33
RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION: A
M
ODERN APPROACH TO A FOUNDING PRINCIPLE
Marc A. Greendorfer*
I. Introduction ......................................................................... 33
II. What Do the Nobility Clauses Mean? ................................. 36
A. Historical Background of the Nobility Clauses ............ 37
B What is Nobility? .......................................................... 43
C. What was the Intent of the Nobility Clauses? ............... 44
D. Is there a Modern Nobility in the United States? .......... 50
III. The Nobility Loopholes ....................................................... 53
A. Affordable Care Act Loopholes .................................... 54
B. Firearms Laws Loopholes ............................................. 57
C. Chrysler and General Motors Bankruptcies. ................. 61
D. Other State and Local Laws .......................................... 63
IV. Conflict between the Nobility Loopholes and the
Nobility Clauses .................................................................. 64
A. Direct Nobility Conflict ................................................ 65
B. Indirect Nobility Conflict .............................................. 66
V. Proposals .............................................................................. 69
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................... 76
I
. Introduction
It is common lore in the United States that our federal government
was structured with a number of checks and balances that ensure, at a
* Marc A. Greendorfer received his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of California,
Davis in 1986. He received his Juris Doctorate from Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in 1996.
He graduated magna cum laude and served as Articles Editor-Submissions of the Cardozo Law
Review from 1995 to 1996. After working at AmLaw 100 law firms in New York and San
Francisco, Mr. Greendorfer founded Tri Valley Law in 2008, where he is currently a partner. Mr.
Greendorfer is also the founder and president of Zachor Legal Institute, which focuses on legal
scholarship and advocacy in support of constitutional limitations on the scope of government and
the strengthening of individual rights.
34 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
minimum, the equal application of law among all citizens.
1
While there
are indeed such structural mechanisms embedded in the Constitution,
they do not always work as intended and, in fact, at times they fail
utterly to prevent blatant abuses of the rule of law by the political class
in America.
Our political officeholders can, and do, pick and choose which laws
apply to them and, more importantly, which laws they are exempt from.
This has led to increasing outrage focused on the nation’s inequitable
political and legal framework, with many calling for, among other
things, new amendments to the Constitution to remediate the infirmities
of the system. The solution, however, is already in the Constitution.
The “Nobility Clauses”
2
are among the least understood, and least
invoked, provisions of the Constitution relating to the use, limits and
distribution of political and legal power in the United States. Many
believe that the purpose of the Nobility Clauses is specifically limited to
forbidding grants of noble titles by the federal and state governments of
the United States and are thus of narrow constitutional importance.
3
A
review of the Constitutional Convention debates,
4
generally, and other
historical documents relating to the new political class in America,
particularly, show that the Nobility Clauses were intended to have a far
greater reach than simply the prohibition of noble titles.
5
The means of structuring a republican central government and the
need to provide checks on the power of the federal government in order
to protect state and individual sovereignty
6
was a central theme of the
1. See The Honorable Diane P. Wood, Our 18th Century Constitution in the 21st Century
World, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1079, 1081-83 (2005) (stating examples of provisions meant to perform
these checks and balances, including the Vice President presiding over the Senate, the Senate trying
all impeachments, and the President’s veto power).
2. U.S. C
ONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (federal prohibition on titles of nobility) and U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (state prohibition on titles of nobility).
3. Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the Unconstitutionality
of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 W
ASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1379 (2006) (“For
too long, it has been easy simply to assume that the Nobility Clauses raise no significant issues of
interpretation and prohibit only a very specific evil.”).
4. Throughout this paper, references to the “Constitutional Convention” and “Constitutional
Debates” refer to the federal convention held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania from May 1787 through
September 1787 and the debates taking place with regard thereto, respectively.
5. See generally T
HE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison).
6. What others call “popular sovereignty” I call “individual sovereignty.” See generally
Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority
Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994). In discussing the “central
pillar of Republican Government” Amar broadly defines popular sovereignty as “the people rule”
Id. at 749. A distinction must be made between the sovereignty of the state (in relation to the federal
government) and the sovereignty of the people, distinct from any subdivision. It is my contention
that the ultimate pillar of Republicanism is a respect for the individual, with all political
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 35
Constitutional Convention.
7
It was also the subject of great debate. The
anti-federalists, in particular, objected to the proposed Constitution
based in large part on the risk of the political class becoming an
American nobility, unresponsive to the will of the people and unchecked
in its power.
8
As the reach of the federal government has grown,
especially since the New Deal, there has been an increasingly disturbing
trend towards political office holders and government employees
granting themselves extra-constitutional privileges and immunities.
9
The
anti-federalists were prescient: there is now a de facto noble class in the
United States of America.
By way of example, in California, nearly 1,000,000 vehicles
registered to owners affiliated with state and local government agencies
are effectively immune from traffic tickets.
10
A similar loophole exists in
Colorado for state lawmakers and representatives.
11
Immunity from the
enforcement of laws is not limited to parking and traffic laws for the
political class; it extends to the concealed carry of firearms by retired
government officials
12
and the exemption from a host of federal
regulations for the very political body that promulgates those
regulations.
13
Most notorious of late, the Congressional Office of
Personnel Management created a functional exemption from the
Affordable Care Act for members of Congress and their staffs.
14
This paper will show that the Nobility Clauses were never intended
to be limited solely to prohibiting titles and were, in fact, intended to
prevent the political class from granting themselves and their favored
subdivisions existing primarily to safeguard the natural rights of the individual. See also infra note
18.
7. The Framers believed “political corruption” to be the “key threat” to the success of th
e
U
nited States. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 C
ORNELL L. REV. 341, 347
(2009).
8. See, e.g., Centinel Number 1 (October 5, 1787) in The Anti Federalist Papers (edited by
Ralph Ketcham) at 242 (“From this investigation into the organization of this government, it
appears that it is devoid of all responsibility or accountability of the great body of the people, and
that so far from being a regular balanced government, it would be in practice a permanent
aristocracy.”); Qualifications for Suffrage in The Anti Federalist Papers at 136-37 (arguing that an
“aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives”).
9. In this paper the term “privileges and immunities” is used, unless otherwise indicated, in
a colloquial sense, and not solely as used under Fourteenth Amendment and/or Article IV, Section
2, Clause 1 Constitutional jurisprudence.
10. See infra note 122.
11. See infra note 125.
12. See infra note 88.
13. See infra note 68.
14. Kimberly A. Strassel, A Test of GOP Resolve on Obamacare, W
ALL STREET JOURNAL,
A
ugust 30, 2013 at A11.
36 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
affiliates privileges and immunities not available to the general public.
Part II of this paper will provide an overview of the Constitutional
Debates as they relate to the creation of the federal political class and
concerns that led to specific safeguards, including the Nobility Clauses,
to protect the uniquely structured republican form of government in the
United States. Part III will discuss the various loopholes in federal and
state law available to political office holders and their appointees, which
I refer to herein as the “Nobility Loopholes.”
15
Part IV will provide an
argument that the modern political class has become a de facto noble
class that is in violation of the Nobility Clauses. Part V will provide
several proposed solutions to the Nobility Loopholes and discuss
potential arguments for and against such solutions.
II. W
HAT DO THE NOBILITY CLAUSES MEAN?
There is a dearth of scholarship, and even less case law,
16
on the
15. Politicians who seek to change or add to a law or regulation that has otherwise been
effective for its intended purpose frequently describe their new law or regulation as “closing a
loophole.” By describing something as a loophole from the law, they seek to obtain public support
for additional laws that were never included in the original law. One example of this relates to
California’s Proposition 13, which was enacted in the 1970s to limit the increases in real property
taxes. The law was always intended to cover both commercial and residential real property, but
some claim that the application of the law to commercial real estate is a “loophole.” See California
Democratic Party Resolution 13-04.39, Close the Corporate Loophole (available at
http://www.cadem.org/admin/miscdocs/files/Resolutions-Report-FINAL-2.pdf). The proponents of
eliminating the protections of Proposition 13 for commercial real property are in fact advocating a
new tax, rather than closing a loophole. An actual loophole, however, is a weakness or ambiguity in
a system that allows some to take an advantage where no advantage was intended. In this paper, I
seek to put the focus on actual extra-Constitutional acts that benefit the political class and thus are in
fact loopholes.
16. Because existing case law on the Nobility Clauses has not provided substantive
precedential material, this paper will not focus on a review of that case law. For a review of such
case law, see Larson, supra note 3 at 1409-1411 and Delgado, infra note 19 at 113-114.
There have, however, been three potentially substantive references to the Nobility Clauses in United
States Supreme Court opinions. None of the cases directly involved Nobility Clauses questions but
the references made in these opinions are illustrative of the potential scope of Nobility Clauses
doctrine.
The reference to the Nobility Clauses in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) was simply a
footnoted conclusion in Justice Stewart’s dissent that the reasoning behind the enactment of the
Nobility Clauses would prevent the United States from discriminating against illegitimate children.
Id. at 520, note 3. Similarly, in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), Justice Brennan, in a
concurring opinion, referred to the Nobility Clauses as standing for the founding principle that there
was to be no American aristocracy or preferential treatment for select individuals or groups. Id. at
69 and note 3.
I believe that Justice Stevens intimated at future broad uses of the Nobility Clauses as a check on
government favoritism and cronyism in his dissenting opinion to Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980): “[o]ur historic aversion to titles of nobility is only one aspect of our commitment to the
proposition that the sovereign has a fundamental duty to govern impartially. When government
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 37
background and meaning of the Nobility Clauses. To many, this is a
result of the very narrow scope of the Nobility Clauses, which, facially,
are specific and absolute.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or
foreign State.
17
Even the Constitutional Convention debates contain little
discussion of the Nobility Clauses, other than an acknowledgement that
the provision carries forward from the Articles of Confederation.
18
This
limited commentary on the Nobility Clauses has formed the basis for the
view that if there is any meaning to the Nobility Clauses beyond their
plain language, it is as a restriction on any governmental grant of
hereditary benefit to individuals.
19
A. Historical Background of the Nobility Clauses
Benjamin Franklin considered titles of nobility to be baneful
remnants of the waning feudal system that tended to suppress individual
achievement.
For Honour, worthily obtain’d (as for Example that of our Officers), is
accords different treatment to different persons, there must be a reason for the difference. . .it is
especially important that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified and
unquestionably legitimate.” Id. at 533-4. Justice Stewart also invoked the Nobility Clauses in his
dissenting opinion to this case to support the proposition that all people are to be treated equally
under the Constitution. Id. at 531, note 13.
17. U.S. C
ONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Nobility Clauses are applied to the states with the same
substance through U.S. C
ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
18. T
HE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 279 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic
2003) (1961) “The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is copied from the articles of
Confederation and needs no comment.” Richard Delgado argues persuasively that “the anti-nobility
clauses were part of an American reaction to feudalism. . .monarchs cemented relationships with
nobles and local gentry by offering them places in the English administrative government.” Infra
note 19 at 110.
19. While the desire to divest hereditary privileges generally is most certainly one of th
e
f
oundations of the Nobility Clauses, those who focus exclusively on this element have lost sight of
the overarching purpose of the Nobility Clauses, which is to protect and promulgate the republican
form of government. For discussions that focus on the hereditary view of the Nobility Clauses, see
generally Larson, supra note 3; Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Y
ALE L. J. 2313
(1997); and Richard Delgado, Inequality “From the Top”: Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an
Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32 UCLA
L. REV. 100 (1984). Also see the discussion
infra at Section II.C regarding my belief that the hereditary focus is misguided to the extent it is an
argument for a limited view of the scope of the Nobility Clauses.
38 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
in its Nature a personal Thing, and incommunicable to any but those
who had some Share in obtaining it. Thus among the Chinese, the most
ancient, and from long Experience the wisest of Nations, honour does
not descend, but ascends. If a man from his Learning, his Wisdom, or
his Valour, is promoted by the Emperor to the Rank of Mandarin, his
Parents are immediately entitled to all the same Ceremonies of Respect
from the People, that are establish’d as due to the Mandarin himself;
on the supposition that it must have been owing to the Education,
Instruction, and good Example afforded him by his Parents, that he
was rendered capable of serving the Publick.
This ascending Honour is therefore useful to the State, as it encourages
Parents to give their Children a good and virtuous Education. But the
descending Honour, to Posterity who could have no Share in obtaining
it, is not only groundless and absurd, but often hurtful to that Posterity,
since it is apt to make them proud, disdaining to be employ’d in useful
Arts, and thence falling into Poverty, and all the Meannesses, Servility,
and Wretchedness attending it; which is the present case with much of
what is called the Noblesse in Europe. Or if, to keep up the Dignity of
the Family, Estates are entailed entire on the Eldest male heir, another
Pest to Industry and Improvement of the Country is introduc’d, which
will be followed by all the odious mixture of pride and Beggary, and
idleness, that have half depopulated [and decultivated] Spain;
occasioning continual Extinction of Families by the Discouragements
of Marriage [and neglect in the improvement of estates].
20
The distaste for titles of nobility also extended to the possibility of
foreign influence in American politics through the grant of noble titles to
American citizens by foreign governments. One of the more curious
cases of a proposed constitutional amendment, the so-called Titles of
Nobility Amendment, would have revoked United States citizenship
from any person who accepted a title of nobility from a foreign source.
