The Social Contract Theory in the Face of Empirical Morality: Integration and Its Consequences

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN THE FACE OF EMPIRICAL MORALITY:

INTEGRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Margaux Faren Frazier Ramee

______________________________________________________________________________

Faculty Sponsor:

Professor Benedetto Fontana

______________________________

Readers:

Professor Marcus Johnson

______________________________

Professor Gerald DeMaio

______________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

05/04/2021

Submitted to the Committee on Undergraduate Honors at Baruch College of the City University

of New York in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in

Political Science with Honors.

Abstract

The following study empirically investigated moral attitudes, both intuitive and reasoned,

to assess the validity of the social contract theories of four prominent thinkers: Thomas Hobbes,

John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Rawls. These social contract thinkers, though

different in their proposals, all attempt to provide an answer to one long-withstanding question:

which governmental structure is best? Their theories also interweave moral cognition with the

governmental structure recommended. Thus, this research endeavored to contribute to the

contemporary discussion of the social contract theory, encourage empirical investigation of the

social contract theory, and provide a framework for future research of a similar kind in order to

answer such a question. The research was conducted in survey format with two modules and the

data collected was analyzed through evaluation of each section. Module 1, moral consistency, is

the quantitative portion of the survey design which assessed whether or not there was a

consistency amongst respondents’ intuitions. Module 2, moral compatibility, is the qualitative

portion of the survey design which considered whether respondents’ moral intuitions and moral

reasoning align or not and assigned each respondent’s moral reasoning responses to a thinker

based on their method of reasoning. The data was then considered within the framework of the

social contract theories presented in order to determine which theory the data best supported. The

hypothesis put forth was that, given previous and distinct scholarship on the issues of the social

contract theory and moral cognition, that Rawls would represent the majority in both modules of

the survey. However, the empirical results supported Lockeian theory most favorably in both

modules, and the weight of such a conclusion considered in the context of practical politics. A

discussion is then had on the complications such results pose for moral and political theory, and

further experimentation encouraged.

 
3 
Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 2 
Contents .......................................................................................................................................... 3 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5 
Literature Review............................................................................................................................ 5 
Thomas Hobbes .......................................................................................................................... 6 
Passionate Instinct versus Computational Reason .................................................................. 6 
On Obligation.......................................................................................................................... 8 
Science and Its Reasonable Consequences ............................................................................. 9 
John Locke ................................................................................................................................ 10 
A State of Liberty.................................................................................................................. 11 
On Consent and Dual Contracts ............................................................................................ 12 
A Platform of Reason and Natural Instinct ........................................................................... 13 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau ............................................................................................................. 14 
Les Sauvages et Amour de Soi ............................................................................................. 14 
Du Contrat Social et Amour Propre ...................................................................................... 16 
Raison Plutôt que Croyance .................................................................................................. 18 
John Rawls ................................................................................................................................ 19 
The Veil of Ignorance ........................................................................................................... 19 
The Social Order and a Positive Distributive Thesis ............................................................ 20 
Dissecting Reason from Appetite ......................................................................................... 20 
The Thinkers Compared ........................................................................................................... 21 
Reason and Impulse .............................................................................................................. 21 
Morality in Nature and Civil Society .................................................................................... 22 
The Social Contracts as a Consequence ................................................................................ 23 
Gaps in Existing Literature ....................................................................................................... 24 
The Survey .................................................................................................................................... 25 
The Hypothesis and Its Assumptions ........................................................................................ 25 
The Structure ............................................................................................................................. 26 
Consistency: Quantitative Analysis .......................................................................................... 28 
Compatibility: Qualitative Analysis ......................................................................................... 28 
The Data ........................................................................................................................................ 30 
Consistency ............................................................................................................................... 30 
Hobbes .................................................................................................................................. 30 
Locke..................................................................................................................................... 33 
Rousseau ............................................................................................................................... 35 
Rawls..................................................................................................................................... 37 
Compatibility ............................................................................................................................ 39 

Hobbes .................................................................................................................................. 40

Locke..................................................................................................................................... 41

Rousseau ............................................................................................................................... 43

Summary and Significance ....................................................................................................... 46

Notes on Methodology and Recommendations ............................................................................ 47

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 49

References ..................................................................................................................................... 50

Appendix I: Visualization of Research ......................................................................................... 52

Appendix II: Visualization of Data ............................................................................................... 54

....................................................................................................................................................... 55

Introduction

The social contract theory has experienced a recent resurgence in academic circles. The

contemporary discussion of the theory now requires an empirical basis to answer its main

question, the question that political philosophy has wrestled with for the totality of its existence:

which governmental structure is best? The social contract theory has survived into modernity,

and now requires the empirical support that the modern age demands. Famous social contract

theorists Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Rawls attempt to

answer this question, all proposing theories of governmental structure that are very different,

ranging from a monarchy to a direct democracy. However, there is one similarity among these

theories: they are all contingent on a theory of the relationship between moral intuitions and

moral reasoning. Although moral reasoning and the social contract theory are independently well

studied, there is little insight on where they intersect, and consequently, a lack of empirical work

on their connectedness. In this thesis, I will attempt an analysis of the relationship between the

empirical data and the thinkers’ normative social contract theories, each of which is built upon a

foundation of moral theory. This thesis will first describe each thinker’s fundamental ideas; it

will in doing so attempt to demonstrate the inextricable relation between moral theory and

political theory; and it will argue that Lockeian moral reasoning provides the best explanation of

the empirical data relating to moral consistency and compatibility. Finally, it will point to the

intellectual and moral problems attendant upon social contract theories.

Literature Review

Before empirical assessments can be incorporated into theory, the theory itself must be

sufficiently delineated. In this thesis I seek to investigate the thinkers' claims of moral intuition

versus moral reasoning, as well as their claims' bearing on the social contract theory, so the

relationship between intuition and reasoning with the social contract theory is what will be

dissected. I will introduce each thinker's position by first evaluating their notion of morality,

followed by the details of his social contract, and finally their analyses of reason versus intuition.

I believe this order possesses the best approach to the thinkers’ viewpoints, as it is one that

recognizes the intricacies of the social contract before delving into moral reasoning as a

necessary condition for its creation.

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes, a classical humanist, approached moral reasoning not with an attitude of

neutral faculty, but with one of triumph over its counterpart, moral intuition. His mechanistic

theory sees the universe as a system of bodies in motion from which he derives his theory of

morality and society. This proposition on how motion informs perception and action, and

therefore social interaction, diverges his notion of morality from the traditional notions of

morality that were long-standing and heavily derived from religion and ancient classical

philosophy (Cohen, 2018). It is in his magnum opus, Leviathan (1651), and with this newfound

scientific philosophy, that Hobbes makes metaphysical assessments that instruct his political

apriorism. Thus, Hobbes constructs his theory: moral reasoning is a capacity granted by the

nature of our mechanical world which, when employed, leads the people directly to the

inevitable conclusion that the only political society that can survive is an authoritative one by the

contractual obligations of the social covenant.

Passionate Instinct versus Computational Reason

Hobbes describes the state of nature, the hypothetical pre-societal existence, as “solitary,

poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1651). Within it, Hobbes argues that morality is non-

existent. He posits that morality is artificially constructed, rather than naturally occurring.

Reason, however, is naturally occurring. Morality, therefore, is derived from the state, and is

simply an act of self-preservation. The Hobbesian state of nature, a place where moral value is

chimerical, is effectively a state of license, comprising of (1) competition, (2) diffidence, and (3)

glory. Because the state of nature is one of natural equality, it is also one of constant competition,

of which diffidence and glory arise. These conflicts, these individual wars, that dominate the

state of nature are fueled by two intrinsic passions: (1) appetites and (2) aversions. These

individual impetuses produce the natural state and human condition of constant anxiety,

endlessly pursuing appetites and avoiding death and injury. These ever-present passions result in

the competition, diffidence, and glory that terrorize the state of nature and produce fear of the

other, a necessary characteristic of the state of nature. Without society, a finite amount of

resources can only lead to conflict for those resources, where another’s success in obtaining

resources means your failing. Self-interest is synonymous with self-preservation, and so conflict

rages on (Hobbes, 1651). This is the situation in which we naturally find ourselves—entirely

without both morality and security.

Although natural passions produce fear of the other, they also result in its abandonment.

The appetites that drive everyone to act in self-interest also drive one to employ reasoning, a

natural faculty, present in the state of nature, to seek escape. Reason together with fear becomes

the means of escape from the state of nature, for reason leads to the automatic, effortless, and

inevitable conclusion that the only political society that can survive is an authoritarian one in

which individuals are obligated by social contract to relinquish certain freedoms--the rights of

nature--for security, and are thereby freed from the state of nature (Hobbes, 1651). Recall that in

the state of nature, resources are finite, which causes survival to be inherently competitive and

results in the perpetual state of war all are so desperate to escape. In this sense, the sovereign

ensures security by regulating resources. The sovereign therefore, in protecting their citizens,

also artificially constructs property. Property is required to secure one’s future, and the power to

protect their property. Possession of property is not natural and property is not recognized in the

state of nature, but it greatly improves one’s chances of survival, Hobbes argues. It is the duty of

the sovereign to protect this property in guaranteeing the security of their citizens. The only right

that remains is the only natural right, the right to life: the sovereign may not oppress or exploit

the public, and if they should fail in guaranteeing the security of their citizens, the sovereign’s

power collapses and thence society crumbles with it, and the subsequent return to the state of

nature would begin. This does not mean a return to civil society is an impossibility, however. In

the battle between passion and reason, Hobbes trusts the victor will always be reason.

