emphasize that the measure
would decriminalize possession of hard drugs such as heroin, methamphetamine and cocaine.
See generally Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21. To be sure, this marketing tactic
heightened the attractiveness of the measure to voters.
31
See id. §§ 2(2)(b), 22.
32
Id. § 2(2) (directing that, grants must go to “Addiction Recovery Centers” that would be open
24 hours a day and would provide screenings and assessments; requiring that such a center exist
in each of Oregon’s “coordinated care organization service area[s].”). Patricia Perlow, district
attorney for one of Oregon’s most populous counties, and Chris Wig, director of the Focus
Treatment Program at Emergency Addition and Behavioral Therapies, strongly criticized
Measure 110’s emphasis on screenings rather than treatment: “All the measure requires is the
creation of 16 centers that provide screenings and referrals, not high-quality, evidence-based
addition treatment. Oregon doesn’t have a shortage of health assessment and referral centers.
Oregon does have a shortage of residential treatment beds.” Patricia Perlow & Chris Wig, Guest
View: Measure 110 Full of False Promises, The Register-Guard (Oct. 9, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.registerguard.com/story/opinion/columns/2020/10/09/measure-110-full-false-
promises/5910832002/ [https://perma.cc/B8RW-XAFT].
33
Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, §§ 2, 5 (establishing grant program for various
purposes including expansion of treatment, and establishing some requirements for eligibility,
while specifying that funding would come from marijuana tax revenue).
34
Eric Westervelt, Oregon’s Pioneering Drug Decriminalization Experiment Is Now Facing the Hard
Test, NPR (June 18, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/18/1007022652/oregons-
pioneering-drug-decriminalization-experiment-is-now-facing-the-hard-test
[https://perma.cc/K5P9-DUG4] (citing concerns raised by critics including Mike Marshall, co-
founder and director of the group Oregon Recovers, that Measure 110 “did not require those funds
to spent in a strategic way to expand capacity for a system that has too few detox beds.”).
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beds.
35
Both sides campaigned zealously prior to the vote on Measure 110 in November
2020. Proponents emphasized that a health-oriented approach to drug addiction
would be more humane than continuation of the failed War on Drugs.
36
In
particular, proponents pointed to Oregon’s high rate of fatal overdoses, and claimed
that Measure 110 would address this problem better than the traditional criminal
justice system could.
37
Proponents argued that the War on Drugs
disproportionately harmed people of color.
38
Opponents, for their part, contended
that decriminalization would increase drug use, compound the problem of
homelessness, exacerbate intoxicated driving, and take away incentives for
successful completion of drug treatment.
39
Some critics claimed that proponents of
Measure 110 were exaggerating its ability to reduce overdoses, because there was no
guarantee that more low-level violators would ever elect to seek health assessments
and/or drug treatment.
40
When the dust cleared after the November 2020 election, the proponents of
drug decriminalization had won an impressive victory. Voters approved Measure
110 by a margin of 58.46% to 41.54%.
41
A similar initiative also prevailed in Oregon’s
November 2020 election: Ballot Measure 109 allowed the therapeutic use of
35
Contra Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, § 2 (setting aside funding for treatment
without mandating an increase in treatment beds); Perlow & Wig, supra note 32 (“Measure 110
would not create a single new treatment bed . . . If Measure 110 were truly about improving access
to treatment, it would have set clear targets for real, quality treatment, like more sobering centers
and detox facilities, [and] more residential treatment beds.”). Perlow and Wig expressed the
further concern that Measure 110 would divert marijuana tax revenue that counties and cities had
been using to fund mental health and addiction services. Id.
36
Oregon allows advocates to post arguments in the online voters’ guide for a small fee, and
these arguments are typical of those that appeared in op-eds, letters to the editor, and paid
advertisements that appeared in various media. See Official 2020 General Election Voters’
Pamphlet 131149 (2020).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 150157.
40
According to Dr. Paul Coehlo, whose practice involves treating patients with pain and
addiction, the $100 fine provided by Measure 110 is not a “financial disincentive of sufficient
magnitude to coax ambivalent or pre-contemplative people into a life of abstinence or long-term
recovery.” Id. at 150. See also Perlow & Wig, supra note 32 (predicting that passage of Measure 110
would actually cause a “spike in overdoses”).
41
Measure 110, Drug Decriminalization, supra note 24 (reporting election results following
official certification).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
385
psylocibin, or “magic mushrooms.”
42
Oregon’s legislature would later make some
adjustments to the new decriminalization regime; these adjustments were possible
because the voter-approved reforms had taken the form of a statutory rather than
constitutional amendments.
43
II.
CHALLENGES FOLLOWING DECRIMINALIZATION
My role in this symposium is to focus on pitfalls that states must navigate if they
choose to decriminalize drug possession. I realize that other participants in the
symposium are advocating for decriminalization, and I will defer to them to lay out
that argument.
At the risk of duplicating the points made by my fellow authors, I do want to
acknowledge briefly the beneficial results achieved by Measure 110. First and
foremost, decriminalization in Oregon has ameliorated the harsh consequences of
criminal punishment for low-level drug violations. Once Measure 110 took effect on
February 1, 2021, arrests for drug possession dropped by 83%.
44
Officers even
showed a reluctance to issue citations for the new categories of violations created by
Measure 110.
45
Police largely retreated from enforcing drug lawsat least those
42
Oregon Measure 109, Psilocybin Mushroom Services Program Initiative (2020),
Ballotopedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Measure_109,_Psilocybin_Mushroom_Services_
Program_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/YL26-MAGA] (summarizing provisions and
reporting that measure prevailed by a margin of 55.75% to 44.25%).
43
See S.B. 755, supra note 28 (making several changes to provisions in Measure 110). For
example, the new law changed the term “Addiction Recovery Center” to Behavioral Health
Resource Network,” revised the procedure for providing state grants, consolidated jurisdiction
over Measure 110 violations in circuit courts rather than municipal or justice courts, and set forth
quantities distinguishing criminal from noncriminal possession of fentanyl.
44
This figure is for the first nine months following the effective date of Measure 110. See
Crombie, supra note 29 (reporting that arrests after implementation of Measure 110 are generally
for possession of “dealer quantities.”). Prior to the passage of Measure 110, the Oregon Criminal
Justice Commission (OCJC) estimated that the law would reduce felony convictions for drug
possession by 1,800 per year and misdemeanor convictions for drug possession by 1,900 per year.
Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, IP 44 Racial and Ethnic Impact Statement, OPB (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.opb.org/pdf/IP44%20-%20REI%20Statement%20Supplement_1602708982790.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AHW6-KXCJ]. OCJC estimated that the total number of arrests for drug
possession would fall from 6,700 to 615 per year. Id. Note that the “IP 44” was the identifier for
the initiative petition that eventually become Measure 110 upon certification of the signatures
collected by the proponents.
45
In the first nine months following the effective date when possession of a small drug quantity
became a violation rather than a crime, police in Oregon only issued a total of 1,280 citations for
drug possession. See Crombie, supra note 29. The numbers were particularly low in Oregon’s three
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involving possession rather than distribution or manufacture of controlled
substances.
46
The reduction of criminal sanctions for this category of lawbreaking
has brought some benefits by reducing both the short-term and long-term
hardships
47
associated with arrest, conviction, and incarceration.
48
These
hardships have been especially burdensome for people of color, who have felt the
brunt of the War on Drugs.
49
The following subsections do not address the successes of Measure 110, but
rather the challenges facing Oregon as it implements decriminalization. By listing
these challenges, I am not necessarily arguing that Measure 110 was a bad idea. I
am just pointing out that work remains to be done in Oregon.