21
The concern was that if an American citizen (in particular, an American
government official) obtained the honor of a noble title from a foreign
nation, that American would have some form of loyalty or obligation to
the foreign nation. Had this amendment been enacted, not only would
20. See THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (Albert Henry Smyth. Ed., 10 vols. New
York: Macmillan Co.), 1905-7, where Franklin criticizes the Society of the Cincinnati’s hereditary
elements, deriding them as being too close to a form of nobility. For more about the Society of the
Cincinnati and its connection to the Nobility Clauses, see Larson, supra note 3 at 1386-1399.
21. 2 Stat. 613 (1810). The proposed amendment read: “If any citizen of the United States
shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall, without the consent of
Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office or emolument of any kind whatever, from
any emperor, king, prince or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United
States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 39
the grant of titles of nobility by federal and state governments in the
United States be forbidden, such a grant by a foreign nation to a United
States citizen would be barred, effectively foreclosing the possibility of
any noble class existing in the United States. Though this amendment
was never ratified, it did enjoy the support of a number of states and, in
fact, was erroneously published in the 1815 edition of the Statutes at
Large as a ratified amendment.
22
Ultimately, the Nobility Clauses were just one part of the mosaic
that the Framers structured to ensure that the republican form of
government that they were proposing would be a government where
those in service were provided no enhanced legal status by virtue of their
service and had, as its primary goal, service to the people. Anti-
Federalist author “Centennial” described federalism as a government
where
the people are the sovereign and their sense or opinion is the criterion
of every public measure; for when this ceases to be the case, the nature
of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monarchy or
despotism will rise on its ruin.
23
Elaborating on the contradictions between the nascent republican
government in the United States and the hoary aristocracy of Europe,
Joseph Story explained the prohibition on titles of nobility as a
protection against government sanctioned privileges accruing to a select
few.
This clause seems scarcely to require even a passing notice. As a
perfect equality is the basis of all our institutions, state and national,
the prohibition against the creation of any titles of nobility seems
proper, if not indispensable, to keep perpetually alive a just sense of
this important truth. Distinctions between citizens, in regard to rank,
would soon lay the foundation of odious claims and privileges, and
silently subvert the spirit of independence and personal dignity, which
are so often proclaimed to be the best security of a republican
government.
24
Story’s commentary shows that the titles of nobility prohibition was
22. For more on the “Titles of Nobility Amendment,” see Gideon M. Hart, The “Original”
Thirteenth Amendment: The Misunderstood Titles of Nobility Amendment, 94 M
ARQ. L. REV. 311
(2010).
23. C
ENTENNIAL I, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTER, October 5, 1787, reprinted in
13 T
HE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, 326, 331 (M. Jensen, J. Kaminski, G. Saladino and R. Leffler, eds 1976-86).
24. J
OSEPH STORY COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 3 vols.
Boston, 1833.
40 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
rooted in a substantive basis far beyond that of titles or even inherited
powers. At the very core of the prohibition was the desire to prevent
corruption of those who served the people through government service;
that is, the Nobility Clauses were, as Story stated, a bulwark against
subversion of the republican form of government.
The Constitutional Convention-era debates contrasted the structural
elements of republicanism, where the power came from the people and
existed solely at their discretion, with a monarchy, where the crown was
seen as sanctioned by divinity and the nobility, provided for by the
crown, were an elite intermediary between the crown and the
commoners. To address copious concern that a central government,
especially one without strictly enumerated and limited powers, would
infringe upon state and individual sovereignty
25
and perhaps even take
on the appearance of a monarchy
26
the framers implemented a series of
institutional limitations and checks and balances. In addition to
25. See Brutus Letter 1, NEW YORK JOURNAL, October 18, 1787, reprinted in THE ANTI-
F
EDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed.,
Mentor Books 1986) (“[I]n so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon
become above the controul of the people, and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing
themselves, and oppressing them. The trust committed to the executive offices, in a country of the
extent of the United-States, must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troops and
navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of pardoning offences, the collecting of
all the public revenues, and the power of expending them, with a number of other powers, must be
lodged and exercised in every state, in the hands of a few. When these are attended with great honor
and emolument, as they always will be in large states, so as greatly to interest men to pursue them,
and to be proper objects for ambitious and designing men, such men will be ever restless in their
pursuit after them. They will use the power, when they have acquired it, to the purposes of gratifying
their own interest and ambition, and it is scarcely possible, in a very large republic, to call them to
account for their misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of power.”) (emphasis added).
26. See Benjamin Franklin’s warning “I am apprehensive, therefore—perhaps too
apprehensive—that the Government of these States may in futures times end in a monarchy” in
J
AMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 1985), 41-42. See also T
HE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 306 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003) (1961) (“In a government where numerous and extensive
prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very
justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty
ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative
functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted
measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny may well be
apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative
republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and the duration of
its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a
supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is
sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to
be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against
the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and
exhaust all their precautions.”)
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 41
empowering the federal government with defined and limited powers,
27
members of Congress would be elected at regular and relatively frequent
intervals and the Executive and Legislative branches were to have
counterbalancing powers.
28
Far from being simply a discrete prohibition on government
bestowed noble titles,
29
the Nobility Clauses were intended to be
structural impediments against the creation of a political aristocracy, a
guarantee that there would be no privileged class in the United States,
either by title or by treatment. Alexander Hamilton called the prohibition
on titles of nobility “the corner stone of republican government; for so
long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the
government will be any other than that of the people.”
30
In short,
republicanism was presented as the antidote to nobility and the Nobility
Clauses were included in the Constitution as a broad prophylactic
against any intrusion of nobility in American politics and society.
31
27. See MARK. R. LEVIN THE LIBERTY AMENDMENTS: RESTORING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(1
st
edition 2013), 6 and THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Signet Classic 2003) (1961) (“[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined”).
28. For purposes of this paper the systems of checks and balances designed into the federal
government will be dealt with in summary fashion. For a robust explanation of the workings and
nuances of separation of powers and checks and balances, see John F. Manning, Separation of
Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 H
ARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011) (“[T]he Constitution not only
separates powers, but also establishes a system of checks and balances through power sharing
practices such as the presidential veto, senatorial advice and consent to appointments, and the like”)
id. at 1952. See also T
HE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003) (1961) (“In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to
the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of
the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the
power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.”).
29. In fact, one of the initial orders of business for the first Senate was the selection of
a
p
roper title for the President. The Senate decided upon “His Highness the President of the United
States and the Protector of the Rights of the Same” but the House of Representatives feared that the
title would signify a retrenchment to the age of aristocracy and overruled any title other than the
simple title used in the Constitution: “The President of the United States.” See M
ICHAEL P.
R
ICCARDS, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT: THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY,
1700-1800 (1987) at 87. See, also, Hart, supra note 22 at 352 (“[I]t is exceedingly unlikely that the
federal or state government would have ever tried to create an official distinction of nobility in that
purest sense, even if the prohibitions in the Nobility Clauses did not exist . . . [t]he framers were not
nearly so constrained in their conception of the Nobility Clauses and did not intend the prohibitions
in the Constitution to be construed so narrowly.”)
30. T
HE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003) (1961).
31. Hart, supra note 22 at 352 (“. . .it is exceedingly unlikely that the federal or state
42 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
In The Federalist No. 39, Madison used the term “tyrannical
nobles” while writing in support of the republican form of government.
It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the
great body of society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a
favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising
their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the
rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title
of republic.
32
It was no coincidence that Madison referred to nobility in the discussion
of republicanism, as later in The Federalist No. 39 he, like Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 84, explicitly declared that the
prohibition on titles of nobility was to guarantee republicanism: “Could
any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this
system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition
of titles of nobility . . . .”
33
Indeed, as Professor Jack Balkin noted,
[t]he American Revolution was not simply a political revolution; it was
also a social revolution. As Gordon Wood has described in a book
aptly titled The Radicalism of the American Revolution, the generation
of 1776 consciously attempted to break free from the aristocratic social
structure they had inherited from Great Britain. They hoped to create
in its stead not only a republican form of government but a new
republican system, freed from the caste-like system of nobility and
royal honors . . . [t]hey hoped, in short, to breed a new sort of person, a
republican citizen, equal to all and subordinate to none.
34
There is, thus, ample authority for the conclusion that the framers
intended to for the prohibition on titles of nobility to be a fundamental
protection of the republican system. Implicit in this was the idea that one
of the most effective ways to ensure that there would be a republican
system was to prohibit the incidents and substance of nobility as well as
the titles of nobility.
government would have ever tried to create an official distinction of nobility in that purest sense,
even if the prohibitions in the Nobility Clauses did not exist. . .[t]he framers were not nearly so
constrained in their conception of the Nobility Clauses and did not intend the prohibitions in the
Constitution to be construed so narrowly”).
32. T
HE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 237 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic
2
003) (1961).
33. Id. at 238-239.
34. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L. J.2313, 2345 (1997).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 43
B What is Nobility?
But what is the substance of that which was prohibited by the
Nobilities Clause? British historian Lawrence James briefly described
nobility as that which “. . .represented ‘virtue and ancient riches’ and
was the sheet anchor of the country . . . .”
35
Charles de Montesquieu
contrasted a democracy, where “the body of the people is possessed of
the supreme power . . . “ with nobility, where “the supreme power is
lodged in the hands of a part of the people . . . .”
36
Indeed, Montesquieu
drew parallels between monarchy and nobility as they relate to power
over the citizenry. More specifically,
In an aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain
number of persons. These are invested both with the legislative and
executive authority; and the rest of the people are, in respect to them,
the same as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign.
37
Historically, the nobles were thought to have the wisdom and
pedigree that uniquely enabled them to promulgate and enforce law.
Though the noble class was in large part based on heredity, the
perception of nobility as a closed system is erroneous.
38
Nevertheless,
the noble class was indeed a small and elite fraternity. Much like today’s
political class, the noble class presented themselves as the protectors of
the common person from omnipotent forces (whether it be a monarch or,
as today, a corporation).
From the Middle Ages onwards, aristocrats had encouraged the
perception of themselves as robust, independent-minded fellows who
could take up cudgels to protect the people from overbearing monarchs
35. LAWRENCE JAMES, ARISTOCRAT: POWER, GRACE, AND DECADENCE: BRITAIN’S GREAT
RULING CLASSES FROM 1066 TO THE PRESENT, (2009) at 2. James, like many historians and
scholars, uses the words “aristocracy” and “nobility” interchangeably. In defining the word
“aristocracy” James recounts that the “concept of aristocracy was highly flattering to an already
dominant elite, which, since the eleventh century, had been called the ‘baronage’, ‘nobility’ and
latterly the ‘peerage’.” Id. at 1. For purposes of this paper I will follow this convention as well and
use the term “aristocracy” as an analog for nobility.
36. C
HARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8,13 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Colonial Press) (revised ed. 1900).
37. Id. at 13. The positioning of the noble class as the buffer between the monarch and the
people is a theme through Montesquieu’s works. Id. at 22 (“[t]he people, who in respect of nobility
are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws.”) Lawrence
James portrays a similar hierarchy, stating that “[s]ubmission to the Crown meant submission to the
nobility.” James, supra note 31 at 95.
38. James, supra note 35, at 6. “[t]he aristocracy have always been open elite. New blood
was welcomed and assimilated.”
44 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
and elected governments with authoritarian instincts.
39
More important than the public perception of nobility, however, was the
power that came with nobility. The privileges of nobility were quite
amorphous, but as general principle, “the nobles formed[ed] a body, who
by their prerogative, and for their own particular interest, restrained the
people . . . .”
40
That is, they prescribed the law and ensured that it was
executed, often for their own benefit.
41
Certainly, there were many other noble pursuits in addition to
lawmaking, ranging from hunting to the raising of forces and fighting on
the field of war. For the purposes of this Article, however, the legislative
and executive aspects of nobility is of greatest import. Though the scope
of the political power of the noble class ebbed and flowed over the
course of history, at the time of the Constitutional Debates the British
noble class had almost supreme political power.
42
And it was this
superior political class that was the target of the Nobility Clauses.
Professor Jack Balkin cogently explained the evil to which the Nobility
Clauses were directed as “an entire social system of superiority and
inferiority” and political privilege.
43
C. What was the Intent of the Nobility Clauses?
The Constitution’s framers’ concern with the noble class was likely
the same as that of Montesquieu, as expressed in his “The Spirit of the
Laws” (which was published less than 40 years prior to publication of
the Federalist papers).
[E]asy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people, it
is difficult to restrain themselves. Such is the nature of this
constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the
power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.
44
The Framers’ solution was to prohibit the bestowal of titles of nobility.
Montesquieu, presciently observing that an unchecked nobility would
39. James, supra note 35, at 3.
40. Montesquieu, supra note 36, at 22.
41. James, supra note 35, at 117 (“the aristocracy continued to expect slavish deference an
d
t
he law gave them comfort”).
42. Id. at 165. “[w]hat was most significant of all for the future of the nobility was that it had
emerged from an unquiet century [the 17
th
century] as the collective protector of the nation’s
liberties . . . [f]or the next century, the nobility enjoyed a near monopoly of all the major offices of
state”
43. Balkin, supra note 34, at 2350.
44. Montesquieu, supra note 36, at 22.
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 45
only work to protect its own powers, went to the substance of the
problem and proposed that the only way for a republican form of
government to exist would be for the nobility to be “on a level with the
people” with regard to the application of law.