On Obligation

The etched artwork on the front of Leviathan is indicative of how Hobbes views the

sovereign: a ruler comprised of the people, a literal body politic (Hobbes, 1651). Although

Hobbes is grouped with social contract thinkers, his theory is best described as a covenant. In a

contract, a mutual surrender of rights is being made, whereas in a covenant, a perpetual and

irreversible promise is being made. The covenant, where all freedom is renounced for the

protection of the sovereign, is realized in the authoritarian, as reason dictates. However, if reason

leads to the conclusion that an authoritarian regime is the only option, and reason is to trump

passion, what of fear? Fear of the other is never eliminated. It is simply translated from each

other to the sovereign. This is how order is maintained: transference of properties of the state of

nature from the ambiguous other to the one sovereign, for it is the individual versus the

individual that produces the unceasing conflict of the state of nature. If there is one executor, and

the fear transferred to the sovereign body versus the individual, society is secure.

There lies a contingency, however. Once the contractual civil society is developed and

ruled by the sovereign, the laws that are imposed by the sovereign are final. It is mentioned

above that morality is simply an act of self-preservation: morality is an artificial tool,

synonymous with the state’s laws, to ensure security. Because morality is neither naturally

occurring nor universal and is rather constructed by political society as a result of reason, the

sovereign’s justice is identical to moral justice. Furthermore, justice is nonexistent until the

sovereign dictates what it is; justice is, just as morality is, man-made. The sovereign is therefore

additionally tasked with making judgements regarding justice. The sovereign's judgements are

final, for "the greatest disease of a commonwealth is the idea that everyone can decide for

themselves what is good and bad" (Hobbes, 1651). Thus, the sovereign is obligated to the people

and their protection, while the people are obligated to accept the justice imposed by the

sovereign. The social covenant, therefore, finds its strength in the obligation of the authoritarian

regime.

Science and Its Reasonable Consequences

The scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries destabilized the foundation that

traditional philosophy stood upon. Reactionary philosophical movements followed from its

disruptions and rationalist values rose from its ashes, and Hobbes with them. He possessed a

staunch view that the two basic elements of the universe are (1) motion and (2) bodies. The

universe is consequently comprised wholly of bodies in motion. All it is and all that follows from

it can be traced back to those bodies in motion. This extremely mechanical theory does not

exclude humans and their faculties from its bounds, for where bodies in motion are in

occurrence, interaction is inevitable. Bodies in motion become notably important for Hobbes

because he posits that these bodies can be scientifically assessed until it is concluded that reason

is natural (Hobbes, 1651). This computation, analysis of bodies in motion, is the final piece of

the puzzle in Hobbes' determination that reason is a natural human faculty. The scientific

revolution, ushering in a new wave of mechanistic philosophy, settles in Hobbesian reason.

The consequences of the implications that Hobbes' scientific beliefs hold for his beliefs

on moral reasoning are hereby discernible, but what of intuition? This must be further explored.

Although moral intuition cannot be used interchangeably with passionate instinct, it is passionate

instinct of the state of nature that informs our moral intuition; just as appetites and aversions are

concerned with self-interest and self-preservation, so is Hobbesian intuition. Recall that the

properties of the state of nature, just like fear of the other, are never eliminated. It is no different

for the appetites and aversions, which are still very much present in the covenant, and direct its

moral impulses (Hobbes, 1651). Given that morality itself is not natural, there does not exist a

naturally “correct” version of morality, for all valuation of morality is determined by the

sovereign, as its creator. Moral reasoning is therefore nothing more than a tool of power; an

instrument in service of our appetites, and if this is the case, then it is relative to the individual,

though that individual is bound to the will of their ruler.

John Locke

Lockeian thought is noted for its ‘tabula rasa’ empiricism—Locke proves to be yet

another stark contrast from his theologian predecessors. Both natural law and justice can be

found in the state of nature; justice is not bound by politics, but politics an executor of justice.

(Cohen, 2018). Although Locke affirms the presence of natural law in the state of nature and its

service for our morality, Locke imbues reason with purpose. It is the purpose of reasoning that he

emphasizes, the ‘existence precedes reason’ argument, that he derives his conclusions from

(Locke, 1689). In Locke's manuscript Second Treatise of Government (1689), moral reasoning,

subject to objective truth, necessitates sovereignty of the people.

A State of Liberty

Locke refers to the state of nature as a “state of liberty” (Locke, 1689). This liberty,

however, is purely due to the lack of formally implemented societal limitations. The state of

nature, though rife with individual conflict, still recognizes natural law. His natural law teaches

eternal and universal principles of right and justice. From this, he derives natural rights of the

self and the self’s possessions: right to life, liberty, and property. Those in the state of nature

have an obligation to adhere to this natural law, as well as to the “general duty” to preserve life

of both the self and others (Tuckness, 2020). Universal natural laws, Locke posits, are

demonstrated by the fact that a criminal can be punished for a crime they commit in a foreign

country under a foreign crown, for natural law demands redress. As such, universal natural law is

upheld by each individual through punishment, and an element of justice is recognized even in

the state of nature. A staunch defender of natural equality, Locke emphasizes that since property

is not absent from the state of nature and is in fact protected by natural law, power and

punishment must not be either, and are imparted by individual, partial interpreters and executors

of justice. The natural instinct of the people, however, is defined by the following rights: (1)

restraint, punishment for the crime and prevention of the offense, and (2) reparation, which

applies only to the damaged subject. These characteristics of the state of nature allow every

individual to execute the laws of nature (Locke, 1689). Locke warns, however, to not mistake the

presence of justice as incentive enough to remain in the state of nature. Conflict between

individuals still poses a threat to everyone in the state of nature, as each individual, acting in self-

interest, operates as judge, jury, and executioner. Even lone convenience is enough of an

initiator; reason dictates that political power must be provided for an impartial judge to preside

over justice to diminish individual conflict (Locke, 1689). Hence, the social contract is

developed.

On Consent and Dual Contracts

In Locke, two contracts are made rather than one as in Hobbes. One establishes civil

society, the community, and the other the state which is tasked with fulfilling duties for the

community. The significance of this is lies in the fact that civil society does not depend on the

existence of the state (Locke, 1689). The dissolution of the state, or right to revolution, does not

imply a collapse of society.

Locke believed quite simply that the legitimacy of a government was derived from the

consent of those it governs, both express and tacit. Express consent, the ideal consent, is given

through positive societal engagement, whereas tacit consent, the non-ideal and ambiguous

consent, is given when one reaps the rewards of a government’s dominion (i.e. owning property

within its borders or benefiting from infrastructure). Regardless of what consent of the governed

is given, an exchange is made: natural rights for societal freedoms, which are importantly non-

identical (Locke, 1689). The difference will be discussed in the next section. Natural rights,

bestowed by none but present everywhere, are forsaken and societal freedoms replace them. Just

as those in the state of nature have an obligation to adhere to natural moral law, so does the

established trust, or social contract, beyond the state of nature. However, although the trust does

not have the right to violate natural law given that natural law is prevailing, prior to, and superior

to civil law, there can still exist unjust civil laws. However, Locke does not argue that unjust

civil laws warrant revolution. Although there is a natural right to revolution, it may only be

employed if the government fails to uphold its end of the contract, which obligates them to

protect the people from the state of nature (Locke, 1689). This is where the duality of contracts

becomes vital. Consent, both tacit and explicit, can be retracted if the political power fails in this,

just not on the basis of unjust civil law. The only time a right to revolution is permissible is once

all peaceful means have been exhausted and violence is all that is left (Locke, 1689). The state is

obligated to obey the terms of the trust, and if they do not, then the community may withdraw the

power from the state and establish a new trust.

A Platform of Reason and Natural Instinct

Lockeian social contract theory is fraught with moral implications given his subscription

in natural law. In fact, morality itself is synonymous with natural law, which is absolute and

eternal. In Locke’s state of nature, the law of nature and natural rights are moral constructs that

pre-date humanity. According to Locke, there is a standard of good and evil in the state of nature

irrespective of any sovereign. The issue with merely natural law and the consequent objective

morality is that in the state of nature, there is no government to enforce this particular rule of

good and evil, regardless of its existence (Locke, 1689). Each individual is responsible for being

its own enforcer, but this is inconvenient, so a government is created to enforce the law of nature,

as aforementioned. The state does not create morality, but is subject to it. Therefore, moral law is

objective, outside of and predating humanity, and independent of society and the state. Moral

intuition is once again reminiscent of the state of nature, and natural instinct operating for self-

interest and self-preservation. Natural law, however, does not define moral intuition, although it

may influence it; moral intuition is an individual’s intuitive understanding of what is right and

good, but it is not bounded by natural law (Locke, 1689).

Locke’s argument for reason is one that emphasizes interaction. The important thing to

note is that interaction is a necessary property of the state of nature, so reason must be as well,

making it an innate capability. Locke’s empiricist values are identifiable here, for he claims that

the state of nature possesses empirical stimuli that reasoning requires, so the state of nature

operates as a method of “activating” the reason that leads to its very escape: societal

development, and the social contract to follow (Locke, 1689). Reason enables us to understand

moral law because moral law is rational. The state does not have the right to violate these laws,

for moral law is synonymous with natural law, and therefore inviolable.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Rousseau’s argument balances upon a series of critical distinctions that are demonstrative

of how his view is centered upon the alleged shift from the state of nature to society to be a

deterioration of personhood. Rousseau believes that human beings are morally innocent, but are

rendered corrupt by society. However, the oddity of Rousseau is that this goodness does not

originate from morality, for morality is not naturally present. Whatever sense it is that humans

are good by nature, it is not a moral sense, as would ordinarily be supposed. Du Contrat social

(1762) rejects divine rule and asserts that only the people reserve this sovereignty, which is

granted by the social contract as conceived through reason.