50
Other states
considering Oregon’s example might want to choose different language in their
decriminalization measures so they can deal with these issues more effectively at
the outset.
largest counties. In Multnomah, which includes Portland, police only issued 55 tickets; in
Washington County, Oregon’ second largest, police only issued 34 tickets; and in Clackamas
County, Oregon’ third largest, police only issued five tickets. Id. (concluding that “police agencies
generally haven’t embraced [Measure 110’s] plan” to use citations as a means of steering drug users
to health assessments that might lead to counseling and treatment).
46
See Dirk Vanderhart, Oregon’s Pioneering Drug Law Raises More Questions Than Answers in Early
Months, OPB (Oct. 27, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/10/27/oregon-
pioneering-drug-law-raises-more-questions-than-answers-early-months/
[https://perma.cc/V3Z9-HHJN] (describing overall decline in enforcement of criminal laws
against drug possession since Measure 110 took effect, and indicating that “many officers appear
to be turning their attention elsewhere.”).
47
See IP 44 Racial and Ethnic Impact Statement, supra note 44 (indicating that Measure 110 would
reduce “collateral consequences stemming from criminal justice system involvement” such as
“reduced ability to find employment, reduced access to housing, restrictions on the receipt of
student loans, inability to obtain professional licensure, and others.”). Of course, the
consequences of incarceration include physical suffering, mental trauma, and separation from
loved ones.
48
Even before the passage of Measure 110, conviction for possession of small drug quantities
had rarely resulted in incarceration. In 2017, Oregon had reclassified simple possession of hard
drugs to be a misdemeanor rather than a felony offense, so “fewer people were spending time in
jail for possession.” See Bergstrom, supra note 13, at 5.
49
See IP 44 Racial and Ethnic Impact Statement, supra note 44 (predicting that passage of Measure
110 “will likely lead to significant reductions in racial/ethnic disparities in both convictions and
arrests.”).
50
On this point, there would likely be wide agreement among both proponents and opponents
of Measure 110.
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
387
A. Logistical Difficulty of Transitioning from Punitive Model to Health Model
As noted previously, the main marketing theme for proponents of Measure 110
was the need to replace criminal penalties with a public health approach.
51
A
common refrain was that Oregon “cannot arrest [its] way out of [the drug
epidemic.]”
52
Proponents urged that Oregon should follow the lead of Portugal,
which had reduced fatal overdoses by addressing drug use with medical resources
rather than punishment.
53
This strategy appealed to Oregonians because it seemed
to be more humane and fiscally prudent than continuing the War on Drugs.
Whereas the punitive approach demanded more resources each year while making
little progress toward a long-term solution, a health-oriented approach offered the
hope of curing addiction and thereby reducing public expenditures on drug-related
problems. The year 2020 had set records for overdose deaths, so a medical response
seemed to be more fitting than a police response.
54
All of these considerations led
to predictions that Measure 110 would begin a new era in which health care
professionals rather than police would attend to the problem of drug abuse.
55
51
See Bergstrom, supra note 13, at 4 (“Its backers claim Ballot Measure 110 is a bold experiment
that will get illicit drug users out of jail and into treatment. It was framed as an effort to treat
substance abuse as a health care issue rather than a criminal justice one.”).
52
See, e.g., Peter O’Dowd & Allison Hagan, ‘A Sledgehammer to the War on Drugs’: Oregon
Decriminalizes Illegal Drugs, WBUR (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2021/02/01/
oregon-decriminalizes-illegal-drugs [https://perma.cc/U4TK-N3PM] (quoting Kassandra
Frederique, DPA’s executive director, who said, “everyone recognizes we cannot arrest our way
out of this problem,” so it is necessary to “start investing in community well-being.”).
53
Lauren Frayer, In Portugal, Drug Use Is Treated As A Medical Issue, Not a Crime, NPR (Apr. 18,
2017, 4:55 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/18/524380027/in-portugal-drug-
use-is-treated-as-a-medical-issue-not-a-crime [https://perma.cc/54XJ-NB98] (describing
Portugal’s approach); Westervelt, supra note 34 (“Oregon supporters of decriminalization point to
Portugal as a reform model.”).
54
Katherine Cook, CDC: Record Number of Americans Suffered Drug Overdose Deaths in 2020, KGW
(July 14, 2021, 11:30 PM), https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/cdc-record-number-of-
americans-suffered-drug-overdose-deaths-in-2020/283-24d226e6-c2d8-4196-af07-c231789fd410
[https://perma.cc/VXP6-ZAE5] (reporting that overdose fatalities in Oregon rose 40% from 2019
to 2020, and deaths attributable to opioids nationwide rose by 30% during that period); Voters’
Pamphlet, supra note 36, at 131149 (repeatedly stressing that overdoses provided an urgent
reason to treat drug abuse as a health issue rather than a crime).
55
E.g., Robert A. Lowe & Ray G. Strangeland, Opinion: A ‘Yes’ on Measure 110 Will Ensure Oregon
Treats Addiction as the Health Care Issue It Is, OregonLive (Sept. 20, 2020, 6:15 AM),
https://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/2020/09/opinion-a-yes-on-measure-110-will-ensure-
oregon-treats-addiction-as-the-health-care-issue-it-is.html [https://perma.cc/BXZ8-PZSC]
(“Measure 110 will remove criminal penalties . . . [P]eople caught with small amounts of drugs will
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The first nine months of implementation disappointed some observers who had
hoped for a quick pivot to the health model. One problem has been a lack of
incentives for drug users to seek treatment. Arrests previously landed offenders
under the supervision of drug court judges or probation officers who offered
leniency if the offenders completed treatment.
56
Measure 110 reduced arrests by
83%,
57
but the measure purported to set up an alternate route to treatment: police
would issue tickets imposing $100 fines, and violators could avoid the fines by
calling a hotline to undergo a “health screening” that might result in a suggestion to
seek treatment.
58
Police wrote very few such tickets in the nine months after
Measure 110 took effect. In fact, in Oregon’s three largest counties containing nearly
half of the state’s population, police only issued a total of ninety-four tickets.
59
Statewide, the total was 1280, with a higher concentration in rural counties.
60
Among the violators who received tickets, a substantial number ignored them,
failing to appear in court or pay the fine.
61
Only a total fifty-one violators who
instead be connected to the drug treatment and recovery services they need to get well.”). The
Health Justice Recovery Alliance, a proponent of Measure 110, included this language on its
website: “People will no longer be arrested and put in jail simply for possession of small amounts
of drugs. Instead, they will receive a health assessment and be connected to the right treatment
or recovery services, including housing assistance, to help them get their lives back on track.”
Health Justice Recovery Alliance, https://healthjusticerecovery.org/facts/ (last visited on
Nov. 5, 2021).
56
See Bergstrom, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that a criminal conviction is a necessary condition
for probation); Crombie, supra note 29 (noting that Measure 110 reduced the number of
participants in drug court by approximately 33% in one county, but statewide data are not yet
available).
57
See Crombie, supra note 29 (indicating that arrests for drug possession dropped 83%).
58
Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, §§ 2(2)(b), 22.
59
Crombie, supra note 29 (setting forth total number of citations in Oregon’s three largest
counties, Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas).
60
Id. (indicating total citations statewide from February to October 2021, based on statistics
maintained by Oregon Judicial Department).