45
As the framers were heavily influenced by Montesquieu, it is likely
that they believed that the prohibition on titles of nobility would suffice
to implement Montesquieu’s prescription for preventing the emergence
of an American nobility. It was the intent of the framers to ensure that no
one, from the lowest political officeholder to the President, would have
legal privileges or immunities not available to the population as a whole
nor would they be able to bestow such privileges and immunities on
their colleagues or other individuals.
46
In fact, in The Federalist No. 57, Madison dealt with the question of
whether members of the House of Representatives would be subject to
the laws that come from Congress or, instead, would they, like the noble
class, be above the laws. There can be no question that the framers
intended for the political class to have no privileges when it came to the
applicability of laws.
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of
Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they
can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves
and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has
always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human
policy can connect the rulers and the people together. It creates
between them that communion of interests and sympathy of
sentiments, of which few governments have furnished examples; but
without which every government degenerates into tyranny. If it be
asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making
legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of
the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system; the nature of just
and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit
which actuates the people of America—a spirit which nourishes
freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not
obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will
45. Id. at 313.
46. See Balkin, supra note 34, at note 118 (“[t]he Federalist Papers took great care to
distinguish the President from [a monarch] and to emphasize the President’s limited powers and
subjection to ordinary law.”) In furtherance of the point that political office holders in the United
States were to be stripped of any remnant of nobility that existed in the British system, Balkin goes
on to note that the President was not intended to have the power to confer any privileges at all.
46 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty.
47
The Federalist Papers are complete with cautionary notes about the
tendency towards self-aggrandizement of those individuals who are
given power under the Constitution
48
and the quoted text above puts a
point on the issue. The language “they can make no law which will not
have its full operation on themselves and their friends” could not be
more clear. The Framers knew that the greatest guarantee that laws
would be fair and have a minimal impact on liberty was to ensure that
those who make the laws, and their friends, had to live with those laws
exactly as the citizenry at large would have to live with them. Gordon
Wood reiterates this in discussing the structure of early American
society, proclaiming that there was a new egalitarianism where the
Nobility Clauses “were interpreted to mean that no one should be set
apart from the body of the people.”
49
Decades after the ratification of the Constitution, Andrew Jackson,
in vetoing the creation of the Second Bank of the United States,
reiterated the objection to government bestowed privileges for the
benefit of a select few, urging that there be a mechanism for redress
when the government acts in such an unjust manner.
In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior
industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic
2003) (1961) (emphasis added).
48. T
HE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 163-164(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003) (1961) (“It was a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of
men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and
PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure
in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience, and if
we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate
our system, we may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try change after change;
but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better.”); T
HE FEDERALIST No. 51,
at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003) (1961) (“In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”); Id. at
320 (“It is of great importance in a
republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers. . .”); and T
HE FEDERALIST
No.57, at 348 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003) (1961) (“The aim of
every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next
place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold
their public trust.”).
49. G
ORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-
1815 at 35 (2009).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 47
protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural
and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and
exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more
powerful, the humble members of society the farmers, mechanics, and
laborers who have neither the time nor the means of securing like
favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their
Government.
50
Consequently, where the political class has the power to exempt itself
and its friends from the operation of the law, we not only have an affront
to republicanism, we have a de facto nobility in contravention of the
intention of the framers and the spirit of the Constitution. This was the
fear of the framers as well as noted scholars and commentators of the
time.
If what has been said be a sufficient answer to the necessity of the
distinction of ranks and honours to the well government of a state, the
commentator himself hath afforded an unanswerable argument against
their expedience in a republic, by acknowledging them to be both
dangerous and invidious in such a government. And herewith agrees
the author of the Spirit of Laws, who informs us, that the principle of a
democracy is corrupted, when the spirit of equality is extinct. The
same admirable writer [Montesquieu] gives us a further reason why so
heterogeneous a mixture ought not to have a place in any government
where the freedom and happiness of the people is thought an object
worthy the attention of the government. “A nobility,” says he, “think it
an honour to obey a king, but consider it as the lowest infamy to share
the power with the people.”
51
Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Adams on titles of nobility
generally and their place in America specifically.
52
Jefferson saw nobles
and politicians as analogous in large part, with nobility being an
outdated concept and freely elected political leaders being preferable as
there was systemic check on their power.
53
As far as the framers were
concerned, the safeguard against the political class taking on the
trappings of aristocracy would, primarily, be the constitutionally limited
terms in office and the need to be elected and re-elected on a regular
50. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 576-89 (Richardson ed., 1897) (emphasis added)
51. S
T. GEORGE TUCKER. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 220 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 6
th
prtg. 2008).
52. See Thomas Jefferson letter to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813) in The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, at 1304-10.
53. Id.
48 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
basis.
54
For reasons that defy easy explanation, the people have not served
as a check on the political class. In part, blame can be placed on the
Seventeenth Amendment,
55
which put both houses of Congress into the
same electoral pool. Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, Senators were
selected by the respective State’s legislature.
56
The Framers provided
this alternative to the election of members of the House of
Representative in order to “more intimately connect the State
governments with the national legislature” so that there would be
“mutual checks on [each house of Congress].”
57
True to the founders’
fears, a Congress without the check of Senators selected directly by the
States and accountable to the states, rather than a populist majority, has
resulted in the rise of an omnipotent federal government and a
corresponding dismantling of the republican system.
58
Added to this, the ease with which incumbents can control public
perception and topics of debate obscures from the public consciousness
the emergence of a political nobility in the United States. To wit, as
Mark Levin argues in “The Liberty Amendments,”
[t]hrough gerrymandering of House districts, patronage, a barrage of
self-serving free and paid media, and fund-raising advantages,
incumbents are able to extend their hold on federal office.
Furthermore, incumbents often use their positions as lawmakers to
promote federal spending and legal initiatives that benefit their
personal longevity in office, making it increasingly difficult for
54. See THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS (Lester J. Cappon ed., Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg,
Virginia, 1959) (“It suffices for us, if the moral and physical condition of our own citizens qualifies
them to select the able and good for the direction of their government, with a recurrence of elections
at such short periods as will enable them to displace an unfaithful servant before the mischief he
meditates may be irremediable.”).
55. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII.
56. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
5
7. John Dickinson of Delaware on June 7, 1787 at 398, in D
EBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS (Jonathon Elliott, ed)., vol. 1 (1901).
58. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 D
UKE L.J. 1, 34 (1994) (arguing that “the
Seventeenth Amendment’s alteration of the Senate’s political constituency, providing for election of
senators directly by voters rather than by state legislatures, decreased the institutional fitness and
disposition of that body to serve as a political safeguard against increasing federal influence”); see
also Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth
Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 207
(1997) (“The Seventeenth Amendment reduced the monitoring of behavior by Senators, thereby
enabling Senators to sacrifice their constituents’ concerns for their own desires and those of special-
interest groups.”).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 49
successful electoral challenges.
59
This point is not to be dismissed lightly. Many of the numerous
safeguards that the framers built into the Constitution ultimately depend
on the voting public as an enforcement mechanism.
60
History has shown,
though, that American voters appear to rarely use their power, even
when great abuses are occurring. One study showed that there was less
incumbent turnover in the House of Representatives than in the Politburo
in the final years of the Soviet Union.
61
In many ways we have become an untitled aristocracy, where the
political class pacifies a majority of the voting population with local
pork barrel spending and political patronage in return for being allowed
to enrich and entrench themselves with little fear of being removed from
office.
62
It is here that I differ with those who argue that the primary
focus of the Nobility Clauses was the prevention of hereditary privilege.
It is beyond question that the framers sought to ensure that there would
be no hereditary political class,
63
but to focus solely on hereditary
privilege is to miss the more overarching concern, which was to
establish and protect the republican form of government. As such, the
Nobility Clauses were intended to provide a blanket prohibition on any
representative of the people ascending to privileged status by virtue of
his or her office, with the privilege being not only of status and
opportunity, but of legal standing among the citizenry as a whole.
59. Levin, supra note 27, at 20.
60. Jennifer A. Covell et. al., Mr. Smith Went to Washington and Never Came Home: A
Defense of Colorado’s Term Limitation Amendment, 1
J.L. & POL’Y 47, 58 (1993) (stating that in
response to those who feared corruption in the new government, “[p]roponents of the Constitution
pointed to frequent elections and short terms of office and argued that the corresponding provisions
were included to prevent long-term incumbency, nobility and corruption”).
61. Ronald Rotunda, A Commentary on the Constitutionality of Term Limits, in T
HE
P
OLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS at 141 (Edward H. Crane and Roger Pilon, eds. 1994).
62. Throughout The Federalist Papers there were cautionary statements with regard to
majoritarianism. See generally, T
HE FEDERALIST No. 10, where Madison explained that the flaws in
a pure democracy can result in a form of tyranny. Further to this point, the concept of a “tyranny of
the majority” was later described by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America: “In general,
the American functionaries are far more independent within the sphere that is prescribed to them
than the French civil officers. Sometimes, even, they are allowed by the popular authority to exceed
those bounds; and as they are protected by the opinion and backed by the power of the majority,
they dare do things that even a European, accustomed as he is to arbitrary power, is astonished at.
By this means habits are formed in the heart of a free country which may some day prove fatal to its
liberties . . . .” A
LEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at ch. XV, pt. II Tyranny of the
Majority (Henry Reeve, trans., Phillips Bradley, ed. Vol 1. 2004).
63. Though political office is not inherited in the United States, the Kennedy, Clinton an
d
B
ush families, among others, come close to demonstrating a quasi-hereditary aspect to American
politics.
50 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
Even Professor Carlton F.W. Larson, in arguing for the primacy of
the hereditary approach to interpreting the prohibitions at the heart of the
Nobility Clauses, stated that
[t]he scope of the Nobility Clauses was not limited to holding office. It
extended to any form of privilege provided by the government. As
another Federalist explained, under the Constitution there ‘never can
be any nobility in the states, or person possessed of any rights or
privileges but what are common to the meanest subject . . . .’
64
Furthermore, I strongly disagree with those who have argued that the
Nobility Clauses are a guarantee of societal equality and should be used
to ensure some form of government controlled equality. Professor
Richard Delgado, while clearly stating that he does not advocate the use
of the Nobility Clauses as a form of affirmative action,
65
proposes that
the Nobility Clauses be used to provide government with sweeping
powers to regulate all forms of individual conduct under the guise of
ensuring equal governmental treatment.
66
Such arguments are contrary
to the founding principle at the heart of the Constitution: a federal
government of limited and enumerated powers. Professor Delgado’s
proposed Nobility Clauses doctrine would eclipse modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence in expanding the reach of the federal
government.
67
Moreover, a government of select individuals that is
empowered to have despotic powers to determine what “fairness” is and
how it should be distributed, as Professor Delgado proposes, is one that
is in contravention of the clear purpose of the Nobility Clauses, which is
to ensure the republican system.
D. Is there a Modern Nobility in the United States?
Having established that the Nobility Clauses were intended to
prevent the formation of an American nobility characterized by, inter
alia, incidents (as well as titles) of nobility, the question turns to whether
there is such a system in the United States today. One could devote a
library to chronicling the incidents of nobility throughout history, but for
64. Larson supra note 3, at 1403. (emphasis added) (quoting To The People of Pennsylvania,
PA. Gazette, Nov. 7, 1787).
65. Delgado, supra note 19, at 122.
66. Id. at 127-134. Delgado goes as far as proposing that the Nobility Clauses be used to
restrict political donations above a certain amount, even though such restrictions have previously
been found to violate other constitutional rights and redistribute wealth that was ostensibly obtained
at some level from government action. Id. at 128-134.
67. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 51
purposes of this paper the most important incident of nobility is that of
government-granted privilege. This, too, can take many forms.
Today, it would be rare to find a law that explicitly and
affirmatively favors a certain class of person, due in large part to the
equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
68
as well as
the political repercussions that would follow from such an obvious abuse
of office. But there was more to noble privilege than simply laws that
explicitly benefited the noble class. British nobility, deriving, at times,
and sharing, at other times, its power with the crown, had “virtual
control over local government”
69
and as a result, other than having to
answer to the King, had broad powers to make, and ignore, law. In many
cases, nobility’s privilege was in the nature of being exempted from laws
that were a burden upon the rest of the population; the American
political system was specifically designed to eliminate this practice.
70
One example of such legal privilege provided to the noble class is
embodied by the various British game laws. These laws, starting in the
fourteenth century and continuing for centuries after, were “a blatant
case of the nobility’s selfishness and [were] deeply resented by peasant
farmers and labourers.”
71
Under the game laws, there were general
prohibitions on the hunting of game. A select few (generally lords and
knights) were, however, allowed to hunt and consume game. All others
were forbidden from any form of hunting or enjoying the products of the
hunt. Any violation of this prohibition would subject the offender to
fines and imprisonment for violating the privileges reserved for the
nobility.
72
Possessing the right to hunt was no trivial matter. As game was an
abundant source of meat (and did not involve incurring costs or time
involved in raising animals on a farm), hunting provided a practical
advantage to those who possessed the right to engage in that activity and
was, in addition, a coveted incident of status to the nobility. Even as late
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
69. James, supra note 35, at 19.
70. Tucker, supra note 51, at 221. (“In America the senate are not a distinct order of
individuals, but, the second branch of the national legislature, taken collectively. They have no
privileges, but such as are common to the members of the house of representatives, and of the
several state legislatures: we have seen that these privileges extend only to an exemption from
personal arrests, in certain cases, and that it is utterly lost, in cases of treason, felony, or breach of
the peace. They are more properly the privileges of the constituents, than of the members, . . .In
England the privileges of the peerage are in some instances an insult to the morals of the people . . .
