2020-11-17 Designing SCt Term Limits

___________________________________"

*"Profe ssor"of"Law,"University"of"Chicago"Law"School."

†"Associate"Professor"of"La w,"Washington"University"in"St."Louis.""

††"Associate"Professor"of"Law,"Washington"University"in"St."Louis.""

‡"Professor"of"Public"Polic y,"Harvard"Kennedy"School.""

Desig ning"Supreme"Court"Term"Limits"

Adam"Chilton,

"Daniel"Epps,

"†

"Kyle"Roz ema,

††

"&"Maya"Sen

‡"

[First&Draft&–&Please&Do&Not&Distribute]&

&November"24,"2020"

!"#$%&'$()Since"the"Founding,"Supreme"Court"ju stices"have"enjoyed"life"

tenure."This"helps"insulate"the"justices"from"political"pressures,"but"it"

also"means"that"unpredictable"deaths"and"strategic"retirements"deter-

mine"when" vacancies"on" the"Court" arise."In" o rder"to"make" the"appoint-

ment"of"justices"more"predictable,"a"number"of"detailed"term"limits"

proposals"have"been"put"forwa rd"in"recent"years"by"academics"and"

policy"makers."But"although"there"appears"to"be"increasing"support"

for"term"limit s"i n" the"abstract,"there"does"not"appear"to"be"consensus"

on"the"details"of"how"term"limits"regimes"should"be"designed.""

This"Article"explains"the"decisions"that"mu st"be"made"by"any"term"lim-

its"proposal"and"then"empirical"investigat es"t he"trade-offs"associate d"

with"those"choices."We"specifically"lay"out"nine"issues"that" term"limits"

proposals"must"resolve"and"then"explain"how"existing"proposals"have"

addressed"them."After"doing"so,"we"use"data"on"historical"control"of"

the"political"branches"of"government,"the"composition"of"the"Supreme"

Court ,"and"the" lifespans"of"federal "judges"to"simulate"how"the"term"

limits" proposals" would" have" shaped" the" Court" if" they" had" been"

adopted"any"time"during"a"roughly" 70" year" window"in"recent"Ameri-

can"history."These"simulations"reveal"that"differences"in"the"design"of"

term" limits" regimes" would" have" produced" profound" changes"in"the"

composition"of"the"Court.""

Our"results"offer"several"insights"for"designers"of"Supreme"Court"term"

limits"regimes."First,"the"length"of"time"that"it"can"take" to"implement"

term" limits"proposals"can"vary"dramatically,"so"consideration"should"

be"given"to"how"to"roll"out"any"proposal."Second,"there"are"features"of"

term" limits"proposals"that" can"produce"substantial"differences"in"the"

number" of" justice-years" appointed" by" presidential" term," and" care"

should"thus"be"given"to"ensure"that"plans"provide"ways"to"f ill"unex-

pected" vacancies" that" do" not" create" windfalls" for" some" presidents."

Third,"even"with"term"limits"in"place,"there"are"likely"to"be"many"va-

cancies"that"occur"when"the"Senate"is"control led"by"the"opposite"pa rty"

of"the"president;"a"procedure"is"thus"likely"needed"to"compel"the"Sen-

ate"to"vote"on"nominees"put"forward"under"any"new"system.""

& &

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

ii"

INTRODUCTION"..............................................................................................................."1"

I." THE"CASE"FOR"TERM"LIMITS"........................................................................."6"

!*" !%+,-./$#)0,112%$3/+)4.%-)53-3$#".................................................."6"

6*" 4%./7#)0,112%$3 /+)4.%-)53-3$#"......................................................."11"

II." DESIGNING"PROPOSALS"................................................................................"19"

!*" 8.#3+/)8.'3#32/#"......................................................................................"19"

1." Term"Length"....................................................................................."20"

2." Appointment"Timing....................................................................."20"

3." Transit ion"Timing".........................................................................."20"

4." Legacy"Justices"................................................................................."20"

5." Unexpected"Vacancies".................................................................."21"

6." Senior"Justices".................................................................................."21"

7." Senate"Impasses".............................................................................."22"

8." Chief"Justices"....................................................................................."22"

9." Enactment"Method"........................................................................"23"

6*" 9:3#$3/+);%212#&<#".................................................................................."23"

1." Oliver’s "Proposal"............................................................................."23"

2." The"Virgin ia"Plan"............................................................................"24"

3." The"Nor thwestern"Pl an"..............................................................."25"

4." The"Renewal"Act"............................................................................."26"

5." Fix"the"Court"....................................................................................."27"

6." The"Khanna"Bill"..............................................................................."27"

7." Other"Proposals"..............................................................................."28"

=*" =2-1&%3/+);%212#&<#"............................................................................"28"

1." Appointments"and"Tenure"........................................................."29"

2." Ideological"Composition"............................................................."29"

3." Transition"Process"........................................................................."30"

4." Confirm ation"Incentives.............................................................."30"

5." Profile"of"Nominees"......................................................................."30"

III." EVALUATING"PROPOSALS"............................................................................"31"

!*" >.$?27#"......................................................................................................."31"

6*" @.#,<$#".........................................................................................................."37"

1." Appointments"and"Tenure"........................................................."37"

2." Ideological"Composition"............................................................."39"

3." Transit ion"Process"........................................................................."48"

4." Confirmation"Incentives.............................................................."52"

5." Profile"of"Nominees"......................................................................."54"

IV." DISCUSSION".........................................................................................................."59"

!*" 4%&/#3$32/)43-3/+"..................................................................................."59"

6*" A/.:1.'$.7)B&'&/'3.#"..........................................................................."61"

=*" 0./&$.)C-1&##."........................................................................................"63"

CONCLUSION".................................................................................................................."64"

INTRODUCTION&

Since"the"Fou nding,"Supreme"Court"justices"have"enjoyed"life"tenure.

"And"

although"the"Constitution"does"not"specify"the"size"of"the"Court,

"Congress"has"

not"chang ed"the"number"of"seats"for"more"than"a"century"and"a"half."Vacancies"

are"accordingly"driven"by"a"combination"of"random "events"and"strategic"be-

havior"by"the"justices"t hemselves."This"results"in"ind ividu al"presidents"having"

meaningfully"different"impacts"on"the"composition"of"the"Court."For"example,"

President"Carter"did"not"appoint"a"single"Justice"du ring"his"term" in" o ffice,"but"

President"Trump"was"able"to"appoint"thr ee"in"his"one"term."These"differences"

in"influence"among"presidents"can"lead"to"disparate"outcomes"across"political"

parties."For"example,"over"the"past"half"century"(from" 1970"to"2010),"Republi-

can"presidents"held"the"Whi te"House"for"30"years"(60"percent),"but"they"made"

14"out"of"18"appointments"(78"percent)"to"the"Supreme"Court"during"that"time."

Additionally,"life"tenure"and"the"u npredictability"of"vacancies "also"make" each"

confirmation"battle"a"high-stakes" political"struggle—particularly"s o "in"recent"

decades"as"the"parties"have"grown"more"p olarized"and"as"justices"have"tended"

to"serve"for"long er"periods." "

Many"commentators"have"argued"that"replacing"life"tenure"with"term "lim-

its"for"the"justices"would"ameliorate"th ese"problems."Propo nents"of"term"limits"

argue"that"they"could"regularize"appointments"and,"by"doing,"equalize"infl u-

ence"across"presidential"terms"and"minimize"the"role"of"strategic"retirement"

and"unpredictable"deaths"in"shaping"the"compos ition"of"the"Court."Term"limits"

also"might,"the"proponents"argue,"discourage"presidents"from"choosing"partic-

ularly"young"nominees"and"make"the"appointments"pro cess"less"contentious."

Although"major"structural"reform"to "the"Supreme"Court"does"not"appear"likely"

in"the"short"term,"term"limits"are"more"plausible"than"other" reforms"because"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0..)3/D%&"Section"I.A.""

"0..)U.S."CONST."art."III,"§"1;"#..)&<#2E).*+*," Curtis"A."Bradley"&"Neil"S."Siegel,"F3#$2%3'&<)G<2##E)

=2/#$3$, $32/&<)=2/H./$32/#E)&/7)$?.)I,73'3&<)0.1&%&$32/)2D);2J.%#,"105"GEO."L."J."255,"269–74"

(2017)"(discussing"the"Constitution’s"silence"on"the"size"of"the"Court"and"early"historical"prac-

tice)."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

of"their"popularity."They"have"attracted"suppo rt"from"commentators

"and"pol-

iticians

"across"the"political"spectrum."And"they"also"appear"to"enjoy"the"sup-

port"of"many"Americans.

Yet"even"if"many"support"term"limits"in"the"abstract,"that"does"not"mean"

there"is "co nsensus"on"the"details"of"how"a"term"limits"regime"should"be"de-

signed." In" the" most" prominent"proposals," justices" would"serve" for" 18" years"

with"their"tenures"staggered"so"that"two"appointments"would"be"made"each"

presidential"term.

"But" even"among"those"who"endorse"this"version"of"the"re-

form,"th ere"at"least"half"a"dozen"distinct"proposals"which"differ"in"important"

ways,"such"as"how"the"transition"to"the"new"system"would"work.

"If"term"limits"

are"ever"adopted,"policymakers"should"understand"the"implications"of"the"var-

ious"design"choices"made" by"the"different"pro posals."Unfortunately,"however,"

there"is"essentially"no"evidence" on"h ow"much"differ ence"these"design"choices"

would"make"in"practice."As"one"commentator,"Professor"Stephen"Burbank,"put"

it,"“the"work"of"many"engaged"in"the"debate"over"term"limits "is"quite"relent-

lessly"normative"and"replete"with"unsupported"causal"assertions.”

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0..E).*+*,"Maggie"Jo"Buchanan,"4?.)K..7)D2%)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)4.%-)53-3$#,"CENTER"FOR"AMERI-

CAN" PROGRESS," https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/re-

ports/2020/08/03/488518/n e ed-supreme-court-term-limits/" (last" visited" Aug." 28," 2020);"

John"Fund, "C$L#)43-.)D2%)4.%-)53-3$#)2/)$?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$," NATIONAL" REVIEW"(Nov."24,"2019),"

https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/supreme-court-term-limits- have-bipartisan-

support/."

"0..E).*+*,"David"Jackson,";.%%M)53N.#)$?.)37.&) 2D)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)4.%-)53-3$#,"USA"TODAY,"Aug."

7," 2015," https://www.usatoday.com/story/n e ws/politics/onpolitics/2015/08/07/perry-

likes-idea-of-supreme-court-term-limits/81580084/" (Republican" presidential" candidate"

Rick"Perry"endorsing"term"limits);"3/D%&)Section"II.B.6"(term"limits"bill"sponsore d"by"Demo-

cratic"member"of"Congress).""

"0..)3/D%&)note"43"(citing"surveys).""

"Various"versions"of"this"proposal"have"appeared"in ,"among"other"places,"Ste ven"G."Cala-

bresi"&"James"Lindgren,"4.%-)53-3$#)D2%)$?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$()53 D.)4./,%.)@.'2/#37.%.7,"29"HARV."

J.L."&"PUB."POL’Y"769"(2006);"James"E."D iTullio"&" John"B."Sc hochet,"0&H3/+)4?3#)F2/2%& "<.)=2,%$()

!);%212#&<)$2)@.1<&'.)53D.)4./,%.)2/)$?.)0,1%.-.)= 2,%$)J3$?)0$&++.%.7E)K2/%./.J&"<.)93+?$O

../OP.&%)4.%-#,"90"VA."L."REV."1093"(2004);"Philip"D."Oliver,"0M #$.-&$3')I,#$3'.()!);%212#.7)=2/O

#$3$,$32/&<)!-./7-./$)$2)9#$&"<3#?)Q3:.7E)0$&++.%.7)4.%-#)D2%)>.-".%#)2D)$?.)A/3$.7)0$&$.#)

0,1%.-.)=2,%$,"47"OHIO"ST."L."799"(1986);"Roger"C ."Cramton"&"Paul"D."Carrington,"4?.)0,1%.-.)

=2,%$)@./.J&<)!'$()!)@.$,%/)$2)6&#3');%3/ '31<.#,"3/"REFORMING"THE"COURT:"TERM"LIMITS"FOR"SU-

PREME"COURT"JUSTICES"467"(Roger"C."Cramton"&"Paul"D."Carrington"eds.,"2006);"ERWIN"CHEMER-

INSKY,"THE"CASE"AGAINST"THE"SUPREME"COURT"(2015)."

"In"addition"to"these"structural"details,"there"are"important"legal"questions"that"need"to"be"

worked"out,"such"as"whether" change" would"require"a"constitutional" amendment"or"could"be"

accomplished"through"a n"ordinary"statute."We"discuss"this"question"brief ly"in"Part"I,"but"in"

this"Article"we"largely"focus"on"policy"rath er"than"legal"considerations.""

"Stephen"B."Burbank,"!<$.%/&$3H.)=&%..%)@.#2<,$32/)CC()=?&/+3/+)$?.)4./,%.) 2D)0,1%.-.)

=2,%$)I, #$3'.#,"154"U."PA."L."REV."1511,"1513"(2006)."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

This"Article"explains"the"decisions"that"must"be"made"by"any"term"limits"

proposal"and"then"empirical"investigates" th e"trade-offs" associated"with"those"

choices."We"specifically"compare"and"analyze"the"various"proposals"to"under-

stand"the"implications"of"their"distinct"desig n"choices."We"are"able"to" make"

that"comparis on" by"combining"a"detailed"theoretical"framework"with"a"series"

of"empirical"simulations"to"understand"how"the"prop osals"might"play"out"in"

practice."The"results"of"those"simulations"enable"us"to"identify"meaning fu l"dif-

ferences"among"proposals,"offer"concrete"guida nce"to"policymakers,"and"ad-

vance"the"academic"discussion.""

We"begin"by"outlining"the"key"design"decisions"that"any"term"limits"pro-

posal"must"make."Th ese"include"obvious"choices"like"th e"length"o f"the"term,"

when"appoin tments"will"be"made,"and"whether"“l egacy”"justices"already"serv-

ing"at"the"time"of"a"reform’s"enactment"would"be"subject"to"th e"term"limit."But"

these"decisions"also"include"other"choices"such"as"whether"to"address"the"pos-

sibility"of"Senate"inaction"on"a"president’s"nominee"and" the"role"justices"would"

serve" after" their" term" expires." We" then" describe" the" design" decisions" that"

prominent"existing"proposals"have"made"and"how"those"proposals"compare"to"

each"other."After"doing"so,"we"describe"how"these"design"decisions"could"affect"

the"composition"of"the"Supreme"Court"in"five"distinct"ways:"(1)"changing"who"

gets"to"appoint"the"justices"and"how"long"they" s erve;"(2)"impacting"the"ideo-

logical"composition"of"the"Court;"(3)"delaying"or"hasten"the"tr ansition"from"the"

current"system"of"life"tenure"to"one"of"term"limits;"(4)"altering"the"incentives"

of"key" actors"in"the" appointments" process;" and" (5)" reshaping" th e" profile"of"

nominees.""

To"assess"how"existing"proposals "fare"along"these"five"dimensions,"we"sim-

ulate"how"the"term"limits"proposals"would"have"shaped"the"Co ur t"if"they"had"

been"adopted"any"time"during"a" r oughly"70"year"window"in"recent"American"

history.

" The"simulations"use" data"on" the" historical"occupants"of"the" White"

House,"the"Supreme"Court,"the"Senate,"and"the"lifespans"of"federal"judges."We"

then"simulate"how"existing"proposals"would"have"created"and"fil led"seats"on"

the"Court"while"varying"when"the"plan"was"adopted"and"when"unexpected"va-

cancies"occur."These"simulations"enable"us"to"make"comparative"asses sments"

of"the"drawbacks"and"upsides"of"prominent"existing"proposals."By"doing"so,"

our"results"reveal"that"the"design"choices"made"by"term"limits "proposals"can"

produce"profo und"differences"in"the"composition"of"the"Supreme"Court.""

There"are"several"insights"that"emerge"from"our"results "that"should"inform"

any"term"limits"reform,"but"there"are"three"that"are"particularly"worth"high-

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"Our"simulations"specifically"assess"would"have"happened"if"these"proposals"had"been"in"

adopted"in" any"year"between"1937"and"2010."For"an"explanation"of"why"we"begin"our"simula-

tions"in"1937,"#..)3/D%&"Sec tion"I.B.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

lighting.."First,"the"length"of"time"that"it"can" take"to"implement"term"limits"pro-

posals"can"vary"dr amatical l y,"so"pol ices"that"speed"up"the"transition"pr o cess"

should"be"strongly"considered."Second,"there"are"features"of"term"limits"pro -

posals"that"can"produce"substantial"differences"in "the"number"of"justice-years"

appointed"by"presidential"term,"and"care"should"thus"be"given"to"ensure"that"

plans"provide"ways"to"fill"unexpected"vacancies"that"do"no t"create"windfalls"

for"some"presidents."Third,"even"with" term"limits"in" place,"there"are"likely"to"

be"many"vacancies"that"occur"when"the"Senate"is"controll ed"by"the"opposite"

party"of"the"president;"a"procedure"is"thus"likely"needed"to"compel"the"Senate"

to"vote"on "nomi nees"pu t"forward"under"any"new"system."

By"exploring"how"the"design"of"term"limits"proposals" would"affect"the"com-

position" o f"the"Supreme"Court," o ur"research"contributes"to"a"s mall"empirical"

literature"assessing"how"court"reforms"would"affect"the"structure"and" func-

tioning"of" the"judiciary.

"Th is" Articl e"builds"on"existing"research"because,"in-

stead"of"treating"the"decision"to"adopt"term"limits"as"binary,"we"offer"a"com-

prehensive"empirical"account"of" how"the"features"of"term"limit"r egimes"could"

impact"the"compositio n"of"the"S upreme"Court."And"in"addition"to"our"empirical"

analysis,"we"also"provide"a"framework""we"develop"a"framework"for"comparing"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"Our"research"is"most"related"to"two"recent"articles."First,"Christopher"Sundby"and"Su-

zanna"Sherry"estimate"what"the"support"would"be"for"upholding"@2.)H*)R&7."if"18-year"term"

limits"had"been"in"place"since"1973."Christopher"Sundby"&"Suzann a"Sherry,"4.%-)53-3$#)&/7)

4,%-23<()Roe"v."WadeL#)R?31<&#?,"98"TEX."L."REV."121"(2019)."Aft er"conducting"a"series" of"sim-

ulations,"they"conclude"that"the"impact"of"term"limits"on"upholding"Roe"largely"depends"on"

whether"the"justices"appointed"under"this"system" would"care"more"about"ideological"align-

ment"with"their"appointing"president"than"commitment"to"e xisting"presid ent."Second,"Michael"

Bailey"and"Albe rt"Yoon"use"a"theoretical"model"to"assess"the"effec t"of"politically"motivate d"

retirements" on" the" responsiven ess" of" the" Supreme" Cour t." Michael" A."Bailey" &" Albert"Yoon,"

SR?3<.)4?.%.L#)&)6%.&$?)3/)>M)627ML()4?.)0M#$.-3')9DD.'$#)2D);2<3$3'&<<M)>2$3H&$.7)@ .$3%.-./$)

D%2-) $?.)0,1%.-.)=2,% $,"23"J."THEORETICAL"POLS."293"(2011)."In"a"series"of"simulations,"they"find"

that"strategic"retirements"have"limited"influence"on"the"responsiveness"of"the"Supreme" Court"

largely"because"they"are"symmetrical:"for"every"liberal"justice"that"r etires"early"for"political"

reasons,"on"average"there" is"a"conservative"justice"that"does"so"as"well."They"also" use"simula-

tions"to"compare"the"way"strategic"retirements"occur"under"the"status"quo"of"life"tenure"to"

what"would"occur"with"18-year"term"limits,"and"they"find"that"term"limits"would"increase"the"

responsiveness"of" the" Court"to" electoral"outcomes," decrease"the" age" of"the"justices" on"the"

Court,"a nd"increase"the"turnover"of"justices."In"a"series"of"simulations,"they"find"that"strategic"

retirements" have" limited" influence"on"the" responsiveness"of"the"Supreme"Court"largely"be-

cause"they"are"symmetrical:"for"every"liberal"justice"that"retires"early"for"political"reasons,"on"

average"there"is"a"conservative"justice"that"does"so"as"well."They"also"use"simulations"to"com-

pare"the"way"strategic"retir ements"occur"under"the"status"quo"of"life"tenure"to"what"would"

occur"with"18-year"term"limits,"and"they"find"that"term"limits"would"increase"the"responsive-

ness"of"the"Court"to"electoral"outcomes,"decrease"the"age"of"the"justices"on"the"Court,"and"in-

crease"the"turnover"of"justices. "

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

the" design" decisions" that" must" be" address ed" by" a" term" limits" regime" that"

should"help"to"guide"policymakers"crafting"their"own"proposals."""

Before"continuing,"we"stress"three"caveats "about"our"project."First,"our"goal"

is"not"to"make"a"comprehensive"case"for"Supreme"Court"term"limits"in"general"

or"any"specific"term"limits"plan"in"particular."There"are"many"arguments"for"

and"against"term"limits," and"we"do"not"attempt"t o"fully" resolve"these"compet-

ing"claims."Instead,"the"goal"of"this"p r oject"is"to"provide"guidance"on"the"impact"

that"different"term"limits"reforms "would"have"if"one" were"to"be"implemented."

Second,"there"are"a"number"ways"to"reform"the"Supreme"Court"other"than"term"

limits" that"have"recently"been"proposed"(such"as"adding"additional"justices

or" limiting" the" power"of"the" Court

),"but"we"do"not"attempt"to"offer"any"evi-

dence" relevant"to" the" choice" between" t erm" limits" and" these" alternative" re-

forms."Finally,"implementing"Supreme"Court"term"limits"would"be"a"profound"

change"to"an"institution"that"has"evolved"slowly"over"time."It"could"thus"change"

the"American"political"and"legal"landscape"in"ways"that"go"beyond"the"direct"

changes"to"the"compos ition"of"the"Court"that"we"explore"in"this"project.""

The"Article"proceeds"as"follows."Part"I"provides"necessary"background."It"

explains"the"history"of" life"tenure"for" Supreme"Court" justices,"discusses"why"a"

number"of"com mentators"and"advocacy"organizations"from"across"the"political"

spectru m"have"urged"the"adoption"of"term"limits,"and"reports"descriptive"sta-

tistics"on"the"tenure"of"Supreme"Court"justices"over"time.""

Part"II"sets"forth" a"framework"that"will"enable"comparisons"between"dif-

ferent"term"limits"propos als."It"first"documents"nine"design"decisions"that"any"

reform "proposal"must"make."It"then"summarizes"a"number"of"different"term"

limits"proposals"and"discusses"how"they"address"a" number"of"these"design"de-

cisions."It"then"ou tlines"five"dimensions"along" which" these"des ign"decisions"

could"impact"the"composition"of"the"Supreme"Court.""

Part"III"assesses"how"the"design"decisions"made"by"t hese"proposals"would"

impact"the"compositio n"of"the"Court."To"do"so,"it"first"describes"the"simulations"

and"the"assumptions"made"in"them."After"explaining"our"methods,"we"present"

results"documenting"how"different"proposals"fare"along"the"five"key"trade-offs"

we"identify"in"Part"II.""

Part" IV" then" o ffers" implications" from" o ur" analyses" fo r " designers" of" Su-

preme"Court"term"limits"policies."Our"key"findings"concern"three"key"design"

decis ions"of"a"potential"reform:"how"it"h andles"the"transitio n"period,"how"it"

addresses"unexpected"vacancies,"and"whether"it"includes"provisions"dealing"

with"a"Senate’s"refusal"to"act"on"a"president’s"nominees."

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0..E).*+*,"Michael"J."Kla rman,"Q2%.J2%7 ()4?.)8.+%&7&$32/)2D)!-.%3'&/)8.-2'%&'MT!/7)

$?.)=2,%$,"134"HARV."L."REV."1,"246–53"(2020)"(arguing"that"Democrats"should"add"seats"to"the"

Court"to"retaliate"for"norm-breaking"behavior"by"Republica ns"and"to"entrench"democracy)."