61
Id. (stating that approximately 600 violators receiving tickets failed to show up in court at
all). According to Captain Todd Moran of the Grants Pass Police Department, violators who
receive citations under Measure 110 “generally understand they don’t face a consequence for
failing to follow up.” Id. Kevin Barton, the district attorney for Washington County, Oregon (one
of the state’s largest counties, including portions of the Portland metro area) expressed the
concern that it would be “easy for people struggling with addiction to ignore the $100 fine and not
get a voluntary health assessment.” Amelia Templeton, 2020 Election Trend: Voters Liberalize State
Drug Laws, NPR (Nov. 5, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/05/931643092/2020-
election-trend-voters-liberalize-state-drug-laws [https://perma.cc/B8RK-6EXR] (quoting
Barton’s comments about Measure 110); see Westervelt, supra note 34 (noting criticism, after
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
389
received tickets actually phoned the hotline to take the health assessment, and most
of those calls were perfunctory, with few resulting in drug treatment.
62
By October
2021, nine months after Measure 110 took effect, the Oregon Judicial Department
reported that circuit court judges had only waived fines for a total of seven violators
who completed health assessmentsless than 0.1% of all people who received
tickets.
63
The chief executive for the state’s primary hotline declared at the end of
October 2021 that the tickets had not provided a viable means of connecting
violators to treatment.
64
Another problem was the scarcity of resources for treatment. As of October
2021, only 457 treatment beds were available in Oregon, compared to 740 a few years
before.
65
Recovery advocates sent a letter to Governor Kate Brown on September 2,
implementation of Measure 110, that “there’s basically no consequence if anyone now cited for
possession simply ignores the ticket”); Voters’ Pamphlet, supra note 36, at 150 (arguing that the
$100 fine provided by Measure 110 is not “a financial disincentive of sufficient magnitude”). See
also Radio Interview with Noelle Crombie, ‘OPB Politics Now:’ Measure 110 Isn’t Measuring Up, OPB
(Nov. 5, 2021, 5:49 PM), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/11/05/opb-politics-now-oregon-
measure-110-drug-decriminalization/ [https://perma.cc/FZ5U-TP5L] (concluding that Measure
110 citation system, “pitched as an entry point to possible treatment, is not really working as it was
presented to voters”; noting that violators “are ignoring these citations” and “people just put
[tickets] in their pockets and move on with their lives.”).
62
Crombie, supra note 29 (“By far, the callers are going through the motions: Only eight asked
for treatment information and 35 declined information about those services, saying they called
just to meet the requirements of the new law . . . The remaining eight reported that they were
already receiving treatment services.”). See Crombie, supra note 61 (“The people who staff that
health line, they offer to connect [violators] to a treatment facility on a three-way phone call, but
no one has taken them up on that offer.”). See also Vanderhart, supra note 46 (“The line has
received, on average, fewer than two calls a week from people who’ve received tickets.”).
63
Quinton, supra note 5 (“In only seven cases did defendants submit a health assessment to get
their fines waived” as of October 2021, according to statistics collected by the Oregon Judicial
Department); Vanderhart, supra note 46 (calculating that waivers of fines occurred in fewer than
0.1% of cases).
64
Vanderhart, supra note 46 (quoting Dwight Holton, the CEO of Lines for Life, the nonprofit
that operates a hotline offering screenings to people who receive tickets for drug possession, who
stated: “Potentially the most important metric here aside from decriminalization and taking
stigma away is, “Are we getting people help?” . . . The answer so far is no. Not in any great
numbers.”).
65
According to Monta Knuudson, executive director of Bridges to Change, and Tera Hurst,
executive director of the Health Justice Recovery Alliance, funding for treatment has not matched
the need after Measure 110 took effect. Monta Knudson & Tera Hurst, Knudson and Hurst: Measure
110 Started Strong, But Oregon Still Has an Addiction Crisis, Portland Trib. (Oct. 13, 2021),
https://pamplinmedia.com/pt/10-opinion/524715-419365-knudson-and-hurst-measure-110-
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2021, arguing that Oregon’s addiction recovery system was “straining to a breaking
point with the increase in demand,” and that the inadequate funding for treatment
was “causing system failure.”
66
While Measure 110 established a process for
awarding grants to fund health screening and treatment, some treatment providers
believed that the subsidies lagged too far behind the need, at least in the early stages
of implementation.
67
Critics also complained that Measure 110 had not mandated
an increase in the total number of treatment beds.
68
Another point of concern was
that the measure diverted funding that cities and counties had previously used for
drug treatment.
69
The above-listed shortcomings led some observers to conclude that Measure 110
was far less successful in implementing a health model than in dismantling the
punitive model. Doctor Reginald Richardson, director of Oregon’s Alcohol and
Drug Policy Commission, noted that Measure 110 succeeded in decriminalizing
drugs, “[b]ut in terms of creating a system where more people can get more
treatment, which is what was advertised, that’s absolutely not what’s going to be
started-strong-but-oregon-still-has-an-addiction-crisis [https://perma.cc/2WPK-WA9Q]
(discussing decline in total number of treatment beds and urgent need for additional funding).
66
The lead author of this letter was Mike Marshall, executive director of Oregon Recovers, who
had been an outspoken opponent of Measure 110 prior to its passage. Joining Marshall as co-
authors were twenty-one other leaders of recovery organizations in Oregon. Letter from Mike
Marshall, Exec. Dir., Oregon Recovers, et al., to Kate Brown, Oregon’s Governor, (Sept. 2, 2021),
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21094600/letter-to-brown-from-addiction-
treatment-specialists.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TVX-A224].
67
See id.; Westervelt, supra note 34 (citing various experts who believe that funding for
treatment has been insufficient in early phase of Measure 110 implementation).
68
Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, § 2 (providing funding for treatment without
setting minimum benchmarks for total treatment beds); Perlow & Wig, supra note 32 (indicating
that Measure 110 did not necessarily increase number of treatment beds).
69
Paul Coelho, medical director of the Salem Health Pain Clinic, and Tim Murphy, CEO of
Salem’s Bridgeway Recovery Services, have noted that Measure 110 diverted funding from
marijuana taxes that had formerly supported treatment and prevention services at the local level.
Paul Coelho & Tim Murphy, Measure 110 Would Take Away Addiction Treatment and Cost Lives, Salem
Statesman-J. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/opinion/2020/10/16/
measure-110-take-away-56-million-addiction-treatment-prevention-guest-opinion/
3654050001/ [https://perma.cc/C3L3-ZB78] (“Measure 110 would take away $56 million in
addiction treatment and prevention . . . over the next three years.”). Accord Perlow & Wig, supra
note 32 (pointing out that Measure 110 diverted funding that cities and counties had been using to
fund drug treatment and related services).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
391
happening.”
70
Mike Marshall, executive director of Oregon Recovers, said that
Measure 110 “put the cart before the horse” by decriminalizing hard drugs before
setting up an adequate health infrastructure.
71
By contrast, according to Marshall,
Portugal had achieved better results because that country had spent two years laying
the groundwork for the health model before adopting decriminalization.
72
District
Attorney Joshua Eastman put it simply: Measure 110 brought “decriminalization
with none of the promised treatment.
73
The other side of the story, however, requires careful consideration. Backers of
Measure 110 responded cogently to criticism of Oregon’s slow transition to the
health model.
74
First, they pointed out that Oregon’s treatment infrastructure had
70
Rachel Alexander & Saphara Harrell, Oregon’s Drug Treatment System Is Not Ready for Measure
110 Aftermath, Salem Reporter Finds, Oregonlive (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/18/
1007022652/oregons-pioneering-drug-decriminalization-experiment-is-now-facing-the-hard-
test [https://perma.cc/PPC7-LDGM]. Richardson contrasted Oregon’s experience with that of
other jurisdictions that set up adequate treatment networks before decriminalizing hard drugs:
“Most places that have successfully done decriminalization have already worked on a robust and
comprehensive treatment system . . . Unfortunately, here in Oregon, we don’t have that. What
we have is decriminalization.” Westervelt, supra note 34.
