English July August 2016 Burpo

July-August 2016 MILITARY REVIEW62

20th CBRNE Command

Organizing, Training, and

Resourcing for Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and Explosives Operations

Brig. Gen. James B. Burton, U.S. Army, Retired

Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army

Capt. Kevin Garcia, U.S. Army

Soldiers aached to 2nd Infantry Division destroy simulated chemical weapons manufacturing equipment 22 March 2016 during training

near the Korean Demilitarized Zone in Black Hawk Village, Republic of Korea.

(Photo by Sgt. Quanesha Deloach, U.S. Army)

63MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2016

CBRNE

n April 1980, a U.S. military operation of utmost

strategic importance ectacularly failed before

the entire world, bringing embarassment to the

United States, unease to our alies, and celebration to

our adversaries. Eight Americans died without having

ever been engaged by enemy forces in the operation

that was aborted long before it was close to its objective.

In the aermath, Iranian television jubilantly showed

the chared remains of the eight lackened American

corpses during ensuing press conferences.

Operation Eagle Claw had aimed to rescue y-three

Americans in two locations in the heart of Tehran who

were taken hostage in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. is

complex operation integrated operators from the Army,

Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and dierent inteligence

agencies; forty-four aircra from the dierent services;

thousands of galons of fuel; and a convoy of vehicles for

insertion into a hostile city of over four milion people.

Forward reconnaissance had marked two locations in the

desert, known as Desert One and Desert Two, for aircra

to land. C-130 aircra from the Air Force, loaded with

the rescue force and fuel laders, would rendezvous with

Navy helicopters piloted by marines at Desert One, where

they would conduct refuel operations without ilumination.

From Desert One, the eight helicopters would fery the res-

cue force to Desert Two on the outskirts of the city, where

vehicles would be covertly staged to begin the inltration

early in the morning to the locations harboring the hostages.

Expecting a reght once the Iranians became aware of the

rescue aempt, helicopters would arive at a nearby soccer

stadium to exltrate the hostages and rescue force to a near-

by airport seized by Army Rangers so that a second eet of

xed-wing transports could y everyone to freedom.

Leading up to Operation Eagle Claw, the teams in-

volved from the dierent services and agencies had never

operated together or conducted a ful mission rehearsal.

Mission command confusion and mission complexity

contributed to the crash between a transport plane and

helicopter resulting in American deaths, abandonment of

equipment and sensitive information in the Iranian desert,

and ultimately, the cancelation of the overal mission.

Analysis of the operation in its aermath concluded

that failure could largely be aributed to the services

having brought together ecialized, functional, stove-

piped organizations on an ad hoc basis. Gen. Stanley

McChrystal would later comment that, “At best, the

plan was a series of dicult missions, each a variale

in a complex equation. At worst, with an ad hoc team,

it caled for a string of miracles.”

e needed miracles

did not hapen, and the resulting failure would forever

change the way the United States aproached organiz-

ing, training, and resourcing ecial operations.

Applying Lessons of the Past to

Beer Prepare for the Realities of

the Operational Environment

is article examines the Army 20th Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE)

Command’s eorts in 2014 to 2015 to organize, train,

and resource for CBRNE operations in order to achieve

the Nation’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and

CBRNE objectives. ese initiatives are a conscious eort

to avoid ad hoc organizational solutions that could lead to

mission failures similar to Operation Eagle Claw.

Given the nexus of ideology, technology, and

CBRNE materials employed by state and nonstate ac-

tors, the authors oer that WMD may be beer viewed

as a subset of the more encompassing term CBRNE,

which more accurately reects anticipated mission sets

and serves as a broader lens for force employment. We

sugest that dealing with future operational environ-

ments in accordance with recently pulished strategic

uidance would best be accomplished by reorganizing

Army CBRNE forces and regionaly aligning them in

preparation to execute their critical mission sets.