"0..E).*+*,"Rya n"Doerfler"&"Samuel"Moyn,"8.-2'%&$3U3/+)$?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$,"__"CALIF. "L."REV."

__"(forthcoming"20__)"(discussing"various"“disempowering”"reforms"to"the"Supreme"Court).""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

Finally,"we"conclude"by"describing"several" considerations"that"are"outside"

the"s co p e"of"our"analysis."We"also"note"that"any"pro p osal"is"likely"to " create"

winners"and"losers"at"the"time"that"it"is"implemented."As"a"r esult,"no"matter"

how"well" a"term"limits"pr oposal" is"designed,"it"may"face"s tiff"political"o pposi-

tion"that"makes"it"difficult,"if"not"impossi ble,"to"pass."That"said,"our"results"re-

veal"that"it"is"possible"to"design"term"limits"systems"in"ways"that"ensure"the"

composition"of"the"Court"will"evolve"in"predictable"and"stable"ways—which"

hop efully"removes"at"least"some"objections"to"their"adoption.""

I. THE&CASE&FOR&TERM&LIMITS&&

We"begin"by"explaining"the"current"system"of"life"tenure"for"Supreme"Court"

justices"and"describing"the"calls"that"have"emerged"for"th e"adoption"o f"term"

limits."After"providing"this"background,"we"present"descriptive"statistics"on"

the"appointment"and"tenure"of"justices"on"the" Supreme"Court"that"have"moti-

vated"the"push"for"adopting"term"limits.""

!* Arguments*Sup porting*Term*Limits)

The"Constitution"never"uses"the"phrase"“life"tenure.”"Instead,"it"provides"

that"“[t]he"Judges,"both"of"th e"supreme"and"inferior"Courts,"shall"ho ld"their"Of-

fices"during"good"Behaviour.”

"Nonetheless,"this"provision"has"been"read"as"

meaning"that"judges"and"justices"serve"for"life"unless"they"are"impeached"by"

the"House"of"Representatives"and"convicted"by"a"two-thirds"vote"in"favor"of"

removal"by"the"Senate.

"This "reading"is "not"beyond"debate,

"but"it"has"been"

consistently"followed"since"the"founding"of"the"United"St ates.

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"U.S."CONST."ART."III,"§"1."

"0..E).*+*,"Vicki"C." Jackson,";&'N&+.#)2D)I,73'3&<)C/7.1./7./'.()4?.)0.<.'$32/)&/7)4./,%.)2D)

!%$3'<.)CCC)I,7+.#,"95"GEO."L."J."965,"988"(2007)"(describing"the"“traditional"understanding”"un-

der"which"“an"Article"III"judge"can"be"involuntarily"remo ved"from"office"only"by"the"constitu-

tionally"specified"mech anisms"of"impeachment”)."

"The" leading" argument"that"“good" behaviour”" does"not"mean"“ life" te nure”"is"found"in"

Saikrishna"Prakash"&"Steve n"D."Smith,"F2J)$2)@.-2H.)&)Q.7.%&<)I,7+.,"116"YALE"L.J."72"(2006)."

Even"those"who"are"not"persuaded"acknowledge"that"the"meaning"of"the"Good"Behavior"Clause"

is"not"crystal"clear." Martin"Redish,"in"his"response" to"Prakash"and"Smith"in"which" he"defends"

the"traditional"view,"suggests"that"this"clause"“could"well"be"th e"most"mysterious"provision"in"

the"United"Stat es"Constitution.”"Martin"H."Redish,"@.#12/#.()G227)6.?&H32%E)I,73'3&<)C/7.1./7O

./'.E)&/7)$?.)Q2,/7&$32/#)2D)!-.%3'&/)=2/#$3$,$32/&<3#-,"116"YALE"L.J."139,"139"(2006)."

"0..E).*+*,"Calabresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"777"(“Life"tenure"for"Supreme"Court"Jus-

tices"has"been"a"part"of"our"Constitution"since"1789,"when"the"Framers"created"one"Supr eme"

Court"a nd"provided"that"its" members"‘shall"hold"their"Offices"during"good"Behaviour.’”);" Mi-

chael"J."Gerhardt,"4?.)=2/#$3$,$32/&<)53 -3$#)$2)C-1.&'?-. /$)&/7)C$#)!<$.%/&$3H.#,"68"TEX."L."REV."

1,"69"(1989)"(“The"good"behavior"clause"meant"to"guar a n tee"th at"federal"judges"receive"life"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

Why"grant"judges"life"tenure—especially"given" t hat" holders"of"all"other"fed-

eral"constitutional"offices"serve"for"fixed"and"limited"terms?

"Th e"basic" argu-

ment"in"favor"of"life"tenure"is"that"it"is"supposed"to "g uarantee"judicial"inde-

pendence."One"complaint"that"led"to"the"American"Revolution"was"that"colo-

nial"judges,"unlike"judges"in"England,"were"not"sufficiently"independent"be-

cause"they"served"at"the" pleasure"of"the"crown.

"As"the"Declaratio n"of"Inde-

pendence"states,"King"George"had"“made"Judges"dependent"on"his"Will"alone,"

for" the"tenure"of"their"offices,"and"the"amount"an d"payment"of"their" salaries.”

The" Constitution’s" solution" was"to"guarantee" independence" by" granting"

tenure"during"“good"behaviour,”"as"well"as"to"provide"that" judicial"compensa-

tion"could"not"be"reduced"during"a"judg e’s"“Continuance"in"office.”

"Defending"

the"newly"drafted"Constitution,"Alexander"Hamilton"wro te"that"good-behavior"

tenure"was"“the"bes t"expedient"which"can"be"devised"in"any"governm ent,"to"

secure"a"steady,"upright,"and" impartial" administration"of"the" laws.”

"In"Ham-

ilton’s"view,"“nothing"can"contribute"so"much"to"[the"judiciary’s]"firmness"and"

independence"as"permanency"in"office,”"m aking" that"guarantee" “an"indispen-

sable"ingredient"in"its"constitution.”

Even" before" the"Constitution"became" law," critics" of"life"tenure"emerged."

Anti-Federalists"attacked"the" Good"Behavior"Clause"on"the"ground"that"it"made"

the" judiciary" $22) independent.

" Brutus," for" example," stressed" that" judges"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

tenure".".".".”);"David"R."Stras"&"Ryan"W."Scott,"@.$&3/3/+)53D.)4./,%.()4?.)=&#.)D2%)&)G2<7./ );&%O

&'?,$.,"83" WASH."U."L."Q."1397,"1405"(2005)"(“Records"from"the"founding"era"in"America"con-

firm"that"Article"II I,"Section"1"granted"life"tenure"for"well-beha ved"judges.”).""

"The"Presi dent"and"Vice"Presi dent"serve"f or"terms"of"four"years."U.S."CONST."art."II,"§"1."

After"the"22nd"Amendment,"no" President"may"serve"for"more"than"two"terms."C7*"amend."XXII,"

§"1."Senators"se rve"for"terms"of"six"years,"37*"art."I,"§"3,"and"Representatives"serve"for"two"years,"

37*"art"I,"§"2."The"Constituti on"imposes"no"term"limits"(here,"used"to"mean"limits"on"the"number"

of"terms" that" someone"can"serve)"on"federal"legislative"offices,"and" th e"Supreme"Court"has"

struck"down"state"efforts"to"impose"term"limits"on"those"offices."0..)U.S."Term"Limits,"Inc."v."

Thornton,"514"U.S."779"(1995)."

"0.."Jack"N."Rakove,"4?.)V%3+3/&<)I,#$3D3'&$32/#)D2%)I,73'3&<)C/7.1./7./'.,"95"GEO."L."J."1061,"

1064"(2006)"(noting"that"“colonial"judges"still"served"at"the"pleasure"of"the"crown,"not"during"

good"behavior”"a"fact"“that"led"Americans"to"belie ve" tha t"they"were"being"trea ted"as"second-

class"subjects”).""

"THE"DECLARATION"OF"INDEPENDENCE"para."2"(U.S."1776).""

"U.S."CONST."ART."III,"§"1."

"THE"FEDERALIST"NO."78."

"C7*"

"0..E).*+*,"Nelson"Lund,"I,73'3&<)C/7.1./7./'.E)I,73'3&<)B3%$,.E)&/7)$?.);2<3$3'&<)9'2/2-M)2D)

$?.)=2/#$3$,$32/,"35"HARV."J.L."&"PUB."POL’Y"47,"48"(2012)"(“Some"Anti-Federalists"objected"that"

the"power"of" jud icial"review,"together"with"life" tenure,"could"lead"to"pro found"jud icial" usurp a-

tions"of"power.”).""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

would"be"“rendered"totally"independent,"both"of"the"people"and"the"legisl a-

ture,"both"with"respect"to"their"offices"and" salaries,”"which"would"provide"no"

sanction"for"“erroneous"adjudications.”

"The"skepticism"did"not"end"when"the"

Constitution"was"ratified."Proposals" to" replace"life"tenure"for"federal"judges"

with"term"limits"have"been"introduced"in"Congress"at"various"poi nts"in"Amer-

ican"history"starting"in"the"early"nineteenth"century.

Supreme"Court"term"limits"attracted"renewed"interest"in"the"mid-2000s,"

when"a"number"of"proposals"for"s taggered"18-year"terms"e merged.

"Although"

such"a" reform" had"first"been"proposed"in"the"1980s"by" Philip"Oliver,

"it"may"

have" become" particularly" attractive" given" the" circumstances" two" decades"

later:"between"1994"and"2005,"there"were"no"vacancies"on"the"Supreme"Court,"

the"second"longest"period"of"continuous"membership"in"American"history.

Reformers"noted"that"Supreme"Court"justices"in"recent"decades"had"been"stay-

ing"on"the"Court"longer"as"life"expectancies"had"increased.

"As"Calabresi"and"

Lindgren"argued,"“[ t]his "trend"has" l ed"to" significantly"less"frequent" vacancies"

on" the"Court,"which"reduces"the" efficacy" of"the"democratic"check" that"the" ap-

pointment"process"provides"on"the"Court's"members hip.”

Moreover,"the"timing"of" Justices’"deaths"and"retirements" can"lead"to"a" Court"

in" which" one" party" or" the" other’s" nominees" are" disproportionately" repre-

sented"in"light"of"their"electoral"success.""For"instance,"as"crit ics"of"th e"current"

system"of"life"tenure"like"Erwin"Chemerinsky"have"observed,"currently"“a"pres-

ident’s"ability"to"select"justices"is"based"on"the"fortuity"of"when"vacancies"oc-

cur.”

"The"problem"with"this"state"of"affairs "“is"not"one"of"fairness"to"presiden-

tial"adminis tr ations"or"political "parties”"but"rather"“lies"in"its"unfairness"to"the"

voters"who"elect"a"given"president"to"a"given"term.”

"This"might"be"less"of"a "

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"Brutus"XI,"N.Y."J.,"Ja n."31,"1788,"%.1%3/$.7)3/"2"THE"COMPLETE"ANTI-FEDERALIST"417"(Herbert"

J."Stori ng"ed.,"1981)."

"0.."Michael"J."M azza,"!)K.J)522N)&$)$?.)V<7)8."&$.()53D.)4./,%.)&/7)$?.)!%$3'<.)CCC)I,7+.,"

39"GONZ."L."REV."131,"142–45"(2003)."

"0.."Calabresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6;"Cramton"&"Carrington,"#,1%&"note"6;"DiTullio"&"

Schochet,"#,1%&"note"6."

"0.."Oliver,"#,1%&"note"6."

"0.."Micha el"Comiskey,"4?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)!1123/$-./$);%2'.##()5.##2/#)D%2-)Q3<<3/+)$?.)

@.?/W,3#$)&/7)VL=2//2%)B&'&/'3.#,"41"PS:"POL."SCI."&"POLS."355,"355"(2008)."

"0..E).*+*,"CHEMERINSKY,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"310;"Calabresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"770–

71;"Stephen"L."Carter,"4?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)K..7#)4.%-)53-3$#,"BLOOMBERG.COM"(Oct."6,"2018),"

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-06/kavanaugh-confirmation-su-

preme-court-needs-term-limits."

"Calabresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"771."

"CHEMERINSKY,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"311."

"DiTullio"&"Schochet,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"1117."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

problem"if"Supreme"Court"Justices’"ideologies"did"not"closely"track"the"partisan"

affiliation" of" the" appointing" president," but" there" is" overwhelming" evidence"

that"it"does.

"What"this"means"in"practice"is"that"the"ideological"composition "

of"the"Court"only"bears"an"indirect" relationship" to" the"outcomes"of" national"

elections." Term"limits" alone"would"not" solve"this"problem."But" terms"of" the"

appropriate"length"com bined"with"staggering"designed"to"equalize"each"pres-

idential"term’s"impact"on"the"Supreme"Court"could"alleviate"this"problem.""

In"addition"to"these"primary"arguments,"reformers"have"raised"a"number"

of"other"concerns" about"life"tenure."First,"reformers"argue"that"life"tenure"has"

led" to" justices" staying" on" the" Court" too" long" into" old" age," when" th ey" have"

started"to"become"mentally"incapacitated.

"Second,"reformers"argue"that"life"

tenure" incentivizes" pres idents" to" choose" younger" appointees" to" maximize"

their"impact"on"the"Co urt.

"Third,"reformers"argue"that"life"t enure"encourages"

strategic"behavior"by"justices"seeking"to"time"their"r etirements"to"enable"an"

ideologically"friendly"president"to"pick"their"replacement.

"Fourth,"reformers"

argue"that"life"tenure"makes"the"composition"of"the"Court’s" membership" turn"

on"random"and"unpredictable"events,"such"as"deaths "and"health-related"retire-

ments.

"Fifth,"reformers"argue"that"life"tenure"leads"to"longer"terms"and"there-

fore"fewer"vacancies,"which"means"that"political"battles"over"the"vacancies"that"

do"arise"are"particul arly"contentious.

"Finally," some" reformers"have"even" ar-

gued"that"life"tenure"and"the"resulting"long"tenures" make"Supreme" Co urt"jus-

tices"particularly"hubristic,

"which"may"in"turn"alter"their"decisionmaking.""

Given"these"concerns"with" life"tenure,"reformers"have"put"forward"a"num-

ber" of"term"limits"proposals"that"they"argue"would"address" these"concerns."

The" most" common" version" of" these" term" limits" call" for" staggered" 18-year"

terms." Under " th ese" plans," each" president" would" get" two" appointments" per"

term,"regularizing"the"appointments"process"and"reducing"the"role"of"random"

events."Eighteen-year"terms "would"prevent"justices"from"sitting"un til"very"old"

age"and"remove"most"advantages"for"presidents"to"appoint"young"nominees."

And"because"each"president"woul d"be"entitled"to"two"appointm ents"per"term,"

the"political"stakes"over"each" appointment"might"be"reduced."Eighteen-year"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

""Citations"to"be"added."

"0.."Calabresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"815–18;"Cramton"&"Carrington,"#,1%&"note"6,"

at"468;"#..)&<#2"David"J."Garrow," >./$&<)8.'%.13$,7.)2 /)$?.)A*0*)0,1%.-.)=2,%$()4?.)F3#$2%3'&<)

=&#.) D2%)&)XY$?)!-./7-./$,"67"U."CHI."L."REV."995"(2000).Gregg" Easterbrook,"G.%3$2<)I,#$3'.()C#)

$?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)0./3<.Z,"THE"NEW"REPUBLIC"(Aug."19,"1991),"at"18."

"0.."DiTullio"&"Schochet,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"1110–16."

"0.."37*"at"1101–10."

"0.."37*"at"1116–19."

"0..E).*+*,"Buchanan,"#,1%&"note"3;"Cramton"&"Carrington,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"468."

"0..E).*+*,"Cramton"&"Carrington,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"468–69."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

10"

terms"would"also"encourage"more"regular"turnover,"bringing"fresh"perspec-

tives"to"the"Court.

It" is" worth" noting," however," that" life"tenure"does"have" defenders"in"the"

academy.

"Others"argue"that"there"are"problems"with"the"current"system "bu t"

favor" different" reforms.

" But"many"seem" to" find"the" arguments"in"favor"of"

term"limits"persuasive."Moreover,"recent"surveys"have"found"between"60"and"

77"percent"of"Americans"agreeing "with"the"notion"that"Supreme"Court"justices"

should"serve"for"fixed"or"limited"terms"instead"of"life.

The"odds"that"term"limits"will "be"enacted"in"the"short"to"medium"term"is"

difficult "to"assess."During"the"recent"presi dential"election,"Democrats"warmed"

to"the"possibility"of"major"Court"reform"as"potential"retaliation"for"what"they"

perceived"as"norm-breaking"by"Republicans"in"the" nominations"process."In"the"

leadup"to "the"2020"Democratic"presidential"primary,"candid ate"Pete"Buttigieg"

made"Supreme"Court"reform"his"top"priority,

"and"other"candidates"endorsed"

various" significant" reforms.

" Although" Joe" Biden," the" eventual" Democratic"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0.."CHEMERINSKY,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"311."

"0..E).*+*,"Ward"Farnsworth,"4?.)@.+,<&$32/) 2D)4,%/2H.%)2/)$?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$,"2005"U."ILL."

L."REV."407;"Stras"&"Scott,"#,1%&"note"16;"David"R."Stras"&"Ryan"W."Scott,"!/)9-13%3'&<)!/&<M#3#)

2D)53D.)4./,%.()!)@.#12/#.) $2);%2D.##2%#)=&<&"%.#3)[)53/7 +%./,"30"HARV."J.L."&"PUB."POL’Y"791"

(2007)."

"0.."Doerfler"&"Moyn,"#,1%&"note"12;"Daniel"Epps"&"Ganesh"Sitaraman,"F2J)$2)0&H.)$?.)

0,1%.-.)=2,%$,"129"YALE"L.J."148,"173–74"(2019)."

"0.."K.J)K&$32/J37.)>&%W,.$$.)5&J)0'?22<);2<<)Q3/7#)=2 /D37./'.)3/)A*0*)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)

VH.%&<<E)4?2,+?)>2%.);%2/2,/'.7)!-2/+)=2/#.%H&$3H.#,"MARQUETTE"UNIVERSITY"(Oct."21,"2019),"

https://www.marquette.edu/news-center/2019/new-nationwide-mu-law-school-poll-

finds-confidence-in-us-sup reme-court-overall.php"(noting"that"34%"of"respondents"strongly"

favor"and"38"percent"favor"requiring"Supreme"Court"justices"to" “serve"a" fixed"te rm"on"the"

Court"rather"than"serving"life"terms”);"Adam"Rosenblatt," !+./7&)2D)\.M)Q3/73/+#,"FIX"THE"COURT"

3" (May" 2020)," https://fixthecourt.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/PSB-May-2020-key-

findings-TL.pdf"(finding"that"77"percent"of"respondents"supported"“restrictions"on"length"of"

service"for" U.S."Supreme"Court"justices"(for"example,"setting"a"retirement"age"or "capping"total"

years"of"service)”);"Lee"Epstein" et" al.,";,"<3')@.#12/#.)$2);%212#&<#)$2)@.D2%-) $?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$"

2–3"(Oct."2020)"(finding"60%"support"among"survey"respondents"for"“[h]av[ing]"justices"serve"

a"fixed"term"on"the"Supreme"Court—like"six"or"eight"years—rather"than"serving"life"te rms”)."

"0.."Josh"Lederman,"C/#37.);.$.)6,$$3+3.+L#);<&/)$2)VH.%?&,<)$?.)0,1%.-.) =2,%$,"NBC"NEWS"

(Jun." 3," 2019)," https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-buttig ieg-s-

plan-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491." Buttigieg’s" proposal" was" largely" based" on" a " pro-

posal"outlined"in"Epps"&"Sitaraman,"#,1%&"note"42."

"Senator"Bernie"Sande rs"indicated"support"for"“if"not"term"limits,"then"rotating"judges"to"

the"appeals"court"as"well.”"Gregory"Krieg,"6.%/3.)0&/7.%#)Q<2&$#)>273D3.7)4.%-)53-3$#)D2%)0,O

1%.-.)=2,%$)I,#$3'.#,"CNN" (Apr."2,"2019)," https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/01/politics/ber-

nie-sanders-supreme-court/index.html." Beto" O’Rourke" endorsed" 18-year" term" limits." 0.."

Caitlin"Hue y-Burns,"6.$2)VL@2,%N.)R&/$#)4.%-)53-3$#)D2%)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)I,#$3'.#,"CBS"NEWS"

(Jun." 5," 2019)," https://www.cbsnews.com/news/beto-orourke-interview-orourke-talks-

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

11"

nominee"and"now"President-Elect,"seemed"initially"unenthused"about"major"

changes,

"the"Democratic"Part y"Platform"ultimately"included"a"call"for"“struc-

tural"court"reforms,”

"and"Biden"promised"to"create"a"bipartisan"commission"

that"would "pr opose"Court"reforms.

"That"Republicans"appear"poised"to"main-

tain"control"of"the"Senate,

"however,"seems"to"end"the"prospects"of"any"seri-

ous"reform."Nonethel ess,"term"limits"are"perhaps"the"only"major"reform"that"

has"attracted"support"across"the"political"spectrum,"and"recently"prominent"

conservative"legal" thinkers"have"endorsed" them"or"at"least"expressed"some"

openness"to"them.

"Even"if"it"is"hard"to "imagine"any"Supreme"Court"reform"

being"implemented"in"the"near"term"given"the"current"partisan"configuration,"

term"limits"seem"like"the"only"reform"that"might"obtain"bipartisan"suppor t.""

B. Trends*Supp orting*Term*Limits*

The"case"for"adopting"term"limits"is"motivated"in"part"by"tr ends "in"the"ap-

pointment"and"length"of"service"of"justices"on"the"Supreme"Court."To"illustrate"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

with-cbsn-elaine-quijano-vot ing-rights-supreme-court-today-2019-06-05/." So" did" Andrew"

Yang."0.."Andrew"Yang,"]YOP.&%)4.%-)53-3$)D2%)0,1%.-.)=2, %$)I,#$3'.#,"YANG2020—ANDREW"

YANG" FOR" PRESIDENT," https://www.yang2020.com/policies/scotustermlimits/" (last" visited"

Aug."28,"2020)."

"0..E).*+*,"Alex"Swoyer,"I2.)637./)6<&#$#)8.-2'%&$#)VH.%)0,1%.-.)=2,%$);&'N3/+);<&/)&$)

8."&$.," THE" WASHINGTON" TIMES" (Oct." 15," 2019)," https://www.washington-

times. com/news/2019/oct/15/joe-biden-dismisses-supreme-court-packing-debate/."

"X^X^)8.-2'%&$3');&%$M);<&$D2%-,"DEMOCRATIC"NATIONAL"C ONVENTION"58"(Jul."27,"2020)."

"0.."Annie"Linskey,"637./E)0W,..U.7)2/)$?.)0,1%.-.)=2,%$E);%2-3#.#)&)=2--3##32/)$2)=2/O

#37.%)=?&/+.#,"WASH."POST"(Oct."22,"2020),"https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-

promises-commission-on-overhauling-supreme-court/2020/10/22/4465ead6-121d-11eb-

ba42-ec6a580836ed_story.html."

"Control"of"the"Senate"will"not"be"c lear"until"early"January,"when"two"runoff"elections"in"

Georgia"will"occur."0.."Carl"Hulse,"8.-2'%&$#)R2%N)$2)8.DM)F3#$2%M)3/)G.2%+3&)@,/2DD#)4?&$)F&H.)

Q&H2%.7)G*V*;*,"N.Y."TIMES"(Nov."14,"2020),"https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/14/us/poli-

tics/georgia-runoffs-senate-control.html." Even" if" Democrats" win" both" races," however," they"

would"have"only"the"narrowest"of"majorities:"50-50,"with"Vice"President"Kamala"Harris"casting"

the"deciding"vote."On e"Democratic"Senator,"Joe"Manchin,"has" already"said"he" opposes"Court"

expansion—seemingly"dooming"that"reform."Veronica"Stracqualursi,"=./$%3#$) 8.-2'%&$ )0&M#)

F.) R2/L$) 6&'N) 9:1&/73/+) 0,1%.-.) =2,%$," CNN" (Nov." 10," 2020) ,"

https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/10/politics/joe-manchin-supreme-court-packing-

cnntv/index.html."