Les Sauvages et Amour de Soi

Rousseau’s reference to les sauvages may be misleading; although he identifies those

present in the state of nature as “savages,” the term is absent of the social implications that may

be considered taboo. Rousseau’s argument, that society caused the degeneration of the state of

personhood, gives a sort of reverence to our pre-societal counterparts. To Rousseau, what is

savage is natural, and what is social is corrupted, for the state of nature is a state of isolation.

There does exist an inequality in the state of nature, but that inequality is natural as well, which

Rousseau deems unproblematic (Rousseau, 1762). It is now prudent to identify the difference

between Rousseau's social or constitutional inequality and natural inequality; social and

constitutional inequality is a product of society, whereas natural inequality is not. This is another

way for Rousseau to tip favor towards the savages. Given the only inequality is a natural one, the

state of nature is a morally neutral state of peace where the only necessity is passionate instinct

driven by self-preservation. Self-preservation, or amour de soi ("self-love"), is the

psychologically egoist state the savage finds themself in (Rousseau, 1762). Rousseau compares

amour de soi to the instincts found in "beasts" that drive the propagation of species. There exists

another principle within the state of nature: pitié. There is an “innate repugnance to see his

fellow suffer” that drives the savage to balance amour de soi in such a way that avoids

unwarranted violence (Rousseau, 1762, p. 36). It weighs self-preservation with compassion.

Hence the savage’s purity.

Recall the “peace” of isolation in Rousseau’s state of nature; what is arguably a critique

of both the Hobbesian and Lockeian states of nature is made when Rousseau says there is neither

war nor competition in nature. War, Rousseau argues, is a social activity which not only

mandates the existence of a state, but the presence of interaction. It is therefore an impossibility

for war to be present in the state of nature which lacks society and government. Competition is

similarly impossible—one cannot compete if one is isolated (Rousseau, 1762).

Unlike the former thinkers outlined, Rousseau's imagined divergence from the state of

nature is not a decision concluded by reason, but a product of circumstantial dependence.

Increased interaction with others in the state of nature creates a psychological shift, where amour

de soi finds itself degenerating into amour propre ("self-love in relation to others”). Amour

propre allows comparisons to be made: how do people regard me?; am I superior or inferior to

others?; are others more or less powerful than me? Self-esteem is created as consequence. This

deterioration is not merely psychological, however, but physical as well. The acquisition of

knowledge (i.e. the creation of tools) causes a subsequent alteration of the body’s constitution—

without the need to perform physical tasks for self-preservation, the ability to do so falls away. I

expressed how Rousseau applies an air of reverence to les sauvages above, but it is important to

note that this attitude is a product of amour propre; the modernity of self-esteem is imposed onto

les sauvages, when in fact they considered themselves neither good nor bad, and did not even

consider themselves at all beyond self-preservation. They were morally neutral, and the

“goodness” of moral neutrality is imbued by amour propre. As such, Rousseau appraises these

changes to be harmful, and the resulting civil society a lesser state of personhood (Rousseau,

1762). Independence is traded for dependence and civil society is established, though non-

explicitly and unconsciously.

Du Contrat Social et Amour Propre

The introduction of society begins with the family; an increase in population compels

people to interact with one another and continue to reproduce. The interaction between peoples

necessitates private property, by which all moral and political relations become the product of

private possession. He asserts that resources are limited and amour propre encourages the

competition that leads to possession of goods, similarly to the previous states of nature discussed.

Once one has private property, reason compels us to create a state to protect that property. The

structure of the family is what government models itself off of. The stages of human evolution

are marked by key developments, the central transition being the establishment of small

communities. As this society develops, amour propre, external love, grows and amour de soi,

selfish love, diminishes, materializing in a small republic of popular sovereignty. This popular

sovereignty is neither the result of reason nor morality, but the conclusion of “needs” and

“accidents” (Rousseau, 1762).

Rousseau makes another important distinction between general will and particular will in

his argument of a democratic social contract and the notion of popular sovereignty. Particular

will, which is subject to only the individual, is necessarily second to the general will, which is

subject to the whole of society. However, to Rousseau, true freedom is acting in accordance with

the general will, not the particular will. True freedom is the ability to act beyond appetites, and to

find perfectibility in new ways to address needs (Rousseau, 1762). In essence, Rousseau's social

contract attempts to correct amour propre and make amour propre more moral, for one votes

according to what they regard justice to be. By forgoing particular will for the general will,

goodness can be restored. It is a rational replacement for particular wills, as the general will is in

the interest in the will of all and therefore the highest level of society. Thus, morality is born.

Given that, in this democratic contract, everyone must participate in assembly and the actions of

the assembly must be directed to all, the general will is similarly born. In this assembly,

everyone regards what is the common or public good, not their particular wills. Rousseau asserts

that the general will effectively preserves agency and autonomy in a state that restricts freedoms.

The particular will is slave to appetites, while the general will is slave to societal morality,

looking towards the interest of all (Rousseau, 1762). This is how he reconciles utility and justice;

“the general will is always right” (Rousseau, 1762). The general will is basically procedural. It

allows us to unlock moral liberty in the state. As such, because everyone participated in the

formation of the “good” state, everyone is obeying themselves. When one submits to the law,

one submits to themselves. That is true liberty. The general will is liberty and moral reasoning

combined into one. So, if one disobeys the state of the general will, they are immoral and will be

“forced to be free” (Rousseau, 1762).

Raison Plutôt que Croyance

If morality is artificially manufactured by society in the lens of the general will, how is

goodness maintained in a sophisticated society if it is that very sophistication that corrupts?

Rousseau cites his general will as the solution to this dilemma. The general will generates the

morality within a civilized society, directly created by all and for all, that restores the goodness

lost in the corruption of the civilized man. However, although man’s natural, uncorrupted state

sans society is good in the sense that it is absent of evil, the people have no conception of

morality until society is established. Morality’s origin is in society, and the savages are simply

spontaneously good. The conscience, that is posteriori to existence but is developed alongside

civil society in the growth of amour propre, provides a rational appreciation for morality of

reason (Rousseau, 1762). The critical tool in morality is therefore reason, the key human faculty

of the conscious, rather than impulse. Reason is developed only after interacting socially, so it is

unnatural, but allows us to create the contract that fulfills society’s potential and restores

goodness, regardless of the fact that “goodness” is unrecognized by les sauvages. With the

faculty of reason, individuals become free agents, “free” because they are no longer entirely

burdened by passions, and can leave behind the amorality and strive for moral goodness

(Rousseau, 1762).

However, impulse has not yet been forgotten. As Rousseau adamantly suggests that self-

preservation existed before reason, he also suggests that reason, as developed with the proto-

moral conscience, is corrupted by impulse and passionate instinct. The state of nature, morally

unaligned but equipped with passionate instinct, is displaced by civil society, equipped with

reason that is a slave to passionate instinct. The conscience elapses, and its tools used in service

of impulse rather than the morality it helped to develop (Neidleman, 2017).

John Rawls

Rawls ’state of nature is unique. Rather than hypothesize as to the state of man before

society, the theory he presents in the instant classic A Theory of Justice (1971) is a much more

literal thought experiment that not only robs one of society, but of individuality. Rawls suggests

that the innate capacity for reason which we all share, regardless of the presence of society, can

lead to but one conclusion: a liberal government of positive distribution. His theory, however, is

heavily idealistic, and assumes reasonable conditions, which Rawls defends as a proponent of

rational political philosophy. This rational experiment concludes that through reasoning

independently and without bias, absent of appetites, all will agree to establish a fair and equal

social contract.

The Veil of Ignorance

The veil of ignorance is an exercise in which one forgets and forgoes any knowledge of

their lifestyle, privileges, advantages, and disadvantages, so that they are returned to a state that

Rawls calls the original position. In the original position, any sense of individuality that is a

consequent of civil society is eliminated, so that a truly unbiased cost-benefit calculation of civil

society can be made. The theory of the original position is predicated on the idea that all people

have an identical capacity for moral reasoning. The power is so identical that, if taken out of the

birth lottery and placed under a veil of ignorance, every person, through moral reasoning, would

come to the same conclusion as to how to build a political and social order, resulting in a social

contract, that ensures equality to the highest degree (Rawls, 1971). Rawlsian moral judgements

are critically assessed through a method of reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1971), which, by

extension, would allow an individual under the veil of ignorance to practice an assessment of

their moral judgements without the burden of their personal bias. Furthermore, these judgements

are not ordered hierarchically; where they conflict, reflection must occur to alter the judgement

in order to be justified in it (Schroeter, 2004).

The Social Order and a Positive Distributive Thesis

Rawls posits that civil society is defined by a birth lottery: a circumstantial, non-merit

based happenstance, one’s role in society is determined by a game of chance, much like a literal

lottery. This stance presupposes that inequality is not determined by nature, but by the priorities

of the political and social order. Any presence of inequality is not natural. As such, any presence

of inequality in civil society is immoral and unjust. The endurance of equality beyond the

original position therefore requires an extremely liberal social and political order that recognizes

privileges as the downfall of inequality and actively combats it as a positive distributive thesis

(Rawls, 1971).