Multifunctional CBRNE Task Force

In order to evaluate the possibility of eective

multifunctional CBRNE formation employment, the

20th CBRNE Command developed and implemented

a multifunctional CBRNE task force (TF) concept to

synchronize the synergistic capabilities of our chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) forces

with those of our explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

forces and nuclear disalement teams. e CBRNE

TF concept underwent continual evaluation at the

Army’s combat training centers (CTCs) and during an

Army-wide Network Integration Evaluation to identify

critical capability gaps and chalenges.

To increase our understanding of those gaps, and to

aid in the development of solutions for them, the CTCs

provide an optimal taical environment for assemling

the CBRNE enterprise’s senior leadership as part of the

20th CBRNE Command’s “Scientists in the Foxhole”

July-August 2016 MILITARY REVIEW64

initiative.

is initiative is an immersive experience

to beer inform scientic research, technology

acquisition, and policy formulation through ob-

servation of the execution of CBRNE operations

in a multiechelon, eld-training environment that

includes a realistic replication of the ful range of

anticipated CBRNE hazards.

e CBRNE Strategic Landscape

Taking the strategic landscape of 1980 and

aplying it to today, one would be hard pressed to

nd a more “cannot fail” mission than countering

weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). Nearly

every strategic uidance document pulished

identifying threats to the United States and its alies

highly prioritizes CWMD as a clear requirement as

known adversaries continue to pursue these types of

capabilities.

Whether those adversaries are crimi-

nals, terorists, or nation-states, “increased access to

expertise, materials, and technologies heightens the

risk that these adversaries wil seek, acquire, prolif-

erate, and employ WMD.”

Operational environment. With today’s unprece-

dented global interconnections and the ease of access

and distribution of information and threat technology,

potential CBRNE employment methods are much

harder to contain, track, and therefore counter. e

danger is also growing as reular and ireular forces,

criminals, refugees, and other agents increasingly inter-

mingle and interact among themselves internationaly

across traditional lines.

While WMD may elicit the notion of dicult-to-

make-and-access nuclear or chemical weapons, many

CBRNE hazards are commercialy availale, easily

procured, and when coupled with a delivery means, can

have WMD-scale devastating eects. erefore, em-

ploying WMD, and more broaly CBRNE weapons, is

no longer the sole purview of nation-states. In adition

to a broad range of readily availale conventional weap-

ons, state and nonstate actors can select from an aray of

aordale technologies that can be adapted in uncon-

ventional ways. We should, therefore, anticipate that

our adversaries wil seek to develop and employ CBRNE

capabilities to shape the operating environment by

inicting casualties, creating conditions to deter or defeat

entry operations, and eroding pulic alied or coalition

suport together with the basic wil to ght.

WMD and CBRNE terminology. Numerous or-

ganizations exist across the national security enterprise

studying the CWMD prolem set, with many varying

nuances in their denitions of WMD. However, al have

the same objectives of preventing WMD development

and use, and preparing for consequence management.

e American pulic expects that its government

and national security enterprise wil be trained and orga-

nized corectly to meet any threat, regarless of how vast

or complex. Also, there is the pulic’s expectation of rap-

id coalescing of capabilities to defeat, contain, or respond

eectively to CBRNE threats to protect U.S. interests.

To aply the lessons learned from Operation Eagle

Claw, it is paramount that we ensure that military forc-

es and interagency partners responsile for confronting

WMD (and more broaly CBRNE threats and haz-

ards) are not ad hoc groups of functional, stovepiped

organizations coming together on the objective without

previous experience working together, but rather, are

an integrated force continualy training for and colec-

tively organizing apropriately to respond.

Expanding the Scope of the reat

e Department of Defense (DOD) denes WMD

as “chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons

or devices capale of a high order of destruction and/or

causing mass casualties. is does not include the means

65MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2016

CBRNE

of transporting or propeling the weapon where such a

means is separale and divisile part of the weapon.”

However, there is an increasing recognition of the ex-

panded scope and impact of CBRNE threats and hazards.

A 2014 CWMD white paper by the Army Capabilities

Integration Center states, “the Army’s aproach to

CWMD is consistent with the DOD denition and

includes the expanded scope of explosive threats resulting

in a high order of destruction. is ful range of CBRNE

threats and hazards is representative of the combined

arms aproach for future force capabilities development.”