71
Westervelt, supra note 34 (“In fact, Marshall and others worry that the treatment and hard
reduction horse isn’t even on its feet in Oregon, which is leaving too many stuck in a dangerous
pre-treatment limbo and at potential risk of overdosing”); see Zach Weismuller, Oregon
Decriminalized All Drugs to Stop Overdoses. Will It Work?, Reason (Aug. 6, 2021), https://reason.com/
video/2021/08/06/oregon-decriminalized-all-drugs-to-stop-overdoses-will-it-work/
[https://perma.cc/QVY7-X4N9] (citing Marshall’s concern that “Oregon should have bolstered its
treatment infrastructure before moving forward with decriminalization”); see also Vanderhart,
supra note 46 (discussing view among some segments of treatment community that Oregon’s
treatment infrastructure was not ready for implementation of Measure 110 in 2021).
72
Westervelt, supra note 34; see also The Times Editorial Board, supra note 4 (pointing out that
although Oregon sought to emulate Portugal’s decriminalization experiment, “a critical
difference between Portugal and present-day Oregon: Portugal invested a lot of money to develop
a comprehensive healthcare approach to drug use.”).
73
Crombie, supra note 29. Eastman is the district attorney in Josephine County, Oregon.
74
There are many eloquent advocates with this perspective, but some are particularly
noteworthy: Anthony Johnson, one of the chief petitioners for Measure 110; Tera Hurst, executive
director of the Oregon Health Justice Alliance; and various officials with the New York-based Drug
Policy Alliance. E.g., Doug McVay, Measure 110 Update, KBOO (Nov. 1, 2021), https://kboo.fm/
media/105849-measure-110-update [https://perma.cc/Y57D-U3D8] (interviewing Anthony
Johnson about implementation of Ballot Measure 110); Quinton, supra note 5 (quoting Hurst’s
assessment of Measure 110’s implementation); see generally Drug Policy Alliance,
https://drugpolicy.org (last visited on Nov. 5, 2021) (recapping DPA’s work in Oregon and other
jurisdictions, and setting forth positions of DPA leaders on decriminalization).
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ranked among the worst in the nation prior to passage of Measure 110,
75
so it was
unreasonable to expect a quick fix.
76
Second, the proponents downplayed the
inefficacy of the citation system in leading addicts to treatment, saying that there
are other routes to treatment,
77
and that the ultimate goal is “to remove police from
the picture.”
78
Third, proponents contended that drug treatment is more successful
when sought voluntarily than when compelled by a judge or probation officer.
79
Fourth, proponents argued that Oregon’s present insufficiency of treatment
resources is due largely to the COVID-19 pandemicwhich brought hindrances
such as social distancing requirements and a labor shortage
80
and the state will be
augmenting those resources with more funding in the coming months.
81
Fifth, the
backers of Measure 110 declared that decriminalization alone was an important
75
The Times Editorial Board, supra note 4 (indicating that when Oregon passed Measure 110 in
2020, the state’s treatment services were “among the least accessible” in the United States).
76
Quinton, supra note 5 (quoting Hurst’s explanation that shift doesn’t happen overnight”
from the War on Drugs to “a trauma-informed, patient-centered system.”).
77
McVay, supra note 74 (indicating that Oregonians experiencing substance use disorder can
access treatment whether or not they have received citations).
78
Crombie, supra note 29 (reporting in November 2021 that proponents of Measure 110
“downplayed the citations and the role of police as the entry point to the system, and said the goal
overall was to remove police from the picture, so [proponents] weren’t really too bothered by the
low citation numbers and low follow-up from folks who were issued these tickets.”).
79
See, e.g., Daniel Werb, et al., The Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systemic Review,
28 Intl. J. Drug Pol’y 1, 1 (2016) (reviewing studies and concluding that compulsory drug
treatment has limited effectiveness); The Times Editorial Board, supra note 4 (stating that Measure
110 created a policy where “drug treatment should be voluntary”).
80
Nigel Jaquiss, Providers Warn Substance Abuse Treatment Is Vanishing in Oregon, Willamette
Week (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.wweek.com/news/state/2021/09/23/providers-warn-
substance-abuse-treatment-vanishing-in-oregon-amid-slow-measure-110-rollout/
[https://perma.cc/D7EB-3M6H] (discussing imminent closure of some treatment facilities in
Oregon, and attributing problem in part to “workforce shortages in the treatment field
exacerbated by COVID.”).
81
Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, §§ 2, 5 (establishing ongoing process for
awarding grants); Evan Schreiber, On Anniversary of Vote, Measure 110 Still a Work in Progress, KATU
(Nov. 2, 2021), https://katu.com/news/recover-northwest/on-anniversary-of-vote-measure-110-
still-work-in-progress#:~:text=%E2%80%94%20It%20is%20the%20vote%20that,
overwhelmingly%20by%20voters%20in%20Oregon [https://perma.cc/9NXF-9J69] (reporting that
treatment providers are awaiting a “new round of funding” from the state pursuant to Measure
110).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
393
victory, even if Oregon has not yet established a robust treatment system.
82
What alterations to Oregon’s model might allow another state to transition
more effectively from the War on Drugs to a health-oriented approach? To begin
with, I believe that advocates for drug policy reform should lobby the legislature
rather than resorting to the initiative process. A ballot measure has several
limitations: it bypasses vetting by legislators and legislative staff, it rarely fits
cohesively with existing statutes, it needs to address a narrower range of subjects
than does legislation,
83
and it often necessitates campaigning with general themes
that blur the nuances of the actual provisions.
84
I believe that a reform proposal
should include very specific language indicating precisely how it would undertake a
health approach rather than a traditional law enforcement approach.
85
Another
82
Celebrating the one-year anniversary of Measure 110’s passage, Kassandra Frederique,
executive director of the Drug Police Alliance, discussed the benefits of decriminalization that are
separate from ushering in a new health-oriented approach to drug problems. “Now, because of
[Measure 110], there are thousands of people in Oregon that will never have to experience the
devastating life-long barriers of having a drug arrest on their record, which disproportionately
and unjustly affected Black and Indigenous people due to targeted policing.” Matt Sutton, Drug
Decriminalization in Oregon, One Year Later: Thousands of Lives Not Ruined by Possession Arrests, $300
Million+ in Funding for Services, Drug Policy Alliance (Nov. 3, 2021), https://drugpolicy.org/
press-release/2021/11/drug-decriminalization-oregon-one-year-later-thousands-lives-not-
ruined [https://perma.cc/VS8Y-LWRJ] (quoting Kassandra Frederique); accord McVay, supra note
74 (arguing that decriminalization was an important accomplishment notwithstanding
controversy about citations issued in first nine months following implementation of Measure 110).
83
Among the 26 states that allow citizens to propose ballot measures, 16 states require that each
such measure must address a single subject. Single-Subject Rule, Ballotopedia
https://ballotpedia.org/Single-subject_rule [https://perma.cc/J7JP-YL3K]. Oregon follows the
single-subject rule. Or. Const., art. IV, § 1(1)(d), art. XVII, § 1.
84
During the campaign preceding the November 2020 election in Oregon, proponents of
Measure 110 rarely discussed the technical details of the 19-page measure, but instead emphasized
the general theme that Oregon should treat drug abuse as a health problem rather than as a crime.
Compare Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, with Voters’ Pamphlet, supra note 36, at
131149 (invoking general themes rather than discussing provisions).