The structure of this order is based on a tenet of justice as fairness. This tenet is

institutionalized as two principles: (1) all persons have an identical claim to a scheme of basic

liberties that remain compatible with the basic liberties of others, and (2) any inequalities of the

social order that are a byproduct of the order itself must be (a) due to positions accessible to all

with a fair equality of opportunity and (b) able to satisfy the difference principle, meaning they

shall benefit the least-privileged members of society. To relinquish liberties in order to endorse

an order that is optimized for all persons is the reasonable and rational conclusion we all will

inevitably draw (Rawls, 1971).

Dissecting Reason from Appetite

Rawls dictates that the capacity for moral reasoning is innate and not a product of nor

dependent on experience. The faculty of reason is therefore as independent of experience as it is

of appetites. Rawls insists that appetites act in service of the self, and are entirely distinct from

reason. Thus, under the veil of ignorance, where the self is forfeit, appetites play no role in

creation of the social and political order (Rawls, 1971). Outside of the veil of ignorance,

however, Rawls is a unique type of moral intuitionist. He argues for a method called reflective

equilibrium, in which our intuitions flex with each other until we reach a coherence amongst

them (Schroeter, 2004). These intuitions direct our behavior and, though they can be revised

through reflective equilibrium so they are justifiable, that is all they ever can be: justifiable.

The faculty of reason, a mental capability separate from impulse, formulates morality and

grants us “moral powers” (Rawls, 1971). Rawls’ presumption that all persons are reasonable and

rational inherently restricts practical morality from that of a natural element to that of a social

one. However, Rawls does not wholly reject the existence of universal, natural laws and

universal, natural moral principles. His doctrine that the representation of morality is found in the

social contract that defines the social and political order, implies a foundational basis of the order

and morality itself in equality (Rawls, 1971). Rawls is therefore a minimalist natural law thinker;

what is moral and just is what is fair and equal. The impulses of morality, though present in the

self and active in the community, play no part in the formation of a liberal social contract.

The Thinkers Compared

The brief synopses above will be evaluated together in the relevant context. The thinkers'

stances on morality in both nature and civil society and how their different interpretations effect

their social contract theories is what is of interest.

Reason and Impulse

The role of reason and impulse in the social contract varies amongst the thinkers, as does

the relationship between themselves. The latter will be addressed first. Hobbesian appetites are

inseparable from reason; reason is a tool to achieve the appetites' impulses. Reason is a servant

of appetites, not an autonomous nor independent faculty. In a way, reason is contaminated with

appetites. This sentiment is echoed in Locke somewhat, although his views on the matter remain

ambiguous. Locke believed that reason is a deductive tool for piecing out moral law, but that the

resulting moral law is reflective of human nature. Our reason is therefore a method of insight

into natural impulse, rather than an uninvolved faculty. Elements of Hobbes and Locke can be

found in Rousseau, including the notion of corrupted reason. Rousseau's selfish love is

comparable to Hobbesian appetites and Lockeian impulse, and his external love with Hobbesian

and Lockeian reason. However, these natural instincts as interpreted by Rousseau are "good,"

whereas in Hobbes, they are destructive. Furthermore, Rousseau’s vision of the savage is much

less egoistic than Hobbes’ view of those in the state of nature, for the savage’s soul is laced with

pitié. Yet, they reconcile; Rousseau's idea that reason is tainted with impulse, that our conscience

uses morality as a method of satisfying self-interests, is reminiscent of the first two thinkers,

leaving Rawls to be the black sheep. The definitive separation of reason from impulse and

appetites distinguishes Rawls from his predecessors.

Morality in Nature and Civil Society

Natural morality, morality that exists independent of existence, society, and government,

is acknowledged by Locke and semi-acknowledged by Rawls, but rejected by Hobbes and

Rousseau. Locke's adherence to his belief in natural law and that morality is derived from it, its

origins making it natural in its own right, solidifies morality's existence beyond the civil society

and the social contract. Rawlsian moral theory is difficult to interpret in such a clear-cut manner;

although he formally denies the existence of universal morality, he presupposes that justice is

fairness in his analyses. This supposition indicates that there is some universal moral code, even

when society and the self is stripped away. Finally, Hobbes and Rousseau agree on the absence

of morality without the existence of civil society. Although in Rousseau's gradual descent out of

the state of nature morality is less explicitly formed and more inadvertently engendered, it is

similar to Hobbes in the sense that it is non-existent in the state of nature but present in and

directly associated with civil society and the social contract.

The Social Contracts as a Consequence

Throughout disagreements and agreements, all four thinkers arrive at their own basis of a

social contract. For Hobbes, this is an authoritarian regime; for Locke, a representative

government; for Rousseau, a small republic; and for Rawls, a liberal democracy. All agree that

the state is artificial, but its role is a subject of discord. In Hobbes, civil society depends on the

existence of the state, whereas in Locke, the dual contracts sever any kind of dependent

relationship. Furthermore, the state's purview for Hobbes is much greater than is permitted in

Locke, and the right to revolution much more restricted. Hobbesian disbelief in natural moral law

places all of the legitimacy of a sovereign in the hands of protection rather than adherence to

natural justice. The sovereign itself operates as the determinator of justice, expanding its power

in ways Locke's would never.

Another important distinction between Hobbes and Locke must now be made: though

Locke and Hobbes both assert that the state of nature is one of conflict and that the act of

reasoning is the solution to its escape, they disagree on the inevitability of societal contracts.

Where Hobbes asserts that it is an absolutely unavoidable consequence, Locke simply asserts

that it is a convenient consequent. Rousseau's style of government is even more distinct, and that

can be traced to his belief that a conception of morality is impossible to achieve simply through

the use of reason and instead requires a constitution. His interpretation of wills and love naturally

lead to a government of popular sovereignty. A social contract representing the general will of a

society based in amour propre is all that would satisfy his conditions. Finally, Rawls' egalitarian

approach to the social contract through a positive distributive thesis is sensibly resulted from his

beliefs in the rational and reasonable mind as well as the assumption that natural law is simply

justice as fairness.

Gaps in Existing Literature

There is an abundance of existing literature regarding moral reasoning and the social

contract theory, but little discussion on their necessary integration. The empirical nature of the

social contract theory often involves its practical implementation rather than an empirical

assessment of its own viability. Practical research is plentiful, investigating policy predicaments,

welfarism, and other issues of application that may arise (Paz-Fuchs et al., 2007), but I endeavor

to empirically investigate social contract theories presented by the thinkers. In-depth empirical

analysis of moral intuitions and reasoning is similarly ubiquitous. There is significant scholarship

on general moral predicaments and their impact on the social order (Haidt, 2015; Haidt et al.,

2010; Turiel, 2006) and even investigations into public reason (Habermas, 1990; Habermas,

1996). These works, however, assess moral reasoning outside of the lens that the social contract

theories present, evaluating morality from the picture of politics (and sometimes, religion) as it is

now known, and do not attempt to understand how the results, in an alignment with social

contract theories, may validate the theories. Work integrating the theoretical notions of the

thinkers’ social contract theories and their claims on moral decision-making has yet to be

thoroughly undertaken.

Previous research on empirical morality has determined that reason is best isolated in

confrontation to intuition. Cognitive studies from Van Bavel et al. (in prep) have demonstrated

the cognitive capability for reason to overcome subjugation to intuition through proper

engagement, whereby reason follows intuition in the face of moral dilemmas. I used this model

to address this gap in research.

The Survey

To gather information on moral decision-making, a survey was created. This survey,

though not the preferred medium for such an investigation

, served its purposes effectively

enough through a series of binary questions and exercises intended to assess moral decision-

making. Recall that the social contract theorists detailed above all have notions of morality that

inform their political conclusions; this survey aimed to measure the factuality of the thinkers’

given assumptions regarding the origin of moral principles and the relationship between moral

intuition and reasoning. An analysis of the data regarding moral reasoning for the thinkers’

contracts is to follow.

The Hypothesis and Its Assumptions

To ensure absolute clarity, a brief review of moral reasoning for each thinker is in order:

Hobbesian moral reasoning is a device of cognition that we employ in the service of our

appetites; Lockeian moral reasoning is what allows us to grasp natural moral law; Rousseau’s

moral reasoning is the tool that we use to restore our goodness, though it is not free of the whims

of passionate instinct; Rawlsian moral reasoning is an autonomous faculty used to make rational

moral decisions, unaffected by instincts. To break these theses down into their most basic

elements, it can be said that while Hobbesian and Rousseau’s moral reasoning is bound in some

See “Notes on Methodology and Recommendations,” (p. 47).

degree to passionate instinct, be it entirely and all-encompassing or a mere trace, Lockeian and

Rawlsian moral reasoning is an independent instrument that acts in its own right, be it a

contrivance of rationality that brings about the conclusions of natural moral law or the

conclusions our own rationality engineers. If moral reasoning is nothing more than a servant of

appetites, reasoning and intuition should never misalign. If moral reasoning is entirely distinct

from moral intuition, then discontinuity can exist. The true nature of this relationship may then

be analyzed by studying respondents’ approach to both moral reasoning and moral intuition.

It is with this foundational understanding of complex moral arguments that the survey

was created: will participants use moral reasoning as an agent of moral power or a means of

justification for their own moral impulses? As aforementioned, the research conducted by Van

Bavel et al. hints that reason is a faculty that can be isolated through proper engagement; I

hypothesized that if empirical morality were to be applied to the social contract theories

presented by the thinkers mentioned, that the results would align best with Rawlsian reasoning

for his opinion that intuition may be suspended under the right circumstances to engage in pure

reason. Therefore, the hypothesis presented is: inconsistent intuitions and incompatible Rawlsian

sentiments will overwhelm the data, given existing literature on the individuality of reason.

