EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS
New York City—September 11, 2001
April 21, 2002
U.S. Department of Transportation
ITS Joint Program Office
Technical Report Documentation Page
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
5. Report Date
April 2002
4. Title and Subtitle
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management
and Operations, New York City – September 11
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s)
Allan J. DeBlasio, Terrance J. Regan, Margaret E. Zirker, F. Brian
Day, Michelle Crowder, Kathleen Bagdonas, Robert Brodesky, Dan
Morin
8. Performing Organization Report No.
10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)9. Performing Organization Name and Address
U.S. Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs Administration
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
55 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02142-1093
11. Contract or Grant No.
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Catastrophic Events Case Study
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
ITS Joint Program Office
400 Seventh Street, SW
Washington, DC 20590
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) – Joseph Peters
16. Abstract
This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to the earthquake in Northridge,
California on January 17, 1994, and is part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on
transportation system facilities and services. The findings documented in this report are a result of a detailed
literature search on Northridge lessons learned. As part of a larger effort, four case studies will be produced:
• New York City, September 11, 2001
• Washington, D.C., September 11, 2001
• Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire, July 18, 2001
• Northridge, California, earthquake, January 17, 1994.
17. Key Word
Emergency Response, Emergency Preparedness,
Security, Transportation System Recovery, Disaster,
Catastrophic Event, Terrorist Attack
18. Distribution Statement
No restrictions
19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassified
20. Security Classif. (of this page)
Unclassified
21. No. of
Pages
22. Price
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
ii
Foreword
This report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (U.S. DOT)
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) for the
U.S. DOT’s Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Joint Program Office. The
Volpe Center study team consisted of Allan J. DeBlasio, the project manager;
Robert Brodesky from EG&G Technical Services; Margaret E. Zirker and Michelle
Crowder from Cambridge Systematics Inc.; and Terrance J. Regan, F. Brian Day,
Kathleen Bagdonas, and Dan Morin from Planners Collaborative. Vince Pearce
is the U.S. DOT task manager of the review.
This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in re-
sponse to the terrorist attack in New York City on September 11, and is part of
a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on transportation
system facilities and services. The findings documented in this report are a
result of the creation of a detailed chronology of New York events, a literature
search, and interviews of key personnel involved in transportation operations
decision-making on September 11. As part of a larger effort, four case studies
will be produced:
◆ New York City, September 11, 2001
◆ Washington, D.C., September 11, 2001
◆ Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire, July 18, 2001
◆ Northridge, California, earthquake, January 17, 1994.
Each of these events resulted in substantial, immediate, and adverse impacts
on transportation, and each has had varying degrees of influence on the
longer-term operation of transportation facilities and services in their respec-
tive region. Each event revealed important information about the response of
the transportation system to major stress and the ability of operating agencies
and their public safety and emergency management partners to respond
effectively to a crisis. This report emphasizes the transportation aspects of this
catastrophic event and lessons learned that could be incorporated into future
emergency response planning.
iii
Contents
Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
2.0 Transportation System Response ......................................................................... 3
2.1 Pre-Event ....................................................................................................................... 3
2.2 Day of Event: September 11, 2001 ....................................................................... 7
2.3 Post-Event: After September 11, 2001 ............................................................. 21
3.0 Findings .............................................................................................................................. 31
3.1 Advance Preparations and Planning................................................................ 34
3.2 Institutional Coordination ................................................................................... 38
3.3 Guiding Priority: Safety ......................................................................................... 41
3.4 Communications ..................................................................................................... 42
3.5 The Role of Advanced Technologies ................................................................ 45
3.6 System Redundancy and Resiliency ................................................................ 49
4.0 Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 51
List of Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... 53
List of Tables
Table 1. Regional Statistics .................................................................................................... 3
Table 2. Weekday Transit Ridership .................................................................................... 4
Table 3. Journey to Work by Mode for Manhattan ....................................................... 6
Table 4. Key Decisions by Agency ................................................................................... 18
List of Figures
Figure 1. VMS Sign on Sept. 11 ............................................................................................. 1
Figure 2. World Trade Center Complex, Mid-September............................................. 2
Figure 3. Transportation Conditions Before Sept. 11 ................................................... 5
Figure 4. Pedestrians Crossing the Brooklyn Bridge from Manhattan .................. 7
Figure 5. Looking South Down West Street on September 11 .............................. 11
Figure 6. Transportation Conditions on September 11 ............................................ 12
iv
List of Figures (continued)
Figure 7. Ambulances on a Manhattan Street on September 11......................... 14
Figure 8. Ferry Passengers on September 11 .............................................................. 16
FIgure 9. Day-After Newspaper Map ............................................................................... 20
Figure 10. New York City Transit Map of September 24 ........................................... 21
Figure 11. Transportation Conditions, late Fall 2001 ................................................ 26
Figure 12. Effect of SOV Ban on Traffic ........................................................................... 28
Figure 13. Ferry Service, late Fall 2001 ........................................................................... 30
Figure 14. Subway Station on Morning of Sept.ember 11 ..................................... 37
Figure 15. Increase in Web Usage Sept. 11 ................................................................... 44
Figure 16 Subway Service Notice September 17 ...................................................... 45
Figure 17. VMS on Evening of September 11 .............................................................. 46
Figure 18. IRVN Screen Shot .............................................................................................. 47
1
1.0 Introduction
Although New York City transportation agencies never planned for an attack of
the magnitude of September 11, they swung into action without hesitation,
implementing individual and regional emergency response plans already in
place. Within 6 minutes of the first hijacked airliner crash into the north tower
of the World Trade Center in New York City, both New York City Transit subways
and Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) trains began emergency procedures.
Within 9 minutes of a second hijacked airliner crash into the south tower of
the World Trade Center, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey closed
all bridges and tunnels and the George Washington Bridge variable message
sign (VMS) flashed, “Bridge Closed.” (See September 11, 2001 Chronology—
The First Hour.)
For the next several hours, over 1 million people who live and work
in lower Manhattan fled. New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani told
New Yorkers, “If you are south of Canal Street, get out. Walk slowly
and carefully. If you can’t figure what else to do, just walk north.”
Shaken from the terror, people headed north to find transportation
options that were still operating or toward the water where they
could cross bridges on foot or board the make-shift flotilla of water
ferries that was quickly mobilized to transport people off the island.
As the region’s three major airports were closed, people began
walking with their luggage, hitchhiking, or commandeering airport
luggage carts to begin a search for buses, rental cars, and hotels.
However, in the chaos and devastation of the seemingly
unmanageable disaster, the New York transportation system
remained a support system for those fleeing the tragedy and for
those charged with on-site emergency response. Throughout the
chaos of the day, the New York transportation system adapted to
serve travelers and keep them safe on September 11.
Sensitivity
These findings of the impacts of the September 11 attacks are
being compiled only months after the most damaging terrorist
attack in American history. For this reason, there are a number of
sensitivities surrounding the case study work. The World Trade
Center area is still considered a crime scene, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) is coordinating activities and responses.
Because of the nature of the terrorist attack, officials at the time could not be
sure that additional terrorist activities would not occur in the region.
Transportation officials were (and still are) concerned about the targeting of
their facilities. Therefore, some of the information remains classified and
officials are reticent to discuss details of certain responses and actions that
took place that day.
Because of the nature of the incident, some of the interviewees were reluctant
to share detailed information about possible changes in emergency response
Figure 1. VMS Sign on Sept. 11
Source: Port Authority
2
plans for fear of giving would-be terrorists a “blueprint” for how to better plan
the next attack. The World Trade Center was the headquarters for a number of
the transportation agencies and a communications hub. Many of the key
agency officials were actually at the site at the time of the attack. A number of
the high-ranking decision makers for the transportation agencies were either
killed or temporarily lost during the first few hours after the attack. Most
everyone interviewed
told a personal story of
close friends lost or of
their own narrow escape
from injury or death.
Many of the agency
personnel have been
working long hours to
operate the system under
tremendous constraints
and have not had time to
“debrief and reflect on
lessons learned.”
Figure 2. World Trade Center Complex, Mid-September
Source: FEMA
3
2.1 Pre-Event
New York City, Manhattan, and Lower Manhattan
New York City is the most populous city in the nation. The borough of
Manhattan, 13-miles long and 2.3-miles wide at its widest point, holds only 7%
of the land area of New York City, but 20% of the total population. Manhattan
is the most densely populated urban area in the country. It is also one of the
most visited tourist destinations in the world. Lower Manhattan, the area
below 14
th
Street, was home to the World Trade Center Complex. Table 1 gives
an overview of statistics for New York City, Manhattan and Lower Manhattan.
2.0 Transportation System Response
Transportation in New York City and Manhattan
The New York metropolitan area, which includes the 2,440 square-mile region
of New York City, Long Island, and the lower Hudson Valley, has one of the most
extensive transportation networks in the world with nearly 23,000 centerline
miles of roads, streets, and highways, approximately 500 route-miles of
commuter rail, 225 route-miles of rail rapid transit, three major airports, and the
largest maritime facilities for passengers and goods on the East Coast.
The transportation system in New York City is one of the most complex in the
country with innumerable state, local, and regional authorities as well as
private companies operating various components of the transportation
network. The three largest public transportation agencies that serve
New York City are:
◆ The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which operates the 3
major airports, 2 tunnels, 4 bridges, the PATH interstate passenger rail
transit system, 2 interstate bus terminals, and 7 marine cargo terminals
in the New York/New Jersey Port District.
◆ The NYC Department of Transportation (DOT), which manages the city
streets, highways, parking facilities, 4 major bridges, 6 tunnels, 1 ferry
service, and oversees 5 private ferry and 7 private bus companies
serving New York City.
Table 1. Regional Statistics
NYC Manhattan Lower Manhattan
Population 8,800,000 1,537,000 292,000
Workers 3,700,000 2,400,000 566,000
Area (sq. mi.) 309 28 3
Density of residents per sq. mi. 28,479 54,893 97,333
Density of employees per sq. mi. 11,974 85,714 188,667
% households owning a vehicle 44% 22% —
4
◆ The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) runs the NYC Transit
subway and bus system (the largest subway and bus systems in the
country), 2 commuter rail systems, a Long Island bus service, 7 bridges,
and 2 tunnels.
According to the Texas Transportation Institute’s indices of roadway
congestion, the region ranked 13
th
in percent of daily travel undertaken in
congested conditions, 21
st
in roadway congestion, and 24
th
in annual
congestion cost per capita. These rankings reflect a 35% share of daily travel
undertaken in congested conditions and an annual congestion cost of $595
per capita.
Within New York City itself, there are about 2 million registered vehicles, 91% of
which are passenger vehicles, 4% commercial vehicles, 2.5% taxis, and the
remaining 2.5 % rental cars, buses, and motorcycles/mopeds. Figure 3 on the
following page gives a brief overview of transportation conditions before
September 11, 2001.
The New York metropolitan area has the most widely used public
transportation network in the nation. The region’s reliance on transit stems
from historical trends and land use patterns, principally in New York City where
the density makes automobile travel difficult. The largest portion of the city’s
transit system is operated by MTA NYC Transit. From outside the city, MTA’s
commuter rail and bus operations serve suburban New York including Long
Island, the Hudson River Valley, and parts of Connecticut; PATH rapid transit
brings passengers to NYC from New Jersey; ferries connect other New York City
boroughs with Manhattan, as well as carrying passengers from New Jersey.
Table 2 shows the typical weekday transit ridership statistics for the New York
City area.
Table 2. Weekday Transit Ridership
Transit type Passengers/weekday
NYC Transit subway 4,226,600
NYC Transit buses 2,169,800
Private buses 288,900
MTA Long Island Bus 99,100
MTA Long Island Railroad 296,800
MTA Metro North Railroad 231,600
Port Authority PATH 258,000
Public and private ferries 91,600
TOTAL 7,662,400
Source: NYMTC and Port Authority
5
Figure 3. Transportation Conditions Before September 11
w
6
Transportation in Manhattan
Most people who work in Manhattan take transit or walk. Only 16% of all
workers rely on the automobile to commute to Manhattan. During the
daytime, more than two-thirds of all trips in the 8.4 square miles that comprise
central Manhattan are made on foot. Even so, 14,000 motor vehicle trips are
made per square mile per day, far exceeding trip density of all other counties in
the New York metropolitan area.
World Trade Center Complex
The World Trade Center Complex’s seven buildings with its 293 floors of office
space housed some 1,200 companies and organizations. Each floor of the Twin
Towers contained over 1 acre of office space. The complex included 239
elevators and 71 escalators. The World Trade Center housed approximately
50,000 office workers and averaged 90,000 visitors each day.
The below-ground Mall was the largest enclosed shopping mall in Lower
Manhattan as well as the main interior pedestrian circulation level for the
World Trade Center complex. Approximately 150,000 people a day used the
three subway stations located below the towers in the Mall. The below-ground
parking garage included space for 2,000 vehicles, but only 1,000 were used on
a daily basis. The number of parking spaces was reduced for safety and
security reasons after terrorists drove a truck packed with 1,100 pounds of
explosives into the basement parking garage in 1993, setting off a blast that
killed 6 and injured 1,000 people.
Table 3. Journey to Work by Mode for Manhattan
Within From NYC From NYC From NJ From CT
Manhattan Suburbs
SOV 4% 8% 21% 19% 12%
HOV (2+) 2% 4% 8% 10% 4%
Subway 38% 55% 5% 12% 2%
Bus 15% 12% 5% 35% 2%
Rail <1% 2% 60% 22% 77%
Ferry 0% 1% <1% 1% 0%
Taxicab 5% 2% <1% <1% 1%
Walk, Bicycle 27% 12% <1% <1% 2%
Other* 8% 4% <1% <1% <1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NYMTC Journey to Work Analysis, from 1990 census data
*Other includes all other modes of travel including work-a t-home.
7
Because of the terrorist bombing of the World Trade
Center in 1993 and subsequent emergencies, such as the
1999 Queens electrical blackout and the 1995 Toyko
Subway gas attack, the New York City region had
dramatically increased its planning for major
emergencies before September 11, 2001. The New York
City Office of Emergency Management (OEM), under the
direction of the New York City Mayor’s office, significantly
upgraded its resources and preparedness, including the
completion of a new emergency command center in
1999 at 7 World Trade Center. OEM formed a task force to
implement upgrades to the existing emergency
response plans for the New York City region. The region
used the incident command system (ICS). In addition to
following the ICS, individual agencies upgraded their
own internal emergency procedures.
The World Trade Center itself was upgraded after the
1993 bombing with over $90 million worth of safety
improvements, including a duplicate source of power for
safety equipment, such as fire alarms, emergency
lighting and intercoms. Most importantly, building
management took evacuation preparedness seriously,
conducting evacuation drills every six months. Each floor
had “fire wardens,” sometimes high-ranking executives
of a tenant, who were responsible for organizing and
managing an evacuation of their floors. In part because
of this preparedness, 99 percent of the occupants of
each tower on the floors below the crashes survived.
2.2 Day of Event: September 11, 2001
The first airplane attack occurred during the morning rush hour when the city’s
roads, bridges, and transit system were operating at peak capacity. Lower
Manhattan is a major work destination and is served by multiple subway and
rail lines below ground and local and express buses above ground. There are
five major river crossings below 14
th
Street carrying a total of 335,000 autos,
buses, and other vehicles into the area daily. Transportation officials were
immediately faced with the need to make critical decisions on how to respond
in order to protect the safety of the traveling public. The decisions were made
more difficult because of the circumstances that were unfolding at a rapid
pace. Adding to the difficulty were the lack of accurate, immediate information
about the implications and extent of the event, the inability to quickly
communicate agency actions internally and externally, and the need toensure
the safety of their own transportation facilities in the event of possible follow-
up attacks.
Figure 4. Pedestrians Crossing the
Brooklyn Bridge from Manhattan
September 11, 2001 Chronology—The First Hour
8
In the first few minutes there was a lack of accurate information and a sense of
disbelief at the level of destruction. The media quickly broadcast images of the
damage but did not have immediate information on the implications of the
attack. As fires raged in the two buildings, vital utility and communications
systems began to fail. Communications failures included the loss of numerous
radio and communications towers located on top of the towers, the
destruction of the Verizon and Port Authority communications hubs, and an
overwhelming demand for those communications services that were still
operational. As electrical power was lost to the area, traffic signals no longer
worked, hindering traffic movement. The Brooklyn Battery Tunnel lost lighting
and ventilation for the Manhattan portion of the tunnel, forcing motorists to
abandon their cars in the tunnel as smoke and debris poured in. The loss of
electricity made it more difficult to fight the fires resulting from the attack and
to begin pumping operations to prevent flooding of underground transit and
utility facilities.
September 11, 2001 Chronology—The First Hour
Time of Elapsed
Day Time Event/Actions Taken
8:46 a.m.: First plane crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center
(WTC).
8:47 a.m.: [1 min.] An MTA subway operator alerts MTA Subway Control Center of an
explosion in the WTC and begins emergency procedures.
8:52 a.m.: [6 min.] PATH trains begin emergency procedures and proceed to evacuate
WTC station and express Manhattan trains to New Jersey.
9:03 a.m.: [17 min.] Second plane crashes into south tower of WTC.
9:06 a.m. [20 min.] John F. Kennedy International Airport closes for departures, Laguardia
Airport closes for all arrivals and departures at 9:07 and Newark Airport
closes at 9:09.
9:10 a.m.: [24 min.] Port Authority of NY and NJ closes all their bridges and tunnels
eastbound.
9:12 a.m.: [26 min.] George Washington Bridge VMS signs flash “Bridge Closed.”
9:17 a.m.: [31 min.] FAA orders all NYC airports closed until further notice.
morning: Amtrak suspends all nationwide train service; Greyhound cancels
Northeast US operations.
morning: NYC DOT reports that police ordered highways shut down.
9:40 a.m.: [54 min.] FAA halts all US flights.
9:43 a.m.: [57 min.] Third plane crashes into the Pentagon.
9:45 a.m.: [59 min.] The White House evacuates.
9
Within the first hour, each of the transportation agencies had begun internal
emergency procedures and coordination with other agencies. Within minutes
both NYC Transit and PATH had begun emergency operations and were
evacuating transit stations in the World Trade Center area. In the case of NYC
Transit, a subway train operator who had pulled his train into Cortlandt Station
reported the impact of the first plane crash to Subway Operations 1 minute
after the crash. Because of the implementation of emergency procedures
protocol, this was the last train to use the station before it was destroyed in the
collapse of the towers an hour and thirteen minutes later. The PATH system
began similar procedures 6 minutes after the first plane hit ensuring that the
World Trade Center station was evacuated and regular service was suspended
before the PATH station was destroyed.
Under the coordination of the New York Police Department (NYPD), the Port
Authority, MTA and the NYC DOT quickly implemented procedures to close all
the bridge and tunnel crossings into Manhattan. New York and New Jersey
police began the process of closing interstates with major access points into
New York City. The FAA ordered the Port Authority to close all New York City
airports.
TRANSCOM, a coalition of 16 transportation and public safety agencies in the
New York metropolitan region, began the process of alerting other agencies of
the status of facilities and providing updated transportation information to
agencies all along the Northeast Corridor. As facilities were closed, agency
personnel began performing vulnerability assessments of their own facilities.
While New York City transportation agencies had individual and regional
emergency response plans in place, no one had planned for an attack of the
magnitude of September 11. In addition to the loss of key emergency response
and transportation personnel who worked in the command center, the
transportation and communications networks in Lower Manhattan sustained
substantial damage. The World Trade Center served as the major intermodal
transportation hub for Lower Manhattan. The Cortlandt subway station and
the PATH World Trade Center station were both severely damaged during the
collapse of the Twin Towers. Communications hubs for Verizon, TRANSCOM,
and the Port Authority as well as the MTA’s fiber-optic network were all located
either within or in close proximity to the World Trade Center. All of these were
totally or partially destroyed, severing communications during the first few
hours after the attack. This hindered the ability to communicate internally and
externally during the first few critical hours.
Adding to the confusion in the first hour was the fact that several emergency
controls centers, including the City’s, FEMA’s and the Port Authority’s, were
located in the World Trade Center complex. At 9:00 a.m., 14 minutes after the
first plane crashed into the World Trade Center, city officials activated the city’s
OEM Emergency Operations Center at 7 World Trade Center. After hearing a
voice on police radio and a second blast three minutes later, New York City
OEM abandoned its 7 World Trade Center offices. The OEM found functioning
10
phones at a Merrill Lynch office on 75 Barclay Street, about 1 block from 7
World Trade Center. OEM staff set to work immediately getting the White
House on the phone and contacting other key members of the command
team.
As the south tower of the World Trade Center collapsed at 10:05 a.m., the OEM
fled its temporary Merrill Lynch location as the area became engulfed in dust,
dirt and debris. They next set up command at a fire station in West Village,
about a mile north of the Merrill Lynch location. After about an hour, lack of
desks and insufficient space forced the team to leave the fire station in search
of larger quarters.
Around 11:00 a.m., the New York City OEM moved its command center to the
6th Floor Library of the New York City Police Academy on 20
th
Street, about a
mile north of the West Village location. Police Department technicians began
running replacement phone lines into a few essential offices inside the NYC
OEM makeshift command center at the Police Academy.
The Port Authority initially tried to set up a control center in the Marriott Hotel
adjacent to the World Trade Center but they quickly had to abandon that site
because of its proximity to the attack. After that they moved to an interim
center in Jersey City from which they could communicate with Port Authority
facilities and the City’s OEM.
September 11, 2001 Chronology- Late Morning
Time of Elapsed
Day Time Event/Actions Taken
9:59 a.m.: [1 hr. 13 min.] South tower of WTC collapses. Impact measures 2.1 on the Richter scale.
morning: NY state activates its Emergency Operations Center in Albany. Governor
activates the National Guard.
10:20 a.m.: [1 hr. 34 min.] NYC Transit suspends all subway service.
10:29 a.m.: [1 hr. 43 min.] North tower of WTC collapses. Impact measures 2.3 on the Richter scale.
Port Authority headquarters destroyed in the collapse.
10:30 a.m.: [1 hr. 44 min.] NJ Transit stops rail service into Manhattan’s Penn Station.
10:45 a.m.: [1 hr. 59 min.] PATH operations were suspended.
10:53 a.m.: [2 hr. 7 min.] NY primary elections are postponed.
11:02 a.m.: [2 hr. 16 min.] As tens of thousands abandon cars and subway to stream across
Manhattan bridges on foot, Mayor Giuliani urges, “Stay calm, stay at
home… If you are south of Canal Street, get out. Walk slowly and
carefully. If you can’t figure what else to do, just walk north.”
11
By the second hour, a horrible event became even worse as the two towers
began collapsing, spreading thousands of tons of debris and ash over Lower
Manhattan. Visibility was diminished and breathing became difficult for those
leaving the area as well as for those emergency personnel responding to the
scene. Electrical and communications failures spread throughout Lower
Manhattan as the collapsing World Trade Center towers took down
surrounding infrastructure along with it.
At 11:02, Mayor Giuliani instructed the over 1 million workers and residents in
Lower Manhattan to evacuate the area. New York City DOT and the New York
Police Department (NYPD) began the process of closing down city streets. The
loss of electricity meant that some traffic signals in Lower Manhattan were not
operable, requiring NYPD personnel to direct traffic at key intersections.
Figure 5 shows a view of West Street on the afternoon of September 11 with
the entire area covered is a layer of soot and ash. Figure 6 is a map showing the
status of transportation facilities on the day of September 11. The map shows
that most facilities around Manhattan were closed.
With the closing of the subway and rail service approximately an hour and a
half after the attack, transit options were limited. With most New York City
businesses closing mid-morning for the day, the remaining 2.6 million New
Figure 5. Looking south down West Street on September 11
Source: AP/World WidePhotos
12
Figure 6. Transportation Conditions on September 11
t
r
C
13
York City workers outside Lower Manhattan were forced to improvise whatever
sequence of trip routes that would get them home. For many, the trip home
took several hours longer than normal. Intercity travel ground to a halt as the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shut down the commercial air network
and Amtrak and bus lines halted service. To facilitate evacuation and
emergency response the bridges along the East River were open for
pedestrians leaving Manhattan and for emergency vehicles entering
Manhattan. The Coast Guard began the process of overseeing a makeshift
flotilla of water ferries and private boats to help evacuate people from Lower
Manhattan.