In adition to broadening the scope of explosive

yield considered, the ful range of CBRNE threats

and hazards is recommended as a broader umbrela

concept for organizing, training, resourcing, and em-

ploying forces, where the WMD mission space exists

as a subset of CBRNE. Including the range of low- to

high-yield explosives to holisticaly charaerize the

curent and future range of threats and hazards beer

captures the subset of critical tasks that EOD soldiers

perform in operations, including unexploded ordnance

disposal to improvised explosive device (IED) defeat.

With this perective, for the purposes of organizing

Army operations, the term represented by the acronym

CBRNE should be used as the operative term that in-

tegrates and accounts more accurately for these threats

and the capabilities needed to counter them.

ese perectives are drawn from the lessons

learned from the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2012

and multiple explosive aacks that include the 1993

New York City bombing of the World Trade Center,

the 1995 Oklahoma City car bombing of the Alfred P.

Murah Federal Building, the 1996 truck bombing of

the Khobar Tower military complex in Saudi Arabia,

the October 2000 boat bombing of USS Cole, and the

April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.

To further ilustrate this point, explosives in the

form of jet fuel, coupled with the delivery means of

an airplane, exemplied a terorist-delivered CBRNE

event on 11 September 2001, with mass eects that

would not otherwise be formaly charaerized as

caused by a WMD under the DOD denition.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Pamphlet 525-7-19, e United States Ary Concet

Capability Plan fo Combating Weapons of Mas

Destruction fo the Future Moula Foce, 2015-2024, pro-

vides this discussion on the categorization of WMD:

Whether or not the denition of WMD, or a

denition of CWMD, wil eventualy include

al explosives, it is apropriate to acknowl-

edge that future solutions developed in

response to CWMD capability requirements

must consider cross-utility for such things as

explosives detection and forensic analysis of

trace chemical residue. Any analytical capa-

bility developed for CBRN aplications ought

to consider the chemical nature of explosives

as part of the requirement.

With this expanded CBRNE/WMD perective,

state-sponsored nuclear and chemical WMD are

considered here as a subset under the broader umbrela

concept of CBRNE threats and hazards.

While diculty in acquiring, developing, and de-

livering weapons increases from chemical to biological

to radiological to nuclear, with low-yield explosives

remaining cheap and easy, accelerating technological

advancement enales a greater ease in the development

and employment of not only single threat types but

also more complex hybrid CBRNE threats delivered in

paralel or serial within a given operational area.

CBRNE leaders and scientists observe a simulated fuel rod enrich-

ment facility during the Scientists in the Foxhole event November

2015 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

(Photo by Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army)

July-August 2016 MILITARY REVIEW66

In the same manner in which the 9/11 terorists

coupled innovative delivery means with a combustile

fuel, we must anticipate unique and coupled delivery of

multiple elements of the CBRNE threat ectrum. For

example, IEDs are likely to remain a pervasive taical

threat, with the increasing ability to be employed simul-

taneously with other CBRNE components. Regarless, to

successfuly defeat the simultaneous presentation of var-

ious types of CBRNE threats within an operational area

requires unity of command and unity of eort of ecial

purpose, highly technical forces to apropriately synchro-

nize an eective response. Ad hoc solutions wil not work.

Current Organizational Challenges

and Deciencies

e 20th CBRNE Command comprises the majority

of aive component EOD and CBRN units, and these

units are curently organized functionaly into three

brigade-level commands. e 20th CBRNE Command’s

mission requires the unit to deploy forces to suport

unied land operations and perform mission command

for Army or joint

CBRN operations, and

to provide EOD forces

to achieve national

CWMD, homeland de-

fense, and defense-sup-

port-of-civil-authorities

objectives, while providing globaly responsive CBRN

and EOD forces to combatant commands.

In suport of the mission, the curent functional

organization of the command does not capitalize on

overlaping CBRN and EOD mission