Happy for America that her constitution and the genius of her people, equally secure her against the
introduction of such a pernicious and destructive class of men”) (emphasis added).
71. James, supra note 35, at 38.
72. Id., and Munsche, infra note 75, at 21.
52 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
as the
nineteenth century, British nobility dearly held on to its exclusive
right to hunt as one of the last vestiges of noble privilege.
73
Indeed, the
British nobility considered the game laws to be protective of its “prestige
in the countryside and the sovereignty of the law.”
74
The game laws, in short, were a proxy for the political, social and
economic power of the British nobility. In fact, as a reaction to the rising
power of the English bourgeoisie after the English Civil Wars, the
nobility engineered the enactment of the Game Act of 1671 as a means
of reasserting its status and legal power over the masses.
75
Far from
being limited to hunting privileges, the legal power of the British
nobility was profound, even to the point of enabling it to enact
legislation that “outlawed the free market in labour”
76
and employing the
criminal courts to enforce the nobles’ property rights in serfs.
If the nobles were not above the law (it could be argued that the
crown kept the nobility in check at various points in history), they were
as close to such a status as could be imagined. Though largely without
their historical power by the end of the nineteenth century, the nobles,
through the House of Lords, still retained their legal superiority, having
the right to “throw out laws passed by the [House of] Commons.”
77
And
more important, at the time of American independence, the House of
Lords, which had been abolished along with the crown roughly a century
earlier in the wake of the English Civil Wars, was reasserting noble
hegemony in England.
78
It was in this context that the Nobility Clauses
were drafted.
It is worth repeating here Madison’s guarantee from The Federalist
57 regarding the power and privileges intended for members of the
House of Representatives (and, presumably, Congress as a whole): “they
can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves
73. James, supra note 35, at 227 (in discussing an 1819 Parliamentary challenge to the game
laws, James noted that it was “highly unlikely that the Lords would have agreed to forfeit a legal
privilege at a time when their monopoly of political power was under attack.”).
74. Id. at 225.
75. See P.B.
MUNSCHE, GENTLEMEN AND POACHER: THE ENGLISH GAME LAW, 1671-1831
(Cambridge University Press, 1981) at 19 (“Such, then, was the context in which the Game Act of
1671 was passed. In the decades following the Restoration, the gentry watched the growth and
prosperity of the urban bourgeoisie with feelings of anger and frustration. The consequence was not
only a number of discriminatory measures against the bourgeoisie, but also an enhanced feeling of
self-esteem among the gentry themselves. The Game Act combined both elements.).
76. James, supra note 35, at 45.
77. Id. at 299.
78. Id. at 143 (discussing late seventeenth century relations between Charles II and the House
of Lords, “Charles could rely upon the House of Lords, his predominately aristocratic ministers and,
most importantly, those peers whom he appoint as Lords Lieutenants in the provinces.”).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 53
and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society.”
79
The power to meld the law to the benefit of the political class is
precisely the privilege that the modern noble class has reserved for itself.
In the next section I will outline the modern day analogs to noble legal
privilege. I refer to these legal privileges as the “Nobility Loopholes.”
III. T
HE NOBILITY LOOPHOLES
T
hat the political class in the United States has exempted itself
from compliance with law is not a matter of supposition or
circumstantial conjecture. Congress, itself, has formally acknowledged
that unless Congress enacts legislation to compel it to comply with
federal law, it is exempt from such law. The Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 (the “CAA”)
80
nominally obligates Congress
to comply with federal law, but only to the extent that the provisions of
federal law are enumerated in the CAA and then only insofar as the
Office of Compliance (a Legislative branch office created under the
CAA) chooses to enforce the provisions of law that are applied to
Congress through the CAA.
While its title would lead one to believe that the CAA closed the
loophole on Congress’s self-exemption from the laws that it passes, the
truth is that only 13 specific labor and employment related federal laws
are covered by the CAA.
81
If it took legislation to apply enumerated
provisions of federal labor and employment law to Congress, the only
conclusion is that absent authorizing legislation, Congress is exempt
from the reach of all other federal law.
82
Though Congress may assert
that it is exempt from the operation of federal law unless it has explicitly
agreed to be subject to the same (and the Supreme Court has not,
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic
2003) (1961) (emphasis added).
80. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438. See, also, the Presidential and Executive Office Accountability
Act of 1996 (3 U.S.C. §401), which generally applies the provisions of the CAA to the President
and Executive Office.
81. The 13 federal laws that are incorporated in the CAA are: Access to Public Services and
A
ccommodations for the Disabled, Age Discrimination, Collective Bargaining and Unionization,
Disability Discrimination, Equal Employment Opportunity, Fair Labor Standards and the Minimum
Wage, Family and Medical Leave, Notification of Office Closings or Mass Layoffs, Occupational
Safety and Health, Protection from Polygraph Testing, Uniformed Services Rights and Protections,
Veteran’s Employment Opportunity Act and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.
See http://www.compliance.gov/the-act/covered-laws/.
82. This is reinforced in Grassley, infra note 85, at 35-36, where Senator Grassley states that
the CAA will make it “. . .more likely that Congress will apply any future legislation to itself as well
as to the rest of the country.” If federal legislation applied to Congress without limitation there
would be no need for Congressional action to subject itself to future legislation.
54 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
heretofore, acted in any way contrary to this assertion), there is in fact no
constitutional provision that provides such an exemption other than the
Speech or Debate Clause,
83
which is a narrow exemption to protect
Congressional office holders from arrest or prosecution in the course of
carrying out their legislative duties.
While the Speech or Debate Clause has been given a broad
interpretation, there is no authority for the proposition that it provides
Congress with a general exemption from compliance with law. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much, stating that while the
Speech or Debate Clause “must be read broadly to effectuate its purpose
of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch . . . “ it was
never intended “to make Members of Congress super-citizens . . . .”
84
This characterization of Congress as seeing itself as a collection of
“super-citizens” exempt from their own lawmaking is also seen in the
legislative history of the CAA, where Senator Charles Grassley, the
author of the CAA, responded to the objections of many members of
Congress by stating that the members are “not better than the people
[they] represent and [they] are not, by definition and determination,
different than the people [they] represent.”
85
Senator Grassley bemoaned
the fact that the CAA was limited in scope to only enumerated
provisions of federal law, rather than all federal law
86
and explicitly
stated that “[members of Congress] make laws for the people, and we,
too, must follow these laws.”
87
Nonetheless, the problem of the political
class (federal, state and local) creating exemptions from the operation of
law for themselves and their friends has continued to flourish.
A. Affordable Care Act Loopholes
No federal law of recent vintage has created as much political and
public outcry as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
88
also
known as the ACA. Among the provisions of the ACA is a requirement
that all Americans purchase health insurance.
89
In order to facilitate this
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl 1. “[Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech
or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”
84. United States v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972).
85. Charles Grassley and Jennifer Shaw Schmidt, Practicing What We Preach: A Legislative
History of the Congressional Accountability Act, 35 H
ARV. J. ON LEGIS., 33 (1998) at 34.
86. Id. at 47.
87. Id. at 35.
88. P
UB L. 111-148, (2010).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. The individual mandate “requires most Americans to maintai
n
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 55
provision of the ACA, health insurance exchanges have been created,
either at the state or the federal levels, where individuals are guaranteed
access to markets for insurance policies and government subsidies are
provided to those whose incomes are below a certain threshold.
90
Under the ACA, all members of Congress, and their staffs, must
obtain health insurance through the ACA-created insurance exchange.
91
Prior to the implementation of the ACA, members of Congress and their
staffs received their health insurance through the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program, where participants were allowed to select the
insurance plan of their choice and in return the federal government
provided a subsidy of approximately 72% of the premium cost for the
selected coverage.
92
The government subsidies that are available for ACA insurance
premiums are generally limited, for persons who are employed and
receive health insurance through their employer, to those whose income
is less than four times the federal poverty level where the cost of such
insurance is greater than 9.5% of the person’s household income.
93
Thus,
under the ACA, all members of Congress and virtually all of their staffs
would not be eligible for government subsidies relating to health
insurance premium costs. However, after rancorous objections by
members of Congress
94
at imminent risk of losing a benefit worth
approximately $10,000 per family,
95
President Obama’s Office of
Personnel Management issued a proposed ruling that effectively
amended the ACA to provide a government subsidy of 75% of the
amount paid for obtaining ACA insurance exchange for members of
Congress and their staffs (the “Congressional ACA Loophole”).
96
‘minimum essential’ health insurance coverage.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2571 (2012). Those who are exempt from this mandate include “those with certain religious
beliefs, members of a health care sharing ministry, individuals for whom the cost of obtaining
minimum coverage would exceed eight percent of their household income or whose income fell
below a filing threshold, Indian tribe members, and others who are deemed to have a hardship in
obtaining coverage.” Butler v. Obama, 814 F. Supp. 2d 230, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), citing 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(d),(e).
90. See http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/insurance/index.html.
91. § 1312(d)(3)(D), 124 Stat. 182.
92. Reinhardt, Uwe, A Health Care Fight That Punishes Federal Workers, N
EW YORK
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2013).
93. See generally, I.R.S. Notice 2013-45 (http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-45.PDF).
94. Strassel, supra note 14.
95. See Letter from Representative David Vitter to Office of Personnel Management dated
September 3, 2013, available at Representative Vitter’s website
http://www.vitter.senate.gov/newsroom/press/vitter-lawmakers-urge-opm-to-eliminate-obamacare-
exemptions-for-washington.
96. Office of Personnel Management ,Benefits Administration Letter number 13-204,
56 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
As Representative David Vitter succinctly stated in opposing this
ruling, “no ordinary American with an annual income of more than
$43,000 buying on the [ACA health insurance exchange] would receive
any government subsidy, much less one worth approximately $5,000 for
an individual or $10,000 for a family . . . .”
97
Not only was the law
changed to provide members of Congress with a loophole, it was done
outside of the constitutional framework for amending laws.
98
In addition to the Congressional ACA Loophole for government
subsidies, there is another loophole in the ACA. The ACA imposes an
excise tax on what is commonly referred to as “Cadillac” health
insurance plans.
99
However, for those in “high risk” professions, the
threshold for the imposition of the excise tax is raised by approximately
13%. “High risk” professions have been defined to be those that are
generally well represented by labor unions, such as law enforcement, fire
protection and construction.
100
It is likely no coincidence that labor
“Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Members of Congress and Congressional Staff”
(August 7, 2013) (available at http://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-
forms/benefits-administration-letters/2013/13-204.pdf).
97. Vitter, supra note 95.
98. Some argue that the Congressional ACA Loophole is not, in fact, a Congressional
exemption from the ACA since it is a continuation of an existing subsidy. See, e.g., Lori Robertson
No ‘Special Subsidy’ for Congress F
ACTCHECK.ORG, August 30, 2013 (available at
http://www.factcheck.org/2013/08/no-special-subsidy-for-congress/). While it is true that the
subsidy is a continuation of an existing benefit, two points have to be considered. First, the
implementation of the ACA has changed the health insurance marketplace for all individuals, so a
continuation of a pre-existing benefit is in and of itself an exemption, since it allows a select group
to continue having a benefit that the law does not provide to the public at large. Second, the
argument that the Congressional ACA Loophole is really just an employer benefit, no different from
a benefit that would be available from an employer in the private sector, ignores the fact that the
benefit is provided by the government using taxpayer funds. Moreover, the ACA will change
employer benefits decisions as it, in many cases, will make it more cost effective for employers to
pay a fine rather than provide benefits. If one takes two similarly situated employees, each making
$100,000 a year, with one being a member of Congress and the other being an employee of a
privation corporation, upon the full implementation of the ACA the private sector employer would
likely discontinue health care insurance as a benefit and instead pay the ACA fine under the
employer mandate. At that point, the private sector employee would buy health care insurance with
no government subsidy available. The member of Congress, on the other hand, is insulated from the
effects of the cost/benefit analysis that private sector employers will make as a result of the ACA
fine provision, and is, instead, guaranteed a taxpayer funded subsidy representing 75% of the cost of
her health care insurance. This is clearly differential treatment in favor of the members of Congress,
which is why the members of Congress demanded the ruling from the Office of Personnel
Management that effected the change in their treatment under the ACA.
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980I. The excise tax will be imposed starting in 2018 for individual
plans that have a value of $10,200 and family plans with a value of $27,500 (as indexed for cost of
living increases in future years).
100. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics news release dated
January 23, 2013, USDL-13-0105, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 57
unions have traditionally been exceedingly active in political affairs. A
Wall Street Journal study found that labor unions spent over $4 billion
dollars on political activity from 2005 through 2011
101
and according to
the non-partisan research group The Center for Responsive Politics, in
the same period over 90% of union political funding went to Democratic
Party causes.
102
B. Firearms Laws Loopholes
The Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act (the “LEOSA”), enacted
in 2004 and amended in 2010 and 2013, is a federal law that provides a
federal exemption from concealed weapon laws at the federal and state
levels for both law enforcement personnel and retired law enforcement
personnel.