September 11, 2001 Chronology- afternoon to night
Time of Elapsed
Day Time Event/Actions Taken
~ Noon: [3 hr. 14 min.] A NYC Transit employee stands in front of Grand Central Terminal with a
megaphone to try to dispense advice to travelers.
12:48 p.m.: [4 hr. 2 min.] Partial NYC Transit subway service resumes, with many routes truncated or
diverted to avoid Lower Manhattan.
1:15 p.m.: [4 hr. 29 min.] Long Island RR runs limited service eastbound only from Penn Station.
2:30 p.m.: [5 hr. 44 min.] Subway system begins to return to normal except for trains under Lower
Manhattan.
3:50 p.m.: [7 hr. 4 min.] FEMA activates four urban search and rescue teams in New York.
4:12 p.m.: [7 hr. 26 min] PATH service between Newark and Journal Square resumed.
4:40 p.m.: [7 hr 54 min.] PATH uptown New York line to New Jersey resumes service.
afternoon: By evening rush, several public and private water ferry companies are
providing additional ferry service to New Jersey, Queens, and
Brooklyn, evacuating about 160,000 people from Manhattan.
afternoon: 200,000 phone lines in Lower Manhattan are crippled, telephone and
cellular service is overloaded when Verizon central hub at WTC damaged.
5:20 p.m.: [ 8 hr. 34 min.] WTC Building 7, headquarters of NYC Office of Emergency Management
(OEM), collapses.
6:00 p.m.: [ 9 hr. 14 min.] Amtrak resumes passenger rail service.
7:02 p.m.: [10 hr. 16 min.] Some NY bridges open to outbound traffic.
7:30 p.m.: [10 hr. 44 min.] Long Island Rail Road restores full schedule east and westbound.
Nightfall: 750 National Guard troops are in NYC to assist police.
End of day: 65% of subway service is back in operation. Throughout the day, MTA
bus service continues running north of Lower Manhattan.
AT&T reports that it has handled the largest one-day volume of calls in its history
14
The transportation system that had closed for normal operations was needed
to help respond to the needs of the various federal, state, and local emergency
response personnel. At this point, it was assumed that those needing medical
treatment would number in the thousands, so it was important to keep routes
to area hospitals open to emergency vehicles. The Fire Department of the City
of New York (FDNY) had 15,000 employees and as many as 11,000 firefighters
respond to the WTC attacks. At least 1,000 law enforcement personnel from
New York State, surrounding counties, and National Guard police were in New
York City by nightfall on September 11
th
.
By the afternoon, transportation agencies were completing their own internal
vulnerability assessments of their facilities and were beginning the process of
restoring service to help people leave Manhattan. While Manhattan tunnel and
bridge crossings remained closed, transit was slowly returning. By 12:48 partial
subway service resumed north of Lower Manhattan. New Jersey Transit had
rerouted bus service to pick up people who had taken water ferries from
Manhattan. The commuter rail lines began to run limited service out of
Manhattan. By night, some river crossings were opened for outbound traffic
out of Manhattan.
Figure 7. Ambulances on a Manhattan Street on September 11
Source: AP/World Wide Photo
15
Evacuating Lower Manhattan
While the evacuation of Lower Manhattan was chaotic, it was an “interesting
phenomenon,” according to the NYPD. “It happened almost as if it were
rehearsed, but no one had ever planned for it. Everyone followed the flow of
people leaving the city. The vehicles just followed the people. If you had a car,
you just went.” The NYPD reported that traffic jams and abandoned vehicles
were not a problem in Lower Manhattan. More than likely this was due to the
fact that so many people in Lower Manhattan rely on walking or transit, rather
than the automobile.
According to the NYPD, the oversight of the evacuation of Lower Manhattan
followed a protocol, with the tallest buildings evacuated first. Private
companies relied on in-building security personnel to oversee the evacuation,
and staff followed pre-practiced evacuation plans.
The in-place evacuation procedure for the City follows a protocol: mass transit
shuts down, high threat areas (including bridges and tunnels) are secured, and
tunnels and access points are secured for emergency vehicles. Police directed
traffic and pedestrians from their regularly posted positions at bridges and
tunnels according to this evacuation protocol. Most people initially left the
World Trade Center area on foot. Some walked north and, in their search for
bridges, discovered piers with ferry service across the Hudson River. Others
just seemed to know that “ferries were the quickest way out of Manhattan.”
People who were trying to cross into Brooklyn were able to use the series of
bridges across the East River. Buses were rerouted to pick up passengers on the
Brooklyn side of the bridges and take them to destinations in Staten Island,
Queens, Brooklyn and Long Island. Those trying to cross into New Jersey from
Manhattan had fewer options because the only river crossings in the area
across the Hudson River are tunnels. Therefore people had to rely on the
numerous ferries pressed into service that day. One official described the scene
on the Hudson River as looking like “the Dunkirk evacuation.” Because of the
volume of people trying to get across the river, people experienced waits of up
to three hours that morning. New Jersey Transit rerouted its service to pick up
passengers disembarking on the New Jersey side. Figure 8 shows a Circle Line
cruise boat ferrying passengers from Manhattan to New Jersey on September
11.
According to the Port Authority, 160,000 people evacuated New York City on
NY Waterway ferries, and 250,000 to 300,000 left by other water transportation,
which included Coast Guard vessels and other privately operated dining boats
and even tug boats. A retired fire boat evacuated 150 people on September
11, and came back to pump water to the World Trade Center site. This ad hoc
flotilla operation was overseen by the U.S. Coast Guard, with the assistance of
the Port Authority and NYC DOT.
Meanwhile, traffic was piling up outside Lower Manhattan. Places like the
Queensboro Bridge and Holland Tunnel had extensive traffic jams. One New
16
Yorker tells a story of catching a bus going uptown in Manhattan, thinking it
would be faster than walking, “only to sit for 15 minutes at a dead stop in the
traffic jam that was moving up 3
rd
Avenue before the 59
th
street entrance to the
Queensboro bridge.” She got out and walked. The Associated Press reported
that traffic entering NYC from New Jersey was at a standstill approaching the
Holland Tunnel as motorists stood outside their cars and watched the fire.
Many morning commuters heading into Manhattan, stranded as the Lincoln
Tunnel was shut down to incoming traffic, left their cars to stand on the tunnel
on-ramp and watch the smoke pouring from the World Trade Center towers.
The press gave several accounts of the chaos and confusion that followed.
According to Newsday and Newsweek, as the first tower collapses:
Police close off city streets, creating bottlenecks and bumper-
to-bumper traffic for miles. Cars clog streets, mixed with
thousands of pedestrians fleeing. Streets are littered with
high-heeled shoes, abandoned by women on the run. Two
women knock on the window of a closed sporting goods store,
pleading for sneakers for the walk home to Queens. Police
stop cars to ask drivers leaving Manhattan to take extra
passengers, while people taking cabs also take extra
Figure 8. Ferry Passengers on September 11
Source: AP/World Wide Photo
17
customers. Some of the last few motorists who make it onto
the bridges stop to pick up straggling pedestrians. Emergency
vehicles occasionally split the mass exodus of people.
Commuters devise alternate routes that lengthen their travel in
some cases by hours. Thousands jam onto buses and ferries.
At the base of the Manhattan Bridge, police prevent people
from crossing into Manhattan; pedestrians and motorists are
allowed to exit Manhattan by the bridges, but only official
vehicles can enter Manhattan.
And as the second tower collapses:
With police loudspeakers urging drivers on the Whitestone
Expressway to keep moving, drivers ignore the order and pull
over to watch the second WTC tower collapse. The highway
scene is “straight out of a… horror movie. Horns blew, tires
screeched, loudspeakers blared, and car radios blared news of
the disaster.
The Washington Post quotes a fireman at the WTC site when the buildings
collapsed:
It just rained and rained soot, and it was dark. When you see
cops running, you know you’ve got no chance.
On September 11, the Police Department’s emergency management plans
were compromised when their own high-tech headquarters command center
at Police Plaza in Lower Manhattan was forced to evacuate, and many phone,
pager, cellular, email, and other communications systems were down or slow. A
February 5, 2002, Newsday article reported that the NYPD plans to hire an
outside consultant to review NYPD response on September 11. Issues of
concern include NYPD, FDNY, and Port Authority Police accounts of difficulty
controlling and tracking responding personnel, and control problems around
the towers’ perimeter caused by the intersection of hundreds of people
arriving and thousands fleeing.
Taking Action
In general, the NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM) issued “directives”
to transportation agencies and the agencies responded with operating
decisions. These operating decisions were communicated among regional
agencies by TRANSCOM and on Long Island through INFORM, a New York State
DOT traffic management control center, and to the public via regional
intelligent transportation systems (ITS) applications as well as television and
the Internet. According to the NYPD, “ordinarily there are (coordination)
problems within city agencies and between agencies,” however, on September
11, there was a tremendous amount of coordination and cooperation between
agencies. Table 4, on the following page, summarizes the key decisions made
by agencies on September 11.
18
Table 4. Key Decisions by Agency
Agency Key Decisions, Coordination, and Communication
FAAOrdered the closing of the three NYC-area airports. Later, ordered the halt of all aviation
traffic across the country.
FEMA Began the process of implementing response to the “federally declared disaster.”
Federal Highway Implemented “quick release” option for Emergency Relief (ER) funds enabling state and
Administration local agencies to send emergency response teams; helped coordinate relationships
between state and local agencies.
Coast Guard Began process of marshalling public and private boats to Manhattan to aid in the water
evacuation of Manhattan.
MTA Coordinated transit closures and re-routed subway trains by maintaining operations staff
around-the-clock at the Mayor’s OEM who interfaced with Subway Control and Bus
Command Centers. Several bus drivers were forced to make “ad hoc” decisions in
Manhattan after communications were cut off, buses sustained damage from debris, and
hazards blocked roadways.
PANYNJ Coordinated with FAA to close three major airports: Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark. Ferry
division oversaw ferry operator, NY Waterway; contacted NY Waterway to make sure that
vessels were at Battery Park for evacuation; coordinated with Coast Guard and Coast Guard
security zone. Bridges and tunnels coordinated with police for closures and EMS access.
Closed the water port to freight activity. Shut down PATH service.
NJ Transit Coordinated trains and closures through OEM at mobile command center.
NY State DOT Supplied portable VMS, barriers, and backhoes to NYC region with promise of FHWA ER
funds; coordinated with INFORM (a NY State DOT facility) for information dissemination;
provided temporary offices for NYMTC employees.
NY State Police Deployed 23 Highway Emergency Local Patrol (HELP) vehicles to locations in Rockland and
Westchester Counties; deployed 500 troopers to NYC region (to NYC limits) who cleared
highways for EMS vehicles; helped direct EMS vehicles to WTC.
NYC DOT Worked with police to coordinate closing every road, bridge, and tunnel in Lower
Manhattan and show closures on regional VMS; coordinated with NY State DOT out of
Queens TMC.
NYC OEM Coordinated regional response by issuing general “directives” to agency liaisons (police,
fire, transportation, etc.) on-site at OEM; coordinated with Governor and FEMA for disaster
declaration.
NYPD Evacuated lower Manhattan by evacuation protocol, tallest buildings first; directed people
and traffic from “high threat areas” (bridges and tunnels); secured bridges and tunnels for
EMS vehicles.
TRANSCOM Coordinated closures and reopenings of facilities with various agencies. Issued reports of
member agency operating decisions via fax; 800 reports issued in total, terminating on
January 21, 2002.
INFORM Immediately coordinated with police to open up Long Island Expressway for EMS vehicles;
displayed traffic information on regional VMS and deployed portable VMS to NYC bridge
and tunnel entrances; disseminated traffic reports to local agencies, media, and the public;
sent all spare resources to WTC.
19
Closing a facility
Once the OEM made the decision to close the major transportation facilities
leading into Manhattan, it was up to the individual agencies to carry out the
action. Given that each tunnel, bridge or other facility is configured differently,
facility closure plans varied. In general, the closure involved closing the
immediate access to the tunnel portal or bridge span or transit station. For the
bridges and tunnels, this was followed by the establishment of upstream
diversion points to reroute approaching traffic to highway exits and local
streets in advance of the crossing. Remaining traffic in the queue was turned
around using toll plaza roadways or any available roadway area and diverting
the traffic away from Manhattan. The closure required the cooperation and
coordination of agency operations and maintenance staff as well as state and
local police. The agencies also immediately contacted Transcom about the
status of its facility. Transcom then relayed this information to other agencies
and the public.
As an example, the Port Authority decided to close the George Washington
Bridge, located in northern Manhattan, minutes after the initial attack. The Port
Authority had a pre-existing set of procedures for closing the bridge for
incidents, but rarely did it ever close the entire bridge to traffic. Within two
minutes of the decision to close down, the bridge’s variable message signs
(VMS) were flashing messages alerting motorists of the closing. The VMS
extends approximately 12 miles on the New Jersey side and as far as the Cross-
Bronx Expressway on the New York side of the Hudson River. The signs are
located before major decision points so that motorists are able to change their
travel routes in the case of a closing. At the same time, Port Authority
personnel began the process of closing off the bridge access points and New
York and New Jersey state police began the process of closing off interchange
connections leading to the bridge. While closing access to the public, the
bridge remained open to emergency response vehicles and provided a major
link in bringing in equipment for the emergency response effort.
Figure 9, on the following page, gives an overview of the facilities and the
closings that occurred on September 11. This map appeared in the September
12 Washington Post.
Figure 10, on page 21, indicates the changes made to the subway network in
response to the attacks.
20
Figure 9. Day After Newspaper Map
Source: The Washington Post
21
Figure 10. New York City Transit Map of September 24
22
Time of
Day Event/Actions Taken
September 12, 2001 (Day 2)
8:00 a.m.: As a result of President Bush’s NYC disaster declaration, FEMA’s 1-800 help line officially opens.
day: 3,000 National Guard troops are deployed in or near NYC to patrol bridges, tunnels, train stations,
and Ground Zero. Mission: protect transportation links.
Day: MTA Long Island RR and Metro-North RR resume normal weekday service.
Day: PATH ran free service between Newark and 33
rd
Street and between Hoboken and 33
rd
St.
Day: NJ Transit runs regular commuter rail service, but ridership is only 20% of normal as workers stay
home from work.
Day: George Washington (upper level) and Queensboro bridges open to automobile traffic only.
4:40 p.m.: The FAA allows airports to reopen on a limited basis for diverted flights.
5:00 p.m.: Most bridges north of 14
th
St. reopen.
September 13, 2001 (Day 3)
3:00 a.m.: Port Authority reopens the Lincoln Tunnel and the George Washington, Bayonne, and Goethals
Bridges and the Outerbridge Crossing
5:00 a.m.: Port Authority Bus Terminal reopen.
8:00 a.m. Port Authority reopens water port to freight traffic.
Day: PATH began to run the 3 services it operates currently- Newark to 33
rd
St., Hoboken to 33
rd
St. and
Hoboken to Journal Square. (service was no longer free as of this day)
Day: George Washington Bridge upper level opens. Staten Island bridges open.
Day: Greyhound announces it is fully operational at all 3,700 locations in the U.S. and Canada.
Day: Tunnel damage affecting the 1 and 9 subway lines found under the WTC (debris, flooding). Some
station entrances on N and R lines are found to be damaged.
Day: NJ Transit resumes bus service to Port Authority Bus Terminal in Midtown Manhattan, except for
two bus routes that serve Lower Manhattan.
Day: Amtrak increases capacity 30% to accommodate stranded airport passengers.
Day: Traffic downtown sparse; taxis outnumber cars.
6:00 p.m.: Working with NYC DOT and OEM, NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission arranges for TLC-licensed
vehicles to give free rides to hospitals, blood banks, destinations in restricted areas.
Day: Two days of bridge, tunnel, and road blockages into Manhattan lead to widespread disruption of
commercial deliveries, including FedEx and US Postal Service.
2.3 Post-Event: After September 11, 2001
Chronology of Events
The following is a brief summary of the events that occurred after the
September 11 attacks.
23
Time of
Day Event/Actions Taken
September 14, 2001 (Day 4)
6:00 a.m.: Manhattan and Williamsburg Bridges reopen.
11:25 a.m.: CNN reports all three NY area airports — Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark — have reopened.
Day: NY Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) establishes 24-hour hotline to address the taxicab and
for-hire vehicle (FHV) industries’ need for real-time information on access limitations.
September 15, 2001 (Day 5)
Day: New York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management moves to Pier 92
September 16, 2001 (Day 6)
Day: Amtrak and Greyhound report handling twice the normal number of riders systemwide since
September 11. Rental cars also report a surge in business.
September 17, 2001 (Day 7)
6:00 a.m.: Staten Island Ferry service resumes. NYC DOT begins running free ferries: Brooklyn to Manhattan.
September 20, 2001 (Day 10)
Day: Two Manhattan-bound lanes of the Brooklyn Bridge reopen to private vehicles. Brooklyn-bound
lanes remain closed.
September 22, 2001 (Day 12)
In anticipation of Monday September 24 as the worst day of traffic since 9/11 as commuters fully
return to work, NYC DOT urges: use mass transit, “think bikes, think ferries, think subway.”
September 26, 2001 (Day 16)
USDOT requests shippers and transporters of hazardous materials to consider altering routes to
avoid populated areas whenever practicable.
September 27, 2001 (Day 17)
6:00 a.m.: Ban on single-occupancy automobile vehicles (SOV) entering Manhattan weekdays between 6
a.m. and 11 a.m. south of 63
rd
Street on all East River bridges controlled by the City of New York
goes into effect.
September 28, 2001 (Day 18)
3:00 p.m.: Holland Tunnel reopens to westbound auto and bus traffic. It remained restricted to emergency
vehicles in the eastbound direction.
Day: SOV restriction introduced at the Lincoln Tunnel from 6:00 a.m. to noon weekdays.
Day: Mayor Giuliani says bridge/tunnel checkpoints set up by police and FBI will remain indefinitely.
September 30, 2001 (Day 20)
Day: OnStar communications adds real-time traffic reports in a dozen cities, including NYC.
October 4, 2001 (Day 24)
Day: Port Authority officials say they are hurrying to build a new ferry terminal near Battery Park to cut
NJ commute time from 20 minutes to 10.
24
Time of
Day Event/Actions Taken
October 10, 2001 (Day 30)
8:00 p.m.: City reopens most streets south of Canal St. to regular traffic on weekdays from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m.
and all day on weekends.
October 11, 2001 (Day 31)
Day: Port Authority reports that average one-way truck traffic over the George Washington Bridge and
Lincoln Tunnel has increased by 1,700 per day.
October 15, 2001 (Day 35)
5:00 a.m.: Holland Tunnel reopened to revenue traffic eastbound, restricted to HOV+2 autos.
October 17, 2001 (Day 37)
Day: Ban on single-occupancy vehicles entering Manhattan is shortened by 1 hour, to end at 10 a.m. on
weekdays instead of 11 a.m.
October 28, 2001 (Day 48)
5:00 a.m.: Service restored on the N and R subway lines, bypassing Cortlandt Station indefinitely.
November 4, 2001 (Day 55)
NJ Transit sees 44% increase in ridership in and out of Manhattan after September 11.
Dislocation and relocation of offices from Lower Manhattan and the loss of PATH is causing huge
shift in commuting patterns to Midtown.
November 12, 2001 (Day 63)
9:17 a.m.: American Airlines Flight 587 explodes in mid-air, crashing in Queens after takeoff from Kennedy
airport.
9:45 a.m.: Port Authority closes: all bridges and tunnels between Manhattan and NJ to private and
commercial traffic, its bus terminal in Midtown Manhattan, and PATH rapid transit to NJ.
11:00 a.m.: Outbound traffic from Manhattan is allowed to resume.
12:10 p.m.: Most bridges and tunnels reopen.
December 21, 2001 (Day 102)
NYC DOT reports that public and private ferry ridership has more than doubled since the WTC
attacks, from 30,000 to 65,000 daily. Almost a dozen new water ferry routes have been started,
with more than 50 boats now in service. In just 6 weeks, Port Authority of NY and NJ has built a
new Battery Park dock capable of holding 6 ferry boats.
25
Reopening a facility
By the early afternoon transportation agencies were beginning the process of
reopening their facilities to help people leave Manhattan. During the closure
agencies performed vulnerability assessments of their facilities to ensure that
there was no damage done and it was safe to reopen to the general public. The
decision on when to reopen was coordinated with the OEM and NYPD and
information on when each facility would reopen was communicated to other
agencies and the public through Transcom.
Because of heightened security concerns, additional safety precautions were
taken once the facilities were reopened. City and state police personnel as well
as National Guard troops were stationed at key check points to screen vehicles
and passengers. In addition, restrictions were imposed on some facilities to
ensure that emergency vehicles had priority access and that vehicles that
might pose a threat were diverted to certain locations. As an example, trucks
were restricted to the upper level of the George Washington Bridge and were
not allowed on the Holland Tunnel and Brooklyn Bridge.
While open to general traffic, the George Washington Bridge also served as a
major link in providing access for emergency response vehicles. OEM set up a
satellite office at the bridge that maintained contact with Ground Zero. Staging
areas for supplies and equipment were set up in New Jersey. When these were
needed, the information would be relayed from Ground Zero to the OEM office
at the bridge and then police would escort the vehicles from the bridge
through Manhattan streets to the needed locations.
Transportation Conditions After September 11
In the three months after September 11, the transportation network was
slowly returning to normal as mobility was increased and security checkpoints
were reduced. Certain segments of the transit infrastructure within the World
Trade Center area are still out of service and vehicle restrictions were still in
place for Midtown and Lower Manhattan. The airports and water freight port
are back in full operation. Figure 12. Transportation Conditions, late Fall 2001,
provides a post-event synopsis of the transportation network.
On Saturday, September 15, the Mayor’s OEM finally moved its base of
operations to the passenger ship terminal Pier 92 on the west side of Midtown
Manhattan, where all agencies comprising the emergency response team had
an adequate facility from which to direct rebuilding the New York City
infrastructure. While not as technologically-sophisticated as its former
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the World Trade Center, OEM’s
temporary EOC at Pier 92 contained space and equipment for up to 110 city,
state, federal, and private agencies. Among the agencies and organizations that
had consoles at the EOC were New York City Departments of Fire, Police,
Transportation, Buildings, Health, Citywide Administrative Services, Parks and
Recreation, and Environmental Protection, as well as the Economic
26
278
278
278
278
278
87
87
87
95
95
95
95
80
678
495
495
878
878
495
95
MANHATTAN
QUEENS
BROOKLYN
STATEN ISLAND
NEW JERSEY
BRONX
Lincoln
Tun nel
106,000
Queens
Midtown
Tun nel 68,000
Queensboro Bridge
Holland
Tun nel
42,000
Brooklyn
Battery
Tun nel
11,000
Williamsburg
Bridge 67,000
Verrazano-Narrows
Manhattan
Bridge
72,000
Brooklyn
Bridge
57,000
H
e
n
r
y
H
u
d
s
o
n
P
k
w
y
W
e
s
t
S
t
R
o
o
s
e
v
e
l
t
D
r
N
o
rt
h
e
r
n
B
l
v
d
Triborough
Bridge
Bronx-Whitestone
Bridge
177,000
XXX,000
200,000
W. 155th St. Bridge
25,000
37,000
W. 145th St. Bridge
W. 138th St.
Bridge
W. 181th St. Bridge
George Washington
Bridge XXX,00 vehicles/day
P
a
l
i
s
a
d
e
s
P
k
w
y
G
ra
n
d
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
P
k
w
y
World
Trad e
Center
C
a
n
a
l
S
t
1
4
t
h
S
t
La Guardia Airport
JFK Airport
Newark Airport
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
MTA
MTA
MTA
MTA
no vehicles
6
3
r
d
S
t
.