" Will" Baude," V/.) =?..%) D2%) 0,1%.-.) =2,%$) 4.%-) 53-3$#," REASON.COM" (Oct." 26," 2020),"

https://reason.com/volokh/2020/10/26/one-cheer-for-supreme-court-term-limits/;" Ste-

ven"G."Calabresi,"9/7)$?.);23#2/ 2,#);%2'.##)2D);3'N3/+)0,1%.-.)=2,%$ )I,#$ 3'.#,"N.Y."TIMES"(Sep."

22," 2020)," https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/opinion/ginsburg-supreme-court-con-

firmation.html."0..)&<#2"Ilya"Shapiro,"4.%-)53-3$#)R2/L$) Q3:)$?.) =2,%$,"T HE"ATLANTIC"(Sep."22,"

2020)," https://www.theatl antic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/term-limits-wont-fix-

court/616402/."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

12"

these"trends,"and"fo r"our"the"simulations"reported"in"Part"III," we"use"data"from"

the"Federal"Judicial" Center" for"all"biographical"data"on"judges," including" the"

identifying"terms"served"by"justices "and"those"justices"age" and"lifespan.

"We"

also"use"data"on"the"political"party"c ontrolling"t h e"White"House"and"t he"Senate"

in"each"year "from"Wikipedia.""

For"both"this"exercise"and" our"simulations,"we"use" 1937" as" the" starting"

point"of"our"analysis."This"is"to"account"for"the"reality"that"patterns"of" s ervice"

on"the"Supreme"Court"have"evolved"dramatically" over"ti me."For"i nstance,"one"

of"the"inaugural"justices"on"the"Supreme"Court,"John"Routledge,"left"the"Su-

preme"Court"after"just"a"year"to"serve"as"Chief"Justice"of"the"South"Carol ina"

Court"of"Common"Pleas"and"Sessions.

"In"another"example,"in"1812 ,"Joseph"

Story"was"appointed"to "the" Court"at"just"32"years" old—a" record"that"seems"

unlikely"to"ever"be"broken.

"We"thus"elected"to"focus"on"more"recent"patterns"

in"service"on"the"Court."We"decided"to"specifically"start"our"analysis"in"1937"as"

because" it" is" when" President" Roosevel t" pushed" his" ultimatel y" unsuccessful"

court-packing"pl an,

"and"it"is"a"year"that"many " l egal"experts"consider" the"be-

ginning"of"the"modern"era"at"the"Supreme"Court.

"That"said,"we"recognize"that"

this"starting"point"is"admittedly"somewhat"arbitrary.""

To"begin,"we"examine"differences"in"the"number"of"justices"appointed"to"

the"S upreme"Court"across"presidential"terms."To"do"so,"Figu r e"1"repo r ts"the"

number"of" justices"appointed"during" each" four-year" presidential" term" fr om"

1937"through"2020."For"this"figure,"the"x-axis"breaks"terms"into"four-year"pe-

riods," even" if" two" presidents" held"office"during"that"term."For"example," alt-

hough"Lyndon"Johnson"served"as" president"for"the"latter"part"of"the"term"for"

which"John"F."Kennedy"was"elected"in"1960,"we" group"1961"to"1964"as"a"single"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"632+%&1?3'&<)83%.'$2%M)2D)!%$3'<.)CCC)Q.7.%&<)I,7+.#E)]_Y`a;%.#./$,"FEDERAL"JUDICIAL"CEN-

TER,"https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges"(last"v isited"Nov."9,"2020).""

"Routledge"later"return ed"to"the"Supreme"Court"to"serve"as"Chief"Justice"for"a"mere"138"

days"under"a"recess"appointment"before"being"rejected"by"the"Senate."0..)@,$<.7+.E)I2? /,"FED. "

JUDICIAL"CTR.,"HISTOR Y"OF"THE"FEDERAL"JUDICIARY,"https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/rutledge-

john"(last"visited"Nov."9,"2020).""

" 0..) 0$2%ME) I2#.1?," FED." JUDICIAL" CTR.," HISTORY" OF" THE" FED ERAL" JUDICIARY,"

https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/story-joseph"(last"visited"Nov."9,"2020)."

"For"detailed"examinations"of"this"episode,"see"J EFF"SHESOL,"SUPREME"POWER:"FRANKLIN"ROO-

SEVELT"VS."THE"SUPREME"COURT"(2010);"BURT"SOLOMON,"FDR"V."THE"CONSTITUTION:"THE"COURT-PACK-

ING"FIGHT"AN D"THE"TRIUMPH"OF"DEMOCRACY"(2008)."

"The"year"1937"has"been"previously"described"as"the"beginning"of"the"“modern"e ra”"of"

the"Supreme"Court"because"it"was"then"that"the"Supreme"Court"seemed"to"acquiesce"to"the"

constitutionality" of"President"Roosevelt’s"New"Deal"initiatives,"thus"ushering"in" today’s"regu-

latory"state."0.."1"BRUCE"ACKERMAN,"WE"THE"PEOPLE:"FOUNDATIONS"40"(1991)"(“All"of"us"live"in"the"

modern"era"that"begins"with"the"Supreme"Court's"‘switch"in"time’"in"1937,"in"which"an"activist,"

regulatory"state"is"finally"accepted"as"an"unchallengeable"constitutional"reality.”)."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

13"

term."The"numbers "directly"above"the"x-axis"list"the"total"number"of"justices"

appointed"in"each"term.""

Figure&1:&Number&of&Justices&and&Justice-Years&Appointed&

by&Presidential&Term,&1937&to&2020&

During"the"21"presidential"terms"between"1937"and"2020,"a"total"of"39"jus-

tices"were"appointed" to" the" Supreme"Court." Or," on"average,"one" justice" was"

appointed"every"26"months,"which"translates"to"an"average"of"1.8"justices"ap-

pointed"each"fou r-year"presidential"term."However,"there"is"considerable"var-

iation"in"the"number"of"jus tices"appointed"by"p r esid ential"terms,"from"0"ap-

pointments" being"made" in" four"terms—Carter’s" only" term," Clinton’s" second"

term,"George"W."Bush’s"first"term,"and"Obama’s"second"term—to"5"appoint-

ments"made"in"Roosevelt’s"second"term.""

Comparing"the"num ber"of"appointments "from"each"presidential"term"is"one"

way"to"gauge"the"distribution"of"influence"on"the"Court"among"different"presi-

dents," but" it" ignores" differences" in" the" length" that" justices" serve." Another"

measure"of"representation"is"b,#$3'.OM.&%#."This"measure"counts"the"total"num-

ber"of"years"served"by"justices"for"each"president."This"measurement"accounts"

for"the"fact"that"not"all"appointments"are"equal"in"terms"of"influ ence."Because"

a"Justice"who"serves" for"a"particularly"long"period"can"influence"the"law"for"

much"longer"after"the" president"appointing"them"leaves"office,"an"appointing"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

14"

president"might"consider"th em" more"valuable"t han"one"who"serves"for"only"a"

short"period.""

Figure"1"also"reports"t he"number"of"justice-years"appointed"by"each"presi-

dential"term."In"the"figure,"the"differ ent"shading"represents "the"justice-years"

by"the"different"justices"appointed."In"total,"the"39"justices"appointed"during"

these"21"presidential"terms"have"served"for"a"combined"718"justice-years."Or,"

on"average,"each"presidential"term"has"made"appo intments"lasting"34"justice-

years." As" with" appointments " generally," however," there" is" also" considerable"

variation"in"the"justice-years"by"presidential"term."For"example,"the"four"jus-

tices"appointed"in"Roosevelt’s"second"term"served"fo r"a"combined"121"ye a rs.""

In"addition"to"concern"over"equity"in"the" appointment" of"justices" across"

presidential"terms," another"factor"that"has"bee n"cited"to"justify"term"l imits "is"

the"increasing"number"of"years"that"justices"serve.

"To"illustrate"these"trends,"

Figure"2"graph s"the"years"of"s ervice"for"justices"based"on"their"appointment"

year.

" Across" all" justices" appointed" and" who " retired," the" average" length" of"

time"on"the"bench"is"19.1"and"the"median"length"of"time"is"18.5"years."Given"

that"the"median"l ength"is"more"than"18"years,"an"18-year"term"limits"would"

have"cut"short"50"percent"of"all"appointments."The"results"i n"Figure"2"also"re-

veal"a"clear"increase"the"average"number"of"years"of"service"over"time."For"in-

stance,"the" justice"appointed" between" 1937"and" 1950" served" an" average" of"

15.7"year s,"but"the"justices"appointed"since"1990"and"who"have"left"the"bench"

served"an"average"of"26.3"years.

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0.."Cala bresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"815–18;"#..)&<#2"Garrow,"#,1%&"note"34."

"We"made"two"c hoices" about"how"to" report" currently"sitting"justices" to" ensure"that"the"

fact"that"the"sitting"justices"have"not"yet"served"a "full"term" does"not"bias"our"results:"(1)"w e "

exclude"all"justices"appointed"after" Justice"Breyer’s"confirmation"in"1994"and"(2)"we"assume"

that"Justice"Breyer"and"Justice"Thomas"serve"until"2020.""

"This"number"will"increase"as"Justices"Breyer"and"Thomas"continue"to"serve"on"the"Court.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

15"

Figure&2:&Years&of&Service&of&Supreme&Court&Justices&by&

Appointme nt&Yea r,&1937&to&2020&

As" a"more"direct"assessment"of"how"often"term"l imits"would"potentially"

limi t"the"tenure"of"justi ces ,"Figure"3"s hows"the"distribution"of"years"of"experi-

ence"at"the"justice-year"level"from"1937"to"2020."In"the"figure,"an"individual"

Supreme"Cou rt"justice"would"be"counted"for"each"year"they"served."For"exam-

ple,"the"first"year"that"a"given"justice"served"on"the"Court"(i.e."Justice"Ginsburg"

in"1993)"would"be"included"in"the"bar"for"0"years"of"exper ience,"the"second"

year" that" a"given" justice"served" on" the" Court" ( i.e." Justice" Gins burg" in"1994)"

would"be"included"in"the"bar"for"1"years"of"experience,"and"so"o n.""

The"results"in"Figure"3"reveal"that"23"percent"of"the"justice-years"served"on"

the"Supreme"Court"occur"after"a"given"justice"has"already"served"for"18"years."

An"18-year"term"limits"would"thus"have" affected"roughly"a"quarter"of"the"jus-

tice-year s"served"on"the"Supreme"Court."Or"put"another"way,"the"Justices"who"

would"have"been"affected"by"18-year" term" limits" (those" who"served" longer"

than"18"years)"would"have"had"their"tenures"cut"short"by"6.0"years"on"average." "

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

16"

Figure&3:&Years&of&Experience&at&the&Justice-Year&Level&&

by&Political&Party&of&Appointing&President,&1937&to&2020&

A"related"inquiry"is"whether"ter m"limits"would"affect"justices"appointed"by"

one"political"party"more"than"the"other."If,"for"example,"term"limits"would"dis-

proportionately"have"limited"th e"tenures"of"Republican-appointed"justices,"we"

might"expect"Republicans"to"be"less"willing"to "support"term"limits"in"the"future."

Figure"3"assesses"this"possibility"by"breaking"out"results"by"the"political"party"

of"the"appointing"president."These"results"show"that"the"share"of"justice-years"

by"party"is"similar"above" and"below"the"18-year"mark."More"specifically,"46"

percent"of"all"justice-years"were"served"by"justices"appointed"by"Democratic"

presidents,"and"43"percent"of"justice-years"after"a"given"justice"had"been"on"

the"Court"18"years"were"served"justices"appointed"by"Demo cratic"presidents.""

Although"there"are"only"small" differences"by"party"since"1937,"it’s"possible"

that"the"relative"shares"of"justice-years" over"18"years"by"party"have"changed"

over"time."To"assess"the"variation"in"justices"serving"more"than"18"years"by"

party"over"time,"Figure"4"reports"the"years "served"for"each"justice."The"bars"

are"colored"by"the"party"of"the"justices"appointing"president,"where"the"darker"

area"indicates"the"years"after"a"justice"has"served"18"years."At"the"bottom"of"

the"fi gure"is"a"distribution"of"t he"number"of"justices"that"have"been"serving"for"

more"than"18"years"over"time.

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"This"distribution"is"created"by"simply"addi ng"up"the "numbe r"of"justices"in"the"given"year"

in"the"top"part"of"the"figure.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

17"

Figure&4:&Length&of&Supreme&Court&Tenure&by&Justice,&1937&to&2020&

Figure" 4" reveals" that" there" are" cons id erable" differences" in" th e" relative"

shares"of"justice-years"over"18"years"by"party"over"time."In"total"across"the"21"

presidential"terms"since"1937,"Repu blican"pr esidents"have"appointed"19"out"

of"39"justices"and"those"justices"have"served"54"percent"of"justice-years."In"re-

cent"decades,"however,"a"disparity"has"emerged."For"instance,"of"the"Justices"

appointed"since"Richard"Nixon"took"office"in"1969,"14"ou t"of"18"justices"were"

appointed"by"Republicans"and"those"justices"have"served"77"percent"of"justice-

years." Moreover," Figure" 4" also" reveals" trends" by" party" in" the" justices" that"

would"be"effect ed"by"an"18"year"term"limit."Between"1950"and"1970,"only"jus-

tices"appointed"by"Democratic"presidents"served" past"18"year,"from"the"early"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

18"

1990s"through"2010"this "wou ld"only"justices" appointed"by"Republican"presi-

dents"served"past"18"years,"and"since"2010"there"have"been"justices"appointed"

by"presidents"from"both"par ties"serving"longer"than"18"years.""

Figure&5:&Retirements&and&Deaths&by&Shared&Justice&&

and&President&Ideology,&1937&to&2020&

Finally,"because"preventing"strategic"retirements"is"one"argument"for"term"

limits,"we"examine"the"role"that"strategic"departures"play"in"vacancies"to"the"

Supreme"Cou rt.

"To"do"so,"Figure"5"graphs"the"percent"of"justices"that"left"the"

court"when"a"pres ident"that"shared"their"ideology"controlled"the"presidency,"

separately"by"whether"the"justice"died"in"office"or"retired."For"this"analysis,"we"

consider"all"Republican" presidents"conservative"and"all"Democratic"presidents"

liberal;"and"we"consider"justices"liberal"or"conservative"based"on"their"Martin-

Quinn"score."Justices"with"a"negative"(and"thus"liberal)"Martin-Qu inn"s core"are"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"It"is"worth"noting"that,"just"like"some"of"the"justices"that"retire,"some"of"the"justices"that"

die"while"still"serving"on"the"Supreme"Court"still"may"be"engagin g"in"a"strategic"calculation."

For"instance," a" justice" may"elec t"to"not"retire"early"in"the"term"of"a"president"with"whom"she"

shares"an"ideology"because"she"knows"that,"if"she"dies"prematurely,"she"will"be"replaced"by"a"

justice" that"shares"their"ideology."Similarly,"a"justice"may"stay"on"the"Court"despite"serious"

health"consequences" that" couns el"in"favor" of" retirement" if"she" would" prefer" for"the" sitting"

president"to"not"be"able"to"nominate"her"replacement.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

19"

assumed" to" share" ideological" leanings" with" Democratic"presidents," and"jus-

tices"with" a"positive"(and"thus"conservative)"M artin"Quinn"score"are"assumed"

to"share"id eological"leanings"w ith"Republican"presidents."We"use"ideo logy"at"

the"time"of"a"justice’s"retirement"instead "of"at"the"time"of"the"justice’s"appoint-

ment"to"account"for"th e"fact"that"a"justice’s"ideology"may"evolve"over"time."For"

example,"even"though"Justice"Souter"was"appointed"by"George"H.W."Bush,"he"

consistently"voted"with"the"liberal"bloc"of"the"Court"by"the"end"of"his"tenure" on"

the"Supreme"Court."His"decision"to"retire"at"the"beginning"of"the"Obama"presi-

dency"thus"should"be"seen "as"a"likely"strategic"retirement."

The"results"in "Figure"5"reveal"that"10"justices"have"died"while"still"serving"

on"the"Supreme" Co urt"between"1937"and"20 20."Of"the"justices"that"died,"6"of"

them"(or"60"percent)"had"shared"ideology"with"the"sitting"president."During"

that"same"perio d ,"29"justices"retired"from"the"Supreme"Cou rt."Of"the"justices"

who"retired,"17"of" them"(or"59"percent)"had"shared"ideology"with"the" sitting"

president.

II. DESIGNING&PROPOSALS&

Given"the"concerns"outlined"above"about"the"current"system"of"life"tenure"

for"Supreme"Court"justices,"several"pr oposals"have"been"put"forward"by"aca-

demics"and"refo rm"advocates"to"impose"limits"on"the"length"of"their"terms."

This" Section" documents" the" nine" key" design" decisions" that" any" proposal"

should"confront,"summarizes"prominent"existing"proposals ,"and"outlines"sev-

eral" dimensions" along" which" it" is" possible" to" evaluate" the" impact" that" pro-

posals"have"on"the"composition"of"the"Supreme"Court.""

!* Design*Decisions)

Term-limits "proposals"must"solve"several"predictable"problems."More"spe-

cifically,"there"are"nine"design"decisions"that"any"term"limits"proposal"should"

confront."""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"One"study"concluded"that"strategic"r etirement"had"increased"over"American"history."Ar-

temus"Ward’s" 2003" study" of" Supreme" Court" retirement" concluded" that" after"Congress" ex-

panded"the"Justices’"retirement"benefits"in"1955,"“partisanship"became"the"dominant"recur-

rent"factor"in"th e"departure" process.”"ARTEMUS"WARD," DECID ING"TO"LEAVE:"THE"POLITICS"OF"RETIRE-

MENT"FROM"THE"UNITED"STATES"SUPREME"COURT"19"(2003)."That"pattern"appears"to"have"contin-

ued"since"Ward"published"his"study."Every"Justice"who"voluntarily"retired"since"2003"has"done"

so" under" conditions" that" enabled" the" appointment" of" an" ideologically" similar" replacement"

(though"not"necessarily"one"of"the"same"political"party)."Conservative"Justices"O’Connor"and"

Kennedy"retired"under"Republican"presid ents;"liberal"Justices"Stevens"and"Souter"retired"un-

der"a"Democratic"president.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

20"

]* 4. %-)5./+$?)

The"most"salient"design"decision"a"propos al"must"make"is "how"long"the"jus-

tices’"terms"will"last."There"are"a"range"of"tradeoffs "associated"with"different"

term"lengths."For" instance,"shorter"terms"would"create" greater"turnover" on" the"

Court,"and"by"doing"so,"may"ensure"that"the"membership"of"th e"Court"is"more"

reflective"of"the"current"political"moo d"of"the"country."In"contrast,"longer"terms"

would"create"more"continuity" o n" the"Court,"and"by"doing"so,"may"help"ensure"

greater"doctrinal"consis tency"and"alleviate"concerns"that"justices’"interest"in"

future" employment" or" prospects" for" higher" office" would" distort" their" deci-

sionmaking."Although"th e"case"cou ld,"and"has,"been"made"for"a"number"of"dif-

ferent" term" lengths," most" recently" commentators" have" converged" on" stag-

gered,"18-year"terms"as"the"preferred"reform.

X* !1123/$-./$)43-3 /+)

Another"decision"i s"to"determine" when"appointments" will"be" made."One"

option"is"to"have"presidents"make"a"new"appointment"every"two"years ,"typi-

cally"in"the"first"and"third"year"of"a"presidential"term."But"this"feature"is"not"

strictly"required."Another"option"is"to"limit"justices’"terms"to"18"years"but"not"

take"any"steps"to"regularize"when"the"new"appointments"o ccur."Yet"another"

option"is"to"allow"presidents"to" n ominate"two"justices" per"term"but" allow"those"

nominations"to"occur "any"time" (or"even"stipulate"that"those"appointments"do"

not"go"into"effect"until"the"s tart"of"the"s ubsequent"presidential"administration).""

c* 4%&/#3 $32/)43-3/+)

Proposals"must"also"specify"when"the"process"of"transitioning"to"term"lim-

its"appointments"should"commence."One"option"is"to"have"the"plan"go"into"ef-

fect" immediately" upon" passage" of" a" term" limits" statute" or" constitutional"

amendment"(which,"as"we"discuss"below,"are"both"ways"that"reformers"have"

suggested"that"proposal"may"be"enacted)."Another"option"is"to"have"the"pro-

posal"go"into"effect"at"some"later"date,"such"as"at"the"start"of"the"next"presiden-

tial"term"or"after"th e"justices"on"the"Court"at"the"time"of"pass age"have"all"served"

some"amo unt"of"time"(e.g.,"after"they"have"all"completed"18"years"of"service"or"

after"all"the"justices"on"the"Court"at"the"time"of"passage"have"retired).""

d* 5.+&'M)I,#$3'.#)

In"addition"to"specifying"the"timing"of"the"transit ion,"a"related"des ign"deci-

sion"is"how"to"handle"the"terms"of"the"“legacy”"justices"that"are"serving"on"the"

Court"when"the"proposal"is"enacted."As"noted"above,"one"option"is"to"specify"

that"term"limits"appointments" do"not" go"into"effect" until"all"the"current" justices"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0..)3/D%&"Section"II.B.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

21"

leave"the"Court." Another"option"is"to"allow"the"legacy"justices"to"retain"life"ten-

ure"and" only" begin"adding"new"justices"that"will"serve"staggered"18-year"terms"

(this"would"likely"result"in"a"Court"with"more"than"n ine"justices"during"a"tran-

sition"period)."Yet" another" option"is"to"have"legacy"justices"transition"off"the"

Court"in"order"of"seniority"as"new"justices"are"appointed."Importantly,"given"

that"the"justices "currently"on"th e"Court"were"appointed"under"a"system"of"life"

tenure,"this"design"choice"may"have"implications"for"the"cons titutionality"o f"

any"reform"passed"by"statute"even"if"one"believes"such"reform"is"permissible"

as"a"general"matter."

e* A/.:1.'$.7)B&'&/'3.#)

Another"important"design"decision" is" how"the"proposal"addresses"unex-

pected"vacancies."That"is,"what"does"the"proposal "call"for"when"a"Justice"leaves"

the"Cou r t—either"due"to"death,"retirement,"or"removal—before"the"end"of"the"

specified"term?"One"option"is"simply"to"have"fewer"m embers"on"the"Court" for"

the"remainder"of"the"departing"justices’"term."That"is,"if"a"term-limited"justice"

appointed"in"2021"would"be"expected"to"leave"th e"Court"in"2039,"that"justice’s"

unexpected"death"in"2037" would"lead"to" an"8-justice"Court"for"two"years."An-

other"option,"though,"is"to"allow"for"a"justice"to"be"appointed"to"fill"the"remain-

der"of"the"term."This" appointm ent"could"be"made"by"the"current"president,"or"

one" could" imagine" some" requirement" that" the" replacement" justice" be" ap-

proved"by"the"party"that"initiall y"appointed"the"justice"in"o rder"to"minimize"

the"role"of"random"events"on"the"Co urt’s"jurispru d ence."For"example,"if"a"jus-

tice"was"appointed"by"a"Republican"president"and"the"current"president"is"a"

Democrat,"the"plan"could"require" th e"appointment"to "be" approved" by"th e"Re-

publican"leader"in"the"Senate."Other"options"include"allowing"senior"justices"

whose"terms"have"finished"to"return"to"active"service"on"th e"Cour t"until"the"

next"appointment"is"made"on"the"specified"schedule."

f* 0./32%)I,#$3'.#)

A"term"limits"reform"should"also"address"the"role"of"senior"justices"after"

the"end"of"their"term."One"option"is"to"make"these"justices"permanent"members"

of"a"circuit"court."Another"option"i s"to"give"these"justices"the"same"status"of"the"

justices"that"retire"under"the" current"system"(that"is,"th ey"m ay"be"all owed"to"

retain"office"s pace,"hire"a" clerk,"and"sit"by"designation"on"federal"courts"around"

the"country)."Yet"another"option"is"to"permit"these"justices"to "rejoin"the"Cour t"

for"a"limited"period"of"time"when"an"unexpected"vacancy"arises."Another"po s -

sibility"is"for"the"plan"to"include"provisions"that"restrict"the"activities"of"justices"

after"they"are"no"longer"acti ve"members"of"the"Court—restrictions"that"w ould"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

22"

be"designed"to"avoid"any"appearance"of"corruption.