103
The scope of this loophole is impressively large, as it
covers any governmental agents (federal, state, and local) who are
authorized to carry a weapon and have statutory powers of arrest, as well
as Amtrak police, Federal Reserve Police, Executive Branch law
enforcement officers and military police officers and all retired law
enforcement personnel.
104
While it may seem obvious that law
enforcement personnel should be allowed to carry concealed weapons,
the LEOSA provides a blanket exemption from all concealed weapon
laws, whether or not the covered individual is on duty or acting in an
official capacity and, notably, the privilege continues after retirement
from duty.
105
The LEOSA’s privileges are quite significant and go to the heart of
the trappings of nobility in America. In many jurisdictions it is virtually
impossible to obtain a permit to carry a weapon. For example, in
California, only 0.1% of adult California residents have been issued a
concealed weapon permit.
106
Nationwide, less than 4% of adult
While overall only 6.6% of private sector employees were represented by a union in 2012, 13.2% of
construction workers were unionized and a majority of all police and firefighting professionals are
affiliated with unions.
101. Tom Mc Ginty and Brody Mullins, Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct
Donations, W
ALL STREET JOURNAL (July 10, 2012).
102. Available at C
ENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS website:
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2014&ind=P.
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C.
104. Subject to certain limitations, such as the officer being in good standing and not
otherwise being prohibited from carrying a firearm. See Id.
105. See Id.
106. States’ Laws and Requirements for Concealed Carry Permits Vary Across the Nation,
GAO Publication dated July 2012 at page 38. Available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
600/592552.pdf.
58 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
Americans have been issued a concealed weapon permit and many of
these permits are only valid in the state in which they are issued.
107
Yet,
nearly 100% of all law enforcement personnel, whether employed or
retired, have the right to carry concealed weapons in all 50 states.
108
Exemptions from firearms laws also exist at the state level in many
jurisdictions. In Massachusetts, while the possession of “assault
weapons” or high capacity magazines is prohibited, retired (as well as
active duty) law enforcement personnel are exempted from the
prohibition.
109
Similar exemptions exist in California,
110
Hawaii,
111
New
Jersey
112
and New York.
113
New York’s assault weapons ban, as the
most recently enacted law, is quite illustrative of the political and legal
inequities taking place with regard to firearms laws.
The New York assault weapons ban, known as the “SAFE Act,”
banned both assault weapons and ammunition magazines with a capacity
in excess of seven rounds of ammunition.
114
The ban did not provide an
exemption for retired law enforcement personnel. Immediately after the
enactment of the ban, unions representing law enforcement personnel
publicly attacked New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s administration
and demanded the creation of an amendment that exempted retired law
enforcement from the ban.
115
Some local law enforcement officials in
New York State went so far as to state that they would not enforce the
SAFE Act’s provisions as they were originally enacted.
116
107. Id. at pages 77-78.
108. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C.
109. M
ASS. GEN L. ch. 140 §131M.
110. Exemption from assault weapons ban for off-duty law enforcement personnel (C
AL
PENAL §36030).
111. State and county law enforcement personnel and certain state employees are exempted
from, inter alia, the prohibitions against possession of assault pistols and automatic weapons and
concealed carry or any firearm as well as the firearms storage provisions of Hawaii law. See H
AW.
REV. STAT. ch. 134, §§ 134-11.
112. Exemption from assault weapons ban for law enforcement personnel on duty and, at the
discretion of the New Jersey Attorney General, off duty. (N.J.
CRIM. CODE tit. 2C:39-3(g)).
113. N.Y. P
ENAL §265.20(e).
114. N.Y. P
ENAL §265.37. In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, a federal
district court held that some of the restrictions outlined in the SAFE Act are unconstitutional,
including the prohibition on the possessing a magazine loaded with more than seven rounds of
ammunition. 13-CV-291S, 2013 WL 6909955 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2013).
115. Murray Weiss, NY Gun Control Laws Anger Retired Police Who Believe They Should Be
Exempted From Some Restrictions, H
UFFINGTON POST (January 17, 2013) (available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/17/ny-gun-control-laws-anger-police-
retired_n_2495417.html).
116. Jeff Preval, Lawmakers Calls on Sheriff to Enforce SAFE Act, WGRZ.COM (May 18,
2013) (available at http://www.wgrz.com/news/article/215027/37/Lawmaker-Calls-on-Sheriff-to-
Enforce-SAFE-Act).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 59
Shortly after New York police unions demanded an exemption for
their retired members, the Cuomo administration delivered the
amendment
117
and explained that it was because retired law enforcement
personnel “are different”
118
from the rest of New York’s population.
Almost immediately after the Cuomo administration provided the
exemption that the police unions had demanded the police unions did an
about-face and declared their full support for the SAFE Act.
119
A more
direct example of the political class providing above-the-law privileges
to their supporters and affiliates would be hard to dream up.
It is important to note, again, that substantially all law enforcement
personnel are either employed by government agencies or belong to
unions, or both. Thus, like the ACA loopholes, the LEOSA is an
exemption from federal, state, and local laws that applies solely to the
political class and its closest allies.
120
In 2013 Senator Dianne
Feinstein
121
introduced a bill to ban “assault weapons”
122
(the “2013
AWB”).
123
While the bill did not become law, the provisions were
similar to legislation enacted in 1994 (the “1994 AWB”).
124
The relevant
provisions of the 2013 AWB are similar to the 1994 AWB, with the
2013 AWB being more expansive, such that a review of the 2013 AWB
should prove illustrative of both the federal assault weapons ban that had
117. See Weiss, supra note 115.
118. Glenn Bain, NY Gov. Cuomo Signs SAFE Act Exemption for Retired Cops, NY
DAILY
NEWS (July 8, 2013) (available at http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2013/07/ny-
gov-cuomo-signs-safe-act-exemption-for-retired-cops).
119. Dan Mosher, SAFE Act Gets Support From Key Law Enforcement Officials,
L
EGISLATIVE GAZETTE¸ (July 8, 2013) (available at http://www.legislativegazette.com/Articles-
Top-Stories-c-2013-07-08-84355.113122-SAFE-Act-gets-support-from-key-law-enforcement-
officials.html).
120. While political office holders are not explicitly exempted from concealed weapons laws,
they generally are provided with security that is exempted from such laws. In addition, political
officeholders are frequently given special dispensation in jurisdictions where such permits are
issued only at the discretion of law enforcement authorities.
121. Though only one concealed weapons permit has been issued in San Francisco in the past
30 years, former San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein, before she was elected to the United States
Senate, had such a permit when she lived in San Francisco. Debra J. Saunders, Feinstein’s Gun-
Packing History, S
AN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE March 21, 2013 (available at
http://blog.sfgate.com/djsaunders/2013/03/21/feinsteins-gun-packing-history)
122. The firearms covered by the 1994 AWB (and proposed to be covered by the 2013 AWB)
were not, in fact, assault weapons and only had cosmetic similarities to actual assault weapons.
Nonetheless, to avoid further confusion this paper adopts the erroneous term “assault weapons” in
reference to the weapons covered by the foregoing bans.
123. S. 150—113th Congress: Assault Weapons Ban of 2013 (2013). Retrieved September 19,
2013, from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s150.
124. A ban on “assault weapons” was part of Pub.L. 103–322, which ban expired in 2004 due
to a sunset provision. Though the 2013 bill was not enacted as law, since it closely resembled the
1994 law I will use it for illustrative purposes in discussing the Nobility Loopholes.
60 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
been enacted and the successor law that has been proposed (and likely
will be proposed again).
Under the 2013 AWB, the “manufacture, transfer and importation
of 157 of the most commonly-owned military-style assault weapons”
125
would have been banned. As with the 1994 AWB, the 2013 AWB
contained a massive loophole for non-military ownership and use of
assault weapons.
126
Section 3 of the 2013 AWB began by amending
Title 18, Part I, Chapter 44, Section 922 of the United States Code to add
new subsections (v) and (w) (said subsections being referred to in this
letter as the “Proposed Firearms Ban Amendment”). Subsection (1) of
the Proposed Firearms Ban Amendment stated, in essence, that assault
weapons could not be possessed in the United States. Subsections (4)
and (6) of the Proposed Firearms Ban Amendment exempted from the
general ban on possession of assault weapons a wide range of people,
including (paraphrased here):
• “qualified law enforcement officers” (which is defined in Title
18, Part I, Chapter 44, Section 926(B)(c) of the United States Code as
being, generally, anyone who is given law enforcement powers under
federal, state, or local authority);
• People who transport nuclear material;
• Security personnel at educational facilities; and
• Retired law enforcement personnel.
127
T
he latest data available from the United States Department of
Justice (2008) show that there were over 765,000 sworn state and local
law enforcement personnel
128
while the federal government had over
120,000 law enforcement personnel.
129
There, alone, are nearly 900,000
125. S. 150—113th Congress: Assault Weapons Ban of 2013 (2013). The 2013 AWB would
have had a far greater reach than the 1994 AWB due to the structure of the ban. Weapons that
would be subject to the ban were described in very general terms while those that were not subject
to the ban were specifically enumerated. As a result, any firearms that were not in existence at the
time of the enactment of the 2013 AWB would likely have been subject to the ban unless they were
later added to the list of exempted weapons by an act of Congress. In this way, the 2013 AWB
would have eventually prevented the introduction of any new firearms and, in the mid to long term,
would have effected a ban on virtually all semi-automatic firearms. Since the 2013 AWB listed
numerous bolt action and lever action weapons as not subject to the ban, it could be argued that bolt
action and lever action firearms not on the list were intended to be subject to the ban.
126. See Id.
127. See Id.
128. Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U
NITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (July 26, 2011) (available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216).
129. Brian A. Reaves, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008, U
NITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (June 26, 2012) (available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4372).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 61
non-military individuals who would be exempted from the 2013
AWB.
130
Current data are not available for the number of people transport
nuclear material, serve as campus security personnel
131
or are retired law
enforcement personnel.
132
Assuming, for purposes of this paper, that the
number of such individuals equals the number of active federal, state,
and local law enforcement personnel, there are over 1,700,000
133
individuals who would be exempt from the operation of the 2013 AWB.
All of these individuals are affiliated with the government.
134
C. Chrysler and General Motors Bankruptcies.
Though the bankruptcies of each of Chrysler LLC and General
Motors Company
135
were not direct exemptions from law for the
political class, they were perhaps the most blatant example of political
patronage in the history of the United States. In short, the rule of law
was suspended by the Obama administration in order to provide
financial benefits to the unions that were instrumental in electing
President Obama just a year earlier.
136
130. 900,000 is the sum of the 765k state and local law enforcement officials and the 120k
federal law enforcement officials.
131. According to the Department of Justice, there were 13,000 sworn campus security
personnel as of 2005. See Brian A. Reaves, Campus Law Enforcement, 2004-05, U
NITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (February 2008) (available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=76).
132. According to one source, there are, at the time of the writing of this paper, New York
State has over 100,000 retired law enforcement personnel. Weiss, supra note 115. Assuming that
this is representative of other states, based on New York’s population as it relates to the population
of the United States as a whole (19.5 million out of 313 million), this would put the number of
retired law enforcement officers in the United States at approximately 1,500,000.
133. The number of individuals exempt from the 2013 AWB would likely have been at least
2,500,000 if the assumption in the foregoing note is accurate.
134. It is important to note that the assault weapons ban was justified on the basis that the
weapons being banned were weapons of war. Since law enforcement deals with enforcing the law
with respect to citizens, and not foreign armies, and as a result of the ban, citizens will not have
assault weapons, there is no justification for exempting law enforcement from the effects of the ban.
Furthermore, retired law enforcement personnel receive special dispensation under the bans. If
relying on active duty law enforcement personnel is sufficient for an ordinary citizen it should be
sufficient for retired law enforcement personnel as well. Providing them with access to assault
weapons is preferential and disparate treatment, as though their lives and safety are more important
than the lives and safety of all other citizens. Clearly, this is in conflict with Madison’s admonitions
regarding equal application of the law.
135. For an overview of the events leading up to the bankruptcies of the two companies, see
Todd Zywicki, The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law, N
ATIONAL AFFAIRS (Issue 7, Spring 2011)
(available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-auto-bailout-and-the-rule-of-
law).
136. See id.; see also Aaron Jack, The Economic Freedom Amendment: A States-Based
62 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
As Professor Todd Zywicki explained, in a typical bankruptcy
proceeding
[s]ecured debt takes first priority in payment; it is also typically
preserved during bankruptcy under what is referred to as the “absolute
priority” rule—since the lender of secured debt offers a loan to a
troubled borrower only because he is guaranteed first repayment when
the loan is up. In the Chrysler case, however, creditors who held the
company’s secured bonds were steamrolled into accepting 29 cents on
the dollar for their loans. Meanwhile, the underfunded pension plans of
the United Auto Workers — unsecured creditors, but possessed of
better political connections — received more than 40 cents on the
dollar.
Moreover, in a typical bankruptcy case in which a secured creditor is
not paid in full, he is entitled to a “deficiency claim”—the terms of
which keep the bankrupt company liable for a portion of the unpaid
debt. In both the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, however, no
deficiency claims were awarded to the wronged creditors. Were
bankruptcy experts to comb through American history, they would be
hard-pressed to identify any bankruptcy case with similar terms.
137
What was the impetus for the United States government pushing through
such an extraordinary plan? Professor Richard A. Epstein summed it up
as “[United Auto Workers union] favoritism.”