Closed to
commercial
traffic
Closed to
commercial
traffic
Closed weekdays
6am to 8am into
Manhattan
Commercial vehicles
upper level only
SOV ban on all
bridges & tunnels
into Manhattan
south of 63rd St.
M-F 6am-10am
Transit stations closed:
1 & 9 subway - Cortlandt, Rector St., S. Ferry
E subway line - World Trade Center station
N & R subway lines - Cortlandt station
PATH commuter rail -
World Trade Center, Exchange Place stations
MANHATTAN
QUEENS
NEW JERSEY
BRONX
Lincoln
Tun nel
106,000
Queens
Midtown
Tun nel 68,000
Queensboro Bridge
Holland
Tun nel
69,000
Williamsburg
Bridge 67,000
Bridge
Manhattan
Bridge
72,000
Brooklyn
Bridge
57,000
H
e
n
r
y
H
u
d
s
o
n
P
k
w
y
W
e
s
t
S
t
R
o
o
s
e
v
e
l
t
D
r
N
o
rt
h
e
r
n
B
l
v
d
Triborough
Bridge
Bronx-Whitestone
Bridge
177,000
200,000
W. 155th St. Bridge
25,000
37,000
W. 145th St. Bridge
W. 138th St.
Bridge
W. 181th St. Bridge
George Washington
Bridge 295,000 vehicles/day
P
a
l
i
s
a
d
e
s
P
k
w
y
G
ra
n
d
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
P
k
w
y
World
Trad e
Center
C
a
n
a
l
S
t
1
4
t
h
S
t
La Guardia Airport
Newark Airport
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
PANYNJ
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
NYC DOT
MTA
MTA
MTA
6
3
r
d
S
t
.
Closed to
commercial
traffic
Commercial vehicles
upper level only
SOV ban on all
bridges & tunnels
into Manhattan
south of 63rd St.
M-F 6am-10am
Figure 11. Transportation Conditions, late Fall 2001
27
Development Corporation (EDC), the New York State Emergency Management
Office (SEMO) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Additional support was provided by representatives from ConEdison, Verizon,
and Nextel Communications. The Emergency Operations Center was
deactivated on November 23, 2001.
Manhattan Streets
All vehicular traffic was restricted south of Canal Street except for emergency
vehicles and authorized buses. Passenger cars were not allowed south of
Canal Street between 6 AM - 10 AM, Monday through Friday, nor in the frozen
zone by Ground Zero at any time. No pedestrian or vehicular traffic was
permitted within about a one-half mile of Ground Zero. The West Side
Highway from Canal St. to the Battery Park Underpass was closed to all but
High Occupancy Vehicles (HOV) and buses. FDR Drive was closed from the
Brooklyn Bridge to the Battery Park Underpass.
Single Occupancy Vehicle (SOV) Restrictions on
Automobiles
In the weeks following September 11, traffic congestion leading into and
around Manhattan grew worse as vital arteries remained closed, security was
enhanced or restrictions remained in place. September 24 through 26 were
described by a NYC DOT official as the worst traffic days in the city’s history
because of the backups due to security checks and facility closings and
restrictions. An official was quoted in the September 25 New York Daily News
saying, “this is the worst traffic day since Henry Ford created the automobile.”
NYC DOT officials had estimated that 64% of vehicles crossings into Manhattan
were single occupancy automobiles. In response, the Mayor decided to
implement a ban on single occupancy automobiles (SOV) crossing bridges and
tunnels into Manhattan south of 63
rd
Street on weekdays between 6 a.m. and
11 a.m. NYC had an HOV plan from the 1980s that was originally designed to
help alleviate the effects of transit strikes and was able to be implemented
because of the “state of emergency” in Lower Manhattan. As the arterials
around the city began to reopen, the SOV plan took effect starting on
September 27 with the goal of spreading out the traffic entering the city. Since
vehicle counts showed a 23% decrease in traffic south of 63
rd
Street, the NYC
DOT shortened the ban by 1 hour, to end at 10 a.m., starting October 17. Figure
11 shows the traffic impacts of the SOV ban reported by the NYC DOT. They
included:
28
◆ 5 AM – 6 AM: no SOV restrictions. Result: a 26% increase in traffic from 5
AM – 6 AM hour
◆ 6 AM – 10 AM: SOV restrictions in place. Result: a 15% decrease in
traffic from normal peak commute
◆ 10 AM – 2 PM: no SOV restrictions in place. Result: a 9% increase from
normal mid-day traffic
The 15% decrease from the normal peak commute (6 AM – 10 AM) shows that
the SOV ban did deter some commuters from driving to the city alone or
traveling during the peak. The increases in traffic volumes from 10 AM – 1 PM
suggest that employers were sensitive to the new commuting restrictions of
employees and allowed them to adjust their work schedules accordingly.
According to the New York Times, city officials estimated that the SOV ban
contributed to an overall 30% drop in traffic on bridges on September 30. That
figure was down to 23% by October 17, and to 15% by January 3, 2002. ABC TV
in New York reported in December that the SOV restrictions were having three
effects: an earlier citywide rush hour, additional volumes on bridges above 63
rd
Street (e.g., George Washington and Triborough bridges) with corresponding
longer delays on feeder roads, but an overall reduction in volume of traffic on
the highways.
Other Bridge and Tunnel Crossing Restrictions
As of mid-December, commercial vehicles were allowed only on the upper
level of the George Washington Bridge. The Holland Tunnel and the Brooklyn
Bridge were still closed to commercial traffic. The Brooklyn Battery Tunnel was
closed to all Manhattan-bound traffic on weekdays between 6 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
except for emergency vehicles and express buses.
Figure 12. Effect of SOV Ban on Traffic
Effect of SOV Ban on Manhattan
Bridge and Tunnel Traffic
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
26%
5 a.m.–
6 a.m.
-15%
6a.m.–
10 a.m.
9%
10 a.m.–
1 p.m.
% Change in
traffic volume
over normal
29
Vehicle checkpoints were still in effect at Manhattan-bound entrances to the
Queens-Midtown Tunnel, all East River Bridges (Brooklyn, Manhattan,
Williamsburg, and Queensboro Bridges), and the Lincoln Tunnel.
Transit Operations
PATH’s WTC and Exchange Place commuter rail stations remained closed.
Because of their proximity to the World Trade Center damage, the following
New York City Transit subway stations were closed or lines rerouted:
◆ 1 & 9 - Cortlandt, Rector Street, and South Ferry stations closed
◆ E - The World Trade Center subway station closed
◆ N& R - Cortlandt Street station closed
Thousands of west-of-Hudson commuters who previously used PATH to travel
from Penn Station Newark to Lower Manhattan diverted to New Jersey Transit’s
already crowded trains traveling through Newark to New York Penn Station. For
the morning peak period, New Jersey Transit reported ridership growth into
New York Penn Station from 33,700 before September 11 to 48,500 in early
October. These figures reflected an extraordinary crowding on inbound trains
and station platforms. By early December, morning peak ridership had fallen to
43,900 riders.
Ferries
According to the Port Authority, there has been a 91% overall growth in the
use of ferry service after September 11, the highest since the 1940s. Originally,
the Port Authority contracted with NY Waterway to operate ferry service from
New Jersey to the WTC complex to relieve congestion on PATH trains. However,
because of its proximity to the WTC, the Battery Park City Ferry Terminal on the
Hudson River was closed for 6 weeks to the general public following the
attacks. All ferry services were rerouted to Pier 11 on the East River at the base
of Wall Street.
To respond to the increased demand for ferry services, the Port Authority
concentrated on building more facilities in Lower Manhattan. Specifically, a
retrofitted railroad barge was turned into a new ferry landing at Pier A on the
Hudson River, near the southernmost tip of Manhattan. The new 6-slip $3.7
million facility at Pier A significantly reduced queuing at Pier 11. With the
reopening of the Battery Park terminal and the addition of Pier A, the Lower
Manhattan ferries operated by NY Waterway now carry 26,000 daily riders
(5,000 through Battery Park and 21,000 through Pier A) where they used to
transport only 12,000 (through Battery Park only). In addition, new ferry
terminals have been constructed at Pavonia/Newport opposite Lower
Manhattan and in South Amboy and Keyport in Southern New Jersey. Figure
13, on the following page, shows the locations of service in the area as of mid-
December, 2001.
30
BRONX
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Port Imperial
Weehawken
Midtown
W. 38th St.
Lincoln Harbor
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Hoboken North
Hoboken South
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Jersey City
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Jersey City
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Figure 13. Ferry Service, late Fall 2001
31
Since September 11, the Staten Island Ferry, which previously had carried both
passengers and vehicles between Staten Island and Battery Park in Lower
Manhattan, no longer permits vehicles, preventing about 1,000 vehicles per
day from using the ferry to cross into Manhattan. The main reason for this
restriction is to reduce the amount of vehicular traffic in Lower Manhattan.
This section contains the set of findings generated from an analysis of all the
information collected in our research and interviews. This report attempts to
answer questions about how transportation agencies responded to the attack
on September 11 and what lessons were learned. This includes an assessment
of the following questions:
◆ Were the key players prepared?
◆ What happened?
◆ Who took action?
◆ What aspects of the emergency response worked well and why, and
what aspects did not work well and why?
◆ What role did technology play in these aspects with respect to
emergency response and recovery?
◆ What was learned, what could be done differently, and what can be
incorporated into the planning process?
Based on this review, four observations were identified:
◆ Key Players were somewhat prepared. Key players were partially
prepared because of actions taken in response to the terrorist attack of
the World Trade Center in 1993 and other subsequent major and
minor events such as the Year 2000 (Y2K) concern, blackouts, special
major events, and weather-related events. Actions taken since 1993
included forming a security Task Force in 1993, upgrading emergency
procedures, and investing in additional emergency response and
communications infrastructure. Although the key players were
prepared for standard emergency operations, agencies were not
totally prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of the attack. A major
shortfall included the lack of true redundancy in key communications
and utility systems.
◆ Key players made some ad-hoc decisions. Some of the new
infrastructure was destroyed in the attack as emergency control
centers and communications hubs located near the WTC were
damaged or destroyed. These setbacks forced agencies to make ad-
hoc emergency management decisions. Ad-hoc decisionmaking is
likely to occur in any type of disaster, albeit at a different scale and
frequency. The failure of communications systems experienced on
September 11 hindered the ability to quickly make and relay decisions
to key personnel.
3.0 Findings
32
◆ Mayor’s OEM coordinated decisionmaking. In the minutes after the
attack, individuals and independent agencies began to take actions on
their own. These actions are discussed in the Advance Preparations
section. Within a short amount of time, the New York City Office of
Emergency Management (OEM) began to take overall control for making
and disseminating regional transportation-related decisions. The FBI and
FEMA were involved on the Federal level. The OEM was hindered in the
first few hours because its Control Center was destroyed and the agency
was forced to move four times within the first day.
◆ Safety took priority over mobility. The main focus of transportation
operators on September 11 was safety at the expense of mobility. The
reinstitution of mobility to the transportation system continues gradu-
ally but certain restrictions remain in place.
Some aspects of the response that worked well include:
◆ The activation of emergency procedures by the transit agencies to
ensure the safety of its customers — there was not a single rapid transit-
related injury or death on September 11.
◆ The mobilization of transportation resources to the scene to establish
power and communications lines and provide heavy machinery, mobile
generators, and skilled personnel helped reestablish vital communica-
tions and utility links.
◆ The ability of field staff to quickly make good decisions on their own in
the absence of headquarters personnel.
◆ The coordinated dissemination of information provided by TRANSCOM.
◆ Certain forms of communications technology such as Blackberry pagers,
e-mail, and two-way radios.
◆ The transportation system’s ability to provide alternative transportation
options.
◆ Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) technology both within and
outside of the region.
Some aspects that did not work as well include:
◆ Relying on Emergency Management Centers that were located in a high
threat location. Because the centers were located within the World Trade
Center complex they were destroyed and unable to be used during the
response and therefore critical time was spent setting up temporary
centers.
◆ Lack of true redundancy in the communications, utility, and emergency
response systems.
◆ Lack of real-time information providing transportation options and
33
updates for public dissemination on the morning of the attack.
◆ Certain communications networks including landlines and cellular
telephones that did not function due to overwhelming demand or
damage to the infrastructure.
Five lessons learned that could be incorporated into future planning were also
identified:
◆ Pre-existing relationships among key personnel are the key to
emergency management success. There is a need for pre-existing
relationships both internal to an agency and with other public and
private agencies. When asked what role FHWA played in the response,
several New York City agencies responded that the greatest help given
was the provision of Federal funds and support to regional operational
activities over the previous decade. Beginning in the mid 1980s, FHWA
provided Federal funding to help nurture regional operations activi-
ties such as the I-95 Coalition and TRANSCOM. The coordination of
day-to-day operations activities on a regional basis paid dividends
during the emergency situation.
◆ The need for preparation and training for all shifts of workers
under various emergency response scenarios. Field staff is often
forced to make critical decisions with little time for consultation with
others. It is imperative that the field staff be given proper training to
make the right decision under stressful conditions.
◆ An Incident Command System can provide a tool for advance
preparations. The emergency plan used by the New York City region
is based on the Incident Command System (ICS) which was adopted
by FEMA. This system provides a framework for emergency operations
and can serve as the model tool for the command, control, and coordi-
nation of resources at an emergency. This plan can be adopted and
adapted by communities of any size throughout the nation for various
emergencies.
◆ Technology aids decisionmaking. Timely decisionmaking is a
function of available information and the communication of that
information. The application of ITS to transportation operations can
aid in emergency response among public and private agencies and
internal and external communications.
◆ Essential systems require redundancy. There is a need to rethink
the definition of redundancy. It is important to have additional re-
sources available off-site to ensure the continuous operation of facili-
ties. This was especially important with the emergency management
34
centers in this case. Agencies need backup remote facilities that can
be activated if an event damages the primary emergency manage-
ment center or operations control center. Redundancy is necessary
within the transportation system as well as with communications,
utilities, personnel, and other facilities.
The findings are grouped into the following sections:
◆ Advance Preparations and Planning
◆ Institutional Coordination
◆ Guiding Priority: Safety
◆ Communications
◆ The Role of Advanced Technologies
◆ System Redundancy and Resiliency.
3.1 Advance Preparations and Planning
Advance emergency preparations were the backbone of New York City’s
emergency response after the terrorist attacks on September 11. Although the
City’s emergency response team was not fully prepared for a terrorist attack of
the magnitude of that which occurred on September 11, practicing emergency
response prior to the attacks for other disasters through the region’s Incident
Command System (ICS) gave both the agencies involved and the public a high
level of confidence in the ability of New York City to manage the emergency
situation.
FEMA and the Incident Command System (ICS)
On average, there is a federally declared disaster somewhere in the country
once every eight days. In the year 2001 there were 46 federally declared
disasters requiring FEMA assistance in 29 states plus Guam and Puerto Rico.
The disasters resulted from a variety of conditions including:
◆ Severe storms
◆ Floods
◆ Freezes/Ice Storms
◆ Tropical storms
◆ Terrorist attacks
◆ Earthquakes
◆ Winter storms
◆ Tornados
35
Every disaster requires a coordinated response from local, state, regional, and
federal government agencies including those involved in transportation,
underscoring the importance of a pre-existing disaster plan for emergency
management. Agencies must provide mobility and ensure the safety of
emergency response personnel and citizens affected by the disaster.
The ICS was used by New York City to handle response to the World Trade
Center attacks. ICS is one of the FEMA-adopted emergency response tools that
provides a general plan for managing all types of disasters and subsequent
emergencies, yet is adaptable to the specific needs of a community or region.
New York City’s Office of Emergency
Management (OEM)
Emergency response management starts at the local level where disaster
situations are identified, then moves to the state level where the Governor is
contacted for assistance, and finally the federal level for Presidential approval
and crisis management response and coordination through FEMA for
consequence management and through the FBI for investigative
responsibilities in terrorist emergencies. The involvement of the FBI affects the
way in which the situation is handled, making the response much different
from that of a natural disaster. In this case, agencies involved must be flexible in
their emergency response procedures, as the emergency rapidly becomes a
crime scene.
Although NYC was declared a Federal disaster area, the initial decisions for
managing the crisis were initiated by the New York City Office OEM. This multi-
jurisdictional agency was created in 1993 to operate as the centerpiece of all
New York City emergencies. The Mayor’s OEM gives commands to the agencies
involved in decision-making, and is responsible for contacting the Governor’s
office and asking the Governor to declare a “State of Emergency.” The OEM
comprises personnel drawn from several agencies:
◆ The Mayor’s Office, including the Office for People with Disabilities
◆ The NYC Police and Fire Departments
◆ The NYC Department of Transportation
◆ The NYC Department of Information Technology and Communications
◆ The NYC Departments of Corrections, Environmental Protection, Parks
and Recreation, Buildings, Sanitation, Citywide Administrative Services,
and Emergency Medical Service
◆ The American Red Cross
By following the pre-existing ICS system, NYC’s OEM was prepared to quickly
manage the crisis as it unfolded. By the end of the day on September 11, the
head of FEMA reported that President Bush ordered the release of Federal
disaster resources and funds for the New York City region, based on New York
36
Governor George E. Pataki’s expedited request for Federal assistance. This aid
supported emergency response efforts to the catastrophic terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center. FEMA followed the U.S. Government Interagency
Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) established for
such terrorist events leaving the FBI to lead the terrorist investigation and the
Justice Department to head crisis management.
Transportation Agency Preparations
Outside the OEM, public agencies (in both New York and the other
surrounding states) have detailed emergency response plans that are
practiced routinely throughout each year. Private companies also have
emergency response procedures and evacuation plans for employees. This
was especially true for companies located in the World Trade Center, in
response to the 1993 bombing incident. These plans coordinate decision
making both internally and externally in conjunction with the OEM. To aid in
transportation operations decision-making during emergencies, TRANSCOM
disseminates (both internally and externally) the decisions of its 16
transportation and public safety agencies so that they can make informed
decisions based on the decisions of partner agencies.
Transportation agencies involved in September 11 emergency response were
well equipped to handle the operating decisions required as a result of the
general commands issued by the OEM. Agencies placed personnel at the OEM
to receive commands firsthand and pass commands to their agency’s
emergency response center. At agency emergency response centers, key
players gathered to make decisions and relay them back to the OEM and
TRANSCOM. A Port Authority representative commented that many of the
most valuable actions taken on September 11 benefited from having the small
things in place, such as people trained in evacuation procedures, having
emergency lighting in place, and most importantly, practice.
Key decision makers also had success in dealing with the OEM, other
transportation agencies, and the public. After the 1993 bombing, task forces
were developed in the metropolitan region allowing transportation agencies
to build relationships between agencies and across services to fire, police, and
other city departments. These relationships helped support the City’s OEM in
following the ICS on September 11 and, in general, give the agencies and the
public a level of confidence in times of crisis.
The Human Factor in Advanced Preparation
Emergency response plans depend upon the human element for
implementation. Although practice in an emergency command center
environment is a key element in smooth response to a disaster, human
creativity and teamwork become critical when the unpredictable happens.
Every emergency can be different in its complexity and personnel are often
required to make quick decisions that may have dramatic consequences on
37
the safety of people in the area. The quality of the agency’s staff, their ability to
work together, and their preparedness at all levels of the organization to
handle difficult, changing situations is a key to a successful response.
The FHWA stressed the importance of “knowing your people” in all offices so
that you can depend on them in time of crisis. An official at New Jersey Transit
noted the importance of “practice, practice, and more practice for
emergencies.” He also stressed the need to train “not just your first string but
also your second and third string because disasters don’t always happen
Monday through Friday 9 to 5.” As seen on September 11, a number of key
transportation staff members were either lost or injured that day and the
responsibility for decisionmaking fell to others. Staff in the field was
confronted with making operations decisions in the minutes and hours after
the attack, often without input from senior staff. One field staff noted that
“there was no one to talk to at headquarters; it was gone.”
The success of the mobilization provided by transportation agencies in
helping to evacuate the World Trade Center area on September 11 and the
reinstitution of transportation mobility in the days following is not only a
testament to the dedication of the management and command center
operations staff, but a salute to the teamwork and creativity shown at all levels.
The following examples highlight the quick response and creative thinking
built into the transportation organizations involved, right down to the field
level, that helped save lives while providing mobility for the region.
Figure 14. Subway Station on Morning of Sept. 11
Source: AP/World Wide Photo
38
At 8:47 a.m., an R train subway operator felt the impacts of the crash while in
Cortlandt Station and radioed Subway Operations Control Center. NYC Transit
immediately implemented emergency procedures. The train personnel
ensured that everyone from the platform boarded the train and then
expressed the train to City Hall Station. That was the last train to enter or leave
Cortlandt Station before it was destroyed during the collapse of the towers.
At 8:52 a.m., six minutes after the first plane crashed in the towers, the PATH
service operator began emergency procedures and instructed Manhattan
trains to begin the evacuation of the WTC station. By 9:10, three trains had
been able to carry everyone from the WTC station to a safe location in New
Jersey.
The George Washington Bridge lost all of its land-based outside telephone
lines when the central Port Authority communications system at the WTC was
destroyed. Bridge personnel realized that the 1-800 telephone lines that were
part of their intelligent transportation system were still functioning. If some of
these lines were switched to outside lines, the staff would be able to re-
establish phone service. When they were in the process of closing the bridge,
they spotted a Verizon truck in the traffic. Recognizing an unexpected
opportunity, they persuaded the technician to help with their technical needs.
A short time later, they had outside telephone lines available for use.
3.2 Institutional Coordination
The pre-existence of well-established interagency relationships among the
many transportation and emergency personnel in New York City was one of
the most important success factors in managing the post-terrorist situation.
The events of 1993 had a significant impact on better preparing New York City
agencies for what came on September 11. After the first bombing, task forces
were developed in the metropolitan region among transportation agencies
and the police and fire departments, all coordinated through the mayor’s OEM.
Through these task forces, the players had the opportunity to build good
professional relationships prior to September 11. These relationships proved to
be the major sustaining factor in a crisis situation, and are helpful for any type
of crisis. Additionally, since there have been weather incidents and other minor
emergencies in the New York City region since the 1993 bombing,
professionals have gotten to know each other and practiced emergency
procedures.
An event that requires simultaneous closures of multiple facilities in an
effective and timely way requires the close coordination of many parties both
within and outside each agency. In the case of the Port Authority, it relied on its
operations, police and maintenance staff to coordinate the closure of its
facilities. In addition, the operation was supported by multiple state and local
police agencies, as well as fire departments and emergency services agencies.
Each agency, in addition to its participation in the multi-agency task forces, had
The existence of
well-established
interagency rela-
tionships among the
many transporta-
tion and emergency
personnel in New
York City was one of
the most important
success factors in
managing the post-
terrorist situation.
39
also set up internal emergency command centers. For instance, NYC Transit has
a general emergency response plan that they use for all emergencies,
including for weather (they go into a practiced emergency response mode
whenever the temperature drops below 20 degrees F). Staff is assigned to
duties at the emergency command center based on a known rotation. This
center is totally separate from regular operations and every operating and
critical non-operating function is represented, including track, signals, power,
and planning. At the emergency command center, decision makers were able
to communicate with key players, most importantly the mayor’s office and
TRANSCOM. The following examples highlight some emergency command
decisions made after the September 11 attacks:
◆ OEM makes general command decisions. The OEM made general
command decisions, such as closing Lower Manhattan, and passed
these decisions to local, state, and federal agencies. OEM includes not
only the mayor’s office, but also all city emergency service personnel.
◆ TRANSCOM communicates operating decisions. TRANSCOM then
communicated the operating decisions of its 16 agencies among
them, issuing reports on the decisions of each agency and allowing all
the other agencies to adjust accordingly. These updates were as
frequent as once an hour during the first week after the attack. As
other public and private entities recognized the importance of the
information, more and more requested to be put on the transmission
list. TRANSCOM reported that, over a short period of time, it went from
providing information to about 40 agencies to communicating with
over 400 organizations. These additional groups included various
media outlets, private transportation firms and associations that could
then disseminate the information among its members or to the public.