"Importantly,"however,"

any"reform"not"passed"through"a"constitutional"amendment"must"find"a"role"

for"the"term-limited" justices"that"does" not"run"afoul"of"the"Constitution’s" cur-

rent"requirement"that"jus tices"serve"for"a"period"of"good"behavior.

_* 0./&$.)C-1&##.#)

Even"if"a"term"limits"reform"specifies"when"Supreme"Court"seats"become"

vacan t"and"when"the"president"may"nominate"a"new"justice,"it"does"not"follow"

that"the"Senate"will"automatically"confirm"the"pr esident’s"nominee."If"the"Sen-

ate"is"controlled"by"a"different"party"than"the"president,"the"majo rity"leader"

may"instead"elect"to"not"schedule"a"confirmation"vote—just"as"Republican"Ma-

jority" Leader"Mitch"McConnell"did"when"President"Obama"nominated"Judge"

Merrick" Garland"to " fill" the" seat" created" when" Justice"Antonin" Scalia" died"in"

2016."Without"some"solution"to"this"problem,"“instituting"staggered"term"lim-

its"could"spectacularly"backfire.”

Some"reformers"may"hope"that"changing"term"limits" may"also"change"the"

norms"of"confirmation"votes."That"is,"by"making" it"clear"each"presidential"term"

is"“entitled”"to"tw o"Court" v acancies,"it"may"make"it"politically"untenable"for"the"

Senate"to"refuse"to"consider"one"of"the"p resident’s"nominees."But"one"option"is"

to"place"less"faith"in"norms"and"ins tead"pro vide"for"so m e"other"po licy"if"the"

Senate"do es"not"confirm"a"no m inee"in"a"set"amount"of"time."This"could"include"

allowing"the"president"to"directly"appoint"the"candidate"of"their"choosing,"or"

it"cou ld"involve" giving"that"power"to"a"third"party"o f"some" kind."One"particu-

larly"mischievous"(though"quite"possibly"effective)"attempt"to"address"these"

problems"is"to"requ ire"the"president"and"the"Senate"to"be"“confined"together"

until"a" nominee"has" been" approved”" while" imposing" a" “salary" and" benefits"

freeze”"on"all"of"them.

Y* =?3.D)I,#$3'.#)

Proposals"should"also"decide"how"the"chief"justice"will"be"designated."One"

possibility"is"to"have"the"justice"a ppointed"to"fill"th e"vacancy"created"when"the"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"=D*"Stras"&"Scott,"#,1%&"note"16,"at"1425"(arguing"that"“fixed,"nonrenewable"terms"."."."

would"introduce"incentives"for" Supreme"Court" Justices"to"cast"votes"in"a"way"that"improves"

their"prospects"for"future"employment"outside"the"judiciary”)"

"Cramton"has"argued"that"his"and" Carrington’s"proposal"is"consistent"with"the" Constitu-

tion"becaus e"justices"would"hav e"commissions"for"life,"but"would"spend"the"first"part"of"their"

tenure"serving"o n"the"Supreme"Court"and"the"remainder"serving"on"lower" courts."0.."Roger"C."

Cramton,"=2/#$3$, $32/&<3$M)2D)@.D2%-3/+)$?.)0,1%.-.)=2, %$)"M)0$&$,$.,"3/"REFORMING"THE"COURT:"

TERM"LIMITS"FOR"SUPREME"COURT"JUSTICES"345,"359"(Roger"C."Cramton"et"al."eds.,"2006)."

"Shapiro,"#,1%&"note"50."

"Calabresi,"#,1%&"note"50."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

23"

current"chief"justice"leaves"the"Court"assume"that"role."Under"this"system,"as"

with"the"status"quo,"whether"a" president"is"able"to" appoint"the" chief"justice"will"

depend"on"the"happenstance"of"wh en"the"vacancy"becomes"available."Alterna-

tively,"the"plans"could"instead"provide"that"the"mos t"senior"of"the"active"jus -

tices"will"serve"as"the"chief"justice,"or"the"mo st"senior"member"of"the"party"that"

has"appoi nted"the"most"justices"to"the"Court."One"could"also"imagine"a"system"

similar" to"that"used"by"the"courts"of"appeals,"in"w hich"the"most"senior"judge"

below"the"age"of"65"becomes"the"chief"judge"for"a"7-year"term.

"Or"the"plan"

could"simply"allow"the"ju stices"to"elect"their"own "chief.

`* 9/&'$-./$)>.$?27)

A" final" important" design" decision" that" a" term" limits" plan" must"make" is"

whether"it"will" be"implemented"by"passing"a"statute"or"through"the"adoptio n"

of"a"constitutional"amendment."Th e"major ity"of"proposals"res t"on"the"assump-

tion"that"term"limits"are"inconsistent"with"Article"III’s"guarantee"o f"tenure"dur-

ing" “good" behaviour,”" making" a" constitutional" amend ment" necessary." But"

some" scholars" argue" that" there" are" ways" to" effectively" create" term" limits"

through"a"statute"alone.

"While"this"choice"is"quite"significant,"how"to"resolve"

it"rests"on"constitutional"consideratio ns"that"are"beyond"the"scope"of"this"Ar-

ticle."Our"focus,"instead,"is"on"the"pr actical"effect"each"proposal"would"have"if"

successfully"implemented.""

B. Existing*Proposals**

Over" the"last"s everal"decades," s everal"major" term" limits"propos als" have"

been" put"forward."These"proposals"each"make" concrete"choices"for"at"least"

some"of"th e"nine"design"decisions"we"outlined"above,"but"they"also"typically"

leave"some"of"these"decisions"either"ambiguous"or"unaddressed."We"outline"

several"of"the"most"prom inent"proposals"below.""

]* V<3H.%L#);%212#&<)

The"first"scholar"to"lay"out"th e"basic"framework"of"the"dominant"term"limits"

proposals"was" Philip"Oliver."In" a"1986"article,"Oliver"offered"a"draft"constitu-

tional"amendment"that"would"“replace"life"tenure" for"Supreme"Cou rt"Justices"

with"a"system"of"fixed,"staggered"terms.”

"As"he" put"it,"“[t]he"primary"features"

of" the" proposal" are" that" Ju stices" should" serve" for" staggered" eighteen-year"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0.."28"U.S.C."§"45"(providing"procedures"for"selection"of"chief"judges"for"circuit"courts).""

"For"a"discussion"of"the" constitutional"issues"involved"in"changing"the"way"the"chief"jus-

tice"is"designated,"see"Judith"Resnik"&" Lane"Dilg,"@.#12/73/+)$ 2)&) 8.-2'%&$3')8.D3'3$()53-3$3/+)

$?.);2J.%#)&/7)$?.)4.%-)2D)$?.)=?3.D)I,#$3'.)2D)$?.)A/3$.7)0$&$.#,"154"U."PA."L."REV."1575"(2006)."

"0..E).*+*,"Cramton"&"Carrington,"#,1%&"note"6."

"Oliver,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"800."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

24"

terms,"and"th at"if"a"Justice"did"not"serve"his"full"term,"a"successor"would"be"

appointed"only"to"fill"out" the"remainder"of" the" term.”

"Vacancies"would"be"

staggered"such"that"one"seat"would"open"up"each"odd-numbered"year.""

Oliver’s"propos al"has"a"number"of"key"features."Notably,"it"would"limit"the"

tenure"o f"Justices"already"appointed"at"th e"time"of"enactment—that"is,"it"would"

not" accommodate" the" legacy" justices." But" it" includes" a" lag" time" of" approxi-

mately"five"years"before"it"becomes"effective:"the"most"senior"justice"on"the"

Court"would"be"required"to"leave"on"the"thir d "odd-numbered"year"after"enact-

ment.

"So ,"for"example,"if"the" pl an"were"enacted"in"2021"or"2022"and"no"cur-

rent"Justices"retired"or"died,"Justice"Thomas"would"vacate"his"seat"in"August"of"

2027,"to"be"replaced"by"a"new"Justice"who"would"serve"an"18-year"term.""

Another"important"detail"is"how"the"proposal"handles"unexpected"vac an-

cies."If"a"Justice"dies"or"retires"outside"of"the"normal"schedule,"Oliver’s"proposal"

provides"that"a"replacement"Justice"will" be"appointed"who"serves"out"the"rest"

of" the"predecessor’s" term."So," if" the" plan" were" enacted" in" 2021" and" Justice"

Breyer"retired"in"2022,"his"replacement"would"serve"only" until"2029,"when"a"

new"Ju stice"would"be"appointed"for"a"full"18-yea r"term."If"that"Justice"were"to"

leave"the"Court" after"10"years,"she"would"be"replaced"by"a" t emporary" Justice"

who"would"serve"for"eight"years."Temporary"justices"may"not"be"reappointed"

for"full"18-year"terms."The" only"exception" to"these"rules"is"th at"where"a"re-

placement"Ju stice"is"being"appointed"to"a"seat"that"would"become"vacant"dur-

ing"the"same"presidential"term,"allowing"the"new"appointee"to"serve"for"some-

what"longer"than"18"years."If,"say,"Justice"Thomas"were"to"leave"the"Court"in"

2025"before"his"seat"expired"in"2027,"the"president"elected "in"2024 "would"re-

place"him"with"a"Justice"who"would"serve"until"2045.""

X* 4?.)B3%+3/3&);<&/)

Oliver’s"proposal"was"revived"two"decades"later"by" two"University"of"Vir-

ginia"law"students,"J a mes"DiTullio"and"John"Schochet,"in"a"B3%+3/3&)5&J)@.H3.J"

student"note.

"Their"proposed"constitutional"amendment"(which"we’ll"call"the"

“Virgini a"Plan”)"has"much"in"common"with"Oliver’s.""

One"key"difference"relates"to"the"timing"of"the"transition."Although"their"

plan"would,"like"Oliver’s,"limit"the"tenure"of"existing"Justices,"th e"m echanics"are"

slightly"different."The"plan"would"take"effect"on"the"first"odd-numbered"year"

following"ratification,"and"then"the"most"senior"justice’s"tenure"would"end"“on"

the"third"day"of"January"of"the"first"even-numbered"year"following"the"effective"

date"of"this"Amendment"and"commencing"after"that"justice"has"served"for"at"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"C7*"(footnote"omitted).""

"0.."37*"at"801."

"DiTullio"&"Schochet,"#,1%&"note"6."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

25"

least"eighteen"years" on"the"Supreme"Court.”

"At"that"point,"each"remaining"

justice"would"leave" every"two"years,"from"most"to"least"senior."In"other"words,"

so"long"as"the"most"senior"justice"had"already"served"for"18"years"upon"the"

amendment’s" ratification," the" Virginia" Plan" would" become" operative" more"

quickly"than"Oliver’s.""

Another"key"difference"is"that"the"Virginia"Plan"makes"no"allowances"for"

short-term"appointments"th at"would"expire"during"the"appointing"president’s"

term."Whereas"Oliver’s"plan"simply"allows"those"justices"to"serve"for"some-

what"longer"than"18"years,"the"Virginia"Plan"would"require"an"interim" appoint-

ment"who"would"serve"for"a"short"period"and"who"could"not"be"reappointed"to"

a"full"term.

"This"could"lead"to"differences"for"the"ideology"of"justices"in"some"

scenarios."Under"Oliver’s"pl an,"if"a"vacancy"ope ned"up"on"the"Court"in"the"sec-

ond"year"of"a"presidential"term,"the"president"would"be"able"to"fill"it"with"an"

appointee"who"would"serve"for"19"years;"under"the"Virginia"Plan,"the"president"

would"p ick"a"short-term"appointee,"and"then"would"make"a"new"appointment"

the"following" year."Given"that"the"president’s"party"often" (though" not" always)"

loses"seats"in"the"Senate"in"midterm"elections,

"the"Virginia"Plan"might"lead"

to"nominees"who"are"more"id eol ogically" moderate"in"such"scenarios"but"also"

might"have"a"greater"chance"of"producing"Senate"impasses.""

c* 4?.)K2%$?J.#$.%/);<&/)

Another"proposal"comes"from"Northwestern"University"School"of"Law"pro-

fessors" Stephen" Calabresi" and" James" Lindgren."Like"th e" Oliver" and" Virginia"

proposals,"this"one"(which "we’ll"call"the"“Northwestern"Plan”)"is"also"a"consti-

tutional"amendment"that"calls"for"18-year"terms."But"the"proposal"has"some"

key"differences"from"other"proposals."Most"importantly,"it"wo uld"not"apply"to"

legacy"justices"on"the"ground"that"“retroactive"application"."."."would"be"both"

unfair"and"unnecessary.”

"All"justices"currently"serving"at"the"time"the"pro-

posal"was"enacted"would"retain"life"tenure.""

This"choice"has"consequences"for"t he"plan’s"rollout"because"it"complicates"

getting" to" new" appointments" appropriately" synced " on" staggered" 18-year"

terms."The"authors"propose"that"each"new"appointment"after"the"amendment"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"C7*"at"1146."

"0.."37*"

"0..E).*+*,"Bernard"Grofman" et"al.,"R?M)G&3/)3/)$?.)0./&$.)",$)>37$.%-) 52##)3/)$ ?.)F2,#.Z)

9H37./'.) D%2-) &) K&$,%&<) 9:1.%3-./$," 23" LEGISLA TIVE" STUD." Q." 79," 79" (1998)" (noting" that"

“[m]idterm"loss"in"the"House"is"very"likely,"but"it"is"not"as"consistent"a"phenomenon"as"it"is"in"

the"House”).""

"Calabresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"826."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

26"

occupies"the"“next"open"slot”"in"ord er"to"m ake"the"18-year"cycle"work.

"Imag-

ine"that"the"plan"became"operative"in"2021."If"the"first"retirement"occurred"in"

2022,"the"new"justice"woul d "be"appointed"to "the"18-year"slot"that"begins"in"

2023—meaning"that"justice"would"serve"for"19"years."If"the"next"vacancy"arose"

in"2023,"the"new"justice"would"be"appointed"for"th e"s lot"th at"began"in"2025."

And"so"on.""

Under" the" Northwestern" Plan," term-limited" justices" would" receive" their"

salary"for" life" and"would"be"permitted"to"sit"as"judg es"on"the"lower" courts" for"

life.

"In"the"event"of" unexpected"vacancies," an" interim"justice"would"be" ap-

pointed"to" fill"out"the"rest"of"the"term,"and"that"appointee"would" be"ineligible"

for"reappoi ntment"for"a"full"term.

d* 4?.)@./.J&<)!'$)

Roger"Cramton"and"Paul"Carrington"have"proposed"their"own"18-year" limit"

(which"we’ll"call"the"“Renewal"Act,”" the"name"th ey"gave"their"draft"statute).

The"proposal"has"one"with"a"significant"difference"from"those"described"thus"

far:"they" argue"that"their"reform"could"be"implemented"via"an"ordinary"statute"

rather" than"a"constitutional"amendment.

"Th eir"proposal" would"work"as"fol-

lows." First," all" legacy" Justices" would" retain" life" tenure." Vacancies" would" be"

filled"as"per"usual"once"those"Justices" died"or"retired" until"the"<&#$"grandfa-

thered"Justice"left"the"Court."At"that"point,"the"system"of"regularized" appoint-

ments"every"odd-numbered"year"would"begin."

Interestingly," no"Justice"would" be"“term-limited”"from"the"Court;"all"Jus-

tices"w ould"keep"th eir"titles"and"judicial"roles"for"life."But"the"system"would"

effectively"create"an"18-year"term."This"is"because"if"at"any"point"there"were"

more"than"nine"justices"on"the"Court,"only"the"nine"most"b,/32%"wo uld"partici-

pate"in"the"ordinary"work"of"hearing"merits "cas es."In"practice,"after"18"yea rs"of"

service,"any"given"Justice"would"be"bumped"out"of"the"nine"most"junior"jus-

tices,"as" nine"appointments"would"have"been"made" since"that"Justice’s"appoint-

ment."Senior"justices"would"still"be"permitted"to"sit"on"the"Court"in"cases"of"

recusal"or"temporary"disability"by"the"active"justices;"they"would"be"called"up"

in"reverse"order"of"seniority."They"also"would"s it"as"circuit"judges"and"partici-

pate"in"oth er"work"o f"the"Supreme"Court,"such"as"approving"amendments"to"

the"Federal"Rules."In"the"event"of"an"unexpected"death"or" retirement"that" left"

the"Court"with"fewer"than"nine"Justices,"the"president"would" be" permitted"to"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"C7*"at"827."

"0.."Stras"&"Scott, "#,1%&"note"41,"at"775."

"0.."Cala bresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"827."

"0.."Cramton"&"Carrington,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"471."

"0.."Cramton,"#,1%&"note"64."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

27"

make"an" extra" appointment" that"would" take" t he" place" of" the" next" regularly"

scheduled"appointment.""

e* Q3:)$?.)=2,%$)

The"advocacy"organization"Fix"the"Court"has"proposed"a"reform"that"looks"

quite"similar"to"the"Renewal"Act"proposal"but"with"a"couple"of"key"differences."

Under"this"proposal,"th e"cycle"of"appointments"every"two"years"would"beg in"

immediately"upon"enactment.

"The"term"limits" would"apply"to"new"justices,"

but"not"the"legacy"justices."Once"an"18-year"term"expires,"a"Justice"would"be-

come"senior"and"serve"on"the"lower"courts."During" their" 18-year"terms,"how-

ever,"they"would"sit"on"the"Court"only"once"they"were"among"the"nine"most"

#./32%"Justices"on"the"bench."In"practice,"this"would"mean"that"some"of"the"early"

new"appointments"would"have"short"tenures" on"the"Su preme"Court."Depend-

ing"on"how"lo ng"it"took"for"legacy"justices"to"retire,"an"early"appointee"could"

spend"a"sizable"chunk"of"her"18-year"term"waiting"“on"deck”"to"become"on e"o f"

the"nine"most"senior"Justices."

f* 4?.)\?&//&)63<<))

Fix"the"Court"has"also"developed"a"different"propos al,"a"version"of"which"

has"now"been"introduced"into"Congress"by"Representative"Ro"Khanna"(we"will"

refer"to"this"proposal"as"the"“Khanna"Bill”).

"As"with"the"prior"proposal,"ap-

pointments"w ould"begin"immediately"and"legacy"justices"would"not"be"subject"

to"term"limits."Unlike"the"previous"proposal,"however,"there"would"be"no"re-

quirement"that"only"the"nine"most"senior"justices"sit"and"decide"cases."What"

this"means"is"th at,"unlike"the"other"proposals"discussed"thus"far,"the"Supreme"

Court" could" have" more" than" nine" actively" participating" justices" during" the"

transition"per iod—in"theory"as"many"as"18,"if"every"Justice"on"the"Court"upon"

the"bill’s"enactment"remained"on"the"Court" for"18"more"years."After"the"tran-

sition,"senior"Justices"could"r eturn"to"the"Court"tempo rarily"to"fill"unexpected"

vacancies."The"proposal"also"has"one"interesting"feature"designed"to"prevent"

obstruction"of"nominees"in"the"Senate."It"provides"that,"if"the"Senate"fails"to"act"

within"120"days"of"the"p resident’s"nomination,"the"nominee"w ill"be"automati-

cally"seated."This"provision"would"address"a"situation"like"the" o ne" that" arose"

in"2 0 16"with" President"Obama’s"nomination"of"Judge"Garland,"although"im-

portantly"it"would"not"prevent"the"Senate"from"simply"holding"a"vote"and"vot-

ing"down"any"nom inees"by"the"president.""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0.."Memo"from"Tyler"Cooper,"Fix"the"Court,"Nov."6,"2019,"https://fixthecourt.com/wp-

content/uploads/2020/11/JIW-age-88-retirement-11.6.19.pdf."

"Supreme "Court"Term"Limits"and"Regular"Appointments"Act"of"2020, "H.R."8423,"116th"

Cong."(2020)."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

28"

_* V$?.%);%212#&<#)

Most"proposals"for"term"limits" have"converged"o n"1 8-year"limits,"and"we"

expect"that"policymakers"would" be"most"likely"to"select"that"length"o f"term"if"

they"do"adopt"term"limits."A"number"o f"commentators"have"proposed"terms"of"

different"lengths,"however ,"and"we"will"briefly"catalogue"them"here.""

Henry"Monaghan"has"suggested"“some"fixed"and"unrenewable" term,"such"

as"fifteen"or"twenty"years”"for"Supreme"Court"justices.

"The"problem"with"a "

15-" or" 20-year" term" limit," however," is" that," with" a" nine-member" Supreme"

Court,"it"would"not"distribute"appointments"evenly"a mong"presidents—which"

is"one"common"goal"shared"by"many"term"l imits"advocates." This "is"presumably"

why"the"18-year"limit "has"far"more"support"than"either"15-"or"20-year"terms.""

But"some"think"18"years"is"too"long."Conservative"commentator"Mark"Levin"

has"proposed"staggered"12-year"term"limits,"with"three"appointments"made"

each" presidential " term" rather" than" two" under" the" 18-year" plan.

" Stephen"

Carter"has"proposed"staggered"9-year"terms,"which" would"translate"into"one"

appointment"each"year"and"four"each"presidential"term.

And" an"even"shorter"term"limits"proposal"comes" from"D.C."Circuit"Judge"

Laurence"S il berman."He"argues"that"in"order"to"“make"justices"think" o f"them-

selves"as"judges,”"Su preme"Court"appointees"should"serve"for"only"five"years,"

after"which"they"coul d"sit"on"the"lower"courts"for" life.

"With"a"five-year"limit,"

every"two-term"president"would"get"to"repl ace"the"entire"membership"of"the"

Supreme"Court—an"outcome"we"suspect"would"strike"many"observers"as"un-

desirable.""

C. Comp aring*Proposals**

There" are"a"number"of"tradeoffs"ass ociated"with "the" d esig n"decisions"that"

would" go " into" any" term" limits" proposals." In" this" Section," we" will" lay" out" a"

framework"of"possible"tradeoffs"that"will"help"guide"our"comparison"of"the"d if-

ferent" proposals." In" particular," we" are" interested" in" how" the"different" pro-

posals"might"affect"the"composition"of"the"Court"in"various"ways."That"said,"we"

limit"our"analysis"to"differences"between"proposals"that"are"possible"to"empir-

ically"assess"through"simulations."Specifically,"we"focus"on "how"different"pro-

posals"would"change"the"Court’s"membership.""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"Henry"Paul"Monaghan,"4?.)=2/D3%-&$32/) ;%2'.##()5&J)2%);2<3$3'#Z,"101"HARV."L."REV."1202,"

1212"(1988)."

"MARK"R."LEVIN,"THE"LIBERTY"AMENDMENTS:"RESTORING"THE"AMERICAN"REPUBLIC"49–50" (2013).""

"Carter,"#,1%&"note"29."

"4.%-)53-3$#)D2%)I,7+.#)Q.7.%&<3#$)02'3.$M)0M-12#3,-();&/.<)Q3H.," 13"J.L."& "POL."669,"687"

(1997)."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

29"

We"see"five"distinct"ways"in"wh ich"the"design"choices"made"by"these"pro-

posals"may"affect"th e"composition"of"the"Cou rt:"(1)"the"Appointment*and*Ten-

ure"of"justices,"that"is,"how"a"given"term"limits"proposal"would"change"who"

gets"to"appoint"the"justices"and"how"long"they"serve;"(2)"the"Ideological*Com-

position"of"the"Supreme"Court,"that"is,"how"a"given" term "limits"proposal"would"

change"the"ideological"breakdown"of"the"Co urt;"(3)"the"Transition*Process"for"

implementing"the"r eform,"that" is," when" the" proposal "firs t"becom es"effective"

and"how"it"phases"in"over"time;"(4)"the"Confirmation*Incentives*for"new"jus-

tices,"that"is,"whether"a"given"term"limits"proposal" would" alter"the"incentives"

for"either"strategic"retirement"of"justices"or"intentional"obfuscation"by"sena-

tors;"and"(5)"the"Profile*of*Nominees"to"the"Supreme"Court,"that"is,"whether"a"

given"term"limits"proposal"would"lead"to"changes"in"the"type"of"people"con-

firmed"to "Court."Below,"we"elaborate"on"these"five"distinct"considerations.""