85
The November 2021 election indicated an increasing wariness of vague proposals to replace
traditional policing with a public health model. For example, in Minneapolis, where voters
considered a ballot measure that would replace the police department with a “public health
oriented” department of public safety, the lack of specificity was a major campaign theme for the
opposition, which defeated the proposal. Martin Kaste, Minneapolis Voters Reject a Measure to
Replace the City’s Police Department, NPR (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/11/02/
1051617581/minneapolis-police-vote [https://perma.cc/Z5J9-NMW4]. This result seemed
surprising in a city that had expressed so much outrage over the murder of George Floyd by police
in 2020.
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suggestion is that the schedule for implementation should ensure that adequate
treatment infrastructure is in place by the time decriminalization takes effect, as
was the case in Portugal.
86
A lengthy interim between the effective date of
decriminalization and the rollout of new treatment systems could exacerbate the
problems that decriminalization seeks to address.
87
In addition, policy makers
must ensure that incentives exist for drug users to seek treatment.
88
Whether these
incentives come from the judicial system or from other inducements created by
statute,
89
there must be a reason for drug-dependent people to make healthy
decisions. Finally, legislation must provide for periodic collection of data on both
the availability, utilization, and effectiveness of treatment.
B. Problems Experienced by Drug Users Following Decriminalization
Drug users in Oregon continue to suffer significant harm after the passage of
Measure 110.
90
One way to gauge this harm is by comparing overdose rates in 2021
86
See sources cited supra note 71 and accompanying text.
87
Westervelt, supra note 34 (citing concerns raised by Mike Marshal, executive director of
Oregon Recovers, that lag between decriminalization and sufficient funding of treatment
programs could leave drug addicts in “dangerous pretreatment limbo” and at greater risk of
overdose).
88
Coelho & Murphy, supra note 69 (noting that most people experiencing SUD “do not take
advantage of treatment options available . . . studies show that more than 80% of opioid and
methamphetamine users declined treatment when offered”); Vanderhart, supra note 46
(indicating that even after implementation of Measure 110, people with SUD tend to ignore
treatment “if it’s easier to do nothing”).
89
For example, California is considering the possibility of offering payments for sobriety. Ian
Spiegelman, Staying Clean Could Soon Pay Off for Some California Addicts Literally, L.A. Mag. (Aug.
26, 2021), https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/staying-clean-payments/#:~:text=Staying%
20Clean%20Could%20Soon%20Pay%20Off%20for%20Some%20California%20Addicts%E2%80%
94Literally,-The%20State%20Assembly&text=As%20KRON%204%20reports%2C%20the,
a%20similar%20program%20in%20California [https://perma.cc/BMD7-CVR8] (“Governor Gavin
Newsom and members on both sides of the aisle in the State Assembly are looking to enact plans
that would pay California addicts to get sober.”). Other possible inducements might include the
provision of highly desirable housing, job training, or employment opportunities upon
completion of treatment programs.
90
Some reasonable people, such as my fellow symposium participant Michael Lewis, might
question whether the government has any legitimate business preventing citizens from harming
themselves. I agree with Mike that the regulation of drug use stands in conspicuous contrast with
the government’s refusal to police consumption of fatty foods and other dangerous habits. I
second Mike’s suggestion that it would be helpful to develop a principled taxonomy of permissible
and impermissible government interventions in individuals’ victimless activities.
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
395
to those in prior years. (Proponents of Measure 110 had argued before the November
2020 election that the need to reduce overdoses was a paramount consideration.)
91
Some evidence suggests that since Measure 110 took effect on February 1, 2021,
Oregon has seen an increase in overdoses requiring hospitalization,
92
as well as fatal
overdoses.
93
Of course, the causal connection between the implementation date and
subsequent overdoses is unclear. Proponents could argue persuasively that Oregon
already had a high overdose rate when Measure 110 took effect,
94
and the entire
United States experienced a surge of overdoses at around the same time,
95
so
decriminalization cannot be at fault for the recent overdoses in Oregon. By the
same token, though, it is hard to review this evidence and conclude that Measure
110 has somehow reduced overdoses. The most accurate characterization would be
that overdoses have been a significant problem in Oregon both before and after the
passage of Measure 110.
Other categories of drug-related harm persist in Oregon. Some commentators
have suggested that the large size of the unhoused population in Oregon may be
attributable, at least in part, to the prevalence of potent drugs,
96
and that
91
Voters’ Pamphlet, supra note 36, at 131149 (stressing high overdose rate in Oregon as a
reason to transition from a punitive model to a public health model).
92
Oregon Health Authority Public Health Division, Opioid Overdoes Public Health Surveillance
Update October 15, 2021, https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PREVENTIONWELLNESS/
SUBSTANCEUSE/OPIOIDS/Documents/monthly_opioid_overdose_related_data_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2APF-DLJA] (reporting that the number of patients with opioid overdoses who
presented at emergency departments and urgent care facilities in Oregon was higher or at least as
high in each month from March through September of 2021 as in the corresponding months of
2020 and 2019).
93
Id. (indicating that fatal opioid overdoses in Oregon in the three months from February to
April 2021 were higher than in the corresponding months in 2020 and 2019); Crombie, supra note
29 (reporting that in 2022, Oregon “is on track to reach a record for opiate-related overdose
deaths.”).
94
Oregon Health Authority Public Health Division, supra note 92 (reporting a high rate of fatal
overdoses, and also hospitalizations due to overdoses, throughout the year 2020).
95
Bill Chappell, Drug Overdoses Killed a Record Number of Americans in 2020, Jumping by Nearly 30%,
NPR (July 14, 2021, 6:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/14/1016029270/drug-overdoses-killed-
a-record-number-of-americans-in-2020-jumping-by-nearly-30 [https://perma.cc/U7V2-8NKX]
(“More than 93,000 people died of a drug overdose in the U.S. last year a record number that
reflects a rise of nearly 30% from 2019, according to new data released by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.”).
96
Megan Johnson, Cheap, Potent Meth Is Pouring in From Mexico. Is It Making Oregon’s Homeless
Crisis Worse?, KGW (Nov. 4, 2021, 8:07 PM), https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/the-
story/p2p-new-meth-homeless-crisis/283-d37c9aa4-bd5a-4894-af39-d8a7100c4830
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decriminalization makes the problem worse.
97
Proponents could respond, though,
the population was already large before the passage of Measure 110, the problem is
attributable to other factors such as the high cost of housing and the COVID-19
pandemic, and drug use may be a symptom rather than a cause of homelessness.
98
Similarly, there is evidence that child removal by the government occurs more
frequently in households where parents are experiencing substance use disorder,
99
but the evidence does not indicate in particular that child removal increased
following passage of Measure 110,
100
and in any event, the War on Drugs had
[perma.cc/U927-LHPF] (“A surge of cheap, potent methamphetamine from Mexico is flooding the
U.S. drug market, and the growing problem is exacerbating the mental health and homelessness
crises in Portland”); Sam Quinones, “I Don’t Know That I Would Even Call It Meth Anymore”, The
Atlantic (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/11/the-new-
meth/620174/ [https://perma.cc/YQB8-ERYY] (indicating that potent new variety of meth is
“worsening America’s homelessness problem,” and including comments from nonprofit CEO in
Portland, Oregon); see Joanne Zuhl, Unpacking the Complex Relationship of Addiction, Homeless,
Housing and Recovery, Street Roots (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.streetroots.org/news/2020/
11/04/unpacking-complex-relationship-addiction-homelessness-housing-and-recovery
[https://perma.cc/NTC6-PNV2] (“Nearly half of people living unsheltered on Portland’s streets last
year reported living with substance abuse issues.”).