◆ I-95 Corridor Coalition coordinates travel on Interstate Highway
95. Working with TRANSCOM, the coalition provided information
sharing between agencies regarding incidents, events, traffic condi-
tions, and delays and coordinated messages and requests for conges-
tion management and highway advisory radio between various
agencies along the I-95 Corridor from Maine to Delaware.
◆ FEMA sends personnel, FBI assumes overall command. The FEMA
command center in World Trade Center Building 7 was destroyed
during the attacks; however, FEMA liaisons were on-site immediately.
The FBI assumed command since the World Trade Center was quickly
designated a crime scene.
40
◆ FAA closes airports. JFK, LaGuardia, Newark followed FAA procedures
for the shutdown. The airports have standard procedures for closing
due to snow storms, hurricanes, etc. that they implement. Immediately
after the second plane crashed into the towers, the general managers
of the three airports spoke with each other and decided to shut down
the airports immediately. New Jersey Transit provided additional buses
to help get passengers out of Newark airport.
Coordinating emergency response with the private sector is another important
piece of institutional coordination. TRANSCOM is an important link for public
and private transportation operators because it communicates member
agency decisions to public and private agencies throughout the region.
Just as public agencies made operating decisions based on general emergency
commands, private operators, too, made individual operating decisions based
on the events and the decisions of the agencies around them and the general
commands issued by the NYC OEM and the FBI. Amtrak, for example,
suspended service nationwide for a top-to-bottom security sweep, Greyhound
Bus Lines canceled operations and shut down terminals, Bloomingdale’s
department store remained open to serve as shelter to stranded employees,
Marriott evacuated all NYC hotels, and by the evening hours, Circle Line Tours
and the New York Waterway provided free ferry service to New Jersey, Queens,
and Brooklyn, evacuating 160,000 people from Manhattan.
The Role of the FHWA
The FHWA acted quickly to begin to coordinate the road relief effort as well as
the efforts of other agencies involved in emergency response. Normally, FHWA
would also start working with its state and local partners to begin the process
to remove debris from the roadways, but due to the nature and the extent of
the terrorist attacks, the FHWA authorized FEMA to coordinate debris removal
while beginning to coordinate the NY State DOT, FTA, EPA, and FEMA for
restoration efforts. The presence of the FHWA and their immediate promise of
emergency relief (ER) funds (the quick release option made these funds
available in one day) gave the NY State DOT the ability to immediately send
construction personnel to Lower Manhattan. The FHWA also served as
mediator and helped solve problems that arose between the state and local
agencies involved with emergency response.
In the weeks and months that followed the terrorist attacks, FHWA action to
rebuild the highway system was mostly kept on hold until debris and wreckage
were cleared. Even three months later, the event is “still happening,” in that the
destruction of the highway network continues to grow with every debris-
hauling truck or temporary asphalt surface laid. The FHWA estimates that
about one-half of the damage to the highway system occurred on September
11, the other one-half will result from short-term mitigation efforts to aid the
rescue efforts. Because of the temporary “fixes” used to aid search and rescue
efforts (an additional one foot of asphalt, for example, laid on the West Side
41
Highway), it is difficult to assess the total structural damage of the NYC
highway network. However, NYC DOT and NY State DOT damage inspection
reports submitted in January 2002 estimate that permanent repair of federal-
aid highways will cost around $242 million.
Even though the FHWA had to rely on temporary highway fixes to allow crews
to access the World Trade Center in the months following September 11, the
role the FHWA played in coordinating agency relationships before September
was long-term and sustaining. Transportation agencies involved in the
emergency response noted the pre-September 11 importance of the FHWA in
helping to nurture the relationships between agencies that were so valuable
on September 11. Two agencies that played a crucial role in disseminating
information to transportation agencies and the media were TRANSCOM and
the I-95 Corridor Coalition.
3.3 Guiding Priority: Safety
Because of the nature of the event on September 11, the top priority in the
hours and days after the attack was safety. This meant that security was
increased to protect people and facilities from further harm. Mobility for
passenger and freight traffic was restricted as safety took priority. On the
national level, the FBI took the lead in protecting the site and deciding what
should remain open and what should be closed. On the local level, the Mayor’s
OEM was the central decision making body. The transportation officials
responded to the needs of emergency personnel in deciding what facilities to
open and close. Their primary goal was to support the needs of the police, fire,
and emergency rescue agencies, which included two actions:
◆ Allow priority access for emergency vehicles and personnel to and
from the site.
◆ Give transportation agencies time to inspect their own facilities to
ensure the safety of the facility from possible further attack.
Within two hours of the first plane crash and in some cases minutes, most of
the major transportation facilities in Manhattan were closed. This included all
the major bridges and tunnels into and out of Manhattan, most local streets
below Canal Street and all airports in the region. The transit system, with the
exception of local MTA buses, was closed.
While closed to the general public, the facilities remained open to provide
mobility for the emergency response efforts on September 11 and the months
following. The agencies coordinated with the OEM to ensure that personnel
and equipment were able to quickly arrive at the scene. The Holland Tunnel
became a crucial access point from the west and the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel
from the east. In the months following, facility closures allowed for prioritized
debris removal, which tremendously assisted in shrinking the frozen zone over
time.
42
These closings presented a logistical nightmare for transportation officials, as
they had to deal with aiding hundreds of thousands of people in leaving
Manhattan while providing transportation corridors for emergency personnel.
The major forms of transportation for people for the several hours after the
attack were walking, city buses, and water ferry service. Even though the
closing imposed a great inconvenience upon the traveling public, there was
broad public support and understanding for the need to place safety over
mobility. As time passed and officials ensured that proper safety measures
were in place, transportation officials were able to increase mobility. Some
restrictions are still in place.
One of the many dramatic statistics from the day is that not a single rail
customer sustained an injury on the transit system on September 11. The
emphasis on safety over mobility contained within the existing emergency
response plans of the regional transportation agencies allowed transportation
personnel to quickly respond on their own. Security of the transportation
system after the September 11 attacks went hand-in-hand with safety, and
continues to be a priority to this day.
3.4 Communications
Communications immediately after the September 11 attacks were a
challenge for transportation agencies coordinating emergency response
procedures. Transportation agencies had to focus on the following primary
communications needs:
◆ Immediate emergency response and communication with field staff
◆ Internal agency decisions
◆ External decision dissemination (to OEM and to TRANSCOM)
◆ Public information dissemination.
Immediate communication with agency field staff directly involved in the
September 11 attacks was difficult because landlines were damaged and
cellular communications systems were overloaded. Agencies in Lower
Manhattan using landlines and standard cellular service were unable to
communicate with field staff. Two-way radios helped field personnel
communicate during the evacuation; however, field personnel without radio
communications were out of touch.
New technologies provided communication alternatives that proved
successful in the emergency response effort for internal agency decisions.
Internal e-mail, for example, helped agencies communicate decisions with
their staff. The Port Authority effectively used Nextel phones, especially the
direct connect feature. Blackberry pagers (interactive pagers with e-mail
capability) were, however, the most successful form of communications on
43
September 11, according to several transportation agencies. Blackberry pagers
work differently than traditional landline voice communications.
Traditional landline voice communications require an open circuit between
two people for communications to take place in real time. Data technology,
including the internet and electronic messaging used in Blackberry pagers,
uses packet switching where a message is broken down into discrete packets
of data that may move over hundreds of different channels simultaneously,
and rejoins them at their destination. This enables data communication to
avoid bottlenecks by automatically rerouting information packets to open
routes when a closed channel is encountered, and then reassembling the
message at its final destination.
Agency communication centers were also successful in supporting both
internal agency decision-making and external communication. Both NYC
Transit and NJ Transit had “mobile” communication centers (transit buses
equipped with satellite and computer technology), which were used as
command posts for communications and decision-making. (New York Transit
monitored some of its subway stations from its mobile command post using
CCTV.) Along with representatives at OEM, the mobile command vehicles and
other agency emergency operation centers gave agencies the ability to make
operational decisions and communicate them with OEM and TRANSCOM. (The
NY State DOT traffic command centers (TMC) located outside of Lower
Manhattan also proved to be successful in communicating and disseminating
agency decisions both internally and with the public through ITS applications.
Both TMC’s are discussed more thoroughly in section 3.5).
Agency communications with the public were also an important part of
September 11 emergency response. The public need for information is evident
in the statistics. At 9 a.m. on September 11, New York Times, ABC News, and
CNN websites saw 0% availability due to demand for information; MSNBC was
at 22% availability with a 38-second wait to connect; USA Today was 18%
available, with a 47-second connect time. Figure 15 on the following page
gives an estimate of the magnitude of increase in website usage on September
11. By the end of the day, CNN reported 9 million hits per hour on its website
when it normally sees 11 million hits per day; MSNBC reported a tenfold
increase in Internet traffic; Yahoo reported a 40-fold increase in traffic; Cingular
Wireless, the second largest US wireless carrier, reported a 1000% increase in
calls in NY; AT&T long distance reported twice its normal workday traffic. Even
after the September 11 attacks, the MTA reported 10 million hits on its web site
in one day, five times the normal volume, underscoring the need for timely
public information on agency websites. The website
www.MetroCommute.com was also utilized by travelers. MetroCommute picks
up CCTV images from the Interregion Video Network (IRVIN) and INFORM
cameras (see ITS Traffic Management Centers) and posts them on its website
giving travelers access to real-time information on the web. NYC DOT’s Traffic
Management Center in Long Island City, Queens, has 55 CCTVs trained on
44
major arteries. It also controls 6,000 of the 11,000 traffic signals in NYC via
computer. All 2,650 traffic signals in Manhattan are computerized.
Although the Internet was an important means of communication, USA Today
reported that during the week of September 11, 80% of Americans got their
information from TV, 11% from radio, and 3% from the Internet. Overall
Internet usage dropped from 58% to 51% on September 11 and 12. Internet
sites were slow or inaccessible as demand for information soared. Therefore,
agencies utilized radio, TV, and newspapers on September 11 to communicate
public information as well. INFORM and TRANSCOM Highway Advisory Radio
(HAR) gave up-to-date traveler information and news stations ran INFORM and
TRANSCOM reports on the 5:00 news. Local media were also extremely helpful
in communicating transportation information, running the story on the SOV
ban on page 1 of the New York Times, for example. On the other hand, the
media could also be critical of actions taken or not taken. The New York Times
interviewed Michael Powell, chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission, who admitted that the audio-only Emergency Alert System was
never activated on September 11 because the system was scooped by the TV
media. As a result, “public warning” experts called for a system that delivers a
wider variety of targeted messages and better coordination between the
public and emergency officials.
Figure 15. Increase in Web Usage Sept. 11
Note: ABC, Fox, NPR reported ‘over 1000%’
4500%
4000%
3500%
3000%
2500%
2000%
1500%
1000%
500%
0%
ABC News
CNN (page views)
Fox
MetroCommute (hits)
MSNBC
NPR
NYC MTA (hits)
Yahoo
45
Agencies also used maps, station clerks, and other
staff to relay public information. The MTA reported
printing 1.5 million each of “take-ones” (one-page
handouts noting changes or updates) and black
and white maps in two 12-hour shifts to inform
passengers of route changes. Figure 16 is an
example of the numerous take-ones produced by
New York City Transit to keep customers up to date
on the changing conditions of subway and bus
service. During the first three days of the disaster,
there were over 40 changes to subway service in
New York City.
The Port Authority immediately arranged with
Verizon to have their toll-free customer information
phone number rerouted to Jersey City with basic
telephone instruments. Without any capability to
have normal telephone menu options or
recordings at the outset, the operation was
established as a purely manual system, requiring
staffing around the clock to handle a tremendous
volume of calls. Within 24 hours after the attacks,
Port Authority staff began a 24-hour service to
answer customer questions and address concerns.
3.5 The Role of Advanced
Technologies
On September 11, many of the region’s
communications systems were out of service or
severely burdened from overwhelming demand.
Within minutes of the attack, there was an
extraordinary demand for accurate, timely
information. ITS aided in providing this information by assisting decision-
makers in these ways:
◆ Helped make better informed decisions on when and how to open or
restrict facilities.
◆ Aided better communications with other public and private agencies
involved in the response.
◆ Assisted in communicating with the public about the status of the
transportation system.
One of the successes of the ITS was its ability to alert motorists of problems
long before they reached the Manhattan area. Both customers and facility
operators benefited in having traffic diverted before it reached the bridges or
Figure 16: Subway Service
Notice- Sept 17
46
tunnels. After TRANSCOM alerted I-95 Corridor member
agencies of problems in the New York City region, these
agencies used highway advisory radio (HAR), and VMS
on I-95 as far south as Delaware and as far north as New
Haven were flashing alerts to avoid the New York City
region.
Data from traffic sensors also played an important role.
Traffic along key sections of the roadway system
including bridges leading to Manhattan was measured,
and the information was used to help determine
changes in the hours of the lower Manhattan crossings
SOV ban.
VMS were also used to communicate real-time
information to travelers. Within 2 minutes of the
decision to close the George Washington Bridge, the
VMS component of the bridge’s ITS package was able to
alert motorists 10 miles away of the closing of the
bridges. Because of the coordinated nature of the ITS
package, the information provided by its 1-800
telephone lines was simultaneously updated and the
information was electronically transmitted to
TRANSCOM for broader dissemination. Figure 17 gives an
example of the type of message broadcast to the
traveling public on September 11.
In contrast, the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels are not
equipped with the same level of ITS technology as the
George Washington Bridge and so the tunnel operators
require far more hands-on manual monitoring of conditions to provide up-to-
date status reports of tunnel operations. For security reasons, since September
11, trucks are restricted to the upper level of the George Washington Bridge
and are banned at the Holland Tunnel. The George Washington bridge officials
are able to use ITS capabilities to alert truckers of the restrictions long before
they reach the bridge. They are achieving a 99% compliance rate because of
the success of the VMS. The Holland and Lincoln Tunnels rely on a combination
of fixed and portable variable message signs that are not part of a
comprehensive automated system as is available at the George Washington
Bridge.
During the weeks after the attack, New York City Transit used its web to help
keep customers informed. It posted updated maps and service changes. It used
its geographic information systems (GIS) mapping capabilities to produce and
distribute changes both electronically and by handing out paper “take-one”
maps of service changes several times a day.
Figure 17. VMS on Evening of September 11
Source: Port Authority
47
In response to the attacks, at least one transportation authority is looking at
how security components can be integrated with existing ITS and added to the
proposed ITS extensions. Prior ITS installation was done mainly for operations
but is flexible enough to be adapted for security applications. Television
monitors can be modified to provide station emergency evacuation
procedures and other security notices. The existing series of traffic operations
cameras throughout the region can be used for security monitoring as well as
traffic operations. The existing weather monitoring system on the George
Washington Bridge could be used to help with hazardous material incidents by
providing accurate weather information such as wind direction.
While these useful forms of ITS are provided by the public sector, the private
sector plays a significant role in providing other forms of traveler information
including in-vehicle communications and navigations that could be used in
emergency situations. On September 30, OnStar Communications, for
example, added real-time traffic reports to its in-vehicle navigation services in
a dozen cities, including New York City.
Figure 18. IRVN Screen Shot
Source: Transcom
48
Traffic Management Centers
The New York City region has 13 Traffic Management Centers that are linked
with each other and capable of sharing data and video feeds through
Transcom’s Interagency Remote Video Network (IRVN). The IRVN system has
approximately 270 video feeds in the New York, New Jersey and Connecticut
region. This technology allowed agencies to view incidents on other facilities
and make changes to their own operations in response. Figure 18 shows a list
of the different TMCs linked into the network and has video shots of four
different locations on the New York State Thruway. MetroCommute also utilizes
the IRVN pictures and posts them on their website,
www.metrocommute.com.
Local television stations picks up CCTV pictures and posts images during its
traffic reports.
New York City traffic management centers (TMC) located outside of Lower
Manhattan proved to be successful in communicating and disseminating
agency decisions both internally and with the public. Both the multi-agency
TMC in Queens (ITS technology covering New York City streets) and the NY
State DOT’s TMC in Long Island (INFORM technology covering Long Island
highways) served as command centers for state DOT personnel and local
liaisons from NYC DOT, NYPD, and NY State Police, as well as sites of public
information dissemination via their ITS applications. Communications at both
centers were working properly on September 11 allowing for automated
dissemination of traveler information.
The Queens TMC, which includes NY State DOT, NYC DOT, and NYPD staff,
served as a critical mechanism for traveler information in Lower Manhattan
(Region 11). The city’s street and highway network was “totally paralyzed” with
major crossings and exits closed. According to the NY State DOT, “ITS provided
the only mechanism to get people out of the city and continue to warn them
of (travel) restrictions.” Although the TMC applications were critical, NY State
DOT found that there were not enough ITS applications in place in Manhattan.
(The TMC is in early deployment stages.) To overcome fixed VMS deficiencies,
the TMC deployed portable construction VMS and sent personnel to change
messages by hand. After September 11, all new VMS purchased (including
temporary construction VMS) will have remote access to eliminate the need for
manual operations.
INFORM is a TMC that proved effective in providing real-time traffic
information to Long Island travelers on September 11. INFORM technologies
cover all major Long Island highways reaching to about 10 miles from Lower
Manhattan (near Shea Stadium and the National Tennis Center, Region 10) and
include 132 permanent VMS, 28 portable VMS, 2 HAR, and 112 CCTV. On
September 11, the INFORM control room was fully staffed and contained TV
monitors that showed not only the Long Island highways, but also the New
York City skyline and CNN. The TV’s pick up images from the IRVN. These
images allowed INFORM to weed through the misinformation and report
accurate information to transportation agencies and to the public through
49
their transportation reports, which are similar to the regional reports issued by
TRANSCOM.
3.6 System Redundancy and Resiliency
The ability to respond to an emergency in a timely and effective way is
significantly enhanced through advance preparation, including measures to
assure that back-up systems are in place for a variety of critical elements that
support rescue, evacuation, and other activities. In the event of an emergency
that compromises the quality or timing of the response due to a failure in one
of these areas, public safety and welfare are jeopardized and lives may be lost
as a result.
Redundancy, the ability to invoke backup for critical systems that fail, either
partially or entirely, is highly important to consider in the development of a
process or a plan for emergency response. The backup systems invoked for
use in an emergency are determined by the nature and scope of the
emergency itself. For example, communications systems failure would be less
likely in a bio-terrorism event than for, say, the events of September 11.
Likewise, the same level of communications failure would not have happened
if the targeted buildings in New York City had been different. Nonetheless,
because we must prepare for all types of emergency, it is critical that
redundancy be built into systems vulnerable to such failures. It is also
important to rethink how redundancy is defined. As an example, the Brooklyn
Battery Tunnel a redundant system of electricity powering its lights and
ventilation system. The Manhattan half of the tunnel was powered from an
electrical substation in Manhattan and the other half was powered from
Brooklyn. After the attack, the Manhattan half lost its electrical power and that
portion of the 1.7 mile tunnel lost its lighting and ventilation systems. When
the smoke and ash from the collapsed buildings flowed into the tunnel, people
were forced to abandon their vehicles in the tunnel and run to the Brooklyn
side.
The topic of redundancy is covered in more depth in each of the sections on
Advance Preparations, Institutional Coordination, and Communications.
Emergency response planners should consider the following in designing
redundancy into their emergency plans:
◆ The regional transportation network
◆ Agency personnel
◆ Communications
◆ Utilities
◆ Control centers.
The redundancy of the transportation system in New York helped evacuate
Lower Manhattan on September 11 and restore mobility in the days following.
50
The area is not dependent upon only one form of transportation. The
automobile is only one of many transportation options. On September 11,
when the tunnels, bridges, roadways, and subways were temporarily closed,
local MTA buses continued running above Canal Street, water ferries were
pressed into expanded service, and people walked. The MTA was able to
restore subway service by early afternoon on September 11 because of the
redundancy it has in its subway tunnels.
The need for redundancy in personnel was highlighted when a number of key
transportation decision makers were lost or temporarily missing in the attack.
Critical decisions were made by personnel in the field who, at times, were cut
off from communications with headquarters.
The communications system was severely disrupted on September 11. NYC
Transit was able to use its separate system to provide landline telephone
service to local, state, and federal emergency agencies when Verizon’s network
was disabled. On that day, some communications systems worked better than
others. Having the option to use various technologies including two-way radio,
Internet, pagers, e-mail, voice, and cell phone technology allowed agencies to
adapt to the constantly changing landscape.
All of the Port Authorities tunnels and bridges are part of the E-ZPass system, a
regional electronic toll collection system along the Northeast Corridor. The Port
Authorities primary process center for its facilities was located in the World
Trade Center and destroyed. Fortunately, the Authority had a pre-existing, off-
site, back-up system and was able to test the system and have it back on line
by the time its tunnels and bridges reopened in the early morning of
September 13.
Redundant mobile generators allowed for restoration of power to emergency
control centers and allowed agencies to begin flood prevention efforts to
preserve communications and subway tunnels from extensive water damage.
Redundant control centers helped enormously. Even though the NYC Mayor’s
OEM Command Center was destroyed when 7 World Trade Center collapsed,
nearly every other major agency in NYC had an emergency control center that
swung into action immediately. In order to achieve better redundancy and
resiliency within the OEM Command Center itself, current New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg advocates opening five “Help Centers” (one in each
borough) that bring together all city, state, and federal services, with desks for
every department, commission, and agency, and with a mayoral appointee on
site and in charge. These Help Centers would also function as five ready-made
Emergency Command Centers for any disaster, no matter where in the City it
occurs.
51
In response to the events of September 11, officials, including transportation
officials, in the New York City area had to make numerous decisions. Their
decisions were based on their primary goal: to ensure the safety of rescue
workers and the general public. These officials restricted access to New York
City and Lower Manhattan, closed bridges and highways, temporarily shut
down the transit system, banned motor vehicles on some ferry lines, and
instituted security checkpoints. Even though these restrictions imposed a
great inconvenience upon the traveling public, there was broad public support
and understanding for the need to make safety the first priority.
Advanced emergency preparations were the backbone of New York City’s
response on September 11. Representatives of several transportation agencies
noted that documented and practiced emergency response procedures could
have never accommodated for a catastrophic event with such widespread
impacts. But it is clear that practicing and preparing for less-significant
emergencies did, in fact, help transportation agencies manage and adapt to
September 11. Multi-institutional coordination was key. Reliable
communication mechanisms were crucial and advanced technologies aided
decision makers and travelers in many ways. The redundancy of the New York
City highway and transit networks was also a key factor in responding to the
emergency.
Although New York City area transportation officials were able to respond to
the incredible challenge on September 11, new lessons were learned and
additional changes need to be implemented. Given their prior exposure and
their implementation of many changes since 1993, New York City officials
probably were more adept in responding to terrorist attacks than those in
other areas might have been. Officials in other areas should become aware of
the events of September 11 and other catastrophic events to ensure that they
too are able to successfully manage any future catastrophes.
4.0 Conclusion
Practicing and pre-
paring for other
emergencies helped
transportation
agencies respond to
September 11.
52
53
AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials
APTA American Public Transportation Association
AT IS Automated Traveler Information System
CCTV Closed circuit television
CMS Changeable message sign
CNN Cable News Network
CONPLAN U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Operations Plan
DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
DOT Department of Transportation
EMS Emergency Medical Services
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ER Emergency Relief
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FDNY Fire Department City of New York
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FHV For-hire vehicle
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FTA Federal Transit Administration
GIS Geographic Information Systems
GW George Washington Bridge
List of Acronyms
54
HAR Highway Advisory Radio
HELP Highway Emergency Local Patrol
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
ICS Incident Command System
IEN Information Exchange Network
INFORM Information FOR Motorists
IRVIN Interregion Video Network
ITS Intelligent Transportation System
JIC Joint Information Center
JOC Joint Operations Center
LFA Lead Federal Agency
MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization
MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority
NYC New York City
NYMTC New York Metropolitan Transportation Council
NYPD New York Police Department
NYT New York Times
OEM Office of Emergency Management
OIC Operations Information Center
PANYNJ Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
PATH Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
PDA Preliminary Damage Assessment
RRIS Rapid Response Information System
SEMO State Emergency Management Office
SIOC Strategic Information and Operations Center
SOV Single occupancy vehicle
TLC Taxi and Limousine Commission
TMC Traffic management center
TRANSCOM Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee
55
TRB Transportation Research Board
TWC Time Warner Cable
USCG United States Coast Guard
VMS Variable messaging system / variable message sign
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
WTC World Trade Center
U.S. Department
of Transportation
EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS
New York City—September 11, 2001
APPENDIX
April 21, 2002
U.S. Department of Transportation
ITS Joint Program Office
ii
Notice
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of
Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States
Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.