]* !1123/$-./$#)&/7)4./,%.)

The"most"obvious"and"direct"goal"of"term"limits"reform"is"changing"the"ap-

pointment" of" justices" and"how" long" they" serve." By" doing" so, "the" goal" is" fre-

quently"to"regularize"appointments"across"presidential"terms."That"said,"alt-

hough"this"is " a"prim ary"goal"of" the" various" term"lim its"proposals,"there"are"

tradeoffs"that"the"propo sals"must"confront"that"m ay"influence"the"relationship"

between"presidential"elections"and"the"appointment"of"justice s."For"instance,"

plans"that"wo uld"go"fully"into"effect"immediately"would"regularize"appoint-

ments"more"quickly"than"plans"that"would"not"go"fully"into"effect"until"after"

the"legacy"justices"have"died"or"voluntarily"retired ."Si milarly,"th e"different"ap-

proaches"that"term"limits"proposals"adopt"for" addressing"unexpected"vacan-

cies"through"deaths"or"retirements"(or,"less"likely"but"still"possible,"removal"of"

justices" after"impeachment)"also"influence"the"regularity"of"appointments."One"

key" margin" to" evaluate" different" proposals" design" features" is" the" extent" to"

which" they"ensure"that"presidents"have"similar"influence"on"the"composition"

of"the"membership"of"the"Court."

X* C7.2<2+3'&<)=2-12#3$32/)

A"second"way"to"assess"the"trade-offs"associated"with"different"term"limits"

proposals"is"the"impact"that"they"may"have" on"the"ideological"com position"o f"

the"Supreme"Cour t."We"have"discussed"how"reform"could"be"designed"to"make"

the" Court’s" membership," and" th us" presu mably" its" ideo logical" composition,"

more"closely"track"the"results"of"presidential"elections."But"plans"that"increase"

the"short-term"responsiveness"of"judicial"appointments"to"electoral"outcomes"

could"also"creat e"more"swings"in"ideology"of"the"Court."These"swings"between"

liberal"and"conservative"Courts"could"lead"to"doctrinal"instability"that"might"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

30"

undermine"the" Court’s" legitimacy"over"time.

"Those"who" favor"shorter-term"

democratic"control "would"have"to "consider"this"potential"cost."Relatedly,"these"

changes"to"the"appointment"process"may"also"result"in"more"instances"of"one"

party"having"large"majorities"on"the"Court,"whic h"could"lead"to" more"extreme"

changes"in"the"doctrine."Moreover,"judicial"ideology"is"not"binary,"and"the"pre-

cise"details"of"the"term"lim its"plan"might"result"in"a"Court"that" is"more"or"less"

ideologically"polarized.""

c* 4%&/#3$3 2/);%2'.##)

Another" way"to" assess"the"trade-offs"associated"with" different" term"limits"

proposals"is"how"they"would"handle"the"transition"from"the"current"system"of"

life"tenure"to"a"system"of"term"limits."Assuming"that"staggered"vacancies"are"

the"goal,"moving"to" such" a"system" woul d"always" take" some" time." Proposals"

have"different"procedures"for"how"quickly"to" make"the"move"to"that"system,"

with"some"waiting"a"set"period"of"years"and"others"waiting"for"an"intervening"

president"to"be"elected."Given"these"differences,"an"important"question"is"how"

long"the"full"transition"is"likely"to"take."Moreover,"if"a"prop osal"allows"presi-

dents"at"the"time"of"enactm ent"to"make"more"selections"to"the"Court—or"to"

nominate"justices"to"the"Court"that"are"allowed"to"serve"life"terms—there"may"

be"windfalls"in"terms"of"the"number"of"justice-years"that"are"appointed"by"a"

particular"president."The"transition" itself"m ay" r esult" in"windfalls"to "the"presi-

dent"in"office"at"the"time"of"enactment.""

d* =2/D3%-&$32/)C/'./$3H.#)

Another"important"concern"is"how"features"of"term"limits"proposals"may"

influence"confirmation"incentives."Although"at"so me"points"in"history"the"S en-

ate"may"have"been"deferential"to"the"nominees"selected"by"the"president,"the"

political" clashes" over" efforts"to" confirm" replacements" for" Justice" Scalia" and"

Ginsburg"illustrate"how"the"Senate"may"be"unwilling"to"simply"acquiesce"to"

appointments"made"by"presidents"of"the"opposing"party."One"way"to"evaluate"

proposals"is"how"likely"it"is"that"a"pro po s al"will"result"in"vacancies"arising"at"

times" that"are"more"likely"to"produce"deadlocks"during"the"confirmation"pro-

cess"th at"prevent"new"justices"from"being"seated"on"the"Supreme"Court.""

e* ;%2D3<.)2D)K2-3/..#)

A"final"concern"relates"to"what"kinds"of"people"will" be"selected"as"justices."

It"is" possible"that" different" features"of" various"plans"will" impact" the"kind" of "

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"Defenders"of"life"tenure"justify"the"practice"using"this"argument."0.."Stras"&"Scott,"#,1%&"

note"16,"at"1424"(“Swift"legal"change"and"the"rapid-fire "reversal"of"controlling"prece dent"un-

dermine"the"Court's"legitimacy"by"creating"the"appearance"that"its"decisions"turn"on"nothing"

more"than"the"personne l"on"the "Court.”)."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

31"

people"that"are"offered,"and"accept,"nominations"to"the"Su preme"Cour t."For"ex-

ample,"the"shorter"the"term"length,"the"more"people"need"to"be"appointed"to"

the"Cou r t"over"time."If"there"is"a"very"small"supply"of"the"most"qualified"poten-

tial"nominees" (which"is"far"fro m" obvious)," the" overall" quality" of" appointees"

would"go"down."Term"limits"might"also"affect"whether"someone"is"willing"to "

accept" a"nomination"on"the"Court"because"an"indefinite"term"is"more" desirable."

Term"limits" can" also" affect" the" age" of"nominees;" shorter" terms" might"make"

presidents" more" willing" to" select" older" candidates," while" at" the" same" time"

could"make"much "young er"candidates"more"palatable"to"S enators."

III. EVALUATING&PROPOSALS&

We"now"turn"to"evaluating"term"limits "proposals"based"on"how"their"de-

sign"decisions"impact"the"tradeoffs"outlined"above."To"do"so,"we"run"counter-

factual"simulations"that"allow"us"to"directly"compare"the"proposals"alo ng "key"

dimensions"and,"by"doing"so,"identify"the"features"of"the"proposals"that"drive"

key"differences"in"the"composition"of"the"Supreme"Court.""

A. Methods**

We"use"Monte"Carlo"simul ations"to"evaluate"the"trade-offs"associated"with"

five"of"th e"Supreme"Court"term"limit"proposals"we"introduced"in"Section"II.B.

Monte"Carlo"s imulations—which"we’l l"s imply"call"simulations—are"a"research"

method"used"widely"in"the"social"sciences .

"Monte"Carlo"simulatio ns"are"used"

in"situatio ns"wher e"uncertainty"about"some"event"occurring"makes"it"difficult"

to"assess"the"likelihood"of"an"outcome.""

At"the"most"basic"level,"Monte"Carlo"si mulations"require"e xplicitly"stipulat-

ing"a"set"o f"assumptions,"id entifying"the"key"variables"for"w hich"there"is"uncer-

tainty,"using"a"computer"to" randomly"generate"values"for"those"variables"for"

which"there"is"uncertainty,"calculating"the"outcome"of"interest"given"the"reali-

zations"of"the"random"variables,"and"then"repeating" that"process"many"times.

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"We"exclude" the" Oliver" plan"from"this"analysis" because"the" Virgin ia" Plan" made" policy"

choices"along"the"dimensions"relevant"to"these"simulations"that"mean"they"produces"the"same"

results."

" 0..) +./.%&<<M" THOMAS" M." CARSEY" &" JEFFREY" J." HARDEN," MONTE" CARLO" SIMULAT ION " AND"

RESAMPLING"METHODS"FOR"SOCIAL"SCIENCE"(2013)."

"For"a"more"technical"explanation"of"the"process,"see"37*"at"6)(“[T]he"typical"Monte"Carlo"

simulation"involves"drawing"multiple"random"samples"of"data"from"an"assumed"[Data"Gener-

ation"Process"(DGP)]"that"describes"the"unobserved"process"in"the"larger"population"of"how"a"

phenomenon" of"interest" is"produced ."It"is" the" true" or" real"DGP" th at"scholars"are" ultimately"

interested"in"evaluating."Of"course,"we"rare ly"know "what"the"true"DGP"is"in"the "real"world."

Most"of"our"research"is"about"trying"to"uncover"the"underlying"DGP"or"test"predictions"that"

emerge"from"different"theories"about"what"the"DGP"looks"like.”).""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

32"

Through"this"process,"simulations"are"able"to"generate"a"di stribution"of"possi-

ble"outcomes"given"the"initial"set"of"assumptions."As"a"result,"if"the"initial"as-

sumptions" are" credible," simulations" make" it" possible" to" estimate" the" most"

likely" outcomes"and"range"of"possible"outcomes"for"complex"political"and" s o-

cial"phenomena.""

Given"these"strengths,"simulations"have"been"used"for"a"variety"of"applica-

tions"in"the"empirical"legal"studies"literature."For"example,"simulations"h ave"

been" used" to" study:" the" relative" economic" importance" of" contract" terms;

whether"judicial"assignments"to"cases"are"random;

"the"extent"of"publication"

bias"in"empirical"legal"scholarship;

"and"whether"law"schools"could"improve"

their"academic"impact"by"imposing"stricter"tenure"standards.

In"the"case"of"Supreme"Court"term" limits,"there"are"two"primary"sources"of"

uncertainty"that"must"be"accounted"for"when"assessing"the"trade-offs"of"differ-

ent"proposals."First,"even"though"most"variants"of"term"limits"proposals"try"to"

increase"the"predictability"of"when"vacancies"on"the"Court"will"occur,"there"is"

still"uncertainty"because"unexpected"vacancies—due"to"death,"incapacitation,"

resignation,"or"even"removal—wil l"inevitably"still"occur."Second," there" is" also"

uncertainty"about"who"will"control"the"executive"and"legislative"branches"of"

government"when" these"vacancies—whether"expected"o r"unexpected—do "in"

fact"occur."Simulating"how"various"term"limits"proposals"would"compare"thus"

requires"developing"a"way"to"model"these"two"sources"of"uncertainty.""

Our"method"for"m odeling"these"two"sources"of"uncertainty"is"to"compare"

the"results" that" th e" d ifferent"term" limits" proposals" would" have" produced" if"

they" had" been" in" effect" during" the" post-1937" perio d." Mor e" specifically," we"

begin" by" imagining" that" each" of" the" different" reform" proposals" had" been"

adopted"in"1937."We"then"assume"that"the"control"of"Presidency"and"the"Sen-

ate" evolved" in"exactly"the"way"that"it"actually"did."For"instance,"we"assume"that"

Dwight"D."Eisenhower"is"always"president"from"January"1953"to"January"1961,"

that"the"Republican"Party"always"contro lled"the"Senate"from"1953"to"1955,"and"

that"Democrats"al ways"controlled"the"Senate"from"1955"through"1961.""

However,"we"do"not"only" assume"that"the"proposals"had" been"adopted"in"

1937."We"then"further"simulate"what"would"have"happened"if"the" term"limits"

proposals"had"been"adopted"in"each"year"between"1937"and"2010."That"is,"we"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"Kate"Litvak,">2/$.)=&%<2)03-,<&$32/)2D)=2/$%&'$,&<);%2H3#32/#()!/)!11<3'&$32/)$2)8.D&,<$)

;%2H3#32/#)3/)B./$,%.)=&13$&<)53-3$.7);&%$/.%#?31)!+%..-./$#,"98"CORNELL"L."REV."1495"(2013)."

"Adam"S."Chilton"&"Marin"K."Levy,"=?&<<./+3/+)$?.)@&/72-/ .##)2D);&/.<)!##3+/-./$)3/)$?.)

Q.7.%&<)=2,% $#)2D)!11.&<#,"101"CORNELL"L."REV."1"(2015)."0..)&<#2"David"S. "Abrams,"Marianne"

Bertrand"&"Sendhil"Mulla ina than,"82)I,7+.#)B&%M)3/)$?.3%) 4%.&$-./$)2D)@&'.Z,)41"J."LEGAL"STUD."

347"(2012)."

"Daniel"E."Ho,"Q2%.J2%7()=2/D.%./'.)63&#,"10"J."EMPIRICAL"LEGAL"STUD."603"(2013)."

"Adam"Chilton," Jonathan" Masur"&"Kyle"Rozema,"@.$?3/N3/+)5&J)0'?22<)4./,%.)0$&/7&%7#,"

J."LEGAL"STUD."_"(forthcoming).""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

33"

run"a"series "of"simulations"where"the"start" year"is"1937,"we"then"run"a"series"

of"simulations" when"the"start"year"is"1938,"and"so"on."Through"this"approach,"

our"results" are"not"driven"entirely"by"the" specific"events" in" the"historical"rec-

ord"that"would "be"associated"with"using"a"single"start"date.""

For"each"simul ation,"we"assum e"that"vaccines"that"emerge"on"the"Su p reme"

Court"would"be"filled"in"the"way"stipulated"by"the"express"terms"of"a"given"plan."

This"includes"taking"a"plan’s"rollout"process"on"its"own"terms."For"instance,"for"

the"Virginia"Plan,"this"means"that"starting"in"the"first"year"of"enactment"all"ap-

pointments"to"the" Supreme" Court"are"for"18"years."In"contrast,"for"the" Renewal"

Act,"this"means"that"appointments"for"the"Supr e me"Court"are"not"an"18-year"

term"until"the"last"remaining"justice"that"was"active"at"the"time"of"the"plan’s"

enactment"leaves"the"Court."

For"these"simulatio ns ,"we"assume"all"o f"the"actual"jus tices"that"were"on"the"

Court"in"the"year "the"pl an"is"enacted"either"serve"u ntil"they"actually"left"th e"

Court"or"until"the"specific"requirements"of"a" given" term"limits"plan"would"re-

quire"them"to"be"removed." For"example," Justice"Felix"Frankfurter"served"on"

the"Supreme"Court"from"1939"to"1962."For"our"simulations"that"st art"in"1937,"

Justice"Frankfurter"would"not"be"a"member"of"the"Court."But"for"a"simulation"

that"starts"in"1940,"Justice"Frankfurter"would"be"a"legacy"member"of"the"Su-

preme"Court"until"when"the"s pecific"terms"of"a"given" pl an"required"h im"to"be"

replaced."But"if"the"specifics"of"a"given"term"limits"plan"allowed"legacy"justices"

to" s erve"u ntil" they" either"vo luntarily" left" the" Court"or" died,"our"simulations"

would"assume"that"Justice"Frankfurter"served" until"1962." In"other"words,"our"

simulations"take"the"initial"justices"at"the"time"a"plan"is"started"as"a"given"based"

on" the"actual"justices" that"served"on"the"Supreme"Court;"for"those"actual"jus-

tices,"when"applicable,"we"use"the"actual"date"they"left"the"Court.""

For"the"hypothetical"justices"that"we"simulate" joining"the"Court,"however,"

we"must"model"the"uncertainty" in"how"long"they" would" serve"on" the" Court."

This"is"because"it"is"unrealistic"to "assume"that"all "the"justices"would"serve"full"

18-year" terms." Simply" assuming" all" the" justices" served" a" full" 18-year" term"

would"also"not"put"pressure"on"one"of"the"key"differences"between"pro posals:"

how"they"fill"unexpected"vacancies.""

Simulating"this"uncertainty,"however,"requires"making"assumptions"about"

the"rate"th at"justices"would"be"likely"to"leave" the"Court."One"approach"to"esti-

mate"unexpected"vacancies"would"be"to"use"actuarial"tables"to"assess"the"prob-

ability"that"a"justice"would"die"in"a"given"year"conditional"on"their"age.

"Alt-

hough"this"approach"offers"the"best"way"to"estimate"the"probability"that"an"

average"American"would"die"in"a"given"year"conditional"on"their"age,"the"peo-

ple"appointed"to"the"Supreme"Court"are"presumably"not"a ve rage"along"a"range"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"0..E).*+*,"Bailey"&"Yoon,"#,1%&"note"10,"at"302"(“We"base"the"probability"of"dying"from"the"

2005"US"life"tables.” ).""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

34"

of" relevant" dimensions." Importantly," the" justices" are" extremely" highly" edu-

cated," wealthier" than" the" general" population," and" have" access" to" excellent"

medical"care."Moreover,"a"president"is"unlikel y"to"appoint"anyone"to"the"Su-

preme"Court"when"there"is"evidence"that"they"are"not"of"sound"health"at"the"

time"of"their"appointment."As"a"result,"the"probability"that"a"Supreme"Court"

Justice"is" going"to" die"in"the"year"they"are" 65" may"be"lower" than"the"probability"

that"an"average"American"would"die"in"the"same"year.""

Given"this"concern,"instead"of"relying"on"actuarial"tables,"we"generat e"esti-

mates"of"the"probability"that"the"justices"would"die"in"a"given"year"conditional"

on"their"age"based"on"the"actual"mortality"rates"of"a"similar"population:"the"

universe"of"federal"judges."Usi ng"dat a"from"the"Federal"Judicial"Center,"we"cal-

culate"the"probability"that"a"justice"of"a"given"age"in"a"given"decade"would"die"

each"year.

"Figur e"6"plo ts"these"probabilities"by"decade"and"shows"that"fed-

eral" judges" from" any" decade" that" are" between" 55" and" 75" years" old" have"

roughly"the"same"chance"of"dying"as"an"average"American"of"the"same"age"in"

2017."Because"life"expectancies"have"increased"over"time,"this"suggests"that"

judges"have"been"less"likely"to"die"than"average"Americans."Moreover,"a"con-

siderable" difference"opens"up"between" roughly" age"80"and"95,"where"federal"

judges"are"noticeably"less"likely"to"die"than"an"average"American."

We"simulate"unexpected"vacancies"for"the"Supreme"Court"using"the"prob-

abilities"reported"in"Figure"6."Specifically,"we"assume"that"Justices" a re"55"years"

old"when"they"are"appo inted"to"the"Supreme"Court."We"make"this"assumption"

because"it"is"similar"to"the"actual"average"age"of"justices"appointed "across"his-

tory"of"53.2,

"and"because"it" is" consistent"with"the"assumption"made"by"Bailey"

and"Yoon"that"justices"would"be"55"years"old"at"the"time"of"appointment.

100

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

"To"do"so,"we"estimate"a"spline"and"interact"the"spline"with"the "decade"that"the"judge"was"

first" appointed." After"regressing" whether" a" judge" has" died" in"a" given" year"after"being"ap-

pointed,"we"recover"the"conditional"probabilities"of"death"from"the"predicted"values"from"the"

regression"co efficients."

"0.."Cala bresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6."

100

"0.."Bailey"&"Yoon,"#,1%&"note"10,"at"302.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

35"

Figure&6:&Mortality&Rates&of&Federal&Judges&by&Decade&

To"simulate"unexpected"vac ancies,"for"each"justice-year,"we"randomly"gen-

erate"a"number"between"0"and"100." If"that"random"number"is" less" than"the"

probability" of" death" we" generated" based" on" the" life" expectancy" of" federal"

judges,"we"a ssume"that" the"hypothetical" justice"has"unexpectedly"left"t he"Court"

and" thus" needs" to" be" replaced." We" then" replace" the" justice" using" the" terms"

stipulated"by"a"given"proposal."In"this"way,"our"simulations"are"able"to"account"

for"the"uncertainty"of"when"unexpected"vacancies"are"likely" to"emerge" at" the"

Supreme"Court."It"is"worth"noting" that"this"approach"may"both"under"and"over"

count"unexpected"vacancies."It"may"under"count"them"because"we"do"not"at-

tempt"to"estimate" the"possibility"of"impeachment"or"resignations,"and"it"may"

over"count"them"because"Supreme"Court"justices"may"be"less"likel y"to"die"dur-

ing"an"18"year"period"th an"an"average"federal"judge"because"their"medical"rec-

ords"li kely"face"greater"scrutiny"prior "to"appointment.""

There" are" three" advantages" to" assessing" the" impact" of" term" limits" pro-

posals"in"this"w ay—that"is,"by"evaluating"h ow"they" would"have"performed"his-

torically"if"implemented"in"d ifferent"years"while"also"introducing"random"va-

cancies." First," simulating"how" the" proposals" would" perform" historically" re-

duces" the"need"to"make"strong"assumptions"about"what" will" happen"into" the"

futur e."As"previously"noted,"it"takes"decades"for"various"term"limits"proposals"

to"go"fully"into"effect."As"a"result,"any"attempt"to"empirically"evaluate"them"

needs"to"adopt"a"strategy"that"estimates"their" effect"over"a" long" period." We"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

36"

thus"believe"that"it"is"more"defensible"to"base"our"assessments"on"how"they"

would" have" performed" historically" instead" of" trying" to" adopt" a" strategy" to"

model"what"the"outcomes"of"presidential"elections"are"likely"to"be"from"2020"

to" 2100." Second," simulating" how" the" proposals" would" perform" historically"

makes" it" possible" to" compare" each" proposal" against" a" clear" counterfactual:"

what"actually"happened"with"the" members hip"of"the"Supreme"Cou rt."With out"

this" historical" comparison," we" would" not" only" need" to" make" assumptions"

about"what"would"happen"with"elections"in"the"future,"but"we"would"also"have"

to"make"assumptions"about"what"would"happen"to"the"composition"of"the"Su-

preme"Court"over"time" in"the"absence"of"reform."Third,"simulating"these"pro-

posals"being" in"enacted" in" many" different" years" makes" it" possible" to" assess"

how"robust" the" plans"are" to" various"possible"political"scenarios."For"instance,"

some"simulations"begin"during"large"periods"of"rule"by"a"single"party,"but"other"

simulations"begin"during"p eriods"of"frequent"transitions"of"power."The"result"

is"that"varying"the"year"of"adoption"allows"for"us"to"account"for"various"politi-

cal"scenarios."

Of" course," o ur" approach" does" not" entirely" eliminate" the" need" to" make"

strong"assumptions."Most"notably,"by"assuming"that"political"control"is"fixed"

in"this"way,"we"are"implicitly"ass uming"that"ch anges"to"the"rules"governing"

confirmation"and"tenure"on"the"Supreme"Court"would"not"produce"ch anges"in"

electoral"outcomes"to"the"Presidency"and"Senate."This"is,"of"course,"unlikely"to"

be"strictly"true."To"find"an"example"of"how"differences"in"the"composition"of"

the"Supreme"Court"coul d "change"political"outcomes,"we"have"to"look"no"furth er"

than"6,#?)H*)G2%.,

101

"where"the"justices"directly"intervened"in"a"disputed"elec-

tion." Even"outside"such" examples,"th e" Court" can" be" an"issue" in" p r esidential"

elections;" some" argue" that" the" vacancy" created" by" Justice" Scalia’s" death" is"

partly"respo nsible"for"Donald"Trump’s"victory"in"2016.

102

"Whether"term"limits"

would"p roduce"the"same"election"dynamics"is"unknown.""

Moreover,"it"is"also"worth"noting"that"this"is "not"the"o nly" conceivable"way "

to"simulate"the"effects"of"term"limits"propos als."Mos t"notably,"an"alternative"to"

comparing"how"various"plans"would"have"behaved"given"the"historical"record"

would"be"to"fully"simulate"the"entire"pol itical"pro cess"for"a"period"of"time"going"

into"the"future."For"exam ple,"Bailey"and"Yoon"estimate"the"impact"o f"strategic"

retirements" and" potential" term" limits" on" the" composition" of" the" Supreme"

Court"by"simulating"elections"into"the"future.

103

"Specifically,"they"assume"that"

elections"happen"every"four"years"going"forward"for"60"years"into"the"future"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

101

"Bush"v."Gore,"531"U.S."98"(2000).""