The Structure

Given the intent of the survey, the structure is arguably its most important element. The

survey was divided into two modules: (1) binary responses and (2) a free-response exercise. The

binary response section was comprised of two hypothetical scenarios laden with moral

dilemmas, and participants were required to make a choice of moral consequence from only two

options, selecting either an affirmative or a negative (noted experimentally as “+” and “-”

accordingly). The moral dilemmas selected for this survey are fairly common thought

experiments designed to engage moral principles, and though contextually different, they all

involve the same fundamental moral query: are you (the participant) willing to take one life to

save the lives of others?

The first two scenarios are presented and participants are asked to subsequently make an

impulsive and binary decision regarding their response to the situation

. As explained, these

scenarios hold the same moral implications. There is one notable difference, however. Question

1 involves self-destruction, whereas question 2 does not. In question 1, the decision made

assuredly results in not only the death of the many, but the death of oneself as well. In question

2, the decision made results in the death of the many, but the self is secure. The relevance of this

distinction is due to the fact that self-preservation is a key aspect of many of the social contract

thinkers, and whether or not the self is risked will hold a bearing on the interpretation of the

decision for each of them.

After being presented with the first two binary dilemmas, the participant is asked to

refrain from thinking impulsively, and instead ruminate on the responses they gave during the

first module and expand upon them: Why did you choose the affirmative or negative? Now that

you are given proper time to think, would you like to change your response? If so, why? This is

not only where moral reasoning is effectively engaged, but where it is asked to be prioritized

over moral intuition by giving the participants the opportunity to change their binary responses

If the respondents find that they are unable to explain their original choice, they may “fix” it

here.

See Figure 7, Appendix I.

See Figure 8, Appendix I.

Now that the structure has been defined

and the purpose of its construction explained,

how is the data to be assessed? Participants’ actual responses to the questions was of little

relevance—rather, I was concerned with the consistency and compatibility of their responses.

Consistency: Quantitative Analysis

The first item of empirical concern was respondent consistency. A respondent who

responded identically in both scenarios of the first module was marked as consistent (+/+ or -/-),

and inconsistent (+/- or -/+) otherwise. The severity of the scenarios presented, coupled with the

setting aside of legal and periphery matters that society is associated with, an artificial state of

nature has been constructed. Criticisms regarding the efficacy of such an endeavor, the

suspension of all things societal in order to create an artificial state of nature, are legitimate, and

will be addressed in the methodologies section following data review. For now, I ask that the

reader assume this endeavor was successful to allow for operative discussion. In this artificial

state of nature, how uniform are respondents’ moral intuitions? When presented with two

foundationally identical moral quandaries, do they react in a foundationally identical way? When

reason is intentionally set aside, where do their intrinsic passions drive them?

Compatibility: Qualitative Analysis

The second analyzed property of the accumulated data was the compatibility between

module 2 and its predecessor. This was quantified through the presence, or lack thereof, of a

contradiction between the respondent’s exertion of reasoning and intuitive endeavors.

Compatibility is considered qualitative because determining compatibility requires qualitative

analysis through careful interpretation. During this process, each long-form response was

assigned to a thinker according to that thinker’s theory. To be abundantly clear, it is the

See Figure 6, Appendix I.

relationship between intuition and reasoning that is being assessed here. A contradiction could

have occurred if a respondent wished to change his or her answer in module 2 when encouraged

to practice moral reasoning.

This possibility for an occurrence of contradiction is found in the long form of module 2,

if a respondent wishes to change a choice made in module 1 after meditating on the issue. I

would ask the reader to disregard any negative connotations associated with the word

“contradiction” for all aspects of this paper, as this analysis is not meant to pass judgement on

any moral conclusion. A “contradiction” between initial moral intuitions and a reflection period

is by no means comparable to inconsistent moral intuitions, for it is not representative of an

internal strife; rather, it is an indication of the distinction between an impulse and a faculty. A

contradiction between module 1 and module 2 was, quite frankly, expected on my end. It was

expected that at this moment the respondent would consider the choices they were forced to

make and contemplate them, either justifying them or reasoning against them. I then sought to

determine which thinker’s theory aligned best with each respondent’s reasoning through careful

deciphering of their free responses.

Thus, the intended analysis of data is as follows: while the quantitative section

(consistency) tells us what respondents do when asked to employ either impulse or reason, the

qualitative section requires interpretation of the long-form responses and associating them to

thinkers. The purpose these sections serve is as follows: the quantitative section shows raw data

of how individuals handle morality without reason and the qualitative section shows how

individuals handle reason following intuition. Both sections combined provide insight into how

moral individuals treat morality, which holds massive implications for our thinkers’ social

contract theories.

The Data

Consistency

The basic data collected in module 1 concluded that the majority of respondents opted for

the approach that did not deal direct harm, responding to the situation with a negative. This was

the case for both questions of module 1. The negatives landed at 77.24% for question 1 and

82.10% for question 2. The minority counterpart to the negatives, the affirmatives, came in at

22.76% for question 1 and 17.89% for question 2. Between questions 1 and 2, an average of

79.67% responded selflessly with the negative and a mere average of 20.33% responded with the

affirmative

. Thus is the simple data module 1 provided.

What of consistency, however? Module 1’s data indicated that intuitions are not

assuredly steady, though perhaps they are inclined to be. Most respondents expressed consistent

intuitions when it came to the binary choices in module 1, providing a response pattern of either

+/+ or -/- at 72.36%. The inconsistent responses, with a pattern of either +/- or -/+, measured in

at only 27.64%

. It seems that, generally, (1) people opted to spare the few at the doom of the

many, and (2) they did so relatively consistently. Interpretation of this consistency per thinker

will allow for a better understanding of the data collected, for whether or not the data coincides

with intuition as the thinker sees them is directly relevant to the thesis. It is found below that

only a Lockeian understanding of intuition satisfactorily represents the data.

Hobbes

Evaluating the consistency data in Hobbesian thought is twofold given that Hobbesian

moral intuition necessitates that (1) self-interest, equal to self-preservation, is prioritized in the

state of nature and (2) for the self, pleasure be maximized whilst pain is minimized. The moral

See Figure 2, Appendix II.

See Figure 1, Appendix II.

intuitions provided would be entirely governed by appetites and aversions, seeking pleasure and

avoiding pain, and effortfully aiming to ensure the perpetuation of the self. The scenarios

presented in module 1 differed in whether or not they directly threatened the self. As such,

question 1, which does directly threaten the self, corresponds closest to the first property of

Hobbes’ theory of moral intuition. Question 2, which does not directly threaten the self,

corresponds closest to the latter.

In question 1, the respondent is forced to make a decision: spare the few at the expense of

the many or not? Hobbesian theory dictates that moral intuition is not “moral” in the normative

sense at all, but rather an expression of our impulses, including the impulse to survive at others’

expense. Hobbes therefore anticipates that at least a majority, if not all, respondents presented

with a scenario in which the self is put in a position of jeopardy, the respondent would

impulsively select the binary response that ensures their survival. The data collected did not

satisfy this expectation. A significant majority of respondents, an average of 77.24%, opted to

condemn the lives of everyone in the perilous situation rather than actively end the life of one

person. This impulse data collected starkly contradicts Hobbesian moral intuition. An argument

could be made in defense of Hobbes that the artificiality of the state of nature is not effective

enough to assess pure moral impulses, as discussed above, that all impulses will be clouded by

premeditated reason due to the construction of the survey

. However, under the Hobbesian

viewpoint, reason is meant to serve as a tool in service of our impulses, so it matters not whether

the efficacy of the state of nature is questionable. The data stands against Hobbes nonetheless.

The same severe conundrum is presented in question 2, apart from the fact that the self is

no longer at risk. As such, it becomes a matter of pain aversion and pleasure seeking. In the

See “Notes on Methodology and Recommendations,” (p. 47).

scenario that respondents were presented with, it is impossible to avoid pain entirely; they are

forced to choose the path of minimal pain and maximal pleasure. If Hobbes is presumed to be

correct, then in our artificial state of nature, module 1, a majority of affirmative responses would

once again be expected for question 2, to allow for the greatest amount of pleasure to be attained.

A cost/benefit calculation must be made. In order to derive satisfaction, does one actively

intervene to save the lives of others, or refuse to commit an act they deem immoral? Which can

be said to amount to the greatest pleasure? However, Hobbes denies the existence of morality in

the state of nature. No act can be either evil or good. As such, no moral decision as we

investigate it can be discussed under the assumption that those involved weigh moral sentiments

in their process. The Hobbesian viewpoint then dictates that respondents would move towards

desire and away from suffering. This is not what occurred. 82.10% seemed to prefer to witness

the death of more loved ones, and therefore experience more pain, than be directly responsible

for the death of just one.

The involvement of the respondent directly, to be the person committing the action,

complicates the situation of both questions. In fact, a few respondents conveyed in module 2 that

they would not necessarily object to another person in the same situation performing the act

suggested, they just cannot bring themselves to do it. Perhaps it could be argued that it would be

more painful to kill them yourself; Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1986),

writes, “Man…cannot go along with the motive from which he hurt them. [He] readily, therefore

sympathize[s] with the natural resentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of

their hatred and indignation.” Smith’s attitude towards the injured is one of rebuke, but it stems

from “a violation of a sense of fairness” rather than a compulsion to preserve the self (Corby, p.