Technical Report Documentation Page
1. Report No.
2. Government Accession No.
3. Recipient's Catalog No.
5. Report Date
April 2002
4. Title and Subtitle
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management
and Operations, New York City – September 11: Appendix
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s)
Allan J. DeBlasio, Terrance J. Regan, Margaret E. Zirker, F. Brian
Day, Michelle Crowder, Kathleen Bagdonas, Robert Brodesky, Dan
Morin
8. Performing Organization Report No.
10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
U.S. Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs Administration
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
55 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02142-1093
11. Contract or Grant No.
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Catastrophic Events Case Study
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
ITS Joint Program Office
400 Seventh Street, SW
Washington, DC 20590
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) – Joseph Peters
16. Abstract
This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to the earthquake in Northridge,
California on January 17, 1994, and is part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on
transportation system facilities and services. The findings documented in this report are a result of a detailed
literature search on Northridge lessons learned. As part of a larger effort, four case studies will be produced:
• New York City, September 11, 2001
• Washington, D.C., September 11, 2001
• Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire, July 18, 2001
• Northridge, California, earthquake, January 17, 1994.
17. Key Word
Emergency Response, Emergency Preparedness,
Security, Transportation System Recovery, Disaster,
Catastrophic Event, Terrorist Attack
18. Distribution Statement
No restrictions
19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassified
20. Security Classif. (of this page)
Unclassified
21. No. of
Pages
22. Price
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
iv
Foreword
This draft preliminary findings report and appendix was prepared by the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s (U.S. DOT) John A. Volpe National Transporta-
tion Systems Center (Volpe Center) for the U.S. DOT’s Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) Joint Program Office. The Volpe Center study team consisted of
Allan J. DeBlasio, the project manager, and Robert Brodesky from EG&G Techni-
cal Services; Margaret E. Zirker and Michelle Crowder from Cambridge System-
atics; and Terrance J. Regan, F. Brian Day, Kathy Bagdonas, and Dan Morin from
Planners Collaborative. Vince Pearce is the U.S. DOT task manager of the
review.
This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in re-
sponse to the terrorist attack in New York City on September 11, 2001, and is
part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on trans-
portation system facilities and services. The findings documented in this report
are a result of the creation of a detailed chronology of New York events, a
literature search, and interviews of key personnel involved in transportation
operations decision making on September 11. As part of a larger effort, four
case studies will be produced:
◆ New York City, September 11, 2001
◆ Washington, DC, September 11, 2001
◆ Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire, July 18, 2001
◆ Northridge, California, earthquake, January 17, 1994.
Each of these events resulted in substantial, immediate, and adverse impacts
on transportation, and each has had varying degrees of influence on the
longer-term operation of transportation facilities and services in its respective
region. Each event revealed important information about the response of the
transportation system to major stress, and the ability of operating agencies
and their public safety and emergency management partners to respond
effectively to a crisis. This report emphasizes the transportation aspects of this
catastrophic event and lessons learned that could be incorporated into future
emergency response planning.
v
Contents
Appendix A — Literature Review ................................................. 1
Appendix B — Chronology ........................................................... 11
Appendix C — Agency Relationships ........................................ 35
Appendix D — Related Activities Being
Performed by Other Agencies ......................................................
45
Appendix E — Federally Declared
Disaster Procedures.......................................................................... 47
Appendix F — FEMA’s Incident Command
System (ICS) ........................................................................................ 49
Table of Contents
1
Appendix A. Literature Review
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) (www.transportation.org/aashto)
12/07/2001 AASHTO Journal, Weekly Transportation Report, Volume 101, Number
49. “Security Key Topic with Transportation Officials in Wake of Sept. 11”
American Bus Association (ABA) (www.buses.org)
10/10/2001 Bus Association Testifies on Security Measures
11/29/2001 Legislation Introduced to Enhance U.S. Intercity Bus Security
Time Warner Foundation (AOL) (aoltimewarnerfoundation.org)
After Sept. 11 Our Company: On the Ground
American Planning Association (APA) (www.planning.org)
10/25/2001 New Media and Disasters
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) (www.apta.com)
09/17/2001 Passenger Transport weekly newspaper. “A Passenger Transport Special
Report: Public Reacts to Horrific Terrorist Attacks”
10/04/2001 Testimony of APTA Before the Housing and Transportation
Subcommittee of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee on “Transit Safety in the Wake of September 11
th
”
11/ 2001 Information Center Briefing, Terrorism and Public Transportation
12/2001 Checklists for Emergency Response Planning and System Security
Amtrak (www.amtrak.com)
09/13/2001 Amtrak Expands Service as Air System Disruptions Continue
10/01/2001 Amtrak President and CEO George D. Warrington Testimony Before the
Senate Surface Transportation Subcommittee
Architectural Record (www.archrecord.com)
09/12/2001 World Trade Center Statistics
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (www.bls.gov/cew)
Employment in Areas of Manhattan Affected by the Events of September 11, 2001
CNET Networks (news.cnet.com/news)
09/11/2001 Web acts as hub for info on attacks
CNN (www.cnn.com)
06/07/1999 NYC’s Anti-Terrorism Efforts Go High-Tech
09/12/2001 September 11: Chronology of terror
2
DelawareOnline News Journal (www.delawareonline.com/newsjournal)
09/16/2001 In parking lots, empty cars wait
Engineering News Record (www.enr.com)
09/13/2001 Port Authority Vows to Keep Moving; Employees Still Missing
10/08/2001 Crews Shore Damaged Subways
10/15/2001 Nation Struggles with Issue of Protecting Infrastructure
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (www.fema.gov)
09/11/2001 FEMA Responds to Terrorism Attacks
FEMA’s Incident Command System (ICS) serves as a general model for
emergency response
FEMA’s Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) serves as a guide for
response to chemical, biological, and/or nuclear incidents
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Turner-Fairbank Highway Re-
search Center (www.tfhrc.gov)
11/2001 Focus Magazine. September 11 and Beyond: Highway Agencies Respond
to Keep America Mobile and Secure
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) (www.fta.dot.gov)
10/02/2001 Dear Colleague Letter. Practical Security and Emergency Response
Advice from New York and Washington DC
Greyhound Lines (www.greyhound.com)
09/11/2001 News Release. Greyhound Resumes Service
09/13/2001 News Release. Greyhound Operating in All Locations in the U.S. and
Canada
Guardian (www.guardian.co.uk)
09/20/2001 Catch the Last Post
I-95 Corridor Coalition (www.i95coalition.org)
Addresses ITS solutions to transportation problems in northeastern U.S. along
I-95 corridor
Infoplease (www.infoplease.com)
World Trade Center History
Intelligent Transportation Society (ITS) of America (www.itsa.org)
11/ 2001 Vol.11, No.10. ITS America Focuses on Security
11/21/2001 White Paper: An Integrated Network of Transportation Information
3
11/26/2001 ITS Caucus to Host Luncheon on 9/11 Terrorist Attacks and ITS
11/30/2001 Mobility Gave Way to Security Following Sept. 11 Attacks
Metro Magazine (www.metro-magazine.com)
11/2001 – 12/2001 Transit Steps Up Security
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) (www.mta.nyc.ny.us)
Welcome to MTA Bridges and Tunnels
National Associations Working Group for ITS (www.nawgits.com)
11/14/2001 ITS Cooperative Deployment Network Newsletter. New York’s
Groundbreaking Integrated Incident Management Systems (IIMS)
Project Approaches Phase 2
National Geographic News (news.nationalgeographic.com)
10/05/2001 Comment: Washington, New York – Bonded by History
New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (http://www.state.nj.us/
njoem/programs.html)
Coordinates all disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities throughout the state
New Jersey Transit (www.njtransit.com)
NJ Transit runs commuter bus and rail connections between NJ and
Manhattan
New York City Dept. of City Planning (www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp)
Community District Profiles
New York City DOT (www.nyc.gov/html/dot)
About the DOT; Meet the Senior Staff
Access to Lower Manhattan; Roads and Crossings status table
DOT’s Real-Time Traffic Cameras; Advanced Traveler Information System
DOT Traffic Management Center
Frequently Asked Questions
Getting Around NYC; DOT Emergency Information
Getting Around NYC; Ferry Information
Manhattan maps
Travel Advisories & Safety Information; Weekly Traffic Advisory
4
New York City Mayor’s Office (www.nyc.gov/html/oem)
09/26/2001 Mayor Giuliani and DOT Commissioner Weinshall Announce New
Manhattan-Bound Traffic Plan
New York City Police Department (www.ci.nyc.us/html/nypd)
Emergency incidents handled by Operations Unit and the Command
and Control Center
New York City Transit (www.mta.nyc.ny.us/nyct/)
10/2001 – 11/ 2001 At Your Service, Employee Newsletter. The Day That Shook
Our World
New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (www.nymtc.org)
6/1999 Mobility for the Millennium, A Transportation Plan for the NY Region
10/1999 Journey-To-Work in the NYMTC Area and the Surrounding Tri-State
Metropolitan Region (NY, NJ, and CT)
10/2000 1999 Regional Demographics at a Glance
12/2000 Regional Transportation at a Glance 1999, Selected Public
Transpportation Statistics
1/2001 Regional Transportation at a Glance 1999, NY Metropolitan Region
4/2001 1999 Regional Transportation Statistical Report
New York Newsday (www.newsday.com)
9/11/2001 I Knew We Couldn’t Outrun It
9/11/2001 Explosions Wreak Traffic Havoc
9/11/2001 A Frantic Scene on City’s Bridges
9/12/2001 Mayor’s Emergency Center Fails
9/12/2001 Transportation Paralyzed Highways, trains shut down for much
of yesterday
9/12/2001 Residents Pull Together in Aftermath
9/13/2001 Transportation Woes Are Causing Shortages
9/13/2001 Roads, Railways Slowly Reopen; Police Urge People To Avoid Manhattan
9/14/2001 NYC Transit is Nearly Restored, Awaits Influx
9/14/2001 Checkpoints, Threats Keep Traffic Snarled
9/15/2001 Untangling Manhattan Subway Lines
9/16/2001 Trains, Buses Getting Swamped
5
9/16/2001 Stop & Go; What Price for Safety? Security Versus Freedom
9/17/2001 Commuter Ferry Opens in B’klyn
9/18/2001 A Somber Sight at End of Ferry Ride
9/22/2001 Monday’s Traffic Could Be Worst Yet
9/24/2001 Survivors Recount Their Trade Center Escapes
9/27/2001 Gotta Get Together; 1-In-A-Car Ban Begins Today
9/27/2001 Car Restrictions’ Ripple Effect
9/28/2001 Ride-Sharing Strongly Urged as Traffic Woes Predicted Today
10/03/2001 Amtrak Aid Criticized For Focus On Northeast; Senator Questions $3.2 B
Request For Improved Security
10/04/2001 AAA Drives Its Point Home; Backs Limits On Cars, But Only For Short Term
10/09/2001 Security Below The Streets; Subway Officials Quiet On Details
10/16/2001 Car Pooling Restrictions Will be Eased
10/21/2001 A Weekly Guide to the Roads and Rails on LI; Report: Attacks Take $4B
Toll on MTA
10/29/2001 Easy Targets Invite Terror at US Ports
11/14/2001 Giuliani’s Holiday Traffic Plan
11/15/2001 Study: Economic Impact Analysis of the September 11
th
Attack on
New York
11/20/2001 Anemone to Head MTA Security
12/11/2001 Ground Zero: The Aftermath
12/13/2001 Downtown PATH Service to Resume in 2 Years
12/19/2001 NTSB: Steering Parts Failed Before Flight 587 Crash
12/26/2001 Amtrak Doesn’t Work; Let’s Phase It Out
12/29/2001 ‘Smart Cards’ Could Simplify Commute
12/30/2001 Safety Delayed; With Little Federal Aid For Security, Rails Vulnerable
To Attack
01/03/2002 MTA to Restore 1/9 Subway Service by Year’s End
01/05/2002 Report: Investigation Into Flight 587 Crash Focusing On Pilots
02/05/2002 Kelly to Hire Contractor to Rate NYPD’s Sept.11 Response
New York Public Library (http://www.nypl.org/branch/services)
01/31/2002 Emergency Information, Travel and Transit – Latest Information
6
New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission – Highway
Emergency Task Force (1999 report) http://www.dot.state.ny.us/pubs/
disastprep.pdf
Provides state assistance to local municipalities after a disaster emergency declaration
New York State DOT (www.dot.state.ny.us)
11/2001 Federal Highway Administration, Turner-Fairbank Highway Research
Center, Focus Magazine. September 11 and Beyond: Highway Agencies
Respond to Keep America Mobile and Secure
01/18/2002 New York City Metro Area Transportation Report
New York State Emergency Management Office
Protects NY communities from natural and technological disasters
New York State Emergency Response Commission
(www.nysemo.state.ny.us/SERC/serc-work.html )
Performs activities involving hazardous materials planning, training, enforcement
New York State Governor’s Office (www.state.ny.us/governor/press)
09/11/2001 Governor Pataki Announces Actions in the Wake of WTC Events
09/11/2001 WTC Response Update: Governor Announces Overnight Response
09/12/2001 WTC Response Update: Search and Rescue Efforts Continue
09/14/2001 WTC Response Update: Governor Provides Latest Information on State
Response as Rescue and Recovery Efforts Continue
10/08/2001 Governor Pataki: National Guard to Boost Security Around NYC
New York Times
9/12/2001 A Day of Terror: Terrorist Vigil; Security Alerts Go Into Effect Across
Nation
9/12/2001 A Day of Terror: The Government; Trying to Command an Emergency
When the Emergency Command Center is Gone
9/12/2001 A Day of Terror: The Response; As Important as the Corporate Disaster
Plan is How Fast the Employees Carry It Out
9/12/2001 A Day of Terror: Transportation; With City Transit Shut Down, New
Yorkers Take to Eerily Empty Streets
9/13/2001 After the Attacks; Information on Closings and Openings
9/13/2001 After the Attacks: The Government; Still Reeling from Losses, NY Looks
for Makeshift Solutions
9/13/2001 After the Attacks; Part of Subway Tunnel May Have Collapsed Under
Weight of Debris, Officials Fear
7
9/14/2001 After the Attacks: the Commuters; Closings Snarl Travel to
Manhattan Again
9/15/2001 After the Attacks: the Subways; As Train Service Limps Back, Worries
About Monday
9/16/2001 After the Attacks; A Look at the Destruction and the Rescue Effort
9/16/2001 After the Attacks: the Port Authority; Coping with Loss and Varieties
of Traffic
9/17/2001 After the Attacks: the Coverage; Some Flawed Information Occasionally
Creeps In
9/17/2001 After the Attacks: the Recovery Experts; Trying to Plan for the
Unthinkable Disaster
9/17/2001 After the Attacks: Safety; Police Officers Swiftly Show Inventiveness
During Crisis
9/20/2001 Keeping the Lifelines Open
9/20/2001 A Nation Challenged: the Subways; Damage on Lines Near Towers is Less
than Officials Feared
9/21/2001 A Nation Challenged: the Port Authority; $2.4 Billion in Losses are
Detailed in Report
9/26/2001 Hazmat Transportation Community Urged to Increase Safety Measures
9/26/2001 Ban on Lone Drivers at Some NY Gates
9/27/2001 In the Next Chapter, Is Technology an Ally?
9/28/2001 A Nation Challenged: Transportation; Subway at Trade Center to Take
Years to Rebuild
9/30/2001 OnStar Adds NY Road Reports
10/1/2001 City, Noting Traffic Decrease, Continues Lone Driver Rules
10/3/2001 A Nation Challenged: Industries and Utilities; Companies Responding to
Potential Threat
10/4/2001 Securing the Lines of a Wired Nation
10/4/2001 For Commuters, a Jumbled Route to Manhattan
10/9/2001 Tunnel Vision; Mapping the Movements of a Changing Subway
10/10/2001 A Nation Challenged: the Federal Aid; City and State Ask the US for $54
Billion for Recovery
10/11/2001 A Nation Challenged: the Traffic; City is Reopening Brooklyn-Battery
Tunnel Outbound, and Some Streets in Lower Manhattan
10/11/2001 Truckers’ Drive to City is Far from Leisurely
10/13/2001 Budget Woes of the MTA Grow Worse
10/17/2001 A Nation Challenged: Notebooks; Permanent Driving Restriction into
Manhattan is Considered
8
10/24/2001 MTA Restricts Information on Scares that Delay Travelers
11/2/2001 Autos on Friday/Commuting; Putting Traffic Tell-Alls to the Test
11/4/2001 When Getting There Isn’t Half the Fun
11/9/2001 A Nation Challenged: the Subways; Past Lessons Guide Transit Planning
for Attack
11/12/2001 For the New Mayor, a City’s Advice on Challenges That Must Be Faced;
Untangling Transportation
11/13/2001 The Crash of Flight 587: Security; Lessons From 9/11 Followed in Quick
Transportation Shutdowns and Restarts
11/13/2001 The Crash of Flight 587: Homeland Defense; First Test for a Disaster
Response Plan
11/15/2001 City Braces for Gridlock, Holding Line on Road Jobs
11/28/2001 McGreevey Seeks to Bolster State’s Chain of Command in Medical
Disasters
12/09/2001 MTA May Have to Raise Fares 50 Cents in 2003
12/10/2001 Cities and States Say Confusion and Cost Hamper Security Drive
12/12/2001 US Considers Restricting Cellphone Use in Disasters
12/13/2001 Digital Mementos of Terror’s Victims
12/14/2001 Port Authority Approves New PATH Station for Lower Manhattan
12/19/2001 On the Busy Ferries, It’s Steady as He Goes
12/19/2001 Congress Agrees on Emergency Relief for NY
12/19/2001 Radio Used on Sept. 11 is Questioned
12/20/2001 City Had Been Warned of Fuel Tank at 7 WTC
12/20/2001 Senators Call for Inquiry on the Terrorist Attacks
12/20/2001 Congress Terror Package at a Glance
12/20/2001 Senate OKs Bill Raising Port Security
12/21/2001 The Silence of the Alert System
12/21/2001 Commuters Go Back in Time
12/26/2001 Immediate Needs at Ground Zero
01/02/2002 Pataki Seeks US Waiver on Air Quality
01/03/2002 It’s All Aboard, if They’ll Fit, as Sept. 11 Jolts Mass Transit
01/04/2002 Subway Line in Attack May Reopen Much Earlier
01/07/2002 Cleanup’s Pace Outstrips Plans for Attack Site
01/07/2002 Watching a City, and the Days, Pass Slowly By
9
New York Waterway Ferry (www.nywaterway.com)
Largest of private ferry service operators licensed by NYC DOT to
operate between Manhattan and NJ
NewsMax.com (www.newsmax.com)
01/31/2002 Firemen Protest WTC Cuts
Newsweek (stacks.msnbc.com/news)
September Special Edition:
09/11/2001 TV Comes Through
09/14/2001 Q & A: ‘There is No Book for an Incident Like This’
09/15/2001 Saving New York
Police Magazine (www.policemag.com)
11/2001 Emergency Management and Emergency Operations Centers
PoliticsOnline (www.politicsonline.com)
Special Report: America Under Attack, Analysis of the Role of the Internet
Port Authority of NY and NJ (www.panynj.gov)
09/11/2001 George Washington Bridge and Bus Station, Manager’s Office.
Chronology log
12/13/2001 Port Authority Board OKs $544 Million Program to Restore PATH Service
to Lower Manhattan, Begins Planning for Redevelopment of WTC Site
12/19/2001 Travel Information, Weekly Port Authority traffic advisory Port Authority
Facilities Click-Map
PATH System Map
The Public Purpose (www.publicpurpose.com)
Urban Transport Fact Book, NY Metro Area: Market Share & Income by
Commuting Mode: 1990
Suffolk Journal (suffolkjournal.com/news)
09/11/2001 The Ultimate 9-11 Call: Terror Strikes US
09/12/2001 President Declares NYC a Disaster Area: FEMA, DOT, HHS Actions
09/14/2001 Media Reined In; Controls Tightened for Bush Visit
09/15/2001 Donors’ Generosity Overwhelms
TRANSCOM (www.xcm.org)
Operations Information Center collects and disseminates real-time inci-
dent information to over 100 NY/NJ/CT member agencies and affiliates
10
Transoptions Commuter Services (www.transoptions.org)
10/2001 NJ Analysis Shows Large Commuting Shift
Transportation Research Board (www.nationalacademies.org/trb/)
01/13/2002 Transportation Security at the 81
st
TRB Annual Meeting
09/2001-10/2001 TR News, Number 216. Transportation System Security Information
Tri-State Transportation Campaign (www.tstc.org)
09/24/2001 Mobilizing the Region bulletin, issue 335. “Attack’s Impacts and
Opportunities: Ferries Pick Up Riders, Prominence”
U.S. Department of Transportation (www.dot.gov/affairs)
12/03/2001 Remarks for the Honorable Norman Y. Mineta Secretary of
Transportation: AASHTO 87
th
Annual Meeting and Trade Fair Opening
Session
USA Today (www.usatoday.com)
12/20/2001 For many on Sept. 11, survival was no accident
Verizon (www.verizon.com)
12/2001 Vantage Newsletter. Verizon Responds to September 11 Tragedy
VICUG - Visually Impaired Computer Users’ Group of NYC
(www.hicom.net/~oedipus/vicug/)
09/11/2001 - 09/17/2001 Emergency Information for NYC
WABC-TV New York (abclocal.go.com/wabc/traffic)
12/05/2001 The New “Normal”; A Look at the New Morning Rush Hour Routine
Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com)
09/11/2001 Nightmare Shatters Manhattan Morning
White House (www.whitehouse.gov)
10/03/2001 Federal Response: Examples of Government Action Since September 11
ZDNet News (www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news)
09/11/2001 New York shaken by attacks
11
[NOTE: * = No specific time was identified, but context from the cited source material
implies its placement in relation to surrounding events]
Tuesday, September 11
8:46 a.m.: A hijacked passenger jet, American Airlines Flight 11 out of Boston,
Massachusetts, crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center,
tearing a hole in the building and setting it afire. Impact registers 0.9 on
the Richter scale. CNN; Newsday
8:47 a.m.: MTA subway R train at Cortlandt Station begins emergency procedures
and alerts Subway Control Center of an explosion in the WTC area. The
train operator boarded all passengers at the station and expressed the
train to City Hall Station. This is the last train to use Cortlandt Station
before its collapse. NYC Transit, At Your Service
8:52 a.m.: Port Authority Trans-Hudson train master gives orders to stop service of
PATH trains to World Trade Center. All trains rerouted. CNN; speech by
Jennifer Dorn
9:00 a.m.: Deputy Mayor Joe Lahota and other city officials, including Police
Commissioner Bernard Kerik, activate the city’s OEM Emergency
Operations Center at 7 WTC. Newsweek
NY Times, ABC News, and CNN websites see 0% availability due to
demand for information; MSNBC is at 22% availability with a 38-second
wait to connect; USA Today is 18% available, with a 47-second connect
time. PoliticsOnline
9:03 a.m.: A second hijacked airliner, United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston,
crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center and explodes.
Impact registers 0.7 on the Richter scale. Both buildings are burning.
CNN; Newsday
* After hearing a voice on police radio and a second blast, NYC’s OEM
abandons 7 WTC. Giuliani and his team are forced to make do with
walkie-talkies and Nextel digital two-way radios, as they wander
through downtown in search of a new command center. Newsweek
Mayor’s OEM finds functioning phones at a Merrill Lynch office on 75
Barclay Street (about 1 block from 7 WTC). Aides work on reaching the
White House and other key members of the command team. Newsweek
9:06 a.m.: John F. Kennedy International Airport closes for departures Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ).