102

"Philip"Bump,"!)g, &%$.%)2D)@.1,"<3'&/#)B2$.7)D2%)4%,-1)$2)G.$)0,1%.-.)=2,%$);3'N#)T)

&/7) C$) ;&37) VDD," WASH." P OST," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/poli-

tics/wp/2018/06 /26/a-quarter-of-republicans-vot ed-for-trump-to-get-supreme-court-

picks-and-it-paid-off/."

103

"0.."Bailey"&"Yoon,"#,1%&"note"10."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

37"

and"that"each"party"has"an"equal" chance"of"winning"the"presidency." Each"of"

their" simulations" thus" creates" a" different" p otential" futur e" o f" electoral" ou t-

comes."Although"this"is"a"perfectly"defensible"way"to"simulate"the"effect"of"term"

limits"proposals,"we"elected"to"not"use"it"for"o ur"application."Th is"is"because"

our"goal"is"to"compare"multiple"different"term"l imits"propos als"against"each"

other"and"against"the"status"quo"of"not"having"term"limits."Comparing"the"per-

formance"of"plans"against" the"historical"record"gives"us"a"clear"counterfactual:"

the"actual"membersh ip"of"the"Supreme"Court"from"1937"to"2020.""

B. Results*

]* !1123/$-./$#)&/7)4./,%.)

One"part"of"the"appeal"of"term"l imits"is"that"they"would"regularize"appoint-

ments," thus" guaranteeing" that" the" composition" of" the" Court" would" bear" a"

closer"relationship"to"how"long"the"two"major"political"parties"controlled"the"

Presidency." Indeed," all" term" limits" proposals" that" d esign" the" length" of" the"

terms"so"that"the"same"number"of"appointm ents"are"made"each "presidential"

term"should"accomplish"this"goal"similarly"well."Differences"betw een"such"pro-

posals"emerge"in"two"areas."First,"the"length"of"the"transition"and"exactly"how"

it"is"implemented"can"delay"the"reform’s"ability"to"regularize"appointments,"

which"can"result"in"one" party"having"disproportionate"control"over"the"Court"

for"a"longer"period."Second,"how" the"system"handles"unexpected"vacancies"can"

further"distinguish"proposals"because"these"shocks"could"further"distort"one"

party’s"representation"advantage.""

To" simulate" how" well" each" proposal" would" do" at" regularizing" appoint-

ments,"we"estimate"the"number"of"justice-years"per"presidential"term"for"all"

presidencies"s tarting"in"the" enactment"year." Th ese" s imulations"vary"the"year"

of"implementation" between"1937"and"2010"and"introduce"random"vacancies"

based"on"the"probability"that"a"federal"judge"would"die"using"the"data"intro-

duced"in"Figure"6."Across"all"presidential-terms"and"all"s imulations,"we"then"

count"the"number"of"justice-years"per"presidential-term"and"plot"the"dis tribu-

tion"fo r"each"of"the"proposals.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

38"

Figure&7:&Number&of&Absolute&Justice-Years&&

Relative&to&36&by&Presidential&Term&

Figure"7"reports"the"results"of"these"simulations."The"figure"is"a "letter"value"

plot,"which"reports"the"distributions"of"results"across"the"simulations"for"each"

proposal."The"distributions"are"broken"down"by"decile,"but"the"top"decile"(the"

"to"95

"percentile"and"the"95

"to"99

"percentile)" and"bottom"decile"(the"

"to"5

"perc entile"and"the"5

"to"1

"perc entile)"are"broken"into"two"groups."

Deciles"that"share"the"same"values—for"instance,"if"the"40

,"50

,"and"60

"per-

centiles"all"produce"a"mean"value"of"36—appea r"as"a"single"area"representing"

the"middle-most"decile."The"black"line"in"Fig ure"7"is"at"36"justice-years,"which"

is"the"number"each"presidential"term"would"appoint"if"it"w ere"able"to "appoint"

two"justices"that"served"for"18"years.""

The"results"in"Figure"7"reveal"that"three"of"the"plans—the" Virginia"Plan,"

Northwestern"Plan,"and"Khanna"Bill—result"in"a"m edian"of"36"justice-years"

per"pr esidential"term."T h e"Renewal"Act"is"close,"with"a"m edian"of"38"justice-

years" per"presidential"term."The" outlier" on"the"low" end"is" the" Fix"th e"Cou rt"

proposal,"which"produces"a"median"of"28"justice-years"per"presidential"term."

This"is"due"to"the"fact"that" the" Fix"the" Court"proposal" requires"judges"to"wait"

“on"deck”"during"the"implementation"period"until"legacy"justices"that"were"ac-

tive"wh en"th e"pl an"was"enacted"l eave"the"Court."The"result"is"that"many"justices"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

39"

in" the" first" several" decades" of" the" plan" s erve" less" than" full" 18-year" terms"

(which ,"in"turn,"translates"into"fewer"than"36"justice-year s"per"president).

104

The"results"in "Figure"7"also"reveal"considerable"variation"in"the"number"of"

justice-years"that"each"president"is"likely"to "appoint."For"the"Khanna"Bill,"the"

"percentile"through"the"95

"percentile"of"the"presidential" terms"all"result"

in"an"average"of"exactly"36"justice-year s"appointed"per"p residential-term."The"

"throu gh"30

"percentile"of"the"presidential"terms"for"the"Khanna"Bill"do"re-

sult"in"fewer"than"36"justice-years"but"th e"lowes t"is"19"justice-years."In"con-

trast,"the"Virginia"Plan," Northwestern"Plan,"and"Renewal"Act"pro po sals"all"re-

sult"in"considerably"more" variation."Most" notably,"the"95

"percentile"for"the"

Renewal" Act" is" an" average" of" 8 0" justice-years" per" president." This" result" is"

driven"by"the"fact"that"the"Renewal"Act"not"only"allows"the"justices"that"are "

serving"at"the"time"of"the"Court"to"complete"their"term,"but"also"allows"any"

justice"appointed"between"enactment"and"when"the"last"of"those"legacy"jus-

tices"retire"to"be"appointed"for"longer"terms."F inally,"th e"Fix"the"Court"proposal"

results"in" fewer"than"36"justice-years"per"presidential"term" for"95"percent"of"

simulations"(again,"due"to"the"fact"that"it"allows"for"m any"appointments"of"less"

than"18"years"per"justice"during"the"transition"period).""

The"results"in "Figure"7"thus"reveal"that"the"design"choices"asso ciated" with"

different"term" limits"proposals"are"likely"to"produce"considerable"variance"in"

the"expected"number"of"justice-year s"per"president ial"term."However,"it"is"im-

port ant"to"acknowledge"that,"because"one"of"th e"primary"differences"between"

proposals"driving"these"results"is"how"they"handle"the"transition"from"the"cur-

rent" system" of" life"tenure"to"one"of"term" l imits,"the" differences" across" pro-

posals"woul d"naturally"decrease"over"enou gh"time"as"they"become"fully"imple-

mented."That"said,"our"simulations"assume"that"these"plans"were"rolled"out"

between"1937"and"2010,"so"it"would"take"decades"before"these"plans"achieved"

the"kind"of"equal"representation"as"the"Khanna"Bill."

X* C7.2<2+3'&<)=2-12#3$32/)

We"next"ass ess"th e"impact"that" term"limits"proposals"are"likely"to"have"on"

the"ideological"balance"of"the"Supreme"Court."We"do"so"in"four"ways."First,"we"

examine"how"many"times" these"plans"would" lea d"to" changes"in" ideological" me-

dian"of"the"Court."Second,"we"assess"the"extent"to"which"different"plans"may"

lead"to"extreme"ideological"imbalance"on"the"Court."Third,"we"explore"whether"

these"ideological"changes"would"tr anslate"into"mo r e"years"of"divided"control"

of"the"federal" government." Fourth,"we" estimate" the"impact"that"term" lim its"

proposals"would"have"on"ideological"polarization"of"the"Court.""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

104

"0..)3/D%&"Figure"12"for"another"discussion"of"this"issue.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

40"

Ideological& Stability." One" possible" drawback" of"moving" to" a"system" of"

term"limits"is"th at"life"tenure"may"encourage"id eol ogical"stability."This"is"fo r"

several"reasons."First,"we"might"expect"the"Court"to"be"more"ideologically"sta-

ble"when" Justices" serve"for"lo nger"periods"resulting"in"less"turnover."Second,"

life"tenure"creates"incentives"for"strategic"retirements,"which"help"maintain"

ideological"stability."As"a"result,"the" ideological"makeup" of" the"Court"is"only"

likely" to"change" either"when"a"justice"changes"t heir"ideology" or"when"deaths"

occur"and"the"White"House"is"controlled"by"the"opposite"party.""

We" measure" the" impact" of" term" limits" reforms" on" how" often" the" Court"

“flips”"between"Republican"and"Dem ocratic"control."If"the"Court"flips"more"fre-

quently"under"a" term"limits"proposal"than"under"the"current"system,"such"flip-

ping"may"be"desirable—as"discussed"already,"we"might"want"the"Court"to"bet-

ter"reflect"the"actual" results"of"presidential"elections."At"the"same"time,"how-

ever,"if"the"Co urt"flips"frequently"under"a"term"limits"proposal,"it"could"be"un-

desirable,"as"it"could"l ead"to"significant"legal"uncertainty.""

To"simulate"how"ideologically"stable"the"Court"would"be"under"different"

term"limits"plans,"we"assume"that"Supreme"Court"justices"share"the"ideol ogical"

leanings"of"the"president"that"appointed"them."That"is,"we"assume"that"justices"

appointed"by"Democrats"are"liberal"and"justices"appointed"by"Republicans"are"

conservative.

105

"Under"this"assumption,"Figu r e"8"assesses"how"often"the"Court"

would"flip"from"Democratic"to"Republ ican"control ."For"each "20 "year"period,"we"

count"the"average"number"of"times"that"th e"Court"would"have"flipped"its"me-

dian"ideology.""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

105

"Although"we"adopt"this"assumption"because"it"has"been"true"on"average,"but"it"is"im-

portant" to" acknowledge" that" there" have," of" course," been" exceptions." For" instance," Justices"

Soute r"and"Stevens"were"both"a ppointed"by"Republican"presidents,"but"e nded"thei r"careers"as"

reliable"m embers" of"the"Court’s"liberal"wing."That"said,"assuming"that"presidents"will"typically"

appoint"justices"that" share"their"ideological"leanings"is"standard"in"the"literature."Citations"to"

be"added."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

41"

Figure&8:&Number&of&Times&the&Court&Median&&

Flips&Every&20&Years&

In"Figure"8,"the"baseline"estim ate"assumes"that"the"plan"is"enacted"imme-

diately,"that"a"new"justice"is"appointed"for"two"years,"that"the"newly"appointed"

justices" serve"for" 18"years,"and" that" the"justice s"do" not"die" or" unexpectedly"

leave"the"Court"before"the"end"of"the"18"year"period."This"provides"a"point"of"

reference" of" the"rough"range" of" ideol ogical" flips"to" expect."For"our"baseline"

simulations," the" median" results" suggest" that" the" ideological" control " of" the"

Court"would"have"flipped"roughly"1.3"times."The"baseline"simulations"also"sug-

gest"a"range"from"0"flips"for"the"5

"percentile"results"to"2.2"flips"for"the"9 5

percentile"of"presidential"terms."

Of"the"five"propos als"we"evaluate,"the"proposal"that"produces"the"fewes t"

flips"in"ideology"is"the"Khanna" Bill."For"this"proposal,"the"median"outcom e"was"

0.6"flips"per"20"year"period."This"compares"to"1.3"median"flips"for"the"Virginia"

Plan,"0.8"flips"for"the"Northwestern"Plan,"0.6"Flips"for"the" Re newal" Act,"and"0.7"

flips"for"the"Fix"the"Court"plan."The"reas on"that"the"Khanna"Bill"produces"more"

ideological"stability"is"that"it"allows"the"legacy"justices"to"remain"on" the"Court"

with"life"tenure,"which"creates"greater"ideological"stability"in"the"first"few"dec-

ades"after"the"plan"is"enacted."The"Fix"the"Court"proposal"also"produces"few"

flips"by"forcing"justices"to"wait"on"deck"until"legacy"jus tices"leave"the"Court."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

42"

Extreme&Imbalance."A"separate"consideration"is"whether"term"l imits"pro-

posals"are"likely"to"produce"extreme"ideo l ogical"imbalance."That"is,"whether"

some"proposals"are"more"likely"to"produce"periods"when"one"party"is"likely"to"

control"a"large"number"of"seats"on"the"Court."This"may"be"a"concern"because"

periods"with"ideological"im balance"may"be "more"likely"to"produce"extreme"ju-

dicial"decisions,"which"in"turn"may"weaken"the"legitimacy"of"the"Court.""

To"assess" this"possibility,"Figure" 9"reports" resul ts" counting" the"share" of"

years"with"extreme"ideological"imbalance"from"our"simulations,"which"we"de-

fined"as"justices"appointed"by"presidents"of" the"same"party"controlling"75

per-

cent"or"more"of"seats.

106

"In"periods"where"there"are"nine"justices"serving"on"

the"Court,"this"would"mean"that"one"party"controlled"7"or"more"seats."Like"with"

our"simulations"reported" in"Figure"8,"we" again"included"a"baseline" that"as-

sumed"18-year"staggered"terms,"which"does "not"include"any"unexpected" va-

cancies.""

Figure&9:&Share&of&Years&with&Extreme&Party&Imbalance&

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

106

"We"use"this"75

percent"threshold,"instead"of"simply"counting"periods"of"7"or"more"seats,"

because"it"is"possible"that"there"may"not"be"exactly"nine"justices"on"the"Court"for"certain"plans"

at"certain"times."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

43"

For"the"baseline,"the"median"outcome"is"that"22"percent"of"years"would"be"

periods" of" extreme" imbalance" on" the" Supreme" Court." The" res ults" for" the"

Khanna"Bill"are"again"similar"to"the"baseline"results:"the"median"outcome"is"

also"22"percent"of"years"with"extreme"imbalance"on"the"Supreme"Court."The"

results"are" sl ightly"higher"for"the"Virginia"Plan,"which"produced"extreme"im-

balance"for"24"percent"years"on"average."The"other"three"plans"all"produced"

considerably"more"years"of"extreme"imbalance."Notably,"the"median"outcome"

is" that" 38"percent" of" years" would" be" periods " of" extreme" imbalance" for" th e"

Northwestern"Plan,"42"percent"of"years"would"be"periods"of"extreme"imbal-

ance"for"the"Renewal"Act,"and"41"percent" of" years"would"be"periods"of"extreme"

imbalance"for"th e"Fix"the"Court"Pro p osal."These"results"are"likely"due"to"the"

fact"that"these"plans"allow"for"a"greater"role"for"legacy"justices,"which"in"turn"

makes"it"possible"that"there"would"be"extreme"imbalance"in"cas es"when"the"

plan" was" enacted" during" periods" where" the" same" par ty" controls" the" presi-

dency"for"multiple"terms.""

Years&of&Divided&Government.&The"Constitution"was"designed"to"sepa-

rate" governmental" power" along" functional"lines"among" distinct"branches"of"

government"w hile"also"giving"each"branch"some"power"to"serve"as"a"check"on"

actions"by"other"branches."The"pr esident"participates" in"legislation"using" th e"

veto,"and"so"on."Or"in"the"words"of" Madison,"with"these"institu tional"designs,"

“ambition”"will"“be"made"to"counteract"ambition.”

107

"In"recent"yea rs,"however,"

scholars"have"come"to"recognize"that"this" Madiso nian"separation"of"powers"

may"function"close"to"how"it"was"intended"only"during"periods"where"different"

branches"of"government"are" controlled"by"different"political"parties—an"in-

sight"summarized"as"the"“separation"of"parties.”

108

"This"is"because"when"Con-

gress"and"the"Presidency"share"common"interes ts—such" as"where" both" are"

controlled" by" the" same" political" party—separating" power" along" functional"

lines"may"not"create"much"institutional"checking."But"such"checking"may"be"

more"likely"to" occ ur"where"government"is" divided—that"is,"where"different"

parties"each"control"part"of"government.""

For"th is"reaso n,"we"mig h t"want"to"know"how"often"the"Court"will"be"con-

trolled"by"a"party"that"is"/2$"in"power"in"the"political"branches."Compared"to"

the"cu rrent"system"of"life"tenure,"there"are"reasons"to"think"that"term"limits"

might"change"the"rate"at"which"there"would"be"undivided"control"of"govern-

ment."This"is"because"the"shorter"tenures"and"more"regular"appointments"may"

increase"the"connection"between"the"composition"of"the"Court"and"current"po-

litical"trends."And,"by"so"doing,"it"thus"may"result"in"a"higher"s hare"of"years"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

107

"THE"FEDERALIST"NO."51.""

108

"0..)+./.%&<<M"Daryl"J."Levi nson"&"Richard"H."Pi ldes,"0.1&%&$32/)2D);&%$3.#E)K2$);2J.%#,"

119"HARV."L."REV."2311"(2006)."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

44"

where" the" branches" of" the" federal" government" are" controlled" by" the" same"

party.""

To"assess"this,"we"calculate"the"share"o f"years"with"an"undivided"govern-

ment"for"each" simulated" enactment"year"and" recover"a" distribution"of"shares"

for"the"proposal"across"all"enactment"years."For"example,"for"proposal":"being"

enacted"in"year"$,"we"calculate"the"share"of"years"from"t"to"2020"with"a"divided"

government."In"Fi gure"10,"we"again"included"a"baseline"that"assumed"18-year"

staggered"terms,"which"does"not"include"any"unexpected"vacancies.""

Figure&10:&Share&of&Years&with&Undivided&Control&of&All&

Three &Branches&of&the&Federal&Government&&

Figure"10"reports"the"share"of"years"of"undivided"government."The"base-

line"results"suggest"that"the"median"outcome"is"undivided"government"for"46.5"

percent" o f"years."This"ranges "from"32.8"percent"of"years"for" the" 5

"percentile"

results" to" 66.6" percent"o f" years" for" the"95" percentile"res ul ts." For"the"other"

plans," th e"median"ranges"between"27.3"percent"of"years "for" the"Fix"the"Court"

Plan"and"41.5"percent"of"years"for"th e"Virginia"Plan."The"results"suggest ,"how-

ever,"that"the"results"are"fairly"si milar"for"all"but"the"Fix"the"Cour t"Plan,"which"

was"not able"in"that"it"required"newly"confirmed"justices"during"the"transition"

period"to"wait"“on"deck.”"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

45"

Ideological& Polarization.& A" separate" consideration" is" whether" a" given"

plan"is "m ore"l ikely"to"result"in"the"appointment"of"justices"that"are"ideologically"

extreme."Under"the" current"system,"Supreme"Court"vacancies" can"occur"at"ran-

dom" times" due" to" deaths " and" health-related" retirements" and" non-random"

times"rel ated"to"ideology"due"to"strategic"retirements."The"current"system"en-

ables"Justices"to"behave"strategically" by"retiring"when" both"the"Presidency"and"

the"Senate"are "controlled"by"the"p arty"w ith"whom"they"identify."In"fact,"eight"

of"the"last"nine"justices"confirmed"to"the"Court—that"is,"every"Justice"except"

for"Justice"Barrett—was"nominated" and"confirmed"during"the"first"two" years"

of"a"presidential"term,"during"a"period"when"both"the"Presidency"and"the"Sen-

ate"were"controlled"by"the"same"party.

109

"The"term"limits"reforms,"however,"

are"typically"designed"to"distribute"Supreme"Court"appointments"evenly"be-

tween" the" first" and" second" halves" of" each" presidential" term—such" as" by"

providing"one"appointment"each"odd-numbered"year.""

This"matters"because"of"the"Senate’s"role"in"the"confirmation"process."The"

party"holding"the"Presidency"usually"loses"ground"in"the"Senate"in"midterm"

elections.

110

"For"that"reason,"w e"might"expect"justices"selected"during"presi-

dents’"first"two"years "in"office"to"be,"on"average,"more"ideologically"extrem e"

than"thos e"selected"during"the"second"half"of"any"given"presidential"term.

111

Thus,"we"might"expect"a" term"limits"proposal"that"staggers"vacancies" in"two-

year"intervals"to "produce"a"less"ideologically"polarized"Court"than"the"current"

system" in"which"vacancies"may"occur"more"frequently"during"the" first"half" of"

a"presidential"term.""

"One"way"to"ass ess"polarization"is"by"the"number"of"justices"who"were"con-

firmed"when"th e"Senate"majority"and"the"president"are"of"the"same"party."The"

benefit"of"using"this"approach"to"measure"polarization"is"that"it"only"requires"

a" simple" assumption"that"presidents" will"appoint" mo re" extreme" candidates"

when"their"party"controls"the"Senate."We"believe"this"is"a"reasonable"assu mp-

tion"because"withi n"any"of"the"four"combinations"of"president"and"Senate"ide-

ology—Republican" president" and" Republican" majority" Senate," Republican"

president"and"Democratic"majority"Senate,"Democratic"president"and"Repub-

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

109

"Justices" Ginsburg"and" Breyer" were"confirmed"during"President"Bill"Clinton’s"first"two"

years ,"when"the"Senate"was"controlled"by"Democrats."Chief"Justice"Roberts"and"Justice"Alito"

were"confirmed"during"the"first"two"years"of"President"George"W." Bush’s"second"term,"when"

the"Senate"was"controlled"by"Republicans."Justices" Sotomayor"and"Kagan"were"confirmed"dur-

ing"the "first"two"years"of"President"Obama’s"first"term,"when"the"Senate"was"controlled"by"

Democrats."And"Justic es"Gorsuch"and"Kavanaugh"were"confirmed"during"the"first"two"years"of"

President"Donald"Trump’s"preside ncy,"when"the"Senate"was"controlled"by"Republicans.""

110

"0.."Grofman"et"al.,"#,1%&"note"76,"at"79."

111

"Citations"to"be"added.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

46"

lican"majority"Senate,"and" Democratic"president"and"Democratic" majority"Sen-

ate—the"exp ected"ideol ogy"of"a"judg e"is"likely"to" differ."For" example," an" ex-

tremely"conservative"president"with"an"extremely"conservative"majority"Sen-

ate"is"likely"to"result"in"a"justice"that"is"to"the"right" of"a" justice"appointed"by"a"

moderate"conservative" president"and"confined"with"a"moderate" conservative"

majority"S enate."

"One"drawback,"however,"is"that"this"binary"way"of"assessing"the"ideologi-

cal"polarization"of"justices"may"oversimplify"how"the"relationship"between"the"

ideology"o f"the"president"and"Senate"translates"into"actually"ideology"of"jus-

tices"that"would"be"appointed.

112

"Th ere"have"been"m any"theoretical"models"

proposed"to"expl ain"this"exact"dynamic,"most"of"which"are"known"as"move-

the-median"models.

113

"These"models"try"to"produce"more"exact"estimates"of"

what"kind"of"justice"would"be"appointed"by"a"president"of"a"given"ideology"and"

Senate"of"a"given "ideology."However,"the"best" evidence"suggests"that"there"is"

little"empirical"support"for"these"more"complex"models.

114

"As"a"result,"we"fol-

low"p rior"research"and "simply"assume"that"just ices"are"more"likely"to"be"ideo-

logically"extreme"if"they"were"appointed"by"presidents"and"Senates"of"the"same"

party.

115

Based"on"the"assumption"that"justices"confirmed"when"the"same"party"con-

trols"the"Senate"and"presidency"are"more"likely"to"be"extreme,"Figure"11"as-

sesses"polarization"across"the"proposals"by"reporting"the"distribution"of"jus-

tices"on"the"Court"in"a"given"year"who "w ere"confirmed"when"the"Senate"major-

ity"and"the"president"are"of"the"same"party."The"idea"is"that,"for"a"given"year—

say"1980—we"count"whether"the"justices" that"were"on"the"Supreme"Court"in"

that"simulation"had"been"appointed"wh en"the"president"and"Senate"majority"

were"either"both"Democrats"or"both"Republicans."For"instance,"if"five"o f"the"

nine"justices"had"been"appointed"in"those"years,"the"share"would"be"55"p er-

cent."If"the"same"nine"justices"w ere"still"on"the"Court"in"1981,"the"share"would"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

112

"For"exampl e," although"it"is"likely"that"justices" appointed"when"the"presid ent"and"Senate"

are"controlled"by"the"same"party"would"be"less"likely"to"be"ideologically"moderate"than"justices"

appointed" when"the" presidency"and"the"Senate"are"controlled" by"different"parties,"this"is"not"

guaranteed."