174). Although Hobbes’ egoistic theory of human motivation and moral-mindedness is

ambiguous, he does not share the opinion of Smith that there be, especially in a state of nature,

“fairness” in this sense. Additionally, it is interesting that the affirmatives were greater for

question 1 than question 2. This indicates that although Hobbes could be wrong that the impulse

for self-preservation overpowers the will to help others, perhaps it is stronger than the impulse to

maximize pleasure and minimize pain. It would be reasonable to think that if one thought with

Hobbesian impulse for question 1, that same mode of cognition would apply for question 2, but

this disparity suggests that some Hobbesian impulses are either stronger than others or the only

ones recognized. Regardless, the data is not in Hobbes’ favor.

Locke

Allow me to preface this section with a reiteration of the important features of Locke’s

position. Firstly, there exists natural law under Locke: all individuals have a right to life, liberty,

and property. Secondly, moral intuition, according to Locke, can be coarsely interpreted as a

reflection of natural law, though it is not bound to it. Thirdly, he emphasizes that in the state of

nature, all people possess the right to restraint and reparations. In interpreting the data from

module 1 then, under Lockeian tradition, it is best to identify whether or not a sense of

uniformity (+/+, -/-) among the intuitions was invoked. If there is an element of truly staggering

uniformity, then the normativity of the responses may be cited as the result of a communal

access to natural law. The majority percentages collected for questions 1 and 2 (77.24% and

82.10% respectively)

are in Locke’s favor; Locke’s efforts towards natural law have promise.

The first two of these features restated above pertain to the presence of natural law in

respondents’ moral intuitions and is relevant for both questions in the module. I will begin with

question 1: the decision made here can be reduced to an act or omission of self-preservation,

See Figure 2, Appendix II.

which Locke argues we have not only a right to, but a duty to. The notion of duty associated with

self-preservation, echoed in his claim that there exists a natural right to life, is extremely relevant

given that, as established, question 1 threatens not only the lives of the many but the life of the

respondent. One might conclude that if individuals have a right and a duty to preserve their own

lives, then it is nonsensical that a large majority of individuals are willing to sacrifice themselves

and others to prevent the doing of harm. However, although Locke’s thesis does comment on

self-defense and the priorities of natural law, such commentary is not pertinent to this context. If

self-defense is to be considered acceptable under natural law, which it is, then natural law should

compel respondents to protect and preserve their own lives from that which threatens it.

However, Locke refers to that which threatens the individual’s life as the “aggressor” (Locke

1689, sect. 235). How can an individual dying by no fault of their own, accidentally threatening

the lives of others by merely continuing to exist, be considered an aggressor? To label them as

such would be unreasonable. Therefore, the only interpretation of natural law that can be

recognized as relevant to question 1 is that all individuals have a right to life, therefore

respondents ought to opt to protect that life. The data concurs with this hypothesis, as 77.24%

chose the negative in the binary form.

In question 2, the life of the respondent is not threatened, but the natural right to life is,

and in this instance, there is a clear “aggressor.” As such, the decision to defeat the aggressor and

preserve the right to life is not only permitted, but encouraged by natural law. Though it is

unreasonable for individuals to be the judges in cases of defense against aggressors, as no

individual can be expected to be an unbiased arbiter of natural law, Locke unmistakably would

recognize it as the natural position one finds themselves in prior to the formation of society. As

such, in the artificial state of nature constructed in module 1, an individual must operate as their

own executor of natural law. However, in the situation presented, respondents did not have the

option to harm the aggressor, and instead had to either harm an innocent that they are close to in

order to save another innocent that they are close to, or lose both at the hand of the aggressor.

The third feature, a reminder of the right to punish, is relevant for the second question as well,

for this allows action to be taken against the aggressor even before harm is committed against the

innocent. Although the aggressor has not yet committed a harmful action against an innocent,

Locke’s notion of restraint is meant to deter and prevent future crimes, and covers the intent of

the aggressor, justifying action taken against them even before they have taken action. The ideal

option, to punish the aggressor, is not an actual option in the scenario. Thus, the Lockeian course

of action is only to respect the life of the innocent. Locke’s belief is once again supported by the

data. 82.10% chose not to harm the innocent involved, and many expressed their contempt for

the binary characteristic of the situation presented, wishing there was an additional choice in

which they could harm the aggressor. These sentiments will be expanded upon in the next

section.

Rousseau

Recall Rousseau’s claim that the “noble savage” (Rousseau, 1762) has a natural

inclination to achieving the good life, uncorrupted by civilization. By suspending reason, the

protomoral conscience, respondents—the “faux-savages”—provided their intuitive

understanding as to the best course of action in the situations provided. As discussed, question 1

pertains directly to self-preservation, whereas question 2 regards the implications of family that

Rousseau makes much more closely.

Question 1 exemplifies the balance that Rousseau describes in the state of nature; a

balance between amour de soi and pitié. Amour de soi, self-preservation, dictates that affirmative

action must be taken in order to ensure survival. Pitié, however, would stay that hand, unless

self-preservation were at stake. An analysis must be conducted, similarly to Hobbes, and a

decision made. The decision made would be without the judicious assistance of a state, and

would therefore be amoral, neither virtuous nor vicious, but must be made regardless. The data

concluded that 77.24% of faux-savages would choose pitié with only 22.76% prioritizing amour

de soi. This data does not entirely align with Rousseau’s position: a majority should prioritize

self-preservation under Rousseau’s theory. Although the lack of a majority of amour de soi

demonstrates traces of pitié, of hesitation to inflict harm upon a fellow, the self is at risk in this

scenario, so self-preservation should take precedence.

In question 2, respondents are moved to a stage in the movement away from the state of

nature. The traditional family, as Rousseau puts it, is a step towards the development of society,

as government is modeled off of the power structures of the family. In this stage, the savages are

still savage for all intents and purposes, they are simply beginning to understand notions of

property—the family—and power relations as they are set in motion, resulting in conjugal and

parental relationships. In the second scenario, the faux-savages were presented with a severe

scenario that asked them if they were willing not only to commit a violent act, but to do so

against a child of their own (Stirparo, 2013). The condition of devolution of the savages,

worsened by continual coexistence of the family structure, loosened the natural “strength and

ferocity” (Rousseau, 1755, para. 13) that they initially possessed and which Rousseau held in

high esteem. The weakness, an amplification of pitié, moves the savage away from the animosity

comparable to the Spartans. Though not yet civilized or incorporated into any fulfilled society,

the degradation has already begun. To overcome the innate aversion to the suffering of another,

let alone to intentionally harm a child that a personal relationship is held with, is an extremely

difficult task, made even more arduous by virtue of the fact that even having a family to be

endangered results in suppression of the resolve to protect them (Rousseau, 1755). The

paradoxical nature of relations for Rousseau complicates prioritization of impulse. However,

impulse to protect the family, as a newer drive, ought to provide the faux-savages with the

volition necessary to overcome what has already begun degrading. Given that the degradation

has already commenced, familial relations and the desire to protect them is what I argue

Rousseau would prioritize. Thus, a majority affirmative response from the faux-savages is to be

expected, and this expectation was not fulfilled. 82.10% negative responses, an even stronger

propensity than the previous question, was collected. The faux-savages, concerned with power,

property, and protection of that property, were not represented by the negative data.

Rawls

Rawlsian intuitionism is not intuitionism as known to other philosophers. The Rawlsian

conception of justice, that there is an “irreducible family” of first principles of justice (Rawls,

1971, p. 30) that have to be balanced with our judgements, was proposed as a viable alternative

to intuitionist conceptions of justice (Evans, 2016). Rawlsian intuition would dictate that

intuition in this research is therefore guided by some first principles of justice, accessible prior to

the veil of reasoning exercise. The Rawlsian state of nature equivalent is the original position: in

this position, just like the state of nature, individuals are without society and under the veil of

ignorance. What they do retain, however, is an understanding of morality in itself as equality.

Rawls equates morality with equality. Thus, in module 1, respondents can be expected to take the

route that is most fair and most equal. For both questions, however, what is fair and equal is not

applied moral philosophy, but political philosophy; Rawls confines his theory on what is fair and

equal to politics: “the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that

thing” (Rawls, 1971, p. 29). A calculation must be made; not a cost/benefit one in the same way

Hobbes’ is, but one that is analytic and based in moral judgements. Where Hobbesian

calculations are amoral, Rawlsian judgements are moral-laden, a fixed point provisional to

reason.

In question 1, the respondent is forced to consider whether or not they would sacrifice the

life of one already dying in order to save the lives of others. What decision is most equal, and

therefore the most moral? Rawls himself has denied that he is a strict utilitarian (Rawls, 1971),

but when a theory of justice is based on principles of uniform fairness irrespective of status, what

is most equal becomes a question of what satisfies the principles of the most people involved.

However, Rawls’ liberty principle fails to account for the harm principle (Haidar, 2008) such that

protection of liberty allows for harm to come to others. 77.24% argued the negative, that it was

morally impermissible to sacrifice the dying to save the rest, which does not align with what is

most fair and equal for Rawls.

In question 2, the respondent is forced to make a decision on whether or not to inflict

harm upon a loved one in order to save the life of another loved one. According to the prior data

collected, respondents do not believe that what is “fair and equal” is the greatest number of lives

saved, but rather, adherence to the morality of the actions committed. We can therefore predict

that the majority of respondents would opt for the negative, refusing to commit an action they

have deemed immoral, killing an innocent, regardless of the consequences that are sure to

follow. The majority negative for question 2 was even more than question 1: 82.10% chose not

to intervene. This large majority, coupled with the majority of question 1, displays a trend of

prioritizing the moral character of the individual, but does not satisfy Rawls’ liberty principle for

the reason aforementioned.