9:07 a.m.: LaGuardia Airport closes for all arrivals and departures. PANYNJ
9:09 a.m.: Newark Airport closes for all arrivals and departures. PANYNJ
Appendix B. Chronology
12
9:10 a.m.: PANYNJ police orders Port Authority bridges and tunnels to shut down.
PANYNJ log
9:12 a.m.: George Washington Bridge variable message signs (VMSs) flash “bridge
closed”. PANYNJ log
* All NJ Transit buses to and from NYC are shut down due to tunnel and
bus terminal closings. 9/17/01 APTA Passenger Transport weekly
9:17 a.m.: The Federal Aviation Administration shuts down all New York City area
airports, including JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark. CNN
For the next several hours, thousands of passengers could be seen
walking with their luggage, hitchhiking, or commandeering airport
luggage carts for their journeys in search of hotels or buses. NY Times
* Within moments of the tragedy, Amtrak suspends all service nationwide
to allow for a top-to-bottom security sweep. All trains, tracks, bridges,
tunnels, stations and other facilities—including those controlled by
others—are inspected within hours, and security personnel remain
stationed at all facilities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Entrances and
exits are being patrolled, and access is being restricted.
www.amtrak.com/press/20011001gdw.html
* Greyhound Lines, the country’s largest intercity bus line, cancels
operations in the northeastern United States and shuts down terminals
within a one-mile radius of any federal building. 9/11 CNET tech news
* NYC DOT reports that police order the highways shut down. Newsday
* Some major highways close to all but emergency vehicles – West Side
Highway, FDR Drive, parts of Long Island Expressway and NJ Turnpike
north of Exit 11. NY Times
* Police barricade entrance and exit ramps to NYC area bridges and
tunnels. Barricades are put up at the Nassau/Queens border to keep
highways running through Queens open for emergency and rescue
vehicles to reach Manhattan quickly. Newsday
* Avenues in uptown Manhattan turn into high-speed lanes for police cars
and ambulances racing to the disaster scene. NY Times
* NY Stock Exchange and Nasdaq decide not to open. 9/11/01
Washington Post
* While the stock market was closed for the day, the U.S. banking system
and the Federal Reserve continued normal operations. USGOVINFO
9:40 a.m.: The FAA halts all flight operations at U.S. airports, the first time in U.S.
history that air traffic nationwide has been halted. CNN
13
9:43 a.m.: A third plane, American Airlines Flight 77, crashes into the Pentagon.
CNN
9:45 a.m.: Long Island RR suspends service between Jamaica and Manhattan.
Newsday
The White House evacuates. CNN
* Commuter rail service is interrupted on the MTA Long Island RR and
Metro-North RR. 9/17/01 APTA Passenger Transport weekly
9:59 a.m.: The south tower of the World Trade Center collapses. Impact measures
2.1 on the Richter scale. CNN; Newsday
* Mayor’s OEM flees its temporary Merrill Lynch location through an
underground tunnel and makes its way out into the street, heading
farther north. Newsweek
Mayor’s roving command post stops at a fire station in West Village
(about 1 mile from Merrill Lynch location). Station is locked and empty;
occupants are at WTC. Officials try to break the combination lock, but
one member of the group gets the combination over his radio. Aides
man the phones and assistants arrive with rolodexes. Richard Sheirer,
OEM director, and his deputies arrive. After about an hour, lack of desks
and insufficient space force the team to leave the fire station in search of
larger quarters. NY Times; Newsweek
* Governor activates the National Guard. Albany’s State Emergency
Management Office (SEMO) activates its Emergency Operations Center
(EOC) to help coordinate responses among agencies, but most
information was coming from TV reports. NY Times
* SEMO staff is assigned to 12-hour shifts; some staff is deployed to NYC.
Gov. Office 9/12 press release
10:13 a.m.: The United Nations building evacuates. CNN
10:15 a.m.: Several subway lines are left without alternating current, which supplies
power through the third rails, and without direct current, which runs the
signals. NY Times
10:20 a.m.: New York City Transit suspends all subway service. Order issued to send
all trains to their yards or to secure them in tunnels. NY Times
10:24 a.m.: The FAA reports that all inbound transatlantic aircraft flying into the
United States are being diverted to Canada. CNN
14
* Some firefighters tell WTC evacuees to head for the water, others suggest
the Brooklyn Bridge. Newsday
* A firefighter at the WTC comments, “When you see cops running, you
know you’ve got no chance.” 9/11/01 Washington Post
* Tens of thousands of people stream across Manhattan, Brooklyn,
Queensboro, Triborough, and other bridges on foot. NY Times
Police close off city streets, creating bottlenecks and bumper-to-bumper
traffic for miles. Cars clog streets, mixed with thousands of pedestrians
fleeing. Streets are littered with high-heeled shoes, abandoned by
women on the run. Two women knock on the window of a closed
sporting goods store, pleading for sneakers for the walk home to
Queens. Police stop cars to ask drivers leaving Manhattan to take extra
passengers, while people taking cabs also take extra customers. People
on their way to work abandon their cars and the subway to stream
across bridges on foot. Some of the last few motorists who make it onto
the bridges stop to pick up straggling pedestrians. Emergency vehicles
occasionally split the mass exodus of people. Commuters devise
alternate routes that lengthen their travel in some cases by hours.
Thousands jam onto buses and ferries. At the base of the Manhattan
Bridge, police prevent people from crossing into Manhattan; pedestrians
and motorists are allowed to exit via bridges, but only official vehicles
can enter Manhattan. Newsday; Newsweek
10:29 a.m.: The World Trade Center’s north tower collapses. Impact measures 2.3 on
the Richter scale. CNN; Newsday
Headquarters of the Port Authority of NY and NJ, located on six floors of
WTC north tower, is destroyed. Newsday
10:29 a.m.: With police loudspeakers urging drivers on the Whitestone Expressway
to keep moving, drivers ignore the order and pull over to watch the
second WTC tower collapse. The highway scene is “straight out of a…
horror movie. Horns blew, tires screeched, loudspeakers blared and car
radios blared news of the disaster.” Newsday
10:30 a.m.: NJ Transit stops rail service into Manhattan’s Penn Station. 9/17/01 APTA
Passenger Transport weekly
10:45 a.m.: PATH operations suspended. PANYNJ
10:53 a.m.: New York’s primary elections, scheduled for Tuesday, are postponed. CNN
15
* Gov. Pataki makes a request for a major federal disaster declaration for
New York State in response to the attack on the WTC. Gov. Office press
release
10:57 a.m.: Gov. George Pataki says all state government offices are closed. CNN
* City Hall and Police Dept. HQ at One Police Plaza are evacuated. NY
Times
Police Department’s emergency management plans are seriously
compromised: with the loss of several men trained in emergency
response, with their own high-tech command center at police HQ
evacuated, and with phone, pager, cellular service, e-mail, and other
computer communications useless after WTC collapse, police are forced
to rely on radio transmissions, pen-and-paper. NY Times
* Staten Island ferry shut down. NY Times
11:00 a.m.: (Time approximate) Mayor’s roving OEM moves its command center to
the Police Academy on 20
th
Street (about 1 mile from West Village
location). Newsweek
* Time Warner Cable (TWC) workers quickly connect the NYC OEM
command center at the Police Academy to Road Runner cable Internet
service and cable TV after phone service is lost. TWC foremen remain on
site around the clock. AOL Time Warner Foundation website, Sept. 11
news
* Police Dept. technicians begin running phone lines into a few essential
offices inside the NYC OEM makeshift command center at the Police
Academy. 10,000 officers from special units are redeployed to patrol
duties. Crime is down 30% during first days of crisis. NY Times
NY Times website access is back up to 43% availability; ABC News 5%.
PoliticsOnline
11:02 a.m.: NYC Mayor Rudolph Giuliani urges New Yorkers to stay at home and
orders an evacuation of the area south of Canal Street. CNN
Giuliani states, “Stay calm, stay at home… If you are south of Canal Street,
get out. Walk slowly and carefully. If you can’t figure what else to do, just
walk north.” 9/11/01 ZDNet News
* Reactions of companies vary. Workers at Rockefeller Center are urged to
go home early. But Bloomingdale’s remains open to offer shelter to
stranded employees. NY Times
16
* Marriott announces that all its NY hotels are being evacuated. 9/11/01
Washington Post
11:16 a.m.: CNN reports that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are
preparing emergency response teams in a precautionary move. CNN
* Brookhaven, Long Island, officials announce the closure of Callabro
Airport before noon and dispatch additional public safety officers to Port
Jefferson, Long Island, to assist with crowd control and traffic for anyone
trying to use the ferry to CT. 9/11/01 Suffolk Journal
Noon: (Time approximate) A NYC Transit employee stands in front of Grand
Central Terminal with a megaphone to try to dispense advice to travelers.
NY Times
12:48 p.m.: Subway service resumes along the A line between 207
th
Street and Far
Rockaway. NYC Transit, At Your Service
The F, B, D, L, 7 trains and Times SQ-Grand Central Terminal shuttle are
running normally. Other trains are running truncated routes from
Midtown or Upper Manhattan into Queens and the Bronx, including the
A train running to W. Fourth St., but then diverted to F line due to street
collapse at Rector Street subway station in Lower Manhattan. NY Times
1:15 p.m.: Long Island RR runs limited service eastbound only from Penn Station.
Police control access to the station to prevent overcrowding.
Commuters only allowed to enter terminal one at a time through
security checkpoint. Police officers walk platforms, patrol trains, question
passengers to enhance security. Newsday
1:25 p.m.: The FAA reports that all U.S. domestic flights in progress at the time of
the attacks in New York and Washington were accounted for and safely
on the ground. All U.S. airports remain closed and flights cancelled until
further notice. USGOVINFO
1:44 p.m.: The Pentagon sends two aircraft carriers, the USS George Washington
and the USS John F. Kennedy, to the New York coast to protect the East
Coast from further attack. CNN
2:30 p.m.: The FAA announces there will be no U.S. commercial air traffic until noon
EDT Wednesday at the earliest. CNN
2:30 p.m.: Subway system returns to normal operation except for trains under
Lower Manhattan. 9/17/01 APTA Passenger Transport weekly
17
2:49 p.m.: At a news conference, Giuliani says that subway and bus service are
partially restored in New York City. CNN
* Bus service continues running everywhere except in Manhattan south of
Houston St. NY Times
3:00 p.m.: The FAA announces that all U.S. airports would remain closed until at
least noon on Sept. 12. USGOVINFO
3:30 p.m.: NJ Transit resumes westbound service only in Manhattan. 9/17/01 APTA
Passenger Transport weekly
3:50 p.m.: FEMA activates four urban search and rescue teams in NY. USGOVINFO
* FEMA dispatches staff to the EOC in Albany, and has a total of four
disaster mortuary teams, eight urban search-and-rescue teams, and one
national disaster medical team dispatched or ready to be deployed to
NYC. Gov. Office 9/11 press release
4:10 p.m.: Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex is reported on fire. CNN
4:12 p.m.: PATH service between Newark and Journal Square resumes. PANYNJ
4:25 p.m.: The American Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq and the New York Stock
Exchange say they will remain closed Wednesday. CNN
* By evening rush, several ferries (Circle Line tours, New York Waterway)
are providing free service to New Jersey, Queens, and Brooklyn,
evacuating about 160,000 people from Manhattan. NY Times
4:40 p.m.: PATH uptown New York line to New Jersey resumes service. PANYNJ
5:15 p.m.: California Governor Gray Davis clears the state’s urban search and rescue
teams for response to the World Trade Center if requested by New York
officials. USGOVINFO
5:20 p.m.: The 47-story Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex collapses
from ancillary damage. The evacuated building is damaged when the
twin towers across the street collapse earlier in the day. Other nearby
buildings in the area remain ablaze. CNN
New York City’s Office of Emergency Response at 7 World Trade Center,
23
rd
floor, is destroyed. NYT
* Communications are difficult with telephone lines and cellular service
overloaded. World Trade Centers were major link in cellular transmission
18
service, with a Verizon central hub near the site sustaining significant
water and fire damage. 200,000 phone lines in Lower Manhattan
crippled. NY Times
In addition to increased phone traffic, physical damage included: cellular
sites knocked out, local telephone switching office damaged, fiber-optic
transport equipment crushed, high-speed Internet service down for
many companies due to power failures. NY Times
AT&T network managers at their control center use “call-gapping” to
keep a percentage of circuits open for outbound long-distance calls and
for local calls for emergency services in NYC. NY Times
Verizon provides 2,400 spare circuits to city government agencies, 900 to
state government agencies, and 2,600 to federal agencies. Verizon
provides 5,000 free wireless phones to emergency workers and
businesses. NY Times ; 12/2001 Verizon Vantage newsletter
* By day’s end, 65% of subway service is running, omitting only stations
near Ground Zero. NYC Transit, At Your Service
* Power outages darken traffic lights. NY Times
6:00 p.m.: Amtrak resumes passenger rail service. 9/12/01 Suffolk Journal
“As soon as we determined that our system was safe on September 11,
we began putting every available piece of equipment back into service
and accepting the airline tickets of stranded travelers. For several days,
we were one of the only transportation options around the country.”
www.amtrak.com/press/20011001gdw.html
6:10 p.m.: Giuliani urges New Yorkers to stay home Wednesday if they can. CNN
7:02 p.m.: CNN reports that some New York bridges are now open outbound. CNN
7:30 p.m.: Long Island RR restores full schedule east and westbound. Newsday
9:57 p.m.: Giuliani says New York City schools will be closed Wednesday and no
more volunteers are needed for Tuesday evening’s rescue efforts. He also
says that power is out on the west side of Manhattan. CNN
* Newsweek reports that TV provided a public service on 9/11. Since most
networks have a major presence in NYC, with anchors either living or
working in the city, their information was right in content, tone, and
quantity as they experienced the disaster first-hand. Newsweek, 9/11/01
19
Nightfall: 750 National Guard troops are in NYC to assist police. NY Times
* 200 NY State Police troopers are already in NYC, and an additional 300
are due to arrive overnight along with 427 officers from Nassau and
Suffolk counties and National Guard military police. (Total of 1,000 law
enforcement personnel.) An additional 2,500 National Guard troops are
being mobilized and readied for deployment on security and medical
transport missions. Gov. Office 9/11, 9/12 press releases
* State Police have been conducting escorts for medical and National
Guard personnel in NYC, coordinating security efforts and traffic control.
They are using their inventory of police departments statewide as a
source for deployment of additional personnel as needed. Gov. Office 9/
12 press release
* Governor Pataki tonight announces that his request for a major federal
disaster declaration for NY State in response to the attack on the WTC
has been approved by President Bush. Gov. Office 9/11 press release
* Governor issues Executive Order suspending particular laws regulating
the award of highway construction projects, movement of oversize or
overweight vehicles on public highways, and other provisions to
accomplish “safe and rapid transportation of passengers and materials
for emergency purposes”. Gov. Office 9/14 press release
Overnight: NY State Highway Emergency Task Force staging area is set up at Stewart
Airport in Newburgh to handle equipment and supplies. NY State Dept.
of Corrections, NY State DOT, National Guard readies equipment for
deployment to NYC, including generators, light towers, trucks. NY State
DOT provides NYC DOT with list of contractors with available light sets.
Gov. Office 9/11, 9/12 press releases
* NJ state troopers patrolling the Garden State Parkway decide not to tow
cars in parking lots along the highway that are used by commuters who
take the bus to lower Manhattan. NJ Transit orders all parking lot patrols
to stop writing tickets and stop towing cars from train and bus stations.
Police check license plates against WTC missing list. Delawareonline
News Journal
* CNN news website receives 162 million page-views, 12 times more than
normal. APA Knowledge Exchange, ‘New Media and Disasters’
* CNN reports 9 million hits per hour on its website when it normally sees
11 million hits per day; MSNBC reports a tenfold increase in Internet
traffic; Cingular Wireless, the second largest US wireless carrier, reports a
20
1000% increase in calls in NY; AT&T long distance reports twice its
normal workday traffic. PoliticsOnline
* Yahoo reports a 40-fold increase in traffic. The Guardian 9/20
Wednesday, September 12
8:00 a.m.: As a result of the President’s NYC disaster declaration, FEMA’s 1-800-462-
9029 help line officially opens to individuals who have been harmed as a
result of WTC attacks. 9/12/01 Suffolk Journal
* 3,500 National Guard troops are deployed in or near NYC, along with
hundreds of state police troopers, to patrol bridges, tunnels, train
stations, and Ground Zero. Mission: protect transportation links. NY Times
* 1,500 National Guard troops are in NYC, with another 1,500 staged and
ready for deployment north of NYC, and 2,000 in upstate NY. Gov. Office
9/12 press release
* NY State Thruway restricts diesel fuel purchases, except for emergency
vehicles. Gov. Office 9/12 press release
* MTA Long Island RR (LIRR) and Metro-North RR resumes normal
weekday service. 9/17/01 APTA Passenger Transport weekly
* NJ Transit runs regular commuter rail service, but ridership only 20% of
normal. NY Times
* Service on the Port Jefferson ferry to Bridgeport, CT, returns to normal.
Newsday
* Some subway lines between Brooklyn and Manhattan reopen. NY Times
* PATH runs free service between Newark and 33
rd
Street and between
Hoboken and 33
rd
Street. PANYNJ
* After its HQ in 1 WTC was destroyed, PANYNJ opens makeshift offices in
Newark and sets up new HQ at the PATH headquarters, from which it will
continue to direct the region’s three airports, the bridges and tunnels
across the Hudson, the PATH lines, and the ports. Day-to-day operations
already decentralized and key financial and management records
already duplicated after 1993 WTC bombings. NY Times
11:20 a.m.: The Federal Aviation Administration announces that the unprecedented
grounding of all U.S. commercial air flights and closures of airports
would be extended beyond the 12:00 noon EDT reopening previously
21
announced. Some airports announced reopening on a very limited basis
later in the afternoon. CNN
2:20 p.m.: Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta says that airline flights
diverted after Tuesday’s attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
are authorized to finish their journeys Wednesday but all other planes
remain grounded. Only passengers on the original flights could reboard
and only after new security measures were put in place. Airlines also can
move empty airplanes, Mineta said. CNN
4:40 p.m.: The FAA gives clearance allowing airports to reopen on a limited basis so
that diverted flights only could continue on to their destinations. All
other flights are ordered to remain grounded until further notice. Strict
new security regulations will also be in effect, reported the FAA. CNN
5:00 p.m.: Some bridges north of 14
th
St. reopen. VICUG, Emergency Info
* All bridges reopen by end of day. (conflicts later info) NY Times
8:00 p.m.: Fire Dept. orders suspension of subway service on the 4 and 5 lines from
downtown Brooklyn into Manhattan because train vibrations were
thought to be destabilizing damaged buildings. NY Times
10:20 p.m.: CNN reports that New York’s Empire State Building and Penn Station are
being evacuated. No reason for the evacuations are known. CNN
10:50 p.m.: CNN reports that the evacuations of the Empire State Building and Penn
Station were cancelled and both facilities have been allowed to reopen.
CNN
Thursday, September 13
3:00 a.m.: Port Authority reopens the Lincoln Tunnel and the George Washington
(GW), Bayonne, and Goethals Bridges and the Outerborough Crossing.
PANYNJ
5:00 a.m.: Lincoln Tunnel and Port Authority Bus Terminal reopen. VICUG,
Emergency Info
* Port Authority briefly closes Lincoln Tunnel in the morning because of a
report of a man seen running into the tunnel. NY Times
* GW Bridge upper level opens. Staten Island bridges open. NY Times
6:00 a.m.: Public and private bus service into NYC from NJ resumes. VICUG,
Emergency Info
22
* Greyhound lines announces that it is fully operational at all of its 3,700
locations in the U.S. and Canada. 9/13 Greyhound news release
8:00 a.m.: Port Authority reopens Ports of New York and New Jersey to water
freight activity. PANYNJ
8:10 a.m.: Staten Island’s four bridges close for 64 minutes while police set up
checkpoints and perform vehicle inspections to look for suspicious
vehicle linked to the attack. Turns out report was unfounded. However,
causes morning rush to descend into chaos, snarling traffic from Staten
Island to New Jersey where parts of the turnpike remained closed and
traffic from the Lincoln Tunnel, the only tunnel open under the Hudson
River, spilled back onto highways. NY Times
* B, D, F, G, Q, W, 7 subway trains return to normal operations. But most
stations south of 14
th
St. remain closed. C train still suspended. Route
changes on A, E, J, M, N, R, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 lines. NY Times
* To avoid WTC, PATH trains are running three modified routes from 33
rd
street in Manhattan to Hoboken, Jersey City, and Newark. NY Times; 9/17/
01 APTA Passenger Transport weekly
* NYC Transit reports that many of the agency’s buses are being used for
relief and recovery efforts. 9/17/01 APTA Passenger Transport weekly
* Commuting upheavals more widespread in NJ than NY region for PATH.
WTC Station 9/11 closure due to collapsed ceiling and flooding doubles
the number of morning ferry commuters and of PATH riders to and from
its northernmost stop at W. 33
rd
St. NY Times
* Tunnel damage affecting the 1 and 9 subway lines found under the WTC
(debris, flooding). Some station entrances on N and R lines are found to
be damaged. NY Times
* The 2, 3, 4, and 5 subway lines severed again between Brooklyn and
Manhattan due to millions of gallons of water from broken mains
flooding tunnels. Commuter backup so bad that police move in
barricades to control crowds. NY Times
12:30 p.m.: Times Sq., Grand Central subway stations, and Grand Central Terminal
evacuated due to bomb scare. NY Times
* NJ Transit resumes bus service to Port Authority Bus Terminal in Midtown
Manhattan, except for two bus routes that serve Lower Manhattan. 9/17/
01 APTA Passenger Transport weekly
23
* Amtrak adds more than 200 seats on every Washington-NY-Boston train,
increasing capacity 30%, to accommodate stranded airport passengers.
NY Times, Amtrak 9/13/01 press release
* While airports were still closed, hundreds of passengers head to them
anyway, saying that the airlines told them their flights would get out.
For hours, they are stranded in parking lots and on highways, blocked
and herded around by police. NY Times
* Traffic downtown sparse; taxis outnumber cars. NY Times
* Many of the largest city agencies, including Health & Hospitals Corp. and
the health, sanitation, and transportation departments, are forced to find
temporary quarters after abandoning Lower Manhattan offices covered
in ash and left without electricity and phone service. Some agencies lost
access to centralized computer systems and paper records. NY Times
* NY State Office of Emergency Management ships several large
generators to the city to help restore power. NY Times
6:00 p.m.: Working closely with the NYC DOT and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency
Management (OEM), the NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC)
arranges for enhanced access to restricted areas by TLC licensed vehicles
through Operation Free Transportation. This enables victims, their
families, emergency aid workers, and blood donors to receive free rides
to hospitals, blood banks, and destinations within Manhattan.
www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/
* Two days of bridge, tunnel, and road blockages into Manhattan lead to
widespread disruption of commercial deliveries, including Fed Ex and
U.S. Postal Service. Newsday
Friday, September 14
6:00 a.m.: Manhattan and Williamsburg Bridges reopen. VICUG, Emergency Info
10:00 a.m.: Another bomb scare evacuates Grand Central Terminal and diverts
drivers around barricades. NY Times
* The 4 and A subway lines return to normal. Train vibration found to be
of no consequence. NY Times
* Brooklyn Battery Tunnel reopens to express buses. NY Times
11:25 a.m.: CNN reports that all three New York area airports—Kennedy, LaGuardia
and Newark—have reopened, according to Federal Aviation
Administration spokesman Alison Duquette.