138
Upon the conclusion of the Chrysler and General Motors
bankruptcies the United Auto Workers union was given a 55%
ownership stake in Chrysler and a 17.5% ownership stake in General
Motors.
139
Not coincidentally, this occurred only a few months after the
Democratic party took control of both houses of Congress and the White
House. How special was the treatment received by the United Auto
Workers Union? According to one study, by providing the United Auto
Workers union with preferential treatment the Obama administration
Response to the Nationalizing Effects of Bailouts and Federal Ownership of Corporate Stock, 13
E
NGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 32 (2012) (“In short, throughout the 2008 financial
crisis, the federal government suspended the rule of law in its efforts to stabilize the country’s
financial system.”).
137. Zywicki, supra note 135.
138. Richard A. Epstein, Political Bankruptcies: How Chrysler and GM Changed the Rules of
the Game, T
HE FREEMAN, (Vol. 59, No. 10, December 2009) (available at
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/political-bankruptcies-how-chrysler-and-gm-have-changed-
the-rules-of-the-game#axzz2fpsV6VW1).
139. In addition to the common equity stakes, the UAW was given promissory notes and
preferred stock. See James Sherk and Todd Zywicki, Obama’s United Autoworkers Bailout, W
ALL
STREET JOURNAL (June 13, 2012) (available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303768104577462650268680454.html).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 63
showered them with $20 billion more than they would have received in a
normal bankruptcy process.
140
To put a point on this, it is worth repeating that over 90% of union
political donations in recent years has been directed to Democratic
candidates
141
and in the 2008 and 2012 Presidential election cycles, over
99% of United Auto Workers political spending was in support of
Democratic causes.
142
Clearly, the Democratic party has a friend in the
unions, and the United Auto Workers union in particular.
143
This is not
to say that the Democratic party and unions are the only symbiotic
political union, as the Republicans have similar relationships with other
interest groups.
144
The political class abusing its power is something that
transcends party lines.
D. Other State and Local Laws
In 2008, the Orange County Register investigated reports that
hundreds of thousands of individuals affiliated with state and local
government agencies in California were effectively exempted from
traffic laws (and fines) by virtue of having received confidential license
plates issued by the California Department of Motor Vehicles.
145
As it
happens, the confidential license plate loophole is available to union
members as well as political office holders: “[i]n some cases the secret
plates have been negotiated as part of a labor contract.”
146
To this day, the relevant provision of the California Vehicle Code
has not been revised to remove this loophole, even though a bill for that
purpose was introduced in 2010.
147
This loophole covers everyone from
140. Id.
141. Data available at C
ENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS website
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?Ind=P.
142. Id. (available at http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/totals.php?cycle=A&id=d000000070).
In the eight years leading up to the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies the United Auto Workers union
gave nearly $24,000,000 to Democratic candidates and less than $200,000 to Republican
candidates. Id.
143. See Id.
144. See, e.g., Richard W. Caperton, Jackie Weidman and Daniel J. Weiss, Pumped and
Quartered, C
ENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, (February 28, 2012) (available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/02/28/11087/pumped-and-quartered/)
(study finding that “the big five and other oil and gas firms spent more than $146 million lobbying
Congress [in 2011]. The big five oil companies alone spent more than $18 million on federal
campaign contributions. Ninety percent of these contributions went to Republican candidates and 10
percent to Democrats. Many of these politicians were the loudest defenders of oil tax breaks.”
145. Jennifer Muir, Special License Plates Shield Officials from Traffic Tickets, O
RANGE
COUNTY REGISTER (April 4, 2008).
146. Id.
147. California AB 2097 (2009-2010 Session) would have revised Section 1808.4 of the
64 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
the Governor of the State of California to members of every city council
to museum security officers.
148
In other words, virtually every political
office holder and a significant number of unionized state employees, and
members of their families, are effectively exempt from the enforcement
of certain traffic laws. Similar loopholes exist in Colorado, Iowa and the
District of Columbia.
149
Whether it’s Congress exempting itself from its own laws, as with
the ACA, exempting its friends and sponsors, as with the LEOSA,
Congress and the President bending bankruptcy rules with the primary
goal of rewarding supporters, as with the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies,
or state and local authorities quite literally making themselves and their
union friends invisible to the law, all of these acts are forms of
government putting itself and its favored supporters above the law. This
is precisely what Madison was warning us of when he said that Congress
(and, presumably, all subordinate forms of government) “can make no
law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their
friends . . . .”
150
Applying the law to favor friends is, functionally, no
different from making a law that exempts such friends. Such favoritism
is not just unfair, it’s an affront to the republican nature of the United
States and is, in substance and effect, an incident of nobility.
IV.
C
ONFLICT BETWEEN THE NOBILITY LOOPHOLES AND THE NOBILITY
CLAUSES
There are two types of potential conflicts between the Nobility
Loopholes and the Nobility Clauses: laws that directly exempt political
office holders (“Direct Nobility Conflict”) and laws that exempt what
Madison referred to as the “friends” of political office holders (“Indirect
Nobility Conflict”).
California Vehicle Code to require anyone holding a confidential license plate to provide the
Department of Motor Vehicles “. . .with a current employment address for purposes of processing
the service and collection of a traffic, parking, or toll road violation.” The bill was never enacted
into law. In the 2011-2012 Session of the California Legislature another bill was introduced for the
same purpose (AB 2192) but it too was never enacted into law. Thus, the loophole remains.
148. Muir, supra note 145.
149. Tim Cushing, Lawmakers Issued License Plates That Make Them ‘Invisible’ to Traffic
Cams and Parking Tickets, T
ECHDIRT (August 6, 2013).
(available at http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130805/08323124067/lawmakers-issued-license-
plates-that-make-them-invisible-to-traffic-cams-parking-tickets.shtml).
150. T
HE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic
2003) (1961).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 65
A. Direct Nobility Conflict
The Congressional ACA Loophole is an example of a Direct
Nobility Conflict. While the Congressional ACA Loophole was
provided by Executive Branch rulemaking, it is nonetheless an instance
of Congress being exempt from the laws that they enact.
151
Throughout
the debate on the ACA, members of Congress expended an
extraordinary effort to find a way to implement what eventually became
the Congressional ACA Loophole.
152
The concern for many members of
Congress was the negative publicity and constituent outrage that would
result from an explicit Congressional exemption in the ACA.
Consequently, members of Congress did not explicitly exempt
themselves from the operation of the ACA.
153
Rather, Congressional
leaders from both parties appealed to President Obama
154
(some would
say that the appeal was more of a demand
155
) to provide an exemption
from the ACA, which ultimately was delivered in the form of the
Congressional ACA Loophole. Though the authority of President
Obama to provide an exemption that was not in the ACA has been
disputed by some,
156
the Congressional ACA Loophole effects what the
members of Congress demanded: an exemption for members of
Congress from the effects of the law that they enacted. Nobility
Loopholes that constitute Direct Nobility Conflicts are easily discerned
and because they constitute an exemption from law for members of
Congress, they clearly violate the Nobility Clauses.
151. In fact, in previous attempts to enact reform of the healthcare system Congress explicitly
exempted itself from the operation of the applicable laws. See Robert E. Moffit, Congress and the
Taxpayers: A Double Standard on Health Care Reform? T
HE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ISSUE
BULLETIN #174, (April 16, 199) (available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1992/04/
congress-and-the-taxpayers-a-double-standard-on-health-care-reform).
152. Robert E. Moffit, Edmund F. Haislmaier and Joseph A Morris, Congress in the
Obamacare Trap: No Easy Escape T
HE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, BACKGROUNDER #2831, (August
2, 2013) (available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/08/congress-in-the-obamacare-
trap-no-easy-escape#_ftn8).
153. See § 1312(d)(3)(D), 124 Stat. 119.
154. John Bresnahan and Jake Sherman, Lawmakers, Aides, May Get Obamacare Exemption,
P
OLITICO (April 24, 2013) (available at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/obamacare-
exemption-lawmakers-aides-90610.html).
155. John Bresnahan and Jake Sherman, President Obama on Hill’s Obamacare mess: I’m on
it, P
OLITICO (July 31, 2013) (available at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/obama-hill-health-
care-dispute-95017.html#ixzz2g8RUeXTD).
156. See Moffit, Haislmaier and Morris, supra note 152 (“. . .the lack of a statutory basis for
paying the FEHBP contribution to exchange plans means that the Obama Administration cannot fix
the issue of greatest concern to Congress . . . .”).
66 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
B. Indirect Nobility Conflict
In considering the nature of the Indirect Nobility Conflict, the
British game laws, discussed earlier herein, provide an illuminating
historical context of the role weapons privileges have played as an
incident and sign of noble status. In many ways, weapons privileges
have been, and still are, a proxy for nobility. Professor David B. Kopel,
in reviewing Joyce Lee Malcolm’s book on the history of the right to
bear arms,
157
gives an outstanding overview of this.
158
Examining the
works of St. George Tucker, William Rawle and Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story, Kopel confirms that the British game laws functioned to
keep weapons out of the hands of commoners while bestowing the noble
class with virtually unfettered rights to own and use weapons.
159
After
the restoration of the British monarchy following the British civil wars,
King Charles II enacted increasingly draconian laws to consolidate his
power and prevent a recurrence of a popular revolt. At first the laws
were more on the order of registry laws and limitations on the number of
arms and amounts of ammunition that could be kept by commoners
160
but they soon expanded. In concert with the nobles in the House of
Lords, Charles II used the game laws to first limit the possession of arms
to the nobility and then confiscate arms from commoners.
161
If the use of government mandated ammunition and weapons
registries and possession limitations, followed by further limitations
allowing only politically favored persons to possess weapons, and
ultimately followed by confiscation of weapons from anyone who is not
of that class sounds familiar, it is because that is very close to the path of
current firearms laws. The LEOSA, AWB, and various state laws that
have similar restrictions and loopholes are hauntingly reminiscent of the
British game laws under Charles II, which gave the noble class a near-
exclusive franchise on private weapons use and ownership.
162
Loopholes from firearms laws for the political class and those under
their patronage are, in fact, tantamount to the bestowal of noble status,
just as they were under Charles II. Many restrictive firearms laws, such
157. Joyce Lee Malcolm, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT (1994).
158. David B. Kopel, It Isn’t about Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Arms,
93 M
ICH. L. REV. 1333 (1995).
159. Id. at 1333-34 (specifically, footnotes 2-9).
160. Id. at 1343.
161. Id. at 1344-45.
162. See Id. 158, at 1345 (stating that after passage of the Game Act orf 1671, “[t]he vast
majority of Englishmen were now forbidden to kill a rabbit on their own land or to own a gun for
protection”).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 67
as the 2013 AWB, have been justified on the basis that the weapons
being banned are weapons of war
163
and have no place outside of the
fields of battle. Facially, this argument is without merit since the
loopholes in the bans allow a wide variety of individuals to possess and
use the weapons who are neither soldiers nor on any field of battle.
164
In examining the justification for laws such as the 2013 AWB it is
important to note that since law enforcement deals with enforcing the
law with respect to citizens, and not foreign armies, and as a result of the
ban, citizens cannot have assault weapons, there is scant justification for
exempting law enforcement from the effects of the ban. Furthermore,
while the military does not allow active duty personnel to remove actual
assault weapons from military installations other than for duty related
purposes, loopholes in the various state and federal firearms laws allow
law enforcement personnel to possess otherwise banned weapons while
off duty.
165
If military personnel were treated with as much deference as
law enforcement personnel are under firearms laws, we’d see Army
personnel driving tanks home at night. As a result, not only are the
firearms bans and restrictions without justification, they result in those
who have no connection to the conduct of war (law enforcement
officials, who are exempted from assault weapons bans such as the 2013
AWB) having more access to the subject weapons than soldiers who
have the sole responsibility for the conduct of war (who are not
exempted from bans such as the 2013 AWB).
During the Senate debates on the 2013 AWB, Senator John Cornyn
pointed out that under the proposed law, while retired law enforcement
personnel would be allowed to possess assault weapons, retired military
personnel, who would be the most skilled in the safe and effective use of
such weapons, would not.
166
What Senator Cornyn did not mention is
that there are police unions but there is no military union. Additionally,
163. See, e.g., statement of Senator Diane Feinstein, sponsor of the 2013 AWB, on December
14, 2012 (“As I have said many times before—and now repeat in the wake of yet another tragedy—
weapons of war don’t belong on our streets or in our theaters, shopping malls and, most of all, our
schools.”) (available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
releases?ID=3bec5652-be84-4584-affd-9a6998fd60ce).
164. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 926C (authorizing the carrying of concealed firearms by qualified
retired law enforcement officers).
165. See, e.g., C
AL. PENAL § 30630 (“Sections 30605 and 30610 shall not prohibit the
possession or use of assault weapons or a .50 BMG rifle by sworn peace officer members of those
agencies specified in Section 30625 for law enforcement purposes, whether on or off duty.”)
(emphasis added)
166. Tiffany Madison, Feinstein Exempts Police, Not ‘PTSD’ Vets, from Gun Ban, The
Washington Times (March 8, 2013) available at http://communities.washingtontimes.com/
neighborhood/citizen-warrior/2013/mar/8/feinstein-ptsd-veteran-assault-weapons-gun-ban/.
68 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
retired law enforcement personnel receive special dispensation under
most firearms laws.