Compatibility

It is in this section that interpretation is necessary, and where I expect to be the most

contested. In the consistency section prior, binary responses were not associated to a thinker, but

the totality of responses considered within each thinker’s framework. Here, the long-form

responses will be assigned individually to a thinker. I hypothesized for a significant percentage

of module 2 to be incompatible. The basic data collected in module 2, however, demonstrated

that very few respondents felt it necessary to change their moral intuitions. An average of only

7.32% changed their binary response after engaging in reason, and 92.69% did not change their

binary response

. Themes found in the long-form response data were slotted into the theoretical

investigation of the thinkers; I will address all below during the investigation of the content of

the responses per thinker. Firstly, allow me to outline the data: clearly, the overwhelming

majority was satisfied with the binary responses they gave, but most of the respondents spoke in

Lockeian-style justification of their beliefs, appealing to an established moral order. The general

averages per thinker show that in module 2, an average of 16.67% justified their intuitions

without elaborating, talking in circles and using reason as Hobbes suggests it is used. An average

of 54.47% appealed to an innate sense of moral duty, referencing their Lockeian, pre-existing

moral structures. An average of 5.70% suppressed pitié or appealed to a general will, like

Rousseau suggests. An average of 21.96% described a critical assessment of the intuition and

concluded reason should dictate their response in spite of their repulsion to the choice,

suppressing their intuitions in a Rawlsian manner

. I would care to remind the reader before

reading further into this section that it matters not whether the long-form response produced an

See Figure 3, Appendix II.

See Figure 4, Appendix II.

affirmative or a negative response in its placement to a thinker, but the rationale (or, in Hobbes’

case, a lack thereof) the respondent provides.

Hobbes

What identified a Hobbesian long-form response was pure justification. A Hobbesian

manner of justification of the impulse was noted if a respondent, when asked to reason, provided

a response full of tautologies or circular explanations, justifying their binary choice through lone

reference to the binary choice. Such responses were labeled as a Hobbesian justification of

impulse. The phraseology that flagged a representation of the Hobbesian theory that reason is a

tool for impulse was any reasonable variation of the following: “No, I wouldn’t.”; “Yes, I

would.” The common denominator among these responses being that there is no answer to the

“why” question beyond reiteration of the answer itself. Interestingly, 5.69% of responses

provided per question in module 2 did not even elaborate beyond the binary choice provided, and

when asked to reason simply restated the affirmative or the negative. For the purposes of this

thesis, those responses were considered an extreme indication that reason was limited to the

impulses themselves, rather than a lack of interest in engaging with the prompt, and therefore

codified as Hobbesian.

In module 2, 14.63% of question 1’s long-form responses and 18.70% of question 2’s

long-form responses were labeled Hobbesian, for an average of 16.67%. A condition worthy of

note for a long-form response to be codified as Hobbes was that the respondent had to have

compatibility between their reason and their preceding impulses, as Hobbesian theory recognizes

reason as a servant of impulse, and any disagreement between reason and impulse would actively

disprove Hobbes’ thesis. Compatibility, however, was very common: only 7.32% opted to

change their answer, as previously stated.

Locke

Surprisingly, Lockeian long-form responses dominated the data; with a clear majority of

57.72% for question 1, 52.03% for question 2, and an average of 54.88% for module 1, Locke’s

theory seems to be the most illustrative of normative ethics and consequently warrants the most

discussion. This percentage is due to the variety of responses which were attributed to Lockeian

theory, the types of which will be elaborated upon. This percentage, however, was so significant

that it warrants its own graph to better distinguish the data

. Initially, the criteria used to identify

a Lockeian long-form response was an appeal to a higher code or order, be it a moral

commitment, deity, or otherwise. Many referenced a divine power, others just a moral

establishment. Lockeian theory dictates moral access to a natural order, so an appeal of reason to

an order that is absolute and eternal, a morality subject to natural law, is what marked a Lockeian

response. What really skewed the data towards Locke, however, was the introduction of a second

data type: outright denial of the scenarios proposed, or false hope. I expected an element of false

hope, which was to be attributed to Locke, but not to such an extraordinary degree that it would

necessitate its own sub-class. An average of 24.39% of Lockeian respondents were assigned as

such because they denied the premises of the situation: for question 1, “There’s a chance

someone might come earlier.”; for question 2, “…you have no reason to believe the man will kill

them.” These scenarios operated plainly as a thought experiment; one was instructed to accept

the propositions as they are and make hypothetical decisions within their parameters, presuming

what was presented is what is undoubtedly true. This was made quite clear, but many

respondents still rejected the assumptions they were asked to hold. For whatever reason, be it

moral intuitionism or not, it is commonplace for individuals to get defensive when they are

See Figure 5, Appendix II.

challenged with hard moral questions (Haidt, 2001), denial of given premises is a defensive

reaction. One respondent even wrote, “I’d like to think that these situations are more open ended

[sic] despite the parameters provided.” The situations are undoubtedly not more open-ended and

are in fact bound to the parameters provided. It is this abundance of situational denial, what I

have been referring to as the “false hope phenomenon.” Another unexpected data type that was

placed with Locke was outspoken irrationality, e.g. “I know the rational answer is X, but I will

do Y.” An average of 3.66% expressed consciously irrational thought processes. To summarize,

the averages of the Lockeian data depict a small amount of self-recognition of irrationality

(3.66%), a larger amount of appeals to higher orders (71.96%), and an even larger amount of

false hope (24.39%).

It is now prudent to clarify the attribution of these new data types, explicit irrationality

and false hope, and I will explain my reasoning for these distinctions. With regard to explicit

irrationality, by virtue of what moral law is, it is also rational. Individuals are also rational, so

they are able to reason to rational moral law. However, Locke conveys how self-interest

interferes. Respondents were ethically disconcerted by the severity of the scenarios presented,

and that occasionally led them to repudiate the scenarios’ presumed truth—this willful denial as

a defense mechanism for one’s morality is a near-perfect depiction of Lockeian self-interest.

Where a scenario creates a morally problematic situation, the denial in self-interest corrupts the

reason such that respondents are fully aware of the irrationality of their thought, but impelled not

to oppose it regardless. The interpretation of explicit irrationality ought not to be attributed to

Hobbes despite its seeming similarity to the classic Hobbesian notion that reason is held at the

reins of impulse. Explicit irrationality was not attributed to Hobbes because it is, in fact, explicit.

Such a response should not be ascribed to Hobbes because irrationality’s thorough, expressed

acknowledgement does not follow Hobbes’ argument that reason is unknowingly influenced by

impulse. Once recognition occurs, it no longer falls under the perspective of the rationalist who

believes intuition to be a form of rational insight.

False hope was attributed to Locke because the notion of false hope is, as previously

discussed, a defensive strategy, which indicates the respondents’ discomfort to the morally

reprehensible situations they were faced with such that they removed themselves from the reality

of the situation. This highlights the pre-established moral sentiments they felt the scenarios

challenged. Pre-established moral sentiments amongst the thinkers are most clearly a component

of Lockeian moral theory. It is also worth noting that many of the respondents who contributed

to the false hope phenomenon extended their disbelief at the situation and the idea that they will

be rescued from it, also seemed to hope to be rescued from making a moral decision. Now, they

are, in accordance with the survey’s design, incapable of escaping this decision, but many

refused to make a decision because it was not their right and that they might be saved. However,

in a situation where one can either do something or do nothing, deciding not to choose is

tantamount to doing nothing and a choice is making regardless. This translates to the respondents

feeling that they did not have a right to act—that it was not their place, but the place of sense and

order to make such a decision. They deny both the reality that rescue is an impossibility and that

a decision must be made, and was made, whether they believe they have the right to or not.

Rousseau

Rousseau responses weighed in at 7.32% for question 1, 4.07% for question 2, and an

average of 5.69% between the two. Rousseau’s approach towards amour de propre made

identifying such reasoning an interesting endeavor; although he claims that an inflamed amour

de propre may make a peaceful individual an instigator, suppressing the natural pitié in order to

take advantage of others for personal power, he concurrently details the general will where moral

reasoning stands alongside liberty. In these situations, then, moral reasoning is either subject to

an urge to exploit or a utopian-style moral code. However, though the respondents employed

reason, and were acting in total liberty, they were the sole moral actors in a thought experiment

free of ramifications beyond the direct action or inaction, and therefore cannot be said to have

acted in accordance with some general will. General will, after all, is designed to represent the

interests of all involved, and per the parameters of the situations provided, the only interest

represented would be their own. Thus, a long-form response was assigned to Rousseau if a

verbal exploitation of the situation for personal power was provided. There was some of this

amongst the data, and all of it affirmative. Responses like these did not cite their actions as a

necessity for survival, but diminished its severity and even added additional comments like “the

less there are, the better.”

A few long-form responses were most appropriately identified as a secondary response

for Rousseau: an appeal to sentiments that seemed like an unofficial general will. I use

“unofficial” to remind the reader that I do not feel it is appropriate to define the situations the

respondents were placed in as situations that can allow for the production of general will, as the

only decision-maker was the respondent. However, the situations did allow for consideration of

others’ opinions in the matter. Though the non-players were meant to provide stakes and nothing

more, a few respondents considered them very heavily, whether they were fretting over the

consequences their decision may have on the hypothetical relationships and bonds they formed

with these characters or asserting that they would not take the affirmative response unless

another player took action first, in which case they would aid and abet. These responses regarded

the others quite heavily, akin to the conventional character of Rousseau’s society (Noone, 1971).