24
* Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) establishes 24-hour hotline to
address the taxicab and for-hire vehicle (FHV) industries’ need for
detailed, up-to-the-minute, real-time information on access limitations
such as bridge and tunnel closings. www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/
* When asked if the emergency response to the WTC attack went by the
book, Jerome Hauer, first director and commissioner of the NYC OEM’s
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), responds, “There is no book for an
incident like this.” The protocols that did work well are the search-and-
rescue arrangements and the mutual aid agreements with immediate
surrounding communities. He admits there was no anticipation of the
kind of redundancy that would have been required in this case, adding
“there is no place in NYC that is impenetrable. We decided not to put the
EOC underground because there are 625 water-main breaks every
year… so we knew it would be vulnerable.” Newsweek
* Giuliani and top staffers blast the media for releasing false information
on would-be hijackers and allegedly alive trapped disaster victims.
Suffolk Journal 9/14/01
* National Guard continues on active duty, working with SEMO, NYC OEM,
and FEMA to identify needs. Gov. Office 9/14 press release
* About 1,000 cars remain untouched in commuter lots at Metro-North
Railroad stations in CT, NY, and NJ. Bus depots in New Jersey’s
Philadelphia suburbs also have cars awaiting owners. Delawareonline
News Journal
Saturday, September 15
* Mayor’s OEM finally moves base of operations to Pier 92 in Midtown
Manhattan, where all agencies comprising emergency response team
have adequate facility from which to direct rebuilding the infrastructure:
“OEM gathers and directs resources… Scores of gov’t agencies and other
groups mobilize the equipment, supplies, and workers they have
available and move them wherever OEM sees fit, in a continuously
recalibrated effort.” Newsweek
NYC fire department calls shots on search-and-rescue efforts, according
to emergency response protocol design. Newsweek
Time Warner Cable (TWC) workers connect the Pier 92 OEM command
center to Road Runner cable Internet service and cable TV. TWC foremen
remain on site around the clock. AOL Time Warner Foundation website,
Sept. 11 news
25
* Transit planners state that they do not want to open Wall St. subway
stations unless streets and sidewalks, over which they have no control,
are open to pedestrians. City transportation commissioner Iris Weinshall
says her agency is working to design pedestrian safety zones, ban
private vehicles, barricade prohibited streets, and hang new directional
signs for access to Wall Street. NY Times
* Quantity of donations dropped off at the Javitt’s Center gets so massive
that officials are concerned that it’s causing traffic jams. Suffolk Journal
9/15/01
Sunday, September 16
* Amtrak and Greyhound report handling twice the normal number of
riders systemwide since September 11. Rental cars also report a surge in
business. Newsday
Monday, September 17
6:00 a.m.: Staten Island Ferry resumes service. NYC DOT begins running free ferries
from Brooklyn to Manhattan. Newsday #14; VICUG, Emergency Info
* Express bus service into Manhattan from the other four boroughs
resumes. VICUG, Emergency Info
* Businesses scramble to find workspace, communications links, and
personal computers for thousands of workers. They realize that the
disaster recovery systems they put in place stressed mainframe backup
of critical systems at “hot sites”. Plenty of capacity was available at these
sites. But the problems encountered were (1) more local: destruction or
inaccessibility of servers, desktop PC’s, paper records, physical office
space; and (2) more human: loss of workers who oversaw customer-data
systems, and loss of instructional materials to enable others to take over
their functions. NY Times
* In the first week after the WTC attacks, Verizon offered free calls from
4000 curbside pay phones throughout Manhattan, reconstructed or
rerouted 4 million voice and data circuits in Manhattan and parts of NY,
and transmitted 230 million calls per day, twice the normal daily volume.
12/2001 Verizon Vantage newsletter
Tuesday, September 18
* USA Today reports that during the week of September 11, 80% of
Americans got their information from TV, 11% from radio, 3% from the
Internet. Overall Internet usage dropped from 58% to 51% on
26
September 11 and 12. Internet sites were slow or inaccessible as
demand for information soared. PoliticsOnline
Thursday, September 20
* Television was the unsurpassable medium for information as news broke
on Sept. 11
th
. But in the aftermath, millions went online for personal
rather than news-mediated connections. The Guardian, 9/20
* Two Manhattan-bound lanes of the Brooklyn Bridge reopen to private
vehicles. Brooklyn-bound lanes remain closed. NY Times
* President of NYC Transit reports that damage to the N and R subway
lines near the WTC is less than anticipated due to early 1900’s steel arch
construction. Worst damage remains collapsed tunnels on the 1 and 9
lines. NY Times
* Several companies truck in temporary cellular towers. NY Times
In the weeks following the WTC attacks, Verizon erected 21 temporary
cellular towers to expand capacity. 12/2001 Verizon Vantage newsletter
Saturday, September 22
* In anticipation of Monday 9/24 as the worst day of traffic since
September 11 as commuters fully return to work, NYC DOT urges
commuters to use mass transit, and “think bikes, think ferries, think
subway.” Newsday
Monday, September 24
* NJ Transit begins offering ferry service via Liberty Water Taxi to 5,500 bus
riders whose express buses previously ran through the Holland Tunnel.
NYC DOT continues offering free ferry service to Brooklyn commuters
during rush hour; over 1,000 commuters per day took advantage last
week. 9/24/01 Tri-State Transportation Campaign bulletin
Tuesday, September 25
* Heightened scrutiny of trucks and other vehicles are put into place at
checkpoints. Newsday
* In response to crushing traffic jams resulting from security checkpoints,
bridge and tunnel closings, and the cordoning off of Lower Manhattan,
Mayor Giuliani authorizes police to ban cars carrying only one person
from crossing into Midtown and Lower Manhattan on weekday
mornings starting Thursday 9/27. NY Times
City asks PANYNJ, which operates the Lincoln Tunnel, and the Triborough
Bridge, and the Tunnel Authority, which operates the Queens-Midtown
Tunnel, to put the same restrictions in place. The Bridge and Tunnel
27
Authority, a part of the MTA that runs the subways and buses, favors the
idea as a way to boost transit ridership, which is down 20%.
* Working closely with NYC DOT and OEM, the Taxi and Limousine
Commission arranges for all TLC-licensed vehicles to be exempt from the
City’s single occupancy ban, allowing them into Manhattan at bridge
and tunnel crossings below 62
nd
Street without an additional passenger,
as required for other vehicles. www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/
Wednesday, September 26
* USDOT requests shippers and transporters of hazardous materials to
consider altering routes to avoid populated areas whenever practicable.
Thursday, September 27
6:00 a.m.: Ban on single-occupancy vehicles (SOV) entering Manhattan weekdays
between 6 a.m. and 11 a.m. south of 63
rd
Street on all East River bridges
controlled by the city of New York goes into effect, as authorized on 9/
25. Cars with commercial or government plates, taxis, motorcycles, cars
carrying emergency personnel, and cars with permits for the disabled
are exempt. NY Times ; Newsday
* To help cope with SOV ban, NYC opens a 4,000 car park-and-ride facility
at Shea Stadium. Newsday
* Truckers, limousine operators, taxicab companies, and parking garage
managers in Manhattan fear that the closures, and especially security
checks which have caused them to waste time and lose revenue, are
only getting worse. Newsday
* In the immediate aftermath of this crisis, there is a dramatic movement
away from meetings and conferences and toward videoconferencing
and virtual communication on the Web. NY Times
Friday, September 28
3:00 p.m.: Holland Tunnel reopens to westbound auto and bus traffic. It remains
restricted to emergency vehicles in the eastbound direction. PANYNJ
* SOV restriction introduced at the Lincoln Tunnel from 6:00 a.m. to Noon
weekdays. PANYNJ
* Mayor Giuliani says that checkpoints at bridges and tunnels set up by
the police and FBI will remain indefinitely. Newsday
Sunday, September 30
* OnStar communications system adds real-time traffic reports to its
services in a dozen cities, including New York. NY Times
28
* Officials say that the ban on single-occupant cars crossing into Midtown
and Lower Manhattan on weekday mornings will continue indefinitely
due to about 30% less traffic on bridges, and 93% reduction in peak
backups on Queens Blvd. To compensate, ferries are added between
Manhattan and Brooklyn and buses now run to the Port Authority bus
terminal in Midtown from park-and-ride areas in NJ. NY Times
Monday, October 1
* MTA adds new bus routes, including service in the Wall St. area where the
1 and 9 subways have been suspended, and a Battery Park City shuttle.
NY Times
* 300 National Guard troops are deployed to airports across NY state, with
over half assigned to JFK and La Guardia. Gov. Office press release
Wednesday, October 3
* Government transportation officials dispatch 300 inspectors to scan
employee lists at companies hauling hazardous cargo. The goal is to
close as many gaps as possible until the terrorists run out of targets. NY
Times
* Some power companies ask local police to help monitor their towers to
reduce danger of terrorist attack. Nuclear plants increase patrols and
add roadblocks. NY Times
Thursday, October 4
* Ferry system is strained to capacity, even with increase from 24 to 35
vessels. Port Authority officials say they are scurrying to build a new
ferry terminal near Battery Park to cut NJ commute time from 20
minutes to 10. NY Times
* More Long Island drivers are reported to be carpooling, taking the Long
Island RR, and driving into Midtown as early as 4 a.m. to avoid the SOV
ban that starts weekdays at 6 a.m. NY Times
* Informal networks for intrusion detection on computers and the Internet
are beginning to form as defense against a determined coalition of
hackers who could disrupt 911 service, air traffic control, power-
switching centers that move electricity around the country, rail networks,
and more. NY Times
The National Infrastructure Protection Center, established in 1998 by
President Clinton as a collaborative effort of law enforcement, military
and intelligence organizations to upgrade computer security in
government and business against cybercrime and terrorist attack, is
29
expected to fall under the Homeland Defense Council, Office of Cyber
Security. The center has an information-sharing network with major
industrial sectors in place. NY Times
Tuesday, October 9
* MTA reports that its web site is being actively used for the first time to
keep riders informed of changes in service, especially using maps. The
site normally gets 200,000 hits a day; one day in the week after the
attack, the site received 10 million hits. NY Times
* Gov. Pataki redeploys hundreds of National Guard troops from the WTC
site to boost security at Grand Central and Penn Stations, at the request
of the NYPD and MTA. Gov. Office 10/8/2001 press release
* Governor and Mayor of NY announce ambitious $54 billion plan for
rebuilding NY. Plans include $3 billion for transportation projects
throughout the state. NYC projects include new PATH terminal in Lower
Manhattan, finishing engineering for a future 2
nd
Ave. subway, and
completing the design of a link between Long Island RR and Grand
Central Terminal. NY Times
Wednesday, October 10
8:00 p.m.: City reopens most streets south of Canal St. to regular traffic on
weekdays from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. and all day on weekends. However, traffic
stops and safety checks will continue. NY Times
* American Bus Association estimates that its 4,000 U.S. intercity bus
industry operators have lost about 500,000 riders per day, mostly in the
sightseeing, charter, and tour portions of the industry, since September
11. 10/10/01 ABA press release
Motorcoaches or over-the-road buses (OTRBs) carried an estimated 774
million passengers in 1999–far in excess of the passenger load carried by
the airlines, and more in two weeks than Amtrak carries in one year. The
industry has the best safety rating of any commercial passenger
transport mode, with the fewest annual on-board fatalities over the past
decade, according to National Safety Council data. 11/29/01 ABA press
release
Thursday, October 11
* Port Authority reports that average one-way truck traffic over the
George Washington Bridge and Lincoln Tunnel has increased by 1,700
trucks per day, while the Holland Tunnel, which averaged 4,000 trucks
per day, remains closed coming into the city from NJ. NY Times
30
* Contract truck drivers for FEMA have been sitting idle in the Petro
Shopping Center parking lot since 9/11. Petro, 50 miles south of the city,
is one of the largest truck stops on the East Coast. NY Times
Saturday, October 13
6:00 a.m.: Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel reopens to regular Brooklyn-bound traffic only
to ease Manhattan congestion. This was the last major crossing to remain
closed to all but emergency vehicles since 9/11. NY Times
Transit officials may be forced to consider service cuts or fare increases
as MTA projects $406 million deficit by 2004. Of a total annual budget of
$4.6 billion, $326 million is the expected loss by the end of next year
due to 9/11 attack. Losses are due to lower ridership, drop in tax
subsidies, and emergency spending in the wake of the attack. None of
the above costs include rebuilding of the 1 and 9 subway lines in Lower
Manhattan. Transit authorities look to the federal government for help.
NY Times
Monday, October 15
5:00 a.m.: Holland Tunnel reopened to revenue traffic eastbound, restricted to HOV
2+ autos. PANYNJ
Wednesday, October 17
* Ban on SOVs entering Manhattan is shortened by 1 hour, to end at 10
a.m. on weekdays instead of 11 a.m. Since vehicle counts have shown a
23% reduction in traffic, city officials may consider a permanent ban.
NY Times
Sunday, October 21
* $3.6B funding for infrastructure rebuild and upgrade, plus security, safety,
and emergency response enhancements are deemed critical by MTA
since volumes on MTA system are reported to account for 1/3 of all
national ridership, every month moving the equivalent population of the
U.S. Newsday
* LIRR reports ridership down 3.7% in September 2001 versus September
2000. Newsday
Tuesday, October 23
* MTA officials decide to limit release of information about subway and
transit delays caused by anthrax scares so as not to discourage
passengers from reporting suspicious things they see, and to avoid
giving pranksters ideas. The exact length of time a train line is out of
service or the details of an incident will no longer be specified. NY Times
31
Sunday, October 28
5:00 a.m.: Service restored on the N and R subway lines, bypassing Cortlandt
Station indefinitely. NYC Transit, At Your Service
Friday, November 2
* With so many roads to cover in the region and so many backups due to
security checkpoints, bans on trucks and SOVs, and traffic snarls from
closed bridges and tunnels, radio stations can give only sketchy
information on a limited number of roads. So OnStar, Tele Aid, and Cue
now offer in-car real-time traffic information to commuters, either by
sensing the vehicle’s specific location through in-vehicle global-
positioning satellite receivers or by using the Web to key in travel routes
or preselect from a grid of zones. Subscription fees vary from $60 to
$240 per year, plus in-vehicle hardware options around $2000. Three
other Web-based traffic systems plan to add in-car delivery soon.
NY Times
Sunday, November 4
* With Exchange Place station and the PATH tunnel to Lower Manhattan
closed, many riders are taking ferries, Midtown PATH lines, or NJ Transit
instead. NY Times
PATH platforms are so crowded in Midtown Manhattan that officials
designate the Christopher Street Station one-way for exit only during
morning rush hour. Christopher St. and 9
th
St. stations are running at
150% capacity. NY Times
NJ Transit sees 44% increase in ridership in and out of Manhattan after 9/
11, an increase originally forecast to occur over the next 10 years.
NY Times
Dislocation and relocation of offices from Lower Manhattan and the
loss of PATH is causing huge shift in commuting patterns to Midtown.
NY Times
Long-term solution to transit capacity problems between NY and NJ
may be a second tunnel under the Hudson River for passenger trains, a
10-year $3-6 billion project that could double capacity. Project is stalled
due to money problems and opposition from NYC afraid of loss of jobs
to NJ. NY Times
NJ Transit sees 3% increase in bus ridership since 9/11. Small increase
may be due to the fact that buses were already at capacity before 9/11.
Also there is no more capacity at Port Authority bus terminal. Plans are
on the table to renovate the north terminal within 15 months to
accommodate an additional 25,000 commuters per day. NY Times
32
Friday, November 9
* MTA emergency plan for dealing with reports of suspicious substances is
revealed to include: evacuating the station, stopping train service,
closing the doors of the trains in the station and turning off their motors
to minimize the possibility that powders or gases could be swirled or
spread by the trains. PATH officials are reluctant to go into details on
security plans. NY Times
Monday, November 12
9:17 a.m.: American Airlines Flight 587 explodes in mid-air, crashing in Queens
after takeoff from Kennedy airport. CNN
* NYC declares highest alert. Port Authority closes Kennedy, LaGuardia,
and Newark airports. FAA bars all aircraft from a 25-mile radius of
Kennedy airport. NY Times
9:45 a.m.: Port Authority closes all bridges and tunnels between Manhattan and NJ
to private and commercial traffic, its bus terminal in Midtown Manhattan,
and the PATH rapid transit system to NJ. NY Times
NJ Transit suspends bus service into the city. Trains continue running,
honoring bus passes. NYTimes
11:00 a.m.: Outbound traffic from Manhattan is allowed to resume. NY Times
12:10 p.m.: Most bridges and tunnels are reopened. PATH trains, bus terminal, NJ
Transit buses resume service. NY Times
2:00 p.m.: Flight operations are resumed at La Guardia and Newark airports;
inbound flights allowed into Kennedy. NY Times
Early evening: Departing flights from Kennedy are allowed to resume.
NY Times
Thursday, November 15
* Mayor’s office announces suspension of street construction projects until
the new year to ward off holiday traffic congestion. The city plans to
modify traffic signal timing to speed traffic flow and use variable
message signs to alert drivers to street closings. NY Times
Friday, November 23
* Emergency Operations Center of the NYC Mayor’s OEM is deactivated.
www.nyc.gov
Wednesday, November 28
* NJ governor-elect proposes to expand the jurisdiction and authority of
the state’s Office of Emergency Management in responding to a health
33
crisis, and to push for $700 million in federal aid for security
improvements, including a radio system that would allow law
enforcement officials at all levels of government to share a single
emergency frequency. NY Times
Monday, December 10
* Many state and local government officials balk at federal government’s
confusing stream of intelligence information and security alerts. Cited
are conflicting messages and/or not enough information from FEMA,
DOJ/FBI, DOD, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the White House. NY
Times
Wednesday, December 12
* Federal officials (NYC Police and Fire Depts., FBI, CIA) and cellular phone
companies are at odds over proposal to give government officials top
priority in cellphone use during emergencies, thus virtually blocking
public access. NY Times
Thursday, December 13
* PANYNJ authorizes building a temporary PATH commuter rail station in
Lower Manhattan beneath the rubble of the WTC. PATH commuter line
from NJ is reportedly scheduled to be back in service by the end of 2003.
NY Times
Wednesday, December 19
* NY Waterway reports that they now carry about 50,000 to 60,000
passengers per day, up from 32,000 before 9/11. The company has added
11 new boats to its 24-boat fleet, and seven new routes to handle
increased capacity. NY Times
* Fire Dept. officials are investigating the possible malfunction of their
new handheld digital radios during Sept. 11 rescue and evacuation
efforts. NY Times
Thursday, December 20
* Engineering and fire experts speculate that the above-ground
positioning of a 60,000-gallon diesel fuel tank meant to run generators
for emergency electricity supply to the Mayor’s OEM in case of power
failure may have contributed to the fire and collapse of 7 WTC. NY Times
Friday, December 21
* NYC DOT reports that non-DOT public and private ferry ridership has
more than doubled since the WTC attacks, from 30,000 to 65,000 daily.
Almost a dozen new routes have been started, with more than 50 boats
now in service. PANYNJ has built a new Battery Park dock capable of
handling 6 boats in just 6 weeks. NY Times
34
* Michael Powell, chairman of the FCC, admits that the audio-only
Emergency Alert System was never activated on Sept. 11 because the
system was scooped by the TV media. “Public warning” experts call for a
system that delivers a wider variety of targeted messages and better
coordination between the public and emergency officials. NY Times
Thursday, January 3, 2002
* MTA officials report that the 1 and 9 subway lines would be rebuilt as
early as November, a year earlier than planned. However, the lines will be
rebuilt as is without improvement or modernization; the Cortlandt
Station will be demolished and not rebuilt until an unspecified second
phase. NY Times
* NJ Transit reports a 44% increase in train ridership over the last 3 months,
with 23,000 people standing each morning, despite the additional 4
trains into Manhattan. PATH ridership has dropped, but crowding at its
Midtown stations has more than doubled, due to a shift in companies
relocating from Lower Manhattan to Midtown. NY Times
* Ferry ridership is reported to have surged to 124,000 per day from
97,000 before September 11. NY Times
* NYC subway delays due to police investigations more than doubled from
August to September, and more than quadrupled from September to
October. NY Times
* Ban on SOVs crossing into Manhattan between 6 a.m. and 10 a.m
weekdays is estimated to result in a 15% drop in traffic. NY Times
(NOTE: On 9/30, 30% drop reported; on 10/17, 23% drop reported.)
35
Amtrak
◆ Operates national passenger rail service from over 500 stations in 45 states covering
more than 22,000 route miles serving more than 22.5 million passengers.
◆ Is the nation’s largest provider of contract-commuter service for state and regional
authorities, serving an additional 54 million people per year.
◆ Owns 730 route miles, about 3% of the total nationwide, primarily between Boston
and Washington, DC, and in Michigan. In other parts of the country, Amtrak trains use
tracks owned by freight railroads.
◆ Owns 18 tunnels consisting of 26.5 miles of track and 1,165 bridges consisting of 61
miles of track.
◆ Owns Penn Station in NYC.
◆ Amtrak’s busiest train station in 2000 was New York City with 8,354,431 boardings. On
an average weekday, New York’s Penn Station handles about 30,000 Amtrak
passengers a day. But at least 300,000 additional passengers go through the station on
the Long Island Railroad and New Jersey Transit. Thousands more use the station to
transfer to New York City subways.
◆ Amtrak rail service in the New York-Washington corridor carries enough passengers to
fill 121 airline flights per day.
◆ Ridership has jumped by 10% to 15% on a national basis since the attacks. Ridership
on the high-speed Acela Express is up by as much as 45%; and is up about 12% on
long-distance trains.
Source:
www.amtrak.com
Association of American Railroads
◆ North American freight railroad association.
◆ Runs task forces on physical infrastructure, operational security, and information
security.
NYC Mayor’s Office
Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
A NYC mayoral office. Led by Director Richard J. Sheirer, who reports directly to the Mayor,
this multi-jurisdictional agency comprises personnel drawn from such
agencies as:
◆ the Mayor’s Office of the City of New York,
◆ the New York City Police Department,
◆ the New York City Fire Department,
◆ the New York City Department of Correction,
Appendix C. Agency Relationships
36
◆ Emergency Medical Service,
◆ New York City Department of Environmental Protection,
◆ the New York City Department of Transportation,
◆ New York City Department of Parks and Recreation,
◆ the New York City Department of Buildings,
◆ the New York City Department of Sanitation,
◆ the New York City Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications,
◆ the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services,
◆ the Mayor’s Office for People with Disabilities, and
◆ the American Red Cross.
◆ High-tech capabilities linking emergency response agencies with OEM administrative
staff through its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located at 7 WTC include:
– A computer messaging system operating over T1 phone lines, and
– Standard phone communications backed up with an emergency microwave-
linked phone system with multiple providers.
– Some of the emergency response agencies, such as (Fire / Police / EMS), have
dedicated agency terminals that can monitor the status of specific incidents
taking place during the event. This help will ensure that accurate information is
available to the EOC, and allows for direct communication with field units and
command posts.
– In addition to computers and OEM terminals, there is also UHF, VHF, 800-MHz
trunked, conventional, and marine-band radio capability at certain emergency
response agency workstations. This is another means of interacting with field
units and the different borough command centers. All radios systems are
protected with UPS switches.
– Video components of the EOC include links to Coast Guard microwave-assisted
video technology to monitor all of the city’s major waterways, to Department
of Transportation and Metro Traffic camera feeds located throughout the city
to monitor the major roadways in the five boroughs, and to satellite and local
broadcast stations.
– Additional products available at EOC include Internet access, multi-channel
satellite capability, video-conferencing, Geographic Information System and
hurricane tracking and prediction software, access to the location of critical
City resources including the Consolidated Edison power grids, life support
system users, Department of Environmental Protection water systems, schools,
hospitals, and nursing homes, access to “slosh” maps to identify flood zones,
mapping for evacuation routes, emergency transportation locations, and
shelter locations (capacity, services, staffing, contacts).
Source:
www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/eoc/eoc_descrip.html
37
New York City Department of Transportation
◆ A NYC mayoral agency.
◆ Manages much of the city’s transportation infrastructure, including city streets,
highways, sidewalks, and bridges.
◆ Responsible for installing and maintaining street signs, traffic signals, and street lights,
resurfacing streets, repairing potholes and other street defects, and installing and
maintaining parking meters.