113

"0.."Keith"Kr ehbiel,"0,1%.-.)=2,%$)!1123/$-./$#)&#)&)>2H.O$?.O>.73&/)G&-.,"51"AM."J."

POL."SCI.""231"(2007);"Bryon" J."Moraski"&"Charles"R."Shipan,"4?.);2<3$3'#)2D)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)K2-O

3/&$32/#()!)4?.2%M)2D)C/#$3 $,$32/&<)=2/#$%&3/$#)&/7)=?23'.#,"43"AM."J."POL."SCI.""1069"(1999);" David"

Cottrell" et" al.," 4?.) ;2J.%) $2) !1123/$() ;%.#37./$3&<) K2-3/&$32/#) &/7) =?&/+.) 2/) $?.) 0,1%.-. )

=2,%$,"81"J."POLS."1057"(2019);"Jonathan"P."Kastellec"et"al .,";2<&%3U3/+)$?.)9<.'$2%&<)=2//.'$32/()

;&%$3#&/) @.1%.#./$&$32/) 3/)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)=2 /D3%-&$32/);2<3$3'#,"77"J."POLS."787"(2015);"#..)&<#2"

Charles"M."Cameron"&"Jonathan"P."Kastellec,"!%.) 0,1%.-.) =2,%$)K2-3/&$32/#)&)>2H.O$?.O>.O

73&/)G&-.Z,"110"AM."POL."SCI."REV."778"(2016)."

114

"0.."Cameron"&"Kastellec,"#,1%&"note"116."

115

"0..E).*+*,"Bailey"&"Yoon,"#,1%&"note"10."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

47"

still"be"55"percent"for"the"year."The"distribution"shown"in"Figure"11"is"that"

share"across"all"years"and"all"simulations.

116

Figure&11:&Share&of&Justices&on&the&Court&in&a&Given&Year&

Appointed&When&the&Senate&and&Presidency&Were&

Controlled&by&the&Same&Party&&

The"results"in"Figure"11"suggest"that" the"share" of"justices" in" a" year" ap-

pointed"when"the"presidency"and"Senate"were"controlled"by"the"same"party"

would"be"fairly"similar"across"four"o f"the"five"plans."The"median"result"is"55"

percent"(which"translates"to"five"out"of"nine"justices)"for"all"but"the"Renewal"

Act,"which"had"a"median"result"of"66"percent"(which"translates"to"six"out"of"

nine"justices)."Moreover,"for"the"Renewal"Act,"the"80

"percentile"result"is"100"

percent;"that"is,"all"nine"justices"in"a"year"having"been"when"the"presidency"and"

Senate"were"controlled"by"the"same"party."The"reason"for"this"more"extreme"

result" is"that,"by" allowing"justices" to"be"appointed"under"the"old"rule"until"the"

last"legacy"justice"leaves"the"Court,"the"plan"increases"the"influence"of"strategic"

retirements"on" the"composition"of"the" Court."By"doing" so,"the"plan"thus"in-

creases"the"likelihood"of"an"ideologically"polarized"Court.""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

116

"As"noted"above"in"Section"III.A.,"we"simulated"each"year"multiple"times.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

48"

c* 4%&/#3$3 2/);%2'.##)

We"next"compare"how"the"proposals"wo uld"handl e"the"transition"process "

from"the"current"system"of"life"tenure"to"one"of"term-limited"tenure."We"spe-

cifically" focus" on" two" aspects" of" this" transition" process." First," we" assess"

whether"the"trans ition"process"is"likely"to"result"in"windfalls"for"the"president"

in" office" in" the" years" around" its" enactment." Second," we"assess" the" average"

length"of"the"enactment"period"across"different"proposals"

Enactment&Windfalls."As"explained"above,"one"of"the"explicit"goals"of"most"

term" l imits" proposals" is" to" ensure" a" more" consistent" relationship" between"

electoral"outcomes"and"influence"over"the"composition"at"the"Supreme"Court."

But"as"the"results"in"Section"III.B.1."revealed,"even"plans"designed"to"accom-

plish"that"goal"can"still"produce"inequalities"in"the"number"of"justice-years"ap-

pointed" by"presidential"term."However,"the"analysis"in"Section"III.B.1."looked"

at" the"inequality"in" justice-years" across"all"presidential"terms."By"averaging"

across"terms,"that"analysis"obscured"the"possibility"that"the"transition"to"a"sys-

tem"of"term"l imits"may"result"in"a"windfall"of"influence"for"the"p r esidents"closer"

to"the"time"of"enactment."Or," p ut"another"way,"there"may"be"more"seats"to"fill"

during"the"early" years"when"the"plan"is" tr ansitioning"in"the"new"term-limited"

justices."

To"assess"this"empirically,"we" calculate"the"number"of"justice-years"by"the"

presidential"terms"after"the"enactment"period."Specifically,"we"indexed"our"r e-

sults"from"Figure"7"above"by"event"time,"where"event"time"0"is"the"presidential"

term"w hen"the"simu lation"starts,"event"time"1"is"the"first"full"presidential"ter m"

after"we"simulate"the"beginning"of"the"plan,"and"so"on."We"then"calculate"the"

average"number"of"justice-years"for "each"event"time"for"a"given"proposal.""

For"these"results,"we"only"simulate"enactment"dates"before"2000."This"is"

because"this"exercise"creates"a"clear"data"trade-off:"the" more"event"times"we"

assess"after"enactment,"the"fewer"simulated"enactment"dates"we"can"look"at."

For"example," an"enactment"date"of"2002"m eans"th at"the"first" full"presidential"

term"we"assess"is"the"one" that"began"in"2005."For"this"enactment"date,"it"would"

thus"be"impossible"to"assess" more"than"four"presidential"terms"(those"begin-

ning" in"2005,"2 0 0 9,"2013,"and"2017)."We"thus"limit"results"to"simulations "be-

fore"the"y ear"2000"to"ensure"that"we"can"examine"the"results"for"five"presiden-

tial"terms.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

49"

Figure&12:&Average&Number&of&Justice-Years&by&

Presi dential&Terms&from&Enactment&

Figure"12"reports"the"results"of"this"analysis."The"results"suggest"that"sev-

eral"of"the"plans"are"designed"in"a"way"that"creates"a"windfall"for"the"president"

at"the"time"of"enactment."Specifically,"for "the"Renewal"Act,"the"president"at"the"

time"of"enactment"would"appoint"justices"that"would"serve"an"average"of"49.5"

justice-years,"and"the"next"president"would"appoint"justices"that"would"serve"

an"average"of"44.0"justice-years."Similarly,"the"Virginia"Plan"would"allow"the"

president"at"the"time"of"enactment"to"appoint"justices"that"would"serve"an"av-

erage"of"43.0"justice-years,"and"the"Northwestern"Plan"would"allow"the"presi-

dent" at"the"time"of"enactment"to"appoint"justices"that"would"serve"an"average"

of"40.4"justice-years."For"all"three"plans,"this"number"of"justice-years"is"notice-

able"larger"than"for"the"next"several"presidents."The"Khanna"Bill,"in"contrast,"

produces " near" identical" averages" across" these" initial" presidential" terms:"

roughly"33"justice-years"per"president."The"Fix"the"Court"proposal," however,"

produces " an" average" of"ro ughly"20"justice-years" per"president"across"these"

presidential" terms." This" is " because" the" Fix" the" Court" plan" h as" justices " ap-

pointed"after"the"plan"is"passed"wait"“on"deck”"until"spots"open"up"as"the"legacy"

justices"leave"the"Cour t."If"it"takes"eight"years"for"a"spot"to"open"up"for"a"newly"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

50"

appointed"justice"to"join"the"voting"members"of"the"Court,"that"justice"would"

only"serve"for"10"years"(the"remainder"of"their"18"years)."As"a"result,"th e"initial"

presidents " would"get"less"than"the"standard"36"justice-years"from" their"ap-

pointments.""

Length&of&Ena ctment&Period."Proposals"vary" significantly" in"terms"of"how"

they"h andle"the"rollout"of"term"limits."Those"that"do"not"allow"the" justices"serv-

ing"on"the"S upreme"Court"at"the"time"of"enactment"to"retain"their"life"tenure"

allow"for"a"fairly"quick"transition,"whereas"those"that"allow"the"legacy"justices"

to"retain"life"tenure"can"take" longer" to" become"fully"effective"(that"is,"have"a"

full"slate"of"Justices"serving"staggered"18-year"terms)."The"result"is"thus"that"

there"can"be"considerable"differences "in"ho w"long"it"would"take"for"a"plan"to"

become"fully"enacted."

More"s pecifically,"for"the"propos als"that"would"not"allow"the"current"jus-

tices"to"serve"for"life—specifically" the"Virginia"Plan—the"length"of"enactm ent"

has"a"definite"end:"16"years"following"the"initial"year"that"the"first"justice"is"

appointed"under"the"new"system.

117

"Th is" is" because"these"proposals" immedi-

ately"begin"to"replace"existing"justices" on"a"predictable"schedule."For"the"other"

proposals"that"allow"for"som e"continued"role"for"the"legacy"justices,"however,"

the"enactment"will"not"be"complete"until"all"the"current"jus tices"leave"the"Court"

either"through"death,"retirement,"or"removal.""

To"assess"the"enactment"period"for"these"proposals,"we"estimate"the"num-

ber"of"years"that"it"takes"for"the"term"limits"proposals"to"become"fully"in"effect"

by"simulating"how"long"it"would"take"until"all"justices"on"the"Court"were"ap-

pointed"to" a" term-limited"term."Figure"13"reports"the"results"of"these"simula-

tions." The"simulations" reveal" that"the" Virginia" Plan"is" always" fully" in" effect"

within"16"years"after" the"first"justice"is"appointed,"but"on"average"it"would"be"

fully" enacted" within" 13" years" (this" is" due" to" deaths" by" legacy" justices" that"

would"accelerate"appointments "of"new"justices"that"are"term-limited).""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

117

"For"example," if"the" first"justice"was"appointed" in" 2001," the"ninth"justice"would"be"ap-

pointed"in"2017"(the"schedule"would"specifically"be:"2

"in"2003,"3

"in"2005,"4

"in"2007,"5

"in"

2009,"6

"in"2011,"7

"in"2013,"8

"in"2016,"and"9

"in"2017 ).""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

51"

Figure&13:&Simulated&Number&of&Years&from&Enactment&

Until&Every &Sitting&Justice&is&Serving&an&18-Year&Term&

The"Khanna"Bill" and" Fix"the"Court" proposal"both"produce"the"same"distri-

bution"of"results."This"is"because"they"begin"appointing"justices"immediately"

that"are"term-limited"and"both"allow"a"role"for"legacy"justices"un til"they"finish"

their"li fe"tenure."As"a"resu lt,"they"would"both"wait"until "the"final"legacy"justice"

leaves"the"Court"fully"to"go"into"effect—which,"on"average" across"our"s imula-

tions,"is"35.5"years.""

The"longest"enactment"period"is"the"Northwestern"Plan."This"lengthy"en-

actment"time"is" due" to"the"fact" that"some" of"the"appointments"on"the" initial"

scheduled"are"skipped."In" particular,"roughly" 20"percent" of"appointments"from"

the"initial"schedule"are"skipped,"and"r oughl y"5"percent"are"skipped"twice."T his"

also"causes"the"distribution"of"the"number"of"years"of"the"initial"appointments"

duri ng"the"roll"out"to"vary"considerably."

"The"second"longest"enactment"period"is"the"Renewal"Act,"which"has"a"me-

dian"time"of"44"years."This"lengthy"enactment"tim e"is"du e"to"the"fact"that"the"

18-year"rollout"period"does"not"start"until"the"justices"who"still" enjoy"life"ten-

ure"leave" the"Court."This"means"that"the"enactment"period"is"sim ply"the"aver-

age"number"of"years"that"a" justice"sitting"in"a"given"year"will"remain"on"the"

bench"plus"16"years."For "example,"if"the"plan"was"enacted"in"2020,"the"18-year"

appointments"would"not"start"until"the"last"current"justice"leaves"the"Court,"

and"the"rollout"period"would"then"take"16"add itional"years.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

52"

d* =2/D3%-&$32/)C/'./$3H.#)

Because" vacancies" can" interfere" with" the" Court’s" decisionmaking,

118

" it"

would"be"preferable"if"term"limits"reform s"could"avoid"creating"situations "that"

are"likely"to"leave"seats"on"the" Court"open"for"significant"length"of"time."Alt-

hough"there"may" be"several" factors"that"increase"the"likelihood "of"lengthy"va-

cancies," the"recent" process"of" replacing" Justice" Scalia" highlights" two" factors"

that"are"m ay"be"particularly"relevant."First,"whether"the"Senate"is"controlled"

by" the" opposite" party" of" the" president" is"likely" a" decisive" factor" in" whether"

there"would"be"a"lengthy"vacancy."If" the"Senate"is"controlled"by"the"same"party"

as"the"president,"it"is"unlikely"that"the"president"and"Senate"majority"would"be"

unable"to" reach"a"compromise."But"if"the"Senate"is"controlled" by"the"opposite"

party"as"the"president,"it"may"be"unlikely"that"the"Senate"would"confirm "even"

a"moderate"candidate" that"share"ideological"leanings"with"the" president."Sec-

ond,"the"year"of"the"presidential"term"when"a"Supreme"Court"seat"becomes"

vacan t"may"influence"whether"the"s eat"is"promptly"filled."As"the"Garland"affair"

illustrate,""the"Senate"may"become"more"able,"or"more"wi lling,"to"block"a"nom-

inees"that"are"to"fill"vacancies"that"arise"later"in"presidential"term.""

To"assess"whether"these"conditions "are"more"likely"to"emerge"with"some"

term"limits"plans" than"others," we" break"out"the"results"of"our"simulations"by"

when"vacancies "occurred"based"on"the"year"of"the"presidential"term"(i.e.,"the"

,"2

,"3

,"or"4

"year)"and"whether"the"opposite"party"to"the"president"con-

trolled"the"Senate."To"do"so,"we"take"the"total"number"of"appointments"that"

occur"for"a"given"plan"and"report"the"share"of"the"total"vacancies "that"occurred"

duri ng"divided"government"by"year.""

Figure"14"reports"the"results"of"this"analysis."In"total,"66.0"percent"o f"all"

appointments"occurred"during"years"when"the"Senate"was"controlled"by"the"

opposite"party"of"the"president."For"all"five"plans,"the"plurality"of"vacancies"in"

divided" go vernment"(33.4" percent"o n"average) " o ccurred" in" the" first"year" of"

presidential"terms ,"a"year"when"a"large"share"of"appointments"are"made."Three"

of"the"plans,"however,"produced"a"considerable"number"of"vacancies"when"the"

senate"was"controlled"by"the"opposite"party"in"th e"final"year"of"presidential"

terms."Notably,"the"Virginia"Plan"produced"10.4 "percent"of"vacancies"in"the"4

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

118

"For"example,"if"the"Court"has"only"eight"justices,"as"it"did"for"more"than"a"year"after"

Justice"Scalia’s"death"in"2016,"it"can"be"unable"to"re ach"decisions"in"cases"in"which"the"Justices"

are"evenly"divided."During"that"period,"the"Court"was"unable"to"resolve"several"important"dis-

putes"due"to"the"inability"to"break"ties"on"the"Court."For"instance,"The"highest-profile"case"in"

which"this"occurred"was"A/3$.7)0$&$.#)H*)4.:&#,"136"S."Ct."2271"(2016)"(per"curiam)."That"said,"

it"is"worth"noting" that"a t"least"some" scholars"have"argued"that"there"having"a"Court"with"an"

even"number"of"members"may"be"preferable."0.."Eric"J."Segall,"93+?$)I,#$ 3'.#)!%.)9/2,+?()!)

;%212#&<)42)C-1%2H.)4?.)A/3$.7)0$&$.#)0,1%.-.)=2,%$,"45"PEP P."L."REV."547"(2018)"(arguing"in"

favor"of"a n"8-member"Court"evenly"divided"on"ideological"grounds).""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

53"

year"of"presidential"terms"senate"was"controlled"by"the"opposite"party,"the" Re-

newal"Act"produced"5.1"percent,"and"the"Northwestern"Bill"produced"8.7"per-

cent.""

Figure&14:&Share&of&Appointments&During&Divided&

Government&by&Year&of&Presidential&Term&

In"contrast,"the"Khanna"Bill"and"the"Fix"the"Court"proposals"exclusively"pro-

duce"vacancies"during"the"first"and"third"year"of"presidential"terms."Th is"is"be-

cause" these" plans" fill" unexpected" vacancies" by" allowing" justices" that" have"

served"longer"than"their"18-year"terms"to"return"to"active"service."By"doing"so,"

they"avoid"cr eating"scenarios"where"a"ju stice"wou ld"have"to"be"confirmed"dur-

ing"th e"final"year"of"a "presidency"senate"was" co ntrolled"by"the"opposite"part,"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

54"

which"is"arguably"the"time"where"the"Sen ate"ma y"be"most"l ikely"to"block"a"con-

firmation.""

e* ;%2D3<.)2D)K2-3/..#)

There" are"several"ways"that"term"limits"proposals"may" alter"the"profile"of"

the"justices"nominated" to" the"Supreme"Court.

119

" This"Section" evaluates" two"

ways"this"may"o ccur:"(1)"diluting"the"quality"of"jus tices"by"increasing"the"num-

ber"of"justices"appoin ted"to"the"Court"over"time"and"(2)"changing"the"age"pro-

file"of"justices"appointed"to"the"Court."

Diluting&the&Quality&of&Nominees.&It"is"possible"that"a"term"limits"system"

could"affect"the"quality"of"Supreme"Court"nominees."One"reason"this"may"occur"

is"that"a"ter m"limits"system"would"require"more"frequent"appointments—and"

thus"more"appointments"total."This"might"suggest"that"quality"might"go"down"

to"some"d egree,"depending"on"how"deep"the"pool"of"the"l awyers"that"s atisfy"

relevant"criteria.""

Of" course," for" any" viable" term" limits" plan," there" are" undoubtedly" many"

more"lawyers"across"the"country"that"are"qualified"nominees"than"would"be"

realistically"required."However," the"pool"of" available"nominees"may" b e"much"

smaller"if" the" president" is"fixed"on"appointing"justices"that:"(1)" are" already"

serving"in"high-level"legal"positions"(e.g.,"federal"district"or"circuit"courts,"state"

supreme"courts,"or"the"O ffice"of"Solicitor"G eneral);"(2)"are"withi n"a"narrow"age"

band;"and"(3)"fit"the"ideological"and"demographic"preferences"the"president"

has"for"the"appointment."The"pool"of"potential"justices"that"satisfy"thes e"crit e-

ria"may"be"relativel y"small."As"a"result,"relatively"small"increases"in"the"abso-

lute"number"of"nominees"that"are"required"under"term "limits"plans"may"dilute"

the"quality"of"Supreme"Court"nominees.""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

119

"In"Section"III.B.2."above,"we"considered"how"term"limit"proposals"may"alter"ideological"

profile"of"the"justices"appointed"to"the"Supreme"Court.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

55"

Figure&15:&Distribution&of&the&Number&of&Nominees&

Required&for&Every&20-Year&Period&

To" assess" this" possibility," we" calculated" the" number" of" nominees" that"

would"be"r equir ed"by"each"plan"across"our"simulations."Figure"15"s pecifically"

reports"the"distribution"of"nominees"that"would"be"required"in"a"20"year"pe-

riod"by"plan."These"results"reveal"that"there"are"noticeable"differences"across"

proposals"in"the"nu m ber"o f"nominees"that"wo uld"be"required"for"every"20"year"

period."For"instance,"the"Virginia"Plan"wo uld"require"roughly"14"justices"every"

20"years."This"is"because,"when"unexpected"vacancies"occur,"the"Virginia"Plan"

does"not"allow"for"senior"justices"to"rejoin"the"Court."Instead,"it"provides"for"

interim"appointments "that"would"serve"the"remainder"of"the"term"who"are"not"

eligible" for"reappointment." The" Fix" the" Court" and" Khanna" Bill"propos als"re-

quire"10"justices"on"average"every"20"years"due"to"the"Fact"that"unexpected"

vacancies"are"typically"filled"by"adding"a"senior"justice"back"to"the"Court."In"

contrast," the" Renewal" Act" and" Northwestern" Plan" provide" for" considerable"

more"variation"in"the"number"of"justices"that"would"be"required."This"is"be-

cause"they"provide"for"new"appointments"when"existing"just ices"d ie"or"volun-

tarily"leave"the"Cour t,"implying"that"random"deaths"result" in"greater"variabil-

ity.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

56"

Age&of&Nominees."It"is"also"possible"that"term"limits"may"alter"the"age"pro-

file"of"nominees."For"instance,"term"lim its "may"lead"to"ol d er"nom inees"on"av-

erage"by"decreasing"the"value"o f"appointing"someone"with"the"high est"possible"

longevity."Alternatively,"term"limits"may"lead"to"younger"nominees"on"average"

by" decreasing" objections" to" young" nominees" because" senators" would" not"

worry"that"they"would"stay"on"the"Court"for"decades.

120

"Given"that"either"of"

these"dynamics"could"play"out,"we"do"not"make"s trong"predictions"about"how"

term" limits" proposals" could" change" the" age" profile" nominees." It" is" possible,"

however,"to"assess"how"yo ung"no minees"would"have"t o"be"to"ensure"there"is "a"

high"probability"that"they"would"complete"a"full"18-year"old"term.""

To"explore" how" term"limits"may" influence"the"age"of"nominees,"Figure" 16"

reports"the"results"of"simul ations"that"estim ate"how"many"justices"would"be"

eligible"to"serve"on"the"Supreme"Court"assuming"that"a"term"limits"proposal"

had"been"fully"implemented"and"all"justices"had"been"appointed"at"the"same"

age."For"example,"if"an"18-year"term"limits"propos al"were"fully"implemented"

and"every" president"had"appointed" justices" at"50"years"old,"our"simulations"

suggest"that"the"1

"and"99

"percentiles"for"the"number"of"justices"alive"in"any"

given"year"are"14"and"23."Moreover,"the"simulations"further"suggest"that"there"

would"be"more"than"nine"eligible"justices"in"at" least"99" percent" of" years" for"any"

age"of"appointment"of"justices"who"are"62"years"old"or"younger."If"the"average"

age"of"appointment"were"greater"than"62,"however,"our"simulations"suggest"

that"2"percent"of"the"time"there"would"be"fewer"than"9"justices"able"to"s erve"

on"th e"Court.""

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

120

"These "dynamics"could"also"potentially"expand"the"pool"of"potential"justices"that"presi-

dents"would"consider"nominating."For"instance,"presiden ts"may"now"only"consider"nominees"

that"are" within"f ive"years"of"50"years"old,"but"these"change s"in"incentiv es"may"expand"the"po ol"

of"potential"nominees" to"allow"for"candidates"between,"say,"40"and"60"years"old."If" th is"oc-

curred,"it"could"potentially"offset"the"concerns"raised"in"the"previous"section."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

57"

Figure&16:&Estimated&Number&of&Justices&That&Could&Serve&

Conditional&on&Avera ge&Age&of&Appointment&for&All&Justices&

In"a"related"analysis,"for"plans"that"have"senior"justices"re-join" the" Court"

when"there" is"an"expected"vacancy"among"the"nine"most" junior"members,"we"

can"also"assess"the"probability"that"there"would"be"a"senior"justice"on"the"Court"

in"any"given"year.""