97
Judge Eric Bergstrom, Oregons Ballot Measure 110, The Nations First-of-its Kind Drug
Decriminalization Law, https://www.oregon.gov/odot/Safety/Documents/Ballot_Measure_110.pdf
[https://perma.cc/294C-H7N2] (linking Measure 110 to homelessness).
98
See National Coalition for the Homeless, Substance Abuse and Homelessness, (July 2009),
https://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/addiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNC3-G7TW]
(“Substance abuse is both a cause and a result of homelessness, often arising after people lose their
housing”); Zuhl, supra note 96 (“Even if addiction isn’t what puts people on the streets, it’s often
what keeps them there.”).
99
Naomi Schafer Riley & John Walters, Legal Drugs Are Fashionable And Treacherous for Children,
Wall St. J. (Nov. 18, 2020, 1:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-drugs-are-
fashionableand-treacherous-for-children-11605722904 [https://perma.cc/LR4A-AT7Y] (noting
Oregon’s passage of Measure 110 and commenting that [d]ecriminalization efforts will likely
exacerbate the connection between foster care and substance abuse”); cf. Susan Neilson, More Kids
Are Getting Place in Foster Care Because of Parents Drug Use, NPR (July 15, 2019, 11:27 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/07/15/741790195/more-kids-are-getting-
placed-in-foster-care-because-of-parents-drug-use [https://perma.cc/488C-56CY] (“The number
of cases of children entering the foster care system due to parental drug use has more than
doubled since 2000.”).
100
Hillary Borrud, The Number of Oregon Children in Foster Care Dropped Steeply During the
Pandemic, OregonLive (Oct. 31, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2021/10/
the-number-of-oregon-children-in-foster-care-dropped-steeply-during-the-pandemic-state-
official-says-its-part-of-a-long-term-shift.html [https://perma.cc/L8AF-Z3BL] (reporting that
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
397
certainly separated many parents from their children. Once again, the most
accurate characterization would be that the drug-related problems of homelessness
and child removal both predate and postdate the passage of Measure 110 in Oregon.
The available evidence does not indicate clearly that Measure 110 exacerbated or
ameliorated these problems.
A debate swirls around whether underage drug use increases following the
reduction of criminal penalties for drug possession. In the context of marijuana,
there is some evidence that underage use by college students has increased in
jurisdictions that legalized this drug,
101
increasing risks for certain health-related
harms.
102
One explanation is that the elimination of penalties signaled the
government’s de facto endorsement of marijuana as harmless,
diminishing the
reluctance of underage populations to use marijuana.
103
It is too early to tell,
however, whether decriminalization of hard drugs will increase their use by young
people. Proponents of Measure 110 could argue that such an effect would be unlikely
for several reasons. First, the decriminalization of hard drugs does not send as
strong a signal of approval as does the legalization of marijuana: in the former case,
possession of hard drugs is still illegal, and the government is not deeming these
drugs to be innocuous, but rather is determining that a public health approach
the “number of Oregon children in foster care has fallen nearly 20% since January 2020,” due in
part to a policy shift at the state’s human service agency).
101
States that legalize marijuana set a minimum age of 21 for legal marijuana use. College
students, most of whom are under 21, tend to increase use of marijuana following legalization.
Molly Rosbach, College Students Use More Marijuana in States Where It’s Legal, But They Binge Drink
Less, Science Daily (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/01/
200113131637.htm [https://perma.cc/9R33-95NL] (reporting results from study by researchers at
Oregon State University who collected data from seven states and 135 colleges where marijuana
was legal and from 41 states and 454 colleges where marijuana was not legal).
102
These harms could potentially include heart disease and impaired brain development.
Jeanine Santucci, Risk of Heart Attack Associated More Highly with Young Adult Cannabis Users, New
Study Finds, USA Today (Sept. 7, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2021/
09/07/cannabis-heart-attacks-young-customers-study/5763774001/ [https://perma.cc/MF4H-
MUL9] (citing peer-reviewed study published in Canadian Medical Association Journal); see
Kristin Weir, Marijuana and the Developing Brain, 46 Am. Psch. Assoc. Mon. 10 (Nov. 2015)
(collecting studies that show risks of using marijuana before brain development is complete in
one’s mid-twenties).
103
Abigal Mariani & April Williams, Perceived Risk of Harm from Monthly Cannabis Use Among U.S.
Adolescents: National Survey on Drug use and Health, 2017, 23 Preventative Medicine Rep. 101436
(Sept. 2021) (“Despite these risks, adolescents’ cannabis use has risen and their overall perception
that cannabis use is harmful has declined over the past two decades. These shifts could be
attributed to the rapidly changing policies regarding cannabis legalization.”).
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offers the best of hope of reducing overdoses. Furthermore, Measure 110 treats
adult use of hard drugs no differently from use by people under age twenty-one, so
the regulatory regime for hard drugs in Oregon may not seem as hypocritical to
underage populations as does the regime for marijuana.
104
In any event, it is
noteworthy that police are issuing far fewer Measure 110 citations to juveniles than
to the rest of the population in Oregon. Among 1280 citations issued from February
to October 2021, only ten citations were for juveniles.
105
The paucity of juvenile
citations may reflect a low rate of drug use in that population or a hesitation on the
part of police to cite younger users.
Could other states alter the blueprint of Measure 110 to include additional
provisions aimed at harm reduction for drug users? To be clear, Measure 110’s
omission of specific harm reduction strategies does not mean that Oregon
undervalues them; to the contrary, the measure provided funding for harm
reduction, and the omission of greater specificity was likely due to space limitations
or concerns that more granularity might seem to violate the single-subject rule for
a ballot measure.
106
In any event, a comprehensive harm reduction package should
include some or all of the following elements. State and local governments can
improve safety by establishing needle exchange programs and by distributing test
strips that help users to check for fentanyl contamination in their drugs.
107
Another
important strategy is the wide distribution of naloxonea substance that can revive
an opioid user after an overdoseto first responders and other personnel who are
likely to come into contact with drug users.
108
Public service announcements can be
an important element of harm reduction, broadcasting warnings such as “Never use
alone,” admonishing children against drug use, and alerting the local community
104
Bergstrom, supra note 97 (noting that Measure 110 does not distinguish between adults’ and
juveniles’ possession of hard drugs).
105
Crombie, supra note 29 (indicating that among 1,280 tickets that police issued statewide from
February to October 2021, officers only issued ten tickets to juveniles).
106
Oregon follows the single-subject rule, along with 15 other states among the 26 that allow
citizens to propose initiatives. Single-subject rule, supra note 83; Or. Const., art. IV, § 1(1)(d), art.
XVII, § 1. This rule requires that a ballot measure cannot address several subjects; such
multiplicity would require presentation of different proposals in several measures.
107
National Harm Reduction Coalition, Harm Reduction Issues: Fentanyl,
https://harmreduction.org/issues/fentanyl/ [https://perma.cc/LC7F-RJEJ] (“Fentanyl test strips
can identify the presence of fentanyl in unregulated drugs. They can be used to test injectable
drugs, powders, and pills.”).
108
National Institute on Drug Abuse, Naxolone Drug Facts, www.drugabuse.gov/publications/
drugfacts/naloxone [https://perma.cc/UD6P-4YQ4 (“Naloxone is a medicine that rapidly reverses
an opioid overdose.”).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
399
when law enforcement detects dangerous contaminants in the local drug supply.
109
Ideally, state and local governments would invest in the construction of facilities for
detoxification, even if the users of such facilities have not yet consented to
treatment. The combination of these measures does not prevent all harm to drug
users, but helps to establish a safety net that could reduce overdoses.