◆ Responsible for 753 of the 2,027 bridges in New York City, including the four major
East River crossings (Brooklyn, Williamsburg, Queensboro, and Manhattan Bridges), and
6 tunnels.
◆ Other government agencies and public authorities that are responsible for bridges
and tunnels include the NYC Dept. of Parks and Recreation, NYC Dept. of
Environmental Protection, NY State DOT, Amtrak, PANYNJ, and several units of the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA).
◆ Manages municipal parking facilities.
◆ Operates the Staten Island Ferry, which serves 60,000 passengers per day.
◆ Oversees private ferry operations on city-owned piers. Private ferry operators licensed
by NYC DOT include NY Waterway, seastreak, NY Fast Ferry, Liberty Landing Marina,
and Fox Navigation.
◆ Supervises the city’s franchise agreements with seven private bus companies
(Command Bus Company, Green Bus Lines, Jamaica Buses, Liberty Lines Express, NY
Bus Service, Queens Surface Corp., Triboro Coach Corp.) that operate a fleet of 1,280
buses serving 82 local and express routes in Queens, Brooklyn, the Bronx, and
Manhattan, making it the ninth largest transit bus fleet in the U.S. and Canada.
◆ Manages the city’s contracts with companies that provide transportation to pre-
kindergarten special education children.
◆ Issues parking permits to people with disabilities and commercial vehicle permits for
trucks.
◆ Issues construction permits for work in city streets.
◆ Promotes safe travel by bicyclists and pedestrians.
◆ Offers programs to foster traffic safety education.
Source:
www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/faq/faq.html
38
New York City Police Department
◆ A NYC mayoral agency. Responsible for traffic enforcement and towing
◆ Operations Division, the communications link between the police officer on the
street and the executive level command, includes the following units:
–The Operations Unit is a 24-hour-a-day operating unit. The Operations Unit serves
as a central information center for the Department. The Operations Unit also serves
personnel in the field as the conduit for the deployment of emergency resources
that may be needed to handle any police or emergency situation that may occur.
Examples of other emergency resources include city, state, and federal resources
(Sanitation Department, Department of Environmental Protection, State Police,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc.). If any NYPD unit in the field needs resources
of any type, the Operations Unit finds it for them. This is a non-stop unit with an
immense volume of incoming and outgoing notifications on police matters. They
are in the business and information service.
– Command and Control Center, located in police HQ, serves as the City’s
Emergency Operations Center. When there is no citywide emergency or large-scale
event taking place, the Command Center is used as a facility for strategic and
tactical planning sessions. At a moment’s notice, the Command Center can become
operational whenever a citywide situation or emergency develops requiring
intense intraagency and interagency coordination. The Command Center is the
meeting place for representatives from various police units, other city, state, and
federal agencies, along with private corporations. In addition, the room is
equipped with state-of-the-art computer equipment, communications links,
dispatching capabilities, and live television feeds from ongoing incidents. From a
Presidential visit to a major snowstorm or blackout, the Command and Control
Center has earned international recognition for being a premier Command Center
for any type of emergency.
Among the Command and Control Center’s high-tech capabilities is ITS
computerized “pin mapping,” which displays data in a host of visual formats
including comparative charts, graphs, and tables. Through the use of MAPINFO
software and other computer technology, for example, the Computerized Statistics
(CompStat) database can be accessed and a precinct map depicting virtually any
combination of crime and/or arrest locations, crime “hot spots” and other relevant
information can be instantly projected on the Center’s large video projection
screens. Comparative charts, tables, and graphs can also be projected
simultaneously. These visual presentations permit precinct commanders and
members of the executive staff to instantly identify and explore trends and
patterns as well as solutions for crime and quality of life problems.
Source:
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/chfdept/operations.html
39
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC)
◆ NYC mayoral agency responsible for licensing and regulating New York City’s
medallion taxicabs, limousines/livery, neighborhood black car services, commuter
vans, and wheel-chair accessible paratransit industries.
To assist TLC-regulated industries in providing maximum service to the public
(especially in Lower Manhattan after September 11), the TLC has worked with the
Downtown Alliance, NYC DOT, and OEM to establish and/or authorize a number of
taxicab stands and black car layover zones and staging areas (on-street and off-street),
to maximize service availability in areas with limited access.
Sources: www.nyc.gov/html/tlc and
www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/faq/faq.html
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)
MTA is a public-benefit corporation chartered by the State of New York. MTA consists
of five agencies:
1. Bridges and Tunnels (also known as the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority) (B&T)
◆ MTA B&T, serves more than a million people daily. It carries more traffic than any other
bridge and tunnel authority in the nation. Surplus revenues from tolls help support
MTA transit services.
◆ MTA B&T bridges are the Triborough, Throgs Neck, Verrazano-Narrows, Bronx-
Whitestone, Henry Hudson, Marine Parkway-Gil Hodges Memorial, and Cross Bay
Veterans Memorial; its tunnels are the Brooklyn-Battery and Queens Midtown. All are
within New York City.
2. Long Island Bus
◆ Formed in 1973 by the combination of 10 private bus carriers into a unified
transportation system—links 96 communities, 47 Long Island Rail Road stations, five
subway stations, and seven major shopping malls.
3. Long Island RR
◆ Operates rail lines in Nassau and Suffolk counties and in New York City; the largest
commuter railroad in the United States
◆ Extends from three major New York City terminals—Penn Station, Flatbush Avenue,
and Hunterspoint Avenue—through a major transfer hub at Jamaica to the
easternmost tip of Long Island
4. Metro-North Railroad
◆ Owns Grand Central Terminal
◆ The second largest commuter railroad in the nation, Metro-North’s main lines—the
Hudson, Harlem, and New Haven—run northward out of Grand Central Terminal into
suburban New York and Connecticut.
◆ West of the Hudson River, Metro-North’s Port Jervis and Pascack Valley lines operate
from NJ Transit’s Hoboken terminal
40
5. NYC Transit
◆ Runs subways in the NYC boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx
◆ Runs Staten Island Railway linking 22 communities in Staten Island
◆ Runs buses in all five boroughs, on more than 200 local and 30 express routes; they
account for 80% of the city’s surface mass transportation.
Source:
www.mta.nyc.ny.us
Port Authority of NY and NJ
Developer of the twin World Trade Center towers. Independent bi-state authority
that oversees:
◆ Kennedy International, LaGuardia and Newark International airports
◆ Teterboro airport and the Downtown Manhattan Heliport
◆ Seven cargo terminals in the New York – New Jersey region including Brooklyn Marine,
Port Newark, Auto Marine
◆ Lincoln and Holland tunnels
◆ George Washington Bridge and three Staten Island bridges (Goethals, Outerbridge
Crossing, and Bayonne)
◆ Port Authority Bus Terminal and George Washington Bridge Bus Station
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH)
◆ Subsidiary of the PANYNJ
◆ Provides rapid transit service between NY and NJ
◆ Corporate offices in World Trade Center
◆ Main transportation operations offices in Jersey City, NJ
◆ Operated 2 routes to WTC from NJ, and 2 routes to 33
rd
St. in Manhattan from NJ
◆ Now runs 3 modified routes: 2 routes to 33
rd
St. and 1 route within NJ
Source:
www.panynj.gov
NY Waterway Ferry
◆ Largest private ferry service to NY; licensed by NYC DOT
◆ Operates ferry service between Lower and Midtown Manhattan and New Jersey. Also
operates free shuttle buses in Manhattan connecting to ferries.
Source:
www.nywaterway.com
41
NY State Department of Transportation
The New York State DOT played a vital role in coordinating the movement of traffic in New
York City and surrounding areas and assisting in emergency response efforts. This
assistance included deploying maintenance personnel, trucks, loaders, and emergency
vehicles and equipment to New York City; aiding in debris clearance; and transporting
generators and other needed items. New York State DOT personnel also helped staff the
State Emergency Operations Centers and the New York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency
Management.
In New York State, the DOT has launched a multi-faceted campaign to help safeguard
transportation system assets and the traveling public. A system-wide vulnerability
assessment is underway, as is an extensive internal audit of information technology
security. On the roadways, the number of truck inspections being done per day has nearly
doubled and special attention is being given to inspections conducted near border
crossings.
Source:
www.tfhrc.gov/focus/nov01/nineoneone.htm
NY State National Guard
The Division of Military and Naval Affairs administers the State’s military forces and
facilities and coordinates the State’s emergency preparedness plans and response to
disasters. The military forces consist of the New York Army National Guard, the New York
Air National Guard, and the New York Naval Militia, which serve as reserve components to
the United States Army, Air Force, and Navy. They can be activated by the Federal
government or the governor in times of emergency. The New York Guard is organized to
provide a State reserve force if the Army National Guard is ordered into Federal service.
The division also administers the State Reserve and Retired Lists of military personnel. The
division includes the State Emergency Management Office, which adopts and
promulgates statewide disaster plans.
Source:
www.dmna.state.ny.us
NJ Transit Corporation
NJ TRANSIT is New Jersey’s public transportation corporation; it is the nation’s third largest
provider of bus, rail and light rail transit, linking major points in New Jersey, New York, and
Philadelphia. Operates commuter bus service to and from Manhattan (to NY Port
Authority Terminal in Midtown), Newark, Jersey City, Trenton, Camden, Atlantic City, and
Philadelphia. Operates the state’s commuter rail network of 12 lines grouped into three
divisions:
◆ The Hoboken Division (includes service to and from New York Penn Station and lines
operating to and from Hoboken Terminal)
◆ The Newark Division (includes the Northeast Corridor, North Jersey Coast and Raritan
Valley lines operating to and from Newark Penn Station, Hoboken Terminal, and New
York Penn Station)
◆ The Atlantic City Rail Line (runs to Philadelphia and points in between).
42
Operates the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail as a public-private partnership connecting
residential Bayonne and western Jersey City with Jersey City’s Exchange Place and
Newport Center business and shopping centers, with connections to New York City via
PATH and NY Waterway.
Offers connections to other transit agency services connecting to NYC including the NY
Waterway Ferry, PATH, and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). Waterfront
connection trains offer express service between Newark Penn Station and Hoboken
Terminal for NY Waterway Ferry direct connections to the World Financial Center in
lower Manhattan.
Source:
www.njtransit.com
I-95 Corridor Coalition
Regional public-private partnership of major public and private transportation agencies,
toll authorities, and industry associations serving the northeastern U.S. from Maine to
Virginia. Built on the foundation of cooperation, consensus, and coordination, Coalition
members come together to address ITS solutions to shared transportation problems and
challenges. By leveraging resources, sharing information, and coordinating programs, the
Coalition adds value to the individual member organizations’ activities, and provides
synergy for more dynamic and seamless transportation solutions throughout the corridor.
Members and affiliates with NY or NJ interests include MTA, MTA Bridges and Tunnels, NJ
Highway Authority, NJ Transit, NJ Turnpike Authority, NY State Thruway Authority, PANYNJ,
NYC DOT, NY State DOT, NJ State DOT, Amtrak, FHWA, FTA, ITS America, TRANSCOM. Others
include such agencies as ME, MD, MA, and PA turnpike authorities and DOTs from East
Coast states between Maine and North Carolina.
Source:
www.i95coalition.org
TRANSCOM
TRANSCOM is a coalition of 16 transportation and public safety agencies in the NY, NJ, CT
metropolitan region. It was created in 1986 to provide a cooperative, coordinated
approach to regional transportation management. The member agencies are:
◆ NJ Highway Authority
◆ NJ Turnpike Authority
◆ NJ TRANSIT
◆ NJ DOT
◆ Palisades Interstate Park Commission
◆ PANYNJ
◆ PATH
◆ NYC DOT
◆ MTA
43
◆ MTA Bridges and Tunnels
◆ MTA NYC Transit
◆ NY State Police
◆ NY State Thruway Authority
◆ NY State Bridge Authority
◆ NY State DOT
◆ CT DOT
TRANSCOM’s Operations Information Center (OIC) collects and disseminates real-time
incident and construction information, 24 hours a day, to over 100 members agencies
and affiliates.
TRANSCOM’s Technology Development program carries out a federally funded capital
program, which includes operational tests and other technology applications to improve
the quality, timeliness, and dissemination of transportation information. The coalition has
become a nationally recognized testbed for the implementation of intelligent
transportation technologies in a multi-jurisdictional environment.
Source:
www.xcm.org
44
45
Currently all of the listed agencies are in the planning process for their proposed responses to
the September 11 attacks. Although some agencies are more advanced in their planning
process, agencies are still developing responses and waiting for official approval from USDOT
decision makers. Although it appears that many of these forums and programs will become a
reality, it should be noted that as of January 4, 2002, USDOT has not finalized complete details
of the various responses.
Below are the current planned or developing responses to the September 11 attacks by
government agency or organization.
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
The FTA has requested that the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center)
design, implement, and evaluate Emergency Preparedness and Security Forums throughout
the nation. These forums are designed in two parts: the first covers emergency preparedness,
specifically emergency response and recovery; and the second deals with security, with an
emphasis on developing and implementing security plans. The two-day forums consist of
scenario group breakout sessions, presentations by experts in the field, and discussions of
emergency response models. In addition, several transportation agencies have joined with this
program as partners with the FTA. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is serving as a
partner in this project, specifically in regard to commuter rail services. The American Public
Transit Association (APTA) has assisted the FTA in developing course materials and outreach.
(See below for additional information on APTA. The FTA is also working with Amtrak regarding
its participation in these forums.
FTA has targeted transit security personnel, fire and police personnel, city and state emergency
management coordinators, emergency medical personnel, and hospital disaster relief
coordinators to attend the forums. FTA, through the Volpe Center, has already conducted initial
surveys to determine regions throughout the country where agencies demonstrated both a
need and interest in participating in such a forum.
Currently, the FTA is preparing to host between 12 and 15 of these forums. These forums will
begin in late February 2002 and occur once a month until December 2002. The FTA is also
conducting a pilot in early February in Washington, DC, in which selected members of the
transportation community will be invited to provide insight and feedback regarding the
program. More information on this program can be found on the FTA’s Office of Safety and
Security’s website,
www.transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov. The contact person for this program is
Bob Adduci at the Volpe Center.
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the FTA Administrator has also initiated a
major security initiative to assure the transit riding public that transit systems are secure from
terrorist attacks or other major crimes. To address transit safety and security concerns, the FTA
is sponsoring Threat and Vulnerability Assessments at the 35 largest transit properties in the
U.S. The purpose of the safety and security oversight reviews and assessments is to conduct
independent reviews of transit agency plans, procedures, and preparedness to ensure the
highest level of transit system security against the threat of terrorism and major crimes, to
Appendix D. Related Activities Being
Performed by Other Agencies
46
assess the ability to quickly and effectively respond to the consequences of a terrorist act, and
to share the concepts of good practice and lessons learned from other transit and non-transit
experiences.
United States Coast Guard (USCG)
Throughout the nation, the USCG has authorized port captains to institute task lists for all
stakeholders in their regions. These stakeholders include port authorities, ferry operators,
freight transporters, and other commercial operators who operate in the harbors, seaways and
rivers covered by the USCG.
The USCG has also increased security patrols and personnel throughout the country. This
process actually began immediately after the September 11 attacks and appears to be
continuing in the immediate future.
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
Currently, the FHWA is determining what its response will be to the September 11 attacks.
Representatives from both the FHWA and the Joint Program Office have met with members of
the Volpe Center to discuss the possible adoption of the FTA’s Emergency and Security
Preparedness Forums to meet the objective of the FHWA.
The FHWA is also preparing and/or realizing vulnerability assessments, establishing
assessment teams, and developing case studies from various disasters such as the September
11 attacks and the Baltimore Tunnel Fire. Further, the FHWA is adapting its regional workshop
series on regional integrated operations to regional emergency management workshops.
Currently, the FHWA is hoping to have FEMA and AASHTO co-sponsor the workshops. The
contact person for this information and possible program is Vince Pearce at the Operations
Core Business Unit.
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO)
In response to the September 11
attacks, AASHTO has established a Task Force on Transpor-
tation Security. This Task Force includes state transportation officials and representatives of US
DOT and the Department of Defense. The Task Force has identified several tasks that are to be
completed in the next three months. These tasks include preparing a vulnerability assessment
handbook for State DOTs, preparing case studies on State DOT responses on September 11,
and preparing a legislative proposal for special national security funding of highway facilities.
American Public Transportation Association
APTA has been an active partner in developing a transit response to the attacks of September
11. APTA has contributed both materials and resources for the forums developed by the FTA.
Further, the Director of Operations, Safety, and Security program for APTA has authorized the
use of various materials by the FTA in developing a CD that contains all current security
publications throughout the industry. APTA is also providing membership lists to aid in the
mailing of security forum brochures and registration materials.
47
Typically, before FEMA and other federal agencies provide assistance to state and local
governments, the state’s governor must request assistance, and the President must then make
a declaration of major disaster or emergency. Many of the initial response decisions to the
disaster or emergency, however, come from local governments, who identify disaster situations
within their jurisdictions and contact the Governor for assistance through the Stafford Act. If
the emergency is a natural disaster, FEMA will assume command. When the disaster involves
any form of terrorism, the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Operations Plan (CONPLAN) takes precedence. (See below). Under CONPLAN, the FBI as Lead
Federal Agency (LFA) is charged with implementation of a federal crisis management response
and coordination of the response with federal, state, and local authorities until the Attorney
General transfers the LFA role to FEMA.
The seven steps in a typical federal disaster declaration are:
1. Contact is made between the affected state and the FEMA regional office. This contact
may take place prior to or immediately following the disaster.
2. If it appears that the situation is beyond the capacity of state and local resources to
respond, the state requests FEMA to conduct a joint Preliminary Damage Assessment
(PDA). Participants in the PDA will include FEMA, state and local government
representatives, and other federal agencies.
3. Based on the PDA findings, the governor submits a request to the President through
the FEMA Regional Director for either a major disaster or an emergency declaration.
4. The FEMA Regional Office submits a summary of the event and a recommendation
based on the results of the PDA to FEMA headquarters, along with the governor’s
request.
5. Upon receipt of these documents, FEMA headquarters senior staff convene to discuss
the request and determine the recommendation to be made to the President.
6. FEMA’s recommendation is forwarded to the White House for review.
7. The President declares a major disaster or an emergency.
In 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the U.S. Policy on
Counterterrorism. This directive elaborated a strategy and an interagency coordination
mechanism and management structure to be undertaken by the federal government to
combat both domestic and international terrorism in all its forms. This authority includes
implementing measures to respond rapidly and effectively to actual terrorist acts, giving the
highest priority to developing sufficient capabilities to combat and manage the consequences
of terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The CONPLAN, signed in January 2001 by six federal agencies (DOJ/FBI, FEMA, DOD, DOE, EPA,
HHS), provides overall guidance to federal, state, and local agencies on how the Federal
Government would respond to a terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the U.S. It outlines
an organized and unified capability for a timely, coordinated response by federal agencies to a
terrorist threat or act. It establishes conceptual guidance for notifying appropriate federal,
Appendix E. Federally Declared
Disaster Procedures
48
state, and local agencies of the nature of the threat, deploying the requisite advisory and
technical resources to assist the LFA in facilitating interagency and interdepartmental
coordination of a crisis and consequence management response. It also defines the
relationships between structures under which the Federal government will marshal crisis and
consequence management resources to respond to a threatened or actual terrorist incident.
FBI and FEMA responsibilities include:
1. Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
The Attorney General is responsible for ensuring the development and
implementation of policies directed at preventing terrorist attacks domestically, and
will undertake the criminal prosecution of these acts of terrorism that violate U.S. law.
DOJ has charged the FBI with execution of its LFA responsibilities for the management
of a federal response to terrorist threats or incidents that take place within U.S.
territory or those occurring in international waters that do not involve the flag vessel
of a foreign country. As the lead agency for crisis management, the FBI will implement
a federal crisis management response. As LFA, the FBI will designate a federal on-scene
commander to ensure appropriate coordination of the overall U.S. Government
response with federal, state and local authorities, until such time as the Attorney
General transfers the overall LFA role to FEMA. The FBI, with appropriate approval, will
form and coordinate the deployment of a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)
with other agencies, when appropriate, and seek appropriate Federal support based
on the nature of the situation.
2. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
As the lead agency for consequence management, FEMA will manage and coordinate
any federal consequence management response in support of state and local
governments in accordance with its statutory authorities. Additionally, FEMA will
designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel for the FBI’s Strategic
Information and Operations Center (SIOC) and deployment with the DEST, the Joint
Operations Center (JOC), and the Joint Information Center (JIC).
49
What is ICS
◆ ICS is FEMA’s model tool for command, control, and coordination of a
response to emergency situations.
◆ ICS provides a means of coordinating the efforts of individual agencies
to stabilize all types of incidents.
◆ The key principles of ICS are common terminology, modular
organization, integrated communications, unity of command, unified
command structure, consolidated Incident Action Plans, manageable
span of control, designated incident facilities, and comprehensive
resource management.
◆ The benefits of ICS include minimized confusion, maximized resource
use, consolidated control, reduced communications load, centralized
accountability, reduced freelancing, and improved safety.
Endorsements
Federal law requires use of ICS for response to HazMat incidents.
Many states are adopting ICS as their standard.
National Fire Academy adopted ICS as its standard.
ICS is endorsed by the American Public Works Association and the
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
ICS is included in National Fire Protection Association. “Recommended
Practice for Disaster Management”, and is part of National Interagency
Incident Management System.
History
ICS was developed in the 1970s in response to a series of major fires in
southern California. At that time, municipal, county, state, and federal fire
authorities collaborated to address recurring problems, including:
◆ Nonstandard terminology among responding agencies
◆ Lack of capability to expand and contract as required by the situation
◆ Nonstandard and non-integrated communication
◆ Lack of consolidated action plans
◆ Lack of designated facilities
The result became the original ICS model for effective incident
management. By applying a common organizational structure and key
management principles in a standardized way, ICS has evolved into an all-
risk system appropriate to all types of emergencies.
Appendix F. FEMA’s Incident
Command System (ICS)
50
Components
ICS organization is built around 5 major components:
1. Incident Command
◆ Performs command activities, such as establishing the location of the base for
primary logistics coordination and administration, and the location of Incident
Command Posts at which primary command functions are executed
◆ Assesses incident priorities
◆ Determines operational objectives and implements an oral or written Incident
Action Plan which reflects overall incident strategy, specific tactical actions, and
supporting information for the next operational period
◆ Develops an appropriate organizational structure with a manageable span of
control
◆ Protects life and property
◆ Controls personnel and equipment resources
◆ Maintains accountability for responder and public safety, as well as task
accomplishment
◆ Establishes and maintains an effective liaison with outside agencies and
organizations, including a jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations Center when it is
activated
◆ Coordinates overall emergency activities
◆ Authorizes the release of information to the media
◆ Tracks costs
2. Planning (reports to Incident Command)
◆ Planning is part of Incident Command for small events, but is its own section for
large-scale incidents
◆ Collects, evaluates, disseminates, and uses information about the development of
the incident and status of resources
◆ May include creation of the Incident Action Plan discussed above
3. Operations (reports to Incident Command)
◆ Directs and coordinates all operations, and ensures the safety of Operations
personnel
◆ Assists Incident Command in developing response goals, incident objectives
◆ Implements the Incident Action Plan
◆ Requests and releases resources through Incident Command
◆ Keeps Incident Command informed of the situation and resource status within
Operations
51
4. Logistics (reports to Incident Command)
◆ Provides facilities, services, and materials, including personnel, to operate the
requested equipment for the incident and to support incident responders
5. Finance/Administration (reports to Incident Command)
◆ Tracks incident costs and reimbursement accounting.
Training Programs
FEMA Emergency Management Institute courses, both independent study and instructor-
taught, are conducted by the State Training Office of Emergency Services for emergency
management professionals who are U.S. residents only. Courses include:
◆ Basic Incident Command System
◆ Intermediate Incident Command System
◆ Advanced Incident Command System
◆ Incident Command System: Law Enforcement
◆ Incident Command System: Emergency Operations Center Interface
◆ Incident Command System: Public Works
◆ Incident Command System for Public Officials’ Conference.
U.S. Department
of Transportation