Figure"17"reports"the"r esul ts"of"these"simulations."The"estimates"suggest"

that"if"th e"average"age"of"nominees"were"50"years" old,"a" justice"would"be"pulled"

back"to"serve"back"on"the"Court"after"their"18-year"term"in"6"percent"of"years;"

if"the" average" age"of"nominees" were"60"years"o ld," there"would"be"a"justice"

pulled"back"to "serve"back"o n"the" Court"after" their" 18-year"term"in"42"percent"

of"years;"and" if"the"average"age" of"nominees"were"70"years"old,"there"would"be"

a"justice"pulled"back"to"serve"back"on"the"Court"after"their"18-year"term"in"76"

percent"of"years.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

58"

Figure&17:&Percent&of&Years&With&a&Justice&Serving&Beyond&

18-Year&Term&Based&on&Average&Age&of&Appointment&

Additionally,"this"same"question"ca n"be"analyzed"at"the"justice"level"instead"

of"the" year"level."That" is,"instead"of"examining"w hether" there"would"be"one"or"

more"justice"serving" o n"the"Court" after"their"18-year"term"in"a"given"year,"we"

can"assess"the"probability"that"a"given"justice"would"ever"end"up"serving"on"

the"Court" beyond" their"18-year" term." Figure" 18" reports" these" results." They"

suggest" that" if" the" average" age" of" nominees" were" 50," 7" percent" of" justices"

would"end"up "re-joining"the"Court"after"their"18-year"term;"if"the"average"age"

of"nominees"were"60,"27"percent"of"justices"would"end"up"re-joining"the"Court"

after"their"18-year"term;"and"if"the"average" age"o f"nominees" were"70,"37"per-

cent"of"justices"would"end"up"re-joining"the"Court"after"their"18-year"term.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

59"

Figure&18:&Percent&of&Justices&Serving&Beyond&18-Year&

Term&Based&on&Average&Age&of&Appointment&

IV. DISCUSSION&

Although"our"simulations"produced" several"noteworthy"findings,"they" re-

veal"what"we"believe"are"three"design"choices"that"are"particularly"important"

for"any"pol icymaker"hoping"to"implement"an"18 -year"term"limits"plan"to"ad-

dress.

121

"First,"how"a"plan"handles"the"transition"from"th e"old"sys tem"to"the"

new"can"h ave"significant"consequences."Second,"how"the"plan"deals"with"un-

expected"vacancies"due"to"deaths"or"early"retirements"can"undermine"or"ad-

vance"some" of" the"goals"of"reform." Third,"plans"should"include"some"pr ovision"

for" dea ling"with"Senate"impasse,"given"that"obsti nance"by"the" Senate"could"un-

ravel"a"reform"designed"to"equalize"appointments"across"presidencies.""

A. Transition*Timing*

Perhaps" our" most" important" takeaway" is" that" the" biggest" difference" be-

tween"proposals"involving"terms"of"the"same"length"is"how"long"they"can"take"

to"become"effective."Th e"first"choice"the"designer"m ust"face"is"how"to"handle"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

121

"As"noted"above,"most"reformers"have"conv erged"on"18-year"term s"as"the"best"solution,"

and"our"analysis" is" focused"on"optimizing"such"plans."However,"these" prescriptions"would"

likely"be"applicable"to"term-limits"proposals"involve"different"term"lengths.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

60"

legacy"justices."A"reform"such" as"the"Virginia"Plan"that"went"into"effect"imme-

diately"wo uld"take"o n"average"13"years"to"complete"the"transition,"and"at"most"

16"years."Reforms"that"permit"legacy"justices"to"retain"life"tenure"take"m uch"

longer."The"Northwestern"Plan,"for"example,"takes"an"average"of" 52"years"to"

become"fully"effective—and"in"some"cases"significantly"longer,"depending"on"

how"long"the"l egacy"justices" l ive"and"when"they"leave" the" Court"in"relation"to"

the"oth ers.""

Minimizing" the"length" of" the"transition"would" not,"presumably,"be"the"pri-

mary"concern"driving"the" choice"of"whether" to" allow"legacy" justices"to" retain"

life"tenure—since,"definitionally,"plans"that" allow"legacy"justices" to"retain"life"

tenure"will"take"longer"to"transition"than"plans"that"take"effect"immediately."

The"choice"might"turn"on"legal"considerations—as"noted,"even"if"one"believes"

that" term"limits" reform"is" constitutionall y" permissible" via" ordinary" statute,"

there" may" be" additional" constitutional" problems" raised" by" stripping" sitting"

justices"of"life"tenure"after"the"fact."A"plan"might"also"perm it"legacy"justices"to"

retain"life"tenure"in"order"to"make"the"proposal"mo re"politically"viable,"as"the"

reform "would"thus"not"change"the"present"balance"of"power."For"examp le,"Re-

publicans "currently"enjoy"a"6-3"majority"on"the"Court,"including"the"Cou rt’s "

three"youngest"justices"(Justices"Gorsuch,"Kavanaugh,"and"Barrett)"who"each"

could"serve"for"several"decades."Many"Republican"politicians"would"thus"likely"

be"unwilling"to"support"any"reform"that"would"impose"term"limits"on"sitting"

Justices.""

Other"normative"considerations"may"also"play"a"role."Calabresi"and" Lind-

gren"argue"that"“[s]ince"the"current"Justices"were"appointed"to"the"Court"on"

the"assumptio n"th at"they"would"have"life"tenure,"it"would"be"unfair"to"them,"as"

well" as"to"the"appointing"parties"(both"the"president"and"the"Senate),"to"alter"

the"arrangement" struck"in"the"appointment.”

122

"These"concerns"are"not"obvi-

ously" determinative."Fairness" to" political" actors" seems" at" best" a" second-" or"

third-order"concern"when"discussing"policy"changes "designed" to"make" a"gov-

ernmental"institution’s"membership"correspond"better"to"the"results"of"elec-

tions."But" in"any" event,"if" policymakers"choose"to" retain" life"tenure"for"legacy"

justices,"it"is"important"for"them"to"understand"the"implications"of"the"choice,"

as"it"is"a"momentous" one"that"affects"the"composition"of"the"Court"for"decades."

But"even"once"this"choice"is"made,"there"are"still"meaningful"differences"

among"plans"in"terms"of"how"long"they"take"to"transition."Among"plans"that"

permit"legacy"justices"to"retain"life"tenure,"there"is"a"significant"difference"be-

tween"the"Fix"the"Cour t"and"Khanna"Bill"proposals"on"the"one"hand"(which"take"

an" average" of" 35.5" years" to" transition)" and" the" Northwestern" Plan"and" Re-

newal"Act"on"the"other"hand"(which"take"an"average"of"52"and"44"years,"re-

spectively)."The"difference"appears"to"be"explained"by"the"fact"that"the"former"

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122

"Calabresi"&"Lindgren,"#,1%&"note"6,"at"826."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

61"

two"plans"begin"the"cycle"of"18-year"appointments"3--.73&$.<M,"whereas"the"

latter"two"plans"have"more"complex"procedures."The"Renewal"Act"does"not"

begin"the" cycle"of"regular"appointments"until"all"legacy"justices"leave" the"Court,"

whereas"the"way"the"Northwestern"Plan"assigns"the"early"appointees"to"des-

ignated"terms"prolongs"the"transitio n."Absent" some"other"advantages"of"the"

Renewal"Act"or"Nort hwestern"Plan,"we"think"our"findings"reveal"that"the"tran-

sition"mechanisms"used" by"the"Khanna"Bill"and"the"Fix"the"Court"plan"are" su-

perior,"and"should"be"incorporated"into"any"future"reform"that"permits"legacy"

justices"to"retain"life"tenure.""

The"Virginia"Plan"was"the"only"one" we"simulated" that"applied"term"limits"

to"the"legacy"justices."Accordingly,"we"do"not"have"any"findings"that"offer"com-

parative"findings"on"such"plans."But"there"is"unlikely"to"be"significant" variation"

in"such"plans,"and"all"such"plans"will"take"16"years"to"ensure"that"all"justices"

on"the"Court"are"serving"full"18-year"terms"(rather"than"temporary,"shorter"

appointments)" unless" the" plan" abandons" a" commitment" to" staggering" the"

terms.""

B. Unexpected*Vacancies*

A" second" takeaway" is" that" how" plans" handle" unexpected" vacancies" can"

have"significant" consequences."Refer"back"to"figure"7,"which"shows"the"distri-

bution"of"justice"years"relative"to"36"by"presidential"term"in"the"simulations."

The"plans"with"the"highest"variance"is"the"Renewal"Act,"under"which "part"of"

the"variance"is"due"to"this"pl an’s"longer"transition"periods."But "part"is"also"ex-

plained"by"how"this"plan"handles"unexpected"vacancies :"under"this"plan,"when"

an"unexpected"vacancy"occurs,"the"president" appoints"a"justice"that"takes"th e"

place"of"an"appointment"that"would"have"been"made"by"the"next"president.

123

This" provision" can" provide" significant" windfalls" to" whoever" happens " to" be"

president"when"a"justice"dies"or"reti res"outside"of"the"expected "schedule.""

One"way"to"reduce"this"variance"is"to"provide"for"interim"appointments"by"

the"s itting "pres id ent."The"Virginia" P lan"and"Northwestern"P lan"do"this ."But"an-

other"path,"which"the" Fix"th e"Court"plan" and"Khanna"Bil l "follow"is"to"provide"

no" special" provision" allowing" ad d itional" appointments" in" the" case" of" unex-

pected"retirements ."Either"option"seems "acceptable,"thoug h"o nly"a"plan"with"

interim"appointments"is"able"to"provide"a"satisfactory"solution"if"some"black"

swan"event—such"as"the"death"of"multiple"justices"within"a"short"period—oc-

curs.""

There" are"other"modifications"we"can"imagine"which"might"regularize"ap-

pointments"further ."One"applies"only"to"plans"that"do"not"permit"legacy"jus-

tices" to" retain" life" tenure;" we" call" this" procedure" th e" “dynamic" rollout.”" It"

would"provide"an"im proved"way"of"add ressing"early"deaths"or"retirements"of"

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123

"0.."Cramton"&"Carrington,"#,1%&"note"6."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

62"

legacy"justices" during"the"transition"period"that"would"minimize"the"need"for"

interim"appointments."The"best"way"to"explain"how"it"would"work"is"by"using"

a"concrete"example."

Imagine"that"a"reform"were"enacted"in"20 21."Justice"Barrett,"the"most"jun-

ior"justice,"would"be"scheduled"to"have"her"term"expire"in"January"20 38."Under"

the"Virginia"Plan,"if" she"were"to"leave" the"Court"unexpectedly"in"2030,"the"pres-

ident"would"m ake"a"tempo r ary"appointment"to"serve"for"8"years"until"a"new"

18-year"appointment" can" be"made."Under" the" dynamic" rollout"procedure,"if"

the"president"had" not" yet" made"two"appointments"during" that"presidential"

term,"the"president"would"appoint"a"replacement"justice"to"serve"for"a"full"18-

year"term."The"remaining"legacy"justices"would"then"be"“reshuffled”"in"order"

to" keep" the" schedul e" on" tr ack—the" second-most" junior" Justice," Justice" Ka-

vanaugh,"who"was"originally"slated"to"leave"the"Court"in"2036,"would"leave"the"

Court"in"2038"instead."Only"if"a"president"had" alrea dy"made"two"appointments"

in"the"current"presidential"term"would"an"interim"appointment"be"made."The"

dynamic"rollout"procedure"wo uld"not"shorten"the"transition."But"it"would"min-

imize"the"role"of"random" events"by"reducing"the"likelihood"that"any"one"pr es-

ident" would" make" more" than" two" appointments" (including" temporary" ap-

pointments)."[We"h ave"not"simulated"th is"plan,"but"we"m ay"do" s o "in"a"future"

iteration"of"the"paper.]"

We"can"also"envision"other"additions"to"the"plan"to"reduce"variance"amo ng"

presidential"terms ."One"option"involves"permitting"s enior "justices"to"return"to"

the"Court"in"the"event"of"an"unexpected"departure;"if"there"were"multiple"avail-

able"senior"just ices,"the"system"could"give"priority"to"the"senior"ju stice"whose"

appointing" president" was" respons ible"for"the" least"justice-years—thus" ena-

bling"the"senior"justice"to"level"the"playing"field"somewhat"through"additional"

years"of"service.""

But"a"more"creative"possibili ty"would"be"to"permit"a"president,"at"the"time"

of"the"initial"appointment,"to"designate"additional"lower-court"judges"as"“back-

ups”"for"the"justice"appointed"to"the"Court.

124

"That"wo uld"mean"that,"in"the"

event" of" the" appointed" jus tice’s" early" d eparture" from " the" Co urt,"one" of" the"

backups"could"fill"the"departing"justice’s"seat"for"the"remainder"of"the"term."

Perhaps" these" backups" would" be" formally" nominated" and" confirmed" at" the"

time"of"the"initial"appointment;"that"requirement"would" b e st"preserve" the"Sen-

ate’s"role"in"the"pr ocess."Assuming"the"presid ent"were"permitted"to"designate"

a"sufficient"number"of"backups,"this"system"would"guarantee"equal" impact"on"

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124

"This"procedure"would"almost"certainly"only "w ork"if"reform"w as"accomplished"through"

a"constitutional"amendment"rather"than"a"statute.""

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

63"

the" Cour t" among" presidents" and" would" greatly" reduce" the" rol e" of" random "

events"in"shaping"the"composition"of"the"Court.

125

C. Senate*Impasse&

A"final"takeaway"is"that"term"limits"plans"should"likely"inclu de"some"provi-

sio n"that"addresses"the"possibility"that"a"Senate"controlled"by"members"of"the"

party"that"does"not"control"the"pr esidency"will"refuse"to"vote"on"a"President’s"

nominee,"thus"potentially"derailing"a"reform’s"goal" of" equalizing"appointments"

across" presidential" terms." This" possibility" seems" particularly" likely" in" the"

wake"of"the"Republican-controlled"Senate’s"refusal"to"hold"hearings"or"a"vote"

for" president"Obama’s"nominee,"Judge"Garland,"in"2016."While"one"m ight"hope"

that" a" successfully" implemented" term " limits" plan" m igh t" cause" a" “reset”" of"

norms"governing"the"appointments"process,"that"is"certainl y"not"guaranteed,"

and" in" any" event" norms" once" restored" could" nonetheless" break" dow n" once"

more"in"the"future."It"th us"seems"prudent"to"include"a"provision"handling"this"

possibility.""

Our"findings"show"that"this"situation"could"arise"wi th"some"regularity."Un-

der"our"simulations,"75"percent"of"vacancies"on" the" Court"arose"during"periods"

when"the"Senate"and"presidency"were"controlled"by"different"parties "for"the"

Renewal" Act," the"proposal " where" th is" scenario"arose"most" frequently." Even"

under"the"Khanna"Bill"and"Fix"the"Court"Plan,"at"the"other"end"of"the"spectrum,"

62"percent"of"vacancies"arose"during"divided "gover nment."If"refusal"to"act"on"

the"other"party’s"nominees"becomes"th e"norm," these"scenarios"could"quickly"

derail"the"reform.""

One"possibility"would"be"to"provide"that"presidents"get"both"appointments"

in"the"first"year"of"their"t erm,"a"period"when"divided"government"is"less"likely."

But" even" so," our" simulations" found" that"many" first-year" appointments" still"

arose"during"divided"government."For "this"reason,"we"think"a"more"targeted"

solution"is" called"for."What’s"needed"is"some"set"of"provisions"that"would"re-

duce"the"Senate’s"incentives"to"refuse"to"approve"any"of"the"president’s"nomi-

nees."One"possibility,"discussed"briefly"above,"is"Calabr esi’s "suggestion"that"th e"

president"and"Senate"be"forced"to"reach"agreement"before"they"could"perform"

any"other"government"business,"and"while"holding"their"salaries"hostage.

126

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125

"Random"events"that"required"backups"to"be"called"into"active"service"would"still"play"

some"role"in"shaping"the"Court’s"jurisprudence,"as"one"presid ent’s"nominees"do"not"vote"in"

lockstep."President"Clinton’s"nominees,"Justices"Ginsburg"and"Breyer,"did"not"always"agree,"

nor"did"President"Bush’s"nominees,"Chief"Justice"Roberts"and"Justice"Alito."Nonetheless,"a"sys-

tem"that"limited"the"role"of"random"events"to"causing"the"swap"of"one"pre sident’s"nominee"

with"a"different"nominee"by"the"same"president"would" almost"certainly"give"less"of"a"role"to"

random"chance"than"a"system"that"permits"an"unexpected"departure"to"produce"a"significant"

ideological"shift."

126

"0.."Cala bresi,"#,1%&"note"50."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

64"

But"we"can"imagine"other"less"aggressive"possibilities."One"option"would"

be,"in"the"event"of"the"Senate’s"refusal"to"confirm"a"nominee"within"some"pe-

riod"of"time,"to"automatically" appoint"one"of"a"number"backups" previously"des-

ignated"if"the"president"in"questio n"h ad"made"earlier"appointments"during"her"

presidency."Such"a"provision"would"deprive"the"Senate"of"the"ability"to"hold"

out"i ndefinitely"in"or der"to"keep"a"seat"open.""

This"option" would" not"work," however," if" the" deadlock" aro se" during" the"

president’s"first"appointment"to"the"Court,"and"thus"some"other"mechanism"is"

needed."Perhaps"there"could"be"a"penalty"for"th e"party"in"control"o f"the"Senate."

If,"for"example,"the"Senate"failed"to"act"on"president’s"nominee,"justices"cur-

rentl y"on"the"Court"who"had"been"appointed"by"presidents"of"the"party"cur-

rentl y"controlling" the"Senate"could"have"their"terms"reduced"by"a"set"amount"

(such" as" 18" years" collectively)." This" procedure" is" not" ideal," however," as" it "

would" reduce"the"influence"of"a"prior"pres ident"who"was" not"responsible"for"

the"d eadlock."Ano ther"possibility"would"be"to"penalize"the"Senate"majority’s"

party"by"depriving"the"next"pres ident"from"th at"party"of"nominations"to"which"

she"would"normally"be"entitled."Such"a"provision"would"thus"deprive"a"further"

president"of"the"very"advan tage"which"the"Senate"was"attempting"to"seize.""

These"s olutions"are"o nly"a" couple"of"possibilities;"no"doubt"there"are"oth-

ers."But"in"any"event"some"method"for" handling"Senate"impasse"is" likely" nec-

essary"if"term"limits"reform"is"actually"to"accomplish"its"goals.""

CONCLUSION&

Despite"decades"of"debate"over"the"relative"merits"of"life"tenure"and"term"

limi ts,"there"have"not"been"an y"major"changes"to"the"system"since"the"ratifica-

tion"of"the"United"States"Co nstitution."One" reason"that"the"Court"has"been"so"

stable"is"likely"bec ause"any"structural"reform"of"the"Supreme"Court"will"create"

both"winners"and"losers."At"present,"term"limits"would"benefit"Democrats"and"

harm"Republicans,"given"that"Republicans"have"had"more"success"and"luck"ap-

pointing"Justices"to" r ecent"years"and"currently"enjoy"a"six-Justice"majority"on"

the"Court."This"dynamic"may"make"Supreme"Court"r eform"difficult," if"not"pos-

sible."But"if"policy"makers"do"decide"to"implement"term"limits,"our"research"

offers"con crete"guidance"on"how"to"design"such"a"regime.""

Of"course,"ther e"are"a" number"of"other"considerations"relevant"to"choosing"

between"po ssible"term"limit"proposals"that"th at"we"did"not"consider"here."For"

instance,"one"important"question"is"whether"some"of"the"design"choices "out-

lined"above"may"make"a"given"plan"more"politically"viable"and"thus"more"likely"

to"be"enacted ."For "example,"pro posals"that"push "off"changes"further"into"the"

future"(such"as"by"not"imposing"term"limits"on"legacy"justices)"might"be "either"

more"politically"viable"because"they"do"not"look"like"power"grabs"or"less"polit-

ically"viable"bec aus e"they"produce"immediate"benefits"su ch "th at"they"are"mor e"

likely"to"find "political"champions."Yet"which"p ath"is"mos t"likely"seems"difficult"

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS"

65"

to"know."Indeed ,"as"Adrian"Vermeule"has"noted,"this"“trade-off"between"impar-

tiality"and" motivation”"may"make"Supreme" Court"systematically"unlikely"to"oc-

cur:"a"proposal"that"takes"effect"later"“makes"reform"possible"by"creating"an"

appearance" of" impartiality" and" buying" off" current" opposition," but" the" tactic"

also"makes"the"reform"less"likely"to"be"proposed"and"pursued”"precisely"be-

cause"there"are"no"short-term"gains"from"enacting"it.

127

"Given"this"complexity,"

and"given"that"we"lack"any"comparative"expertise"in"political"viability,"we"tend"

to" agree" with" Vermeule’s" suggestion" that" academic" discussions" of" reform"

should"“deliberately"ignore"political"feasibility,”"leaving"it"to"politics"itself"to"

determine"which"p roposals,"if"any,"are"viable.

128

Another"important"consideration"involves"the"question"of"legal"constraints"

on"Supreme"Court"reform."Is"a"statutory"term"limits"proposal"constitutionally"

permiss ible"if" pro perly" constructed"or"would"it"inevitably"run"afoul"of" Article"

III’s"guarantee"of"tenure"during" good"be havior?"And"even"if"statutory"term"lim-

its"r eform"of"s ome"kind"is "possible,"do"o ther"specific"d esign"choices—such"as"

whether"to"impose"term"limits"on"legacy"justices—raise"additional"constitu-

tional"problems?"Although"these"are"questions"on"wh ich"legal"scholars"have"

offered" their"expertise,

129

"they"are" beyond" the"scop e"of"our"inquiry."The"con-

stitutional"issues"appear"sufficiently"nuanced"and"complex"that"we"cou ld"no t"

give"them"adequate"consideration"while"also"engaging"in" the"comparative"in-

quiry"that"is "our"main"goal"here.""

Finally," there" ar e" a" number" of" specific" goals" that" term" limits" reformers"

could" have"that"we"will"not"build"into"our"framework."Some"reformers"may"

choose"a"reform"with"the"goal"of"depoliticizing"the"appointments"process"or"

increasing"th e"Court’s"legitimacy."Other"reformers"might"pursue"term"limits"

with"the"aim"of"shaping"the"law"in"one"direction"or"another."While"s uch"con-

siderations"may"be" important"motivators"for"reformers,"they"too"are"beyond"

the"scope"of"our"analysis."Ho w"term"limits" might"change"the"law,"for"example,"

is"a"question"that"would"turn"on"many"contingent"facts"about"the"specific"area"

of"the" law"in"question"and"the" precise"time"when"reform"was"enacted"as"well"

as" predictions" about" the" results" of" future" elections." Such" questions" do" not"

strike"us"as"likely"subjects"of"empirical"comparisons"among"proposals,"and"we"

thus"did"not"consider"them.""

But"even"though"we"do"not"address" all"these"subjects,"if"either"party"w ere "

to"push"for"term"limits"for"the"Supreme"Court"justices,"our"research"gives"im-

portant"gui dance"into"how"to"design"such"a"plan."We"not"only"explain"the"nine"

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

127

"Adrian"Vermeule,";2<3$3'&<)=2/#$%&3/$#)2/)0,1%.-.)=2,%$)@.D2%-,"90"MINN."L."REV."1154,"

1169"(2006)."

128

"C7*"at"1172."

129

"0..E).*+*,"Prakash"&"Smith,"#,1%&"note" 15;"Saikrishna"Prakash" &"Steven" D." Smith,"h>3#iA/O

7.%#$&/73/+)G227O6.?&H32%)4./,%.,"116"YALE"L.J."159"(2006);"Redish,"#,1%&"note"15;"Cramton,"

#,1%&"note"64."

DESIGNING"SUPREME"COURT"TERM"LI MITS""

66"

design" decisions "that"any"pl an"must"make,"but"we" also"show"th at"the"choices"

that"are"made"can"result"in"substantial"differences"across"a"range"of"key"out-

comes."This"includes"the"degree"to"which"the"plan"regularizes"appointments"

across"presidential"terms,"how"long"the"plan"would"take"to"fully"implement,"

and" whether"there" are" likely" to" be" unplanned" vacancies" in" periods" that" are"

more"likely" to"result"in"the" Senate" blocking" appointments." In" short," our" re-

search"reveals"that"the"way"that"any"Supreme"Court"term"limits"proposal"is"

designed"has"profound"implications"for"the"functioning"of"the"Court.""