C. Complications for Enforcement of Remaining Criminal Laws after
Decriminalization of Some Offenses
Critics sometimes raise the concern that decriminalization of low-level offenses
could constrain the enforcement of criminal laws remaining on the books. For
example, by eliminating criminal penalties for simple possession, Measure 110
could hinder the investigation of higher-level drug crimes such as distribution,
manufacturing, and possession with intent to distribute. This effect is difficult to
quantify.
110
Critics point out that Measure 110 forecloses the use of certain
investigative techniques such as “rolling” low-level offenders against their dealers,
or relying on the possession of a small drug quantities as probable cause for search
warrants.
111
Measure 110 could allow dealers to evade arrest by carrying quantities
below criminal thresholds, such as thirty-nine units of LSD.
112
Another criticism is
that the inconsistent patchwork of drug laws might cause confusion or frustration
109
Cf. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, The Real Cost Campaign, https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-
products/public-health-education/real-cost-campaign [https://perma.cc/LVA-8-4PU7]
(discussing effectiveness of public service announcements warning against tobacco use in certain
contexts).
110
To quantify this effect, it would not be sufficient to compare arrests and convictions in the
periods before and after February 1, 2021, the date when Measure 110 took effect. It would be
necessary to determine the ratio of arrests and convictions to total crimes committed during those
periods. Available data presently do not allow such a calculation, although some statistics seem
to indicate a declining total number of arrests and convictions for offenses involving drug dealing
and possession of large quantities during the period from February to August 2021. Quinton,
supra note 5 (citing data collected by the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission).
111
F. Lee Bailey & Kenneth Fishman, Handling Narcotic and Drug Cases, § 73.12 (2021)
(discussing Oregon’s Ballot Measure 110, and noting that “decriminalization will have an effect on
searches and arrests where the quantity no longer gives rise probable cause”); Eric Howald,
Decriminalization Movement’s Goals Are Lofty; the Effects Are Already Being Felt Locally, Keizer Times
(Mar. 30, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.keizertimes.com/posts/2627/decriminalization-
movements-goals-are-lofty-the-effects-are-already-being-felt-locally [https://perma.cc/MBG7-
F6AE] (listing various ways in which Measure 110 will impact traditional investigative techniques
such as stopping and questioning suspects carrying small quantities of hard drugs).
112
Measure 110, Drug Addiction, supra note 21, §§ 1117. See supra text accompanying note 26.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW
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that would lead police to abandon their enforcement efforts altogether.
113
Backers
of Measure 110 could rightly respond that past enforcement strategies have
sometimes abused low-level offenders and have exacerbated racial disparities;
moreover, there is no requirement that police work must be easy, and alternative
investigative tools are available when police pursue higher-level traffickers. One
possible irony, however, is that the withdrawal of state and local police from such
investigations might increase the involvement of federal authorities, leading to
longer sentences and compounding mass incarceration.
114
Intoxicated driving, also known as driving under the influence of intoxicants
(DUII), is a matter of great concern to critics of decriminalization. They insist that
DUII rates will increase as Measure 110 takes away the criminal penalties and stigma
formerly associated with drug use. Some evidence suggests that legalization of
marijuana led to higher rates of DUII involving that drug.
115
One challenge for police
is that there is no easy way to determine what blood alcohol level of drugs necessarily
proves intoxication: sometimes trace amounts of drugs remain in the bloodstream
after intoxication has ended. Whereas proof of drunk driving is relatively
straightforward, proving drug-intoxicated driving will be difficult, at least in the
near future.
116
Proponents of Measure 110 could reply to such concerns by pointing
out that the best proof of intoxicated driving is the erratic driving itself, not the
inference of danger from evidence of past drug use. Moreover, the shift from
alcohol use to marijuana use in certain states has arguably reduced the danger of
113
This problem seems to have arisen in the context of marijuana laws. A study by researchers
at Portland State University found that among police officers surveyed in Oregon, the
“overwhelming consensus” was that marijuana laws were so complicated, inconsistent, and
confusing as to preclude effective enforcement. Kris Henning & Greg Stewart, Dazed and Confused:
Police Experiences Enforcing Oregon’s New Marijuana Laws, Portland St. U. Research Brief (Feb. 2021)
https://www.pdx.edu/criminology-criminal-justice/sites/g/files/znldhr3071/files/2021-04/2021-
oregon-marijuana-law-enforcement-survey-research-brief.pdf (“[P]olice officers and deputies in
Oregon are struggling to understand and actively enforce the state’s remaining prohibitions
involving marijuana. Where once there was a clear distinction between legal and illegal activity,
there is now complex, many would say poorly written, policy that is difficult to implement in the
field.”).
114
Richard Boylan & Cheryl Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal
Prosecutors, 48 J. L. & Econ. 627, 642 (2005) (indicating that “in states with short state sentences
for drug offenders, relatively simple cases may be prosecuted at the federal level to obtain longer
prison sentences.”).
115
Henning & Stewart, supra note 113 (presenting evidence that driving under the influence of
marijuana in Oregon has increased since legalization of the drug).
116
Id. (setting forth survey results indicating the difficulty of proving a suspect has driven while
under the influence of marijuana).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
401
intoxicated driving, because marijuana does not cause the same degree of
impairment as alcohol.
117
In any event, say the backers of Measure 110, law
enforcement officers should develop new investigative techniques for DUII instead
of assuming that a device such as a breathalyzer will always be sufficient to prove
this crime.
How can states that adopt decriminalization reduce the risk that this reform
will limit enforcement of other criminal laws? One important precaution is to make
sure police have access to resources and investigative techniques that remain
effective following decriminalization. Once legislators decide what crimes they
want to keep on the books, and how aggressively they want to enforce violation of
those laws, legislators should consider the extent to which they will permit and/or
subsidize alternate investigative techniques such as the following: proactive
electronic surveillance, reliance of paid informants, and the use of a statewide
investigative team that includes credible undercover officers who can rotate from
location to location in order to maintain their cover. Some legislators might
conclude that the use of such techniques is an intolerable infringement on suspects’
liberties, but at least there will be a careful consideration of the tradeoff with
tolerance of higher-level drug crime. With respect to DUII investigations,
legislatures can provide funding for the training of drug recognition experts who
will be able to assess whether a suspect is driving under the influence.
118
In sum,
Measure 110 and similar reforms in other states will require an update, not an
abandonment, of techniques for the investigation of higher-level crimes outside the
scope of the decriminalization measures.
D. Need to Codify Protections Against Police Misconduct as Fewer Cases Go to
Court Due to Declining Prosecutions
Decriminalization also necessitates greater protection of suspects rights
against overreaching by police. Historically the remedy for police misconduct
during investigations has been the exclusion of evidence from criminal
117
Rishi Iyengar, Driving While Stoned Is Much Safe Than Driving Drunk, Says a New Study, Time
(Feb. 12, 2015, 5:32 AM), https://time.com/3706491/driving-stoned-drunk-study-safety/
[https://perma.cc/6NVD-VCHS] (citing data collected by National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration).
118
National District Attorneys Association, Saving lives and preventing crashes: the drug
evaluation and classification (DEC) program (2018) https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/
1033558_DREMonograph_FinalWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HZF-F7PH] (discussing value of
drug recognition experts in investigation and prosecution of intoxicated driving).
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW
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prosecutions.
119
The authority for this sanction has come primarily from judicial
interpretations of constitutional requirements.
120
Now that Measure 110 has taken
away any possibility of a criminal prosecution for a low-level drug violation, this
sanction could seem inconsequential to police,
121
especially when they realize that a
ticket for a civil violation rarely results in any judicial proceeding.