Rawls

Rawlsian responses measured in at 20.33% for question 1, 25.20% for question 2, for an

average of 22.76%. What identified a Rawlsian long-form response was explicit placement of

pure reason over intuitive feelings in decision-making. If a respondent willfully suppressed their

initial aversion to their response, be it affirmative or negative, then they were identified as

employing a veil to sharpen their reasoning according to the Rawlsian preference towards

rationality. Common phraseology amongst these types of responses for an affirmative response

were as follows: “It’s terrible, but…” or “I don’t want to do this, but…” The rationale explicitly

overcame the aversion to violence. Such responses were affirmative to the binary question, and

all of these types of responses reasoned for the “greatest good.” However, as stated earlier,

Rawlsian responses can be either affirmative or negative. A negative response justification was

much rarer, and there was little overlap in the actual reasoning, though the key identifier of

reason over intuition remained the same across the responses. An example of such a reasoned

negative response for question 2 genuinely considered the outcomes of the two choices provided

for the scenario and after reviewing their implications, decided that the death of both children

was rationally preferable to the death of one by their own hand: “The moment I shoot my

daughter, I have also lost my son.” Now, I feel comfortable disagreeing with this decision

(estrangement is not death), but thought and rationale were put into this response. The participant

did not act on feeling, but by weighing the interpersonal strain such a situation would have on

their family. Essentially, a long-form response labeled as Rawlsian reason in module 2 should

demonstrate a recognized disconnect between the impulse and the reason. Importantly, this does

not necessarily constitute a change between impulse and reason, as is demonstrated by the fact

that 22.76% of responses were Rawlsian and only 7.32% of responses were incompatible.

Rather, it mandates an explicit discussion of the reasoning as previously stated.

Summary and Significance

The empirical data, mostly consistent and compatible, is best explained by Locke’s

theory of moral reasoning within his social contract theory. Considering the quantitative section

alongside the qualitative section allows for analysis on how these respondents treat moral

decision-making in accordance with the social contract thinkers’ theories. In my efforts to

determine which social contract theorist’s ideas regarding moral reasoning would capture the

data, I found that coordinated intuitions and Lockeian sentiments were the most popular amongst

respondents. Thus, the hypothesis presented, that Rawlsian-style autonomous reason would be

most prevalent, was not supported. Lockeian responses prevailed, constituting a significant

majority of the data collected. Although respondents did not employ reason in the Rawlsian

sense, explicating their discrimination of intuition and reason as I had suspected, does this mean

Lockeian governmental propositions in Two Treatises on Government are the ideal form of

government? Not necessarily. This research was meant to investigate the inclination of popular

reason, and given that a majority of respondents to this inquiry thought in a Lockeian style, it

might seem reasonable to implement Lockeian government, given that the majority of the masses

were properly fitted in their social contract. The social contract, however, is not a matter of

“majority-fit.” Because the social contract’s justification relies on a universal moral theory, what

fits for most is insufficient—the social contract under these theorists must fit for all. If it were the

case that the majority social contract could be the ideal social contract, then it would be

reasonable to implement the Lockeian trust. However, each social contract requires that its

foundational moral theory be true, which presents intellectual and moral problems.

Furthermore, according to this data, methodology of reason is not a matter of “one size

fits all.” The variations in reason potentially threaten the gargantuan assumption made by all four

of the social contract thinkers regarding the universality of how reason itself is engaged. The fact

that even some of the responses were Rawlsian seems to imply that the faculty is there and

perhaps it just was not engaged in the other responses. The same could be argued for Hobbes and

Rousseau. However, the social contract—and political philosophy as a whole—is grounded in

moral thought, such that the social contract is contingent on the universal theories of moral

reasoning presented. If this assumption about the nature of reasoning is made, then the social

contract is similarly bound to universality and opposes variation. Thus, I argue that the social

contract, rooted in a theory of reason that varies widely amongst the thinkers, can be either

wholly right or wholly wrong, and majority-fit is viable. The consequences of variant reasoning

for the political theories discussed propose intellectual and moral dilemmas: Need the thinkers’

moral theories be truly universal? If not, how can the social contract theories be justified? If so,

can a social contract theory be proposed that does not rely on such a universal moral theory? The

practicality of these results is therefore limited, but its results prompt important subsequent

questions for scholarship on the social contract theory and its relationship to reason that I am

eager to see further explored.

Notes on Methodology and Recommendations

It is important to mention that the Covid-19 pandemic barred the ideal method of

assessing moral intuitions, an Implicit Association Test (IAT). The Qualtrics survey, though

effective in enforcing binary decision-making, was not as effective in instituting time

management as an IAT. The average response time of the intuitive responses in my survey was

3.27 seconds. The upper boundary for an IAT of 2.0 seconds (Nosek et al., 2014) would have

produced more accurate data; the maximum time possible in an IAT is less than the average time

for my survey. Because in a survey, time limits are impractical, the intuitive responses would

have been more accurately captured were the original design a practical feasibility. Furthermore,

an in-person discussion would have allowed a stronger space for respondents to critically assess

their choices made in the IAT, rather than explaining them independently in such a way that

incentivizes easy responses rather than more engaged responses. Because I could not ask

questions and some responses were very brief, it was sometimes difficult to interpret

intentionality, whereas in a laboratory environment, one-on-one discourse is possible. Thus, the

quality of the data suffered. This also posed complications for interpretation of Hobbesian

responses; where tautological explanations were deemed Hobbesian, a secondary interpretation

might be disinterest that would not have occurred in a lab setting. With Qualtrics software,

oversight comparable to that present in a lab is infeasible. It is therefore my recommendation and

hope that this research be repeated when its initial design becomes actionable: an IAT for

module 1 and one-on-one interaction for module 2.

There are also criticisms beyond the methodology to consider, that target the design

itself. An opponent of natural law may claim that my artificial state of nature does not accurately

simulate the state of nature enough to dissolve moral standards and societal norms during

engagement in the IAT, so the results would have no bearing on the existence of natural law, I

would only concede that the artificial state of nature did no such dissolving. However, all

thinkers’ states of nature involve intuition as the lone driver in decision-making. In having the

respondents make moral decisions using only their intuitions, they enter an “effective” state of

nature, one in which the absence of reason warrants a natural state, for reason does not make an

appearance until development in society according to all four thinkers. So, even if it is supposed

that the artificial state of nature was ineffective in stripping away the identity of the respondent

for the intuitions provided, that alone does not defect the results.

Conclusion

My research concluded that there is an affinity towards Lockeian moral decision-making

and demonstrated the significance such a conclusion has on the social contract theory. The social

contract theory’s dependence on the thinkers’ assertions on the nature of moral reasoning and

moral intuitions is inherent and worth sufficient consideration. I attempted to contribute to that

conversation with this project. In this thesis, I investigated four of the most prominent social

contract theories and their empirical viability through an assessment of the consistency and

compatibility of moral decision-making in order to determine which social contract theory best

explains the data collected. Furthermore, my research suggests that there is an inseparable

relationship that the social contract theory shares with moral decision-making and that this

relationship warrants further exploration in the empirical community. My conclusion should

guide future research to answer the moral and intellectual dilemmas that arose from its

conclusion and steer the social contract theory’s modern discussion to recognize empirical data.

Additionally, empirical data will serve to benefit the social contract theory in contemporary

political philosophy, as the need for experimental support becomes more and more necessary in

academic circles.

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Appendix I: Visualization of Research

Question 2

Short-form

Question 1

Short-form

Question 1

Long-form

Question 2

Long-form

Module 1

(Intuitions)

Module 2

(Reason)

Module 1

(Intuition)

Question 1:

You are trapped in a mine shaft with four other miners after the collapse of a structure, and

one miner is seriously injured. It will take 42 hours for the rescue team to clear the wreckage

and safely evacuate your group. You know for certain that the mine shaft only has 42 hours

worth of oxygen for 4 people, and not for all of you that are trapped. Killing the injured miner

would preserve oxygen for everyone else, ensuring your survival and the survival of three

others.

Do you kill the injured miner?

Question 2:

You have two children, a daughter and a son. A sadistic criminal who has broken into your

house wants you to fatally shoot your daughter. He says that if you don't, he will not only kill

your daughter, but your son as well. You don't have any doubt that he means what he says.

Do you shoot your daughter?

Figure 6

Figure 7

Module 2

(Reason)

Question 1:

Consider the first scenario and your response. Please explain why you chose this answer

below (there is no word minimum or maximum--write however much you feel you need to

explain your intuitions). If in the process of explaining you find that you want to amend your

answer, you may do so, but explain why.

Question 2:

Consider the second scenario and your response. Please explain why you chose this answer

below (there is no word minimum or maximum--write however much you feel you need to

explain your intuitions). If in the process of explaining you find that you want to amend your

answer, you may do so, but explain why.

Figure 8

Appendix II: Visualization of Data

72.36

27.64

Module 1: Consistency

Consistent Inconsistent

Figure 1

Figure 2

Question 1 Average Question 2

Negative

77.24 79.67 82.1

Affirmative

22.76 20.325 17.89

100

120

Module 1: Response Data

92.69

7.32

Module 2: Compatibility

Compatible Incompatible

Hobbes Locke Rousseau Rawls

% OF RESPONDENTS

THINKER ASSIGNED TO

Module 2: Alignment Data By Thinker

Question 1 Average Question 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

80.00

False Hope Irrationality Higher Order

% OF LOCKEIAN RESPONDENTS

Module 2: Lockeian Sub-Classes

Question 1 Average Question 2

Figure 5