167
If relying on active duty law enforcement
personnel is sufficient for an ordinary citizen as well as retired military
personnel, it should be sufficient for retired law enforcement personnel
as well. Providing them with access to assault weapons and other banned
firearms and accessories (such as high capacity magazines) is
preferential and disparate treatment, as though their lives and safety are
more important than the lives and safety of all other citizens.
168
Likewise, the political class, from the President of the United States
down to state and local officials, are provided with armed security and
preferential access to law enforcement
169
and such security generally is
exempt from firearms laws, so while they enact laws to disarm the
citizenry, they retain, either directly or through proxies, full rights to
keep and bear arms. Clearly, this is in conflict with Madison’s
admonitions that the political class and their friends shall be subject to
the laws they enact to the same extent as all other citizens are.
170
The harm from differential treatment with regard to firearms laws
could not be more important in Nobility Clauses analyses as a result of
the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.
171
In Heller, the United
States Supreme Court held the Second Amendment “protects an
individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a
militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as
167. See supra Section III.B.
168. See Daniel Halper, Feinstein Gun Control Bill to Exempt Government Officials, T
HE
WEEKLY STANDARD ( Jan. 25, 2013) available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/feinstein-
gun-control-bill-exempt-government-officials_697732.html (“Not everyone will have to abide by
Senator Dianne Feinstein’s gun control bill. If the proposed legislation becomes law, government
officials and others will be exempt.”).
169. The United States Secret Service provides armed security for both the President and Vice
President of the United States and their families Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates,
retired Presidents and Vice Presidents and their families and other federal political office holders
and visiting dignitaries. 18 U.S.C. §3056. The United States Marshals Service provides armed
security for members of the federal judiciary. 28 U.S.C. §566. The United States Capitol Police
provides armed security for members of Congress and their families, both in Washington, D.C.
when Congress is in session as well as wherever the members of Congress may be throughout the
United States at all other times. 2 U.S.C. §1966. Other federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, also provide armed security for political
office holders. Additionally, members of Congress may obtain local police details for their private
security upon request. Congressional Leaders Step Up Security After Arizona Shooting,
POLICE
MAGAZINE, January 13, 2011. (available at http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/news/
2011/01/13/congress-members-step-up-security-after-arizona-shootout.aspx).
170. See T
HE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003) (1961).
171. 554 U.S. 570 (2008), as incorporated to the individual states by McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010).
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 69
self-defense within the home.”
172
In other words, firearms possession for
self defense is an individual right guaranteed by the Constitution. While
a law of general application that infringes the Second Amendment right
would have to pass the intermediate scrutiny tests applied under
constitutional jurisprudence, if not strict scrutiny,
173
a law that suspends
Second Amendment rights for all but the political class and those under
its patronage could not be justified even under a rational basis test and
would, logically, be void ab initio.
V.
PROPOSALS
The fundamental problem of government providing disparate
treatment to certain individuals is not unique to the Nobility Clauses. In
determining how to reinvigorate the import and effect the
implementation of the Nobility Clauses, it is useful to review the
jurisprudence of similar constitutional provisions. Two such provisions,
in particular, are illustrative. The first is the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth
Amendment
174
and the second is the Bill of Attainder
Clause.
175
One would think that any disparate treatment of individuals under
the law would be a subject best left for the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.
176
The flaw with Equal Protection analysis,
however, is the fact that most Nobility Loopholes would not be
examined under strict scrutiny, or even intermediate scrutiny.
177
172. Id.
173. While the Court did not specify the level of scrutiny to which Second Amendment cases
would be subject, they did rule out anything less than intermediate scrutiny. Id. at note 27.
(“Obviously, the [rational basis] test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature
may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double
jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.”).
174. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” (emphasis added). For purposes of this paper I assume the reader has a working knowledge
of Equal Protection jurisprudence. For in-depth discussions on the history and import of the Equal
Protection Clause, see Balkin, supra note 34, at 2347; Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 70 C
OLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1979).
175. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
176. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate-but-
equal violated the Equal Protection Clause); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)
(holding that exclusion of blacks from jury service in West Virginia violated Equal Protection
Clause).
177. For strict scrutiny to be applied, a law must affect a suspect class or a fundamental right.
70 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
Consequently, as long as the government action can satisfy the “rational
basis” test, it will be allowed to continue.
178
Since courts are loathe to
find that any law fails the rational basis test,
179
using an Equal Protection
Clause argument would leave virtually all of the Nobility Loopholes in
place. As the framers drafted the Nobility Clauses to apply without
qualification, it is clear that the Equal Protection path is a dead end.
The Bill of Attainder Clause
180
can be seen as a mirror image of the
Nobility Clauses.
181
While the Nobility Clauses are properly seen as
prohibiting the government from bestowing largess on individuals, the
Bill of Attainder Clause ensures that individuals would not be the focus
of government persecution.
182
Like the Nobility Clauses, the Bill of
Attainder Clause facially has a very narrow scope. The Bill of Attainder
Clause, limited to its literal meaning, prohibits the government from
enacting legislation that imposes the death penalty on a specific person,
without benefit of judicial process.
183
Unlike the Nobility Clauses, however, there is fairly extensive
caselaw on the Bill of Attainder Clause.
184
These cases gradually
Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or
Otherwise, 64 T
EMP. L. REV. 937, 942 (1991). For intermediate scrutiny to be applied, a “quasi-
suspect class must be affected.. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 S
EATTLE
U. L. REV. 135, 137 (2011).
178. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249,
3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) (stating that, under equal protection analysis, “the general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest”).
179. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 H
ARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) at 756
(“rational basis review generally results in validation of state action”) (quoting L
AURENCE H. TRIBE,
A
MERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 1442-43 (2d ed. 1988) “The traditional deference both
to legislative purpose and to legislative selections among means continues . . . to make the
rationality requirement largely equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality.”); Richard
Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
88 K
Y. L.J. 591, 598 (2000) (“The rational basis test, as a general matter, entails a significant degree
of judicial deference.”).
180. U.S.
CONST, art I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”); U.S.
CONST,art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (‘No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . .”).
181. See Balkin, supra note 34, at 2349-50 (describing the Nobility Clauses and the Bill of
Attainders Clause as “[t]wo of the most status-disestablishing clauses” of the Constitution).
182. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 290 (1866) (“A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.”).
183. See generally, United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-442 (1965).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (stating that the Constitution’s
prohibition against bills of attainder “was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to
be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general
safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by legislature”);
Matter of Extradition of McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 606-07 (2d Cir.1993) (en banc) (“[T]he Bill of
Attainder Clause broadly . . . prohibit[s] bills of pains and penalties as well as bills of attainder.”);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324, (1966) (the Bill of Attainder Clause provides
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 71
expanded the reach of the Bill of Attainder Clause
185
to the point where
the Supreme Court has held that the Bill of Attainder Clause generally
prohibits the government from enacting any law that law that
“legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an
identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial
trial.”
186
In a recent decision, the Second Circuit took issue with those
who would narrowly read the Bill of Attainder Clause as an outdated
prohibition on extrajudicial death sentences and described it, instead, as
more of “a reflection of the Constitution’s concern with fragmenting the
government power than merely preventing the recurrence of unsavory
British practices of the time.”
187
At their core, then, the Nobility Clauses are identical to the Bill of
Attainder Clause with respect to policy and intent. Both clauses were
borne of a desire to prevent the establishment of British practices that,
prior to the founding of the United States, had either benefitted or
punished specific individuals.
188
It would thus be consistent with
established Supreme Court practice to consider government acts through
the prism of the Nobility Clauses.
In response to the Congressional exemption from the ACA, a
number of commentators and politicians have discovered the words of
James Madison that have been repeated a number of times in this
paper.
189
Showing the resurgence of Madison’s founding principle
regarding the accountability of the political class, legislation to eliminate
“protections for individual persons and private groups”); and Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 473 (1977). (“The classic example is death, but others include imprisonment, banishment,
the punitive confiscation of property, and prohibition of designated individuals or groups from
participation in specified employments or vocations.”).
185. See Roger J. Miner, Identifying, Protecting and Preserving Individual Rights: Traditional
Federal Court Functions, 23 S
ETON HALL L.REV. 821, 826-30 (1992-1993) (regarding bills of
attainder).
186. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846–47 (1984).
187. ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2010).
188. See Akhil Reed Amar, Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow of Brown, 40 W
ASHBURN L.J. 1,
4-5 (2000) (stating that the Nobility Clauses “are written to condemn the idea of lordship in
America: these words proclaim that ours is a democratic republic, not an hereditary aristocracy
based on birth and blood”); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 (1965) (“The bill of
attainder . . . was a device often resorted to in sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century England
for dealing with persons who had attempted, or threatened to attempt, to overthrow the
government.”); see also J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Y
ALE L.J. 2313, 2351 (1997)
(“The [Nobility Clause] prevents state maintenance of a status hierarchy by prohibiting the creation
of a group of social superiors; the [Bill of Attainder Clause] prevents the state from singling out
particular individuals, or more importantly, particular groups, as social pariahs.”).
189. See T
HE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003) (1961) (Congress “can make no law which will not have its full operation on
themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society”).
72 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
Congress’s ACA exemption was introduced in the House by
Representative Ron DeSantis with the title “The James Madison
Congressional Accountability Act”
190
and also introduced a proposed
Twenty-Eighth to the Constitution to codify Madison’s words into
law.
191
As much as I concur with Representative DeSantis’s concerns,
there is no need for the proposed
Twenty-Eighth Amendment. The
Nobility Clauses were included in the Constitution to prevent the very
abuses that are the subject of the proposed Twenty-Eighth Amendment.
Likewise, there is a danger in relying on Congress to craft a
legislative remedy to the Nobility Loopholes. Allowing Congress (and
the rest of the political class) to police itself is a fundamentally unsound
solution. At the time of the writing of this paper, there was a growing
call for the Office of Personnel Management to reverse its ruling that
provided an exemption from the ACA for Congress.
192
Even if,
ultimately, the exemption is reversed, unless there is a structural
impediment in place whereby the presumption is that Congress is subject
to all laws there is nothing to stop new instances of above-the-law
chicanery in this or future Congresses.
Only Supreme Court precedent holding that the Nobility Clauses
apply to the Nobility Loopholes and are subject to strict enforcement
will fulfill the letter and spirit of the Nobility Clauses.
193
A modern
implementation of the Nobility Clauses would be nothing less than the
use of James Madison’s words as the basis for a test of any government
action: “[Congress] can make no law which will not have its full
operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of
190. James Madison Congressional Accountability Act, H.R. 3076, 113th Cong. (2013).
191. Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the equal
application to the Senators and Representatives of the laws that apply to all citizens of the United
States, H..R.J. Res. 55, 113
th
Congress (2013). The text of the proposed Twenty-Eighth Amendment
is “Congress shall make no law respecting the citizens of the United States that does not also apply
to the Senators and Representatives.”
192. See, e.g., Burgess Everett, Rand Paul pushes constitutional amendment on
Congress,P
OLITICO.COM (Oct. 21, 2013) (“The amendment [proposed by Sen. Paul] is aimed
squarely at Obamacare provisions specific to members of Congress and their staffs that became a
central point of contention during the government shutdown.”), available at
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/rand-paul-constitutional-amendment-98625.html?hp=r1;
see, also, Andrew Kloster and Joseph A. Morris, Warning: Side Effects of Special Congressional
Health Handout May Include Lawsuits, T
HE HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM #117
(March 7, 2014) (illustrating the potential liabilities associated with the Congressional ACA
exemptions), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/warning-side-effects-of-
special-congressional-health-handout-may-include-lawsuits.
193. As stated previously, there has been a dearth of Supreme Court opinions concerning the
Nobility Clauses.
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 73
the society.”
194
As the Executive branch has assumed certain quasi-
lawmaking powers,
195
the Nobility Clauses would logically apply to any
Executive branch rulemaking as well.
Madison’s words would need to be reduced to a practical multi-part
test, something that is common in constitutional jurisprudence.
196
The
test that I propose is as follows:
Any law, rule or regulation that
i) explicitly excludes from the application thereof; or
ii) explicitly or through administration thereof provides a legal
entitlement or status that is available solely or primarily to; or
iii) is applied subject to the discretion of a government agency or
official and the application thereof effectively provides an exemption
from all or part of such law, rule or regulation solely or primarily with
respect to any
1. political office holder, whether elected or appointed; or
2
.
employee of any government agency or political subdivision; or
3
.
any affiliate197 of a political office holder (or any combination
194. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic
2003) (1961).
195. See Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Executive, and the Legitimacy of
the Administrative State, 33 H
ARV. J.L. & PUB. Pol’y 103, 105 (2010) (“The current administrative
state combines wide congressional discretion to delegate regulatory power with considerable
discretion to diffuse power throughout the executive branch.”); Robert C. Sarvis, Legislative
Delegation and Two Conceptions of the Legislative Power, 4 P
IERCE L. REV. 317 (2006) (stating
that Congress regularly delegates its legislative powers to the executive through administrative
agencies).
196. For example, in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Supreme Court outlined a
three part test to determine whether material is obscene and thus not subject to the protections of the
First Amendment: (1) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards”
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law, and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are
adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when
necessary. Id. at 24-25. See also, SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (using a five part test to
determine whether something is an investment contract, and thus subject to regulation as a security:
(1) an investment of money due to (2) an expectation of profits arising from (3) a common
enterprise which (4) depends solely on the efforts of a promoter or third party. Id. at 298.