122
Thus
decriminalization could reduce the disincentive for police misconduct. Of course,
it is important not to be too naïve about the disincentive created by Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence during the War on Drugs,
123
but at least a suppression
motion by a criminal defense attorney could bring police misconduct to light and
thereby embarrass the officer or provoke a judicial rebuke, if not derail a
prosecution. Without the suppression remedy, there really is no recourse for
aggrieved suspects: qualified immunity shields police from liability for civil
damages, and investigations of local police departments by the U.S. Department of
Justice rarely bring meaningful change.
124
One might reasonably wonder why police would want to mistreat drug users
119
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 383, 398 (1914) (applying the exclusionary rule at federal
level for the first time); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to
state level).
120
Orin Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1117, 1118
(2017) (observing that the “best-known” regulation of searches and seizures comes from the
“massive body of case law” under the Fourth Amendment; statutes occasionally address specific
matters of privacy in the interstices).
121
A similar phenomenon occurred during the War on Terror” following the attacks on
September 11, 2001. Domestic antiterrorism investigations were seeking to avert further attacks,
and were not necessarily seeking to collect admissible evidence for criminal prosecutions, so law
enforcement agents were less likely to follow constitutional rules governing investigations,
because the remedy for violation of those rules was the exclusion of evidence. See generally John
Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 765, 79293 (2007) (noting
that because domestic antiterrorism investigations are “not necessarily directed at obtaining
admissible evidence, rules that ordinarily limit the available range of tactics may not apply.”).
122
Crombie, supra note 29 (indicating that small fraction of violators who receive citations
actually end up going to court).
123
Michael Vitiello, The End of the War on Drugs, the Peace Dividend, and the Renewed Fourth
Amendment, 73 Okla. L. Rev. 285, 285 (2021) (“The War on Drugs profoundly eroded the Fourth
Amendment.”).
124
See Eric Williamson, Harmon’s New Casebook Is the First to Look at Law of the Police, U. Va. News
(Mar. 18, 2021) https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/202103/harmons-new-casebook-first-look-
law-police [http://perma.cc/YFD2-P322] (discussing scholarship of Virginia Law Professor Rachel
Harmon, who notes insufficiency of these two remedies, but who sees potential value in
regulation as a means of curbing police misconduct).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
403
when the citation system is so unlikely to result in drug treatment or payment of a
fine, and when criminal prosecution is no longer a possibility. To be sure, most
police probably would not exploit the new era of diminished accountability as an
opportunity to violate the rights of drug users.
125
But some officers might abuse
their authority, either because of enmity toward drug users, a desire to keep drugs
off the streets,” or a strategy of prodding unhoused people to leave certain locations.
Such officers could seize evidence using impermissible techniques and could expose
the suspects to several categories of detriment, including the loss of parental rights,
employment, housing, government benefits, etc.
126
Officers might conceivably
furnish such evidence to federal investigators, who can still arrest for a wide range
of drug crimes including simple possession, and who operate under federal Fourth
Amendment rules that are generally less strict than the rules in the progressive
states where decriminalization is likely to occur.
127
While it is certainly inaccurate
to presume that a large number of state officers would try to circumvent
decriminalization by imposing ancillary hardships on low-level drug offenders, it is
important to guard against the possibility that some police might refuse to abandon
the War on Drugs.
What should states do to address this risk? The time has come to codify rules
against police misconduct in a comprehensive statutory scheme, rather than relying
on judicial enforcement of constitutional rules by means of excluding evidence in
125
It would be inaccurate and unfair to assume that all police desire to harass low-level drug
offenders after the implementation of Measure 110. In fact, early evidence indicates that the
opposite view is more widespread: many officers seem disinterested in interacting with drug
users following decriminalization. Vanderhart, supra note 46 (indicating that after passage of
Measure 110, many officers “have little appetite” for the enforcement of laws against possessing
small quantities of drugs, and these officers “appear to be turning their attention elsewhere”);
Crombie, supra note 29 (discussing reluctance of police to issue citations pursuant to Measure 110).
126
Thanks to UNH Law Professor Melissa Davis for her insightful comments on this topic
during my presentation when I visited campus on October 29, 2021.
127
Federal constitutional requirements serve as a floor, but not a ceiling, for rights that states
can accord to defendants in criminal cases. E.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (“[S]tate
courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection
to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution”); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 33, 43 (1988) (“Individual states may surely construe their own constitutions
as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution.”).
Some courts in progressive states now impose stricter requirements on police in drug
investigations than do the federal courts. Vitiello, supra note 123, at 289 (indicating that some
“states’ courts have shown a willingness to expand Fourth Amendment protection or to rely on
state constitutional provisions to counter the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law” that
has favored the government in the War on Drugs).
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criminal prosecutions. A statute should specify precisely what police conduct is out
of bounds, and should remove immunity for officers who engage in the forbidden
conduct. One advantage of such an approach is that it would provide clearer notice
to police than does the existing jurisprudential framework (set forth in hundreds of
separate judicial opinions).
128
Clear notice would not only facilitate lawsuits for
redress, but it would also help to prevent the use of abusive investigative techniques
in the first instance. State bars should also revise their ethical ruleswhich apply
to both state and federal prosecutorsso that no prosecutor at any level can
participate in an investigation that violates the new statutes for police conduct, and
no prosecutor can adopt a case that rests in whole or in part on an investigation
violating these statutes.
129
CONCLUSION
Oregon has embarked on a bold experiment. In approving Measure 110, the
state’s voters signaled that they can no longer abide certain aspects of the War on
Drugs. They demanded a transition to a health-oriented approach prioritizing
equity, healing, and cost savings.
These goals are commendable, even if the results from the first nine months of
implementation are disappointing in some respects. The state has been more
successful in tearing down criminal penalties than in erecting a health
infrastructure to replace the punitive approach. Drug users continue to suffer
significant harms, police face difficulty enforcing certain statutes that remain on
the books, and there is less incentive for police to respect the rights of suspects when
decriminalization has taken away the sanction of excluding evidence from a
criminal prosecution for drug possession.
It is important to bear in mind that the above-listed challenges are not inherent
shortcomings of decriminalization. Rather, it is likely that a state could avoid or
ameliorate many of these problems by crafting a comprehensive statutory scheme
that addresses the challenges simultaneously with the implementation of
128
See Kerr, supra note 120, at 118 (noting that judicial opinions on constitutional rules governing
searches and seizures sometimes lack clarity, leading to uncertainty in interpretation by police
and others).
129
For an argument that reforms to the ethical rules for prosecutors are an appropriate way to
constrain certain categories of misconduct by police, see Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies and Videotape:
The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1201, 127181 (2004) (advocating
such reforms in the context of racial and religious profiling by police); see also Tom Lininger,
Federalism and Antiterrorism Investigations, 17 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 389, 393405 (2006) (taking
similar position in context of federal antiterrorism investigations).
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS
405
decriminalization.
130
Once again, the imperfection of Oregon’s Measure 110 does not mean it was a
step in the wrong direction. The appropriate basis for comparison is not a utopia
free of drug abuse, racial disparities and police misconduct; rather, Measure 110
deserves evaluation against the backdrop of the War on Drugs. The last half-century
has shown that the United States causes great harm whenever it wages any “war”
against its own citizens (e.g., the War on Poverty that began in the 1960s, the War
on Drugs that began in the 1970s, and the War on Terror that began in 2001). Now
Oregon and the rest of the nation are learning what political scientists have long
understood: peacebuilding can be more difficult than warfare. This reality does not
mean peace is less desirable than war; it just means that reformers and their critics
should temper expectations for a speedy solution to the drug problem, and should
be patient as various jurisdictions experiment with, and incrementally improve,
policy alternatives to the War on Drugs.
130
See supra, final paragraphs of Sections II.A., II.B., II.C., and II.D.