197. The proposed rule will explicitly apply to political office holders and government
employees. I have used the phrase “affiliate of a political office holder” to cover what is the modern
equivalent of patronage and fealty. Affiliate status would apply in a fashion similar to that of Rule
12b-2 as promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (17 C.F.R. §
240.12b-2), which defines an affiliate as anyone “that directly, or indirectly through one or more
74 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
of (1)-(3) hereof);
is void ab initio, unless such treatment is required by the provisions of
U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl 1.
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, the enforcement of which is subject
to levels of scrutiny, the Nobility Clauses are unequivocal and should be
enforced under a strict scrutiny regime.
Professor Larson suggests that in crafting a judicial interpretation of
the Nobility Clauses there needs to be a focus on the difference between
government actions that are distinctions, which tend to be quite broad,
and government actions that are privileges, which tend to be narrow
(though he focuses on whether either category is based on heredity). On
this basis, he argues
[i]n other areas of law, such as equal protection and free speech, these
distinctions are often resolved by balancing tests, such as strict
scrutiny. In the context of the Nobility Clauses, however, such
balancing tests seem particularly inappropriate. The Constitution
prohibits titles of nobility absolutely, both as a means and as ends . . .
[t]he point of the [Nobility Clauses], however, is to ensure that such
options are permanently off the table . . . .
198
A key element to the enforcement of the Nobility Clauses will be the
focus on laws that exempt what Madison referred to as the “friends” of
Congress (i.e., Indirect Nobility Conflicts).
199
This is in keeping with the
intent of the framers, who sought to prevent the entire system of
patronage that went along with the British nobility.
200
There are only 535
members of Congress, but there are millions of individuals who
currently benefit from some form of privilege granted by their political
patrons.
201
In many cases the incidents of titles of nobility are granted to
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified.”
In this case, any person who, either directly or through membership in an organization, contributes
more than a specified amount to any political party or political office holder would be deemed to be
an affiliate of that party or office holder. As such, any law that specifically benefits or exempts that
affiliate would be a violation of the Nobility Clauses.
198. Larson, supra note 3 at 1414.
199. See T
HE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003) (1961).
200. See Steve D. Shadowen et. al., No Distinctions Except Those Which Merit Originates:
The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private Universities, 49 S
ANTA CLARA L.
R
EV. 51, 53 (2009) (“The Founders intended to establish a society based on individual merit rather
than the hereditary distinctions of the feudal societies that the colonists had abandoned.”); Larson,
supra note 3, at 1384 (“It is that British world of inherited privilege that the leaders of the American
Revolution sought to overthrow forever.”).
201. See supra Section II (discussing the loopholes and favors granted to select beneficiaries,
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 75
individuals or entities in exchange for the ultimate quid pro quo of
politics, voting fealty.
202
For example, in the 2012 Presidential election, the AFL-CIO
(representing 11.5 million members)
203
, AFSCME (representing 1.6
million members)
204
, American Federation of Teachers (representing 1.5
million members)
205
, Communications Workers of America
(representing 700,000 members)
206
, International Association of Fire
Fighters (representing 300,000 members)
207
, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters (representing 1.4 million members)
208
, National Education
Association (representing 3.2 million members)
209
and the SEIU
(representing 2.1 million members)
210
endorsed Barack Obama. No
major labor union endorsed Mitt Romney in the 2012 Presidential
election and, after his reelection, President Obama called the United
Auto Workers president, stating “that we could not have done this
without the UAW and its membership.”
211
In exchange for the millions
such as the preferences provided to the United Auto Workers in the General Motors bankruptcy and
exemptions from firearms laws for government affiliates).
202. An example of this is the targeting of conservative groups by the Internal Revenue
Service. In this recent scandal, the political class used the Internal Revenue Service to block
conservative groups from receiving timely 501(c)(4) determinations while generally not obstructing
liberal groups seeking such determinations. This scandal combines the abuse of political office to
benefit patrons while punishing political opponents. For a general timeline of events in this scandal,
see Robert W. Wood 19 Facts On IRS Targeting President Obama Can’t Blame On Republicans,
F
ORBES (July 23, 2015) (available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/07/23/19-facts-
on-irs-targeting-president-obama-cant-blame-on-republicans/).
203. Lila Shapiro, AFL-CIO’s Obama Endorsement Brings More Bodies and New Risks,
H
UFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2012, 8:27pm) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/13/afl-cio-
obama-endorsement_n_1343160.html.
204. AFSCME Endorses President Obama for Re-Election (Dec. 6, 2011) (available at
http://www.afscme.org/news/press-room/press-releases/2011/afscme-endorses-president-obama-for-
reelection).
205. American Federation of Teachers Endorses President Obama for Re-Election (Feb. 7,
2012) (available at http://www.aft.org/press-release/american-federation-teachers-endorses-
president-obama-re-election).
206. 700,000- Member Communications Workers of America Endorses Election of President
Barack Obama (Feb. 2, 2012) (available at http://www.cwa-union.org/news/entry/
communications_workers_of_america_endorses_re-election_of_president_obama#.VknhtN-rQ_W).
207. The IAFF Endorses President Obama and Vice President Joe Biden for Re-Election
(May-June 2012) (available at http://www.iaff.org/about/gp/MayJune12.htm).
208. Teamsters Endorse Obama in 2012 (May 7, 2012) (available at
http://www.tdu.org/media_teamsters-endorse-obama-2012).
209. NEA delegates vote to support President Barack Obama in re-election bid (July 4, 2011)
(available at http://www.nea.org/home/46078.htm).
210. David Walsh, Service Employees International Union endorses Obama in 2012, W
ORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Nov. 19, 2011) https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/11/seiu-n19.html.
211. See statement from United Auto Workers president Bob King The UAW Member
Difference (November 9, 2012) (available at http://www.uaw.org/articles/uaw-member-difference).
76 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
of labor union votes for Democratic candidates, President Obama not
only delivered billions of dollars to General Motors and Chrysler union
members
212
he also went so far as to act in violation of the Constitution
to appoint labor friendly members to the National Labor Relations
Board.
213
Some will argue that my proposal is draconian and that employing
such defined limitations on the scope of laws would result in a litigation
nightmare, as virtually all federal, state, and local laws, rules, and
regulations would be subject to challenge as Nobility Clauses. During
the debates on the CAA members of Congress objected to the proposed
law on a number of grounds: it would violate the Speech or Debate
Clause; it would violate the Separation of Powers doctrine; it would
subject Congress to such levels of litigation that all of its time would be
spent defending against claims, some of which would be baseless, others
that would be made for political purposes.
214
A careful reading of the test that I have proposed, however, will
show that the reach of my proposal is narrowly tailored to fulfill the
intentions of the framers. Only when a law, rule, or regulation directly
provides the political class or its friends with a privilege or immunity not
available to the public at large will the Nobility Clauses apply. There is a
specific exclusion to retain the protections of the Speech or Debate
Clause. As for the other arguments made by Congress, as Senator
Grassley said, Congressional self-regulation has not worked.
215
Furthermore, non-governmental action would not be subject to the
Nobility Clauses nor would laws of generally applicability, such as
affirmative action or anti-discrimination laws.
VI. C
ONCLUSION
T
he case made in this paper may be one of first impression, but
there have been many others who have argued that the Nobility Clauses
deserve consideration in dealing with current political issues. Professor
For an overview of labor union activity in the 2012 Presidential election, see Jeremy M. Peters, Auto
Workers Tap Network for Obama, N.Y.
TIMES (February 24, 2012), (“The United Automobile
Workers union, a primary beneficiary of President Obama’s decision to rescue domestic carmakers,
is now trying to return the favor.”). In 2012, the UAW represented approximately 400,000
members. Id.
212. See infra Section III.C.
213. National Labor Relations Board v. Enterprise Leasing Co. SE, LLC, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14444 (4th Cir. July 17, 2013) (holding that the President’s appointment of three pro-union
members to the NLRB violated the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution).
214. Grassley, supra note 85, at 36.
215. Id.
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 77
Carlton F.W. Larson has argued that legacy admissions in public schools
constitute an unconstitutional title of nobility based on the idea that the
admissions are a form of hereditary privilege.
216
While Professor Larson
focuses on the hereditary aspect of the Nobility Clauses, his premise at a
foundational level is that the Nobility Clauses were intended to prevent
government bestowed privileges to select groups.
217
Professor Richard
Delgado advocates a Nobility Clauses based system to scrutinize any
aspect of government that perpetuates inequality and even comes up
with a four part test to determine whether specified government action
violates the Nobility Clauses.
218
Professor Jack M. Balkin, while not
explicitly endorsing the judicial use of the Nobility Clauses, provides
extensive commentary on incidents of political class privilege, how such
privilege is tantamount to titles of nobility and how the Nobility Clauses
were intended to prevent the rise of political class privilege in the United
States.
219
Finally, Professor Glenn H. Reynolds has identified numerous
instances of political class privilege which he believes is in violation of
the Nobility Clauses and has proposed any law or rule “giving
government officials—whether elected, appointed, or members of the
civil service—preferential treatment compared to ordinary citizens
would have to withstand ‘strict scrutiny.’”
220
In the past 30 years Congressional approval rankings have
plummeted from approximately 34% in 1974 to approximately 14% in
recent polls.
221
Concurrent with this precipitous drop in public approval
216. Larson, supra note 3, at 1375.
217. Id. at
218. Delgado, supra note 19, at 134. Delgado’s test consists of determining whether
government action either confers an actual title of nobility or specified indices of nobility. The
indices of nobility that Delgado specifies are (a) wealth/political influence; (b) advantages with
respect to speech and though; (c) perceived superiority; and (d) membership in a closed class. Id. at
115. If government action results in either an actual title of nobility or most or all of the listed
indices of nobility, a court would find that action to be in violation of the Nobility Clauses. As
mentioned in my critique of Delgado’s proposal, I believe that the broad and vague standards that
Delgado proposes would result in the government both defining and guaranteeing fairness, which
would be far outside of the federal government’s enumerated constitutional powers. See infra
Section II.D.
219. Balkin, supra note 34, at 2350-52. (Balkin describes nobility as a system of political
privilege and argued that the Nobility Clauses were intended to dismantle the system of privilege).
220. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Stop Privileges for Government Officials, USA
TODAY (August
16, 2013) (available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/26/constitution-
government-officials-privileges-column/2696945/). It is with deep gratitude that I give credit to
Professor Reynolds for inspiring this paper and providing, through Instapundit
(www.instapundit.com) specific examples of privilege that were used herein.
221. Jeffrey M. Jones, Congressional Approval Ratings Remains Near Historic Lows Gallup
Politics Poll (August 13, 2013) (available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/163964/congress-
approval-rating-remains-near-historical-lows.aspx).
78 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY [6:33
has been a massive expansion of the size of government, particularly at
the federal level, and a zealous drive to regulate virtually every element
of American life. As Mark Levin pointed out in his proposal for the
“Liberty Amendments,”
[w]hat was to be a relatively innocuous federal government . . . has
become an ever-present and unaccountable force. It is the nation’s
largest creditor, debtor, lender, employer, consumer, contractor,
grantor, property owner, tenant, insurer, health-care provider and
pension guarantor . . . what it does not control directly it bans or
mandates by regulation . . . the question is not what the federal
government regulates, but what it does not.
222
It should be obvious that the American public’s dissatisfaction with its
omnipotent government must, in part, be based on the gradual evolution
of the political class from one that was meant to be in service to the
public to one that is now, in substance, an American nobility, enjoying
privileges and status that are unreachable by the population at large.
The framers knew that with power came the risk of self-
aggrandizement. They assumed that the need to face the electorate on a
regular basis would keep any excesses in check.
223
As a guaranty,
though, they also include the Nobility Clauses in the Constitution to
ensure that if our elected officials could not control their own lust for
power, our system would. Though Congressional approval ratings are at
all-time lows and disapproval ratings are near or above 80%, turnover in
Congress remains the exception.
224
The checks and balances residing within the political system and
the electorate have been comprised. Even those in the political class
acknowledge as much, though they have no incentive to make the
sweeping changes that are necessary to abolish the new nobility and
restore the United States to a true republican system. As Senator
Grassley said about the CAA
It is simply not fair, or good governance, for the Congress of the Unit-
ed States to enact laws for the American people, while exempting itself
from compliance . . . we in Congress are no better than the business-
men and women in our states. We are not different and we, too, must
live under the laws that we pass. We no longer sit in Washington and
222. Levin, supra note 27, at 6-7.
223. Covell, supra note 60, at 58; see also Paul E. McGreal, Ambition’s Playground, 68
F
ORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1147 (2000) (stating that under the Constitution, “[i]f any branch of
government attempts to abuse its power, the People stand ready to exert their influence at periodic
elections”).
224. Levin, supra note 27.
2015] RESTORING NOBILITY TO THE CONSTITUTION 79
look down upon the people and tell them how to run their businesses.
This is a democracy, and therefore, we make laws for the people, and
we, too, must follow these laws.
225
Nonetheless, in the 20 years since the enactment of the CAA, other than
with respect to a handful of labor laws, we are no closer to fulfilling
what should be a goal without controversy: equal application of the law
among all citizens, whether in government service or not. Unless the
Supreme Court implements the Nobility Clauses as they were intended
to work there is every reason to believe that the system will remain
broken.
225. Grassley, supra note 85 at 34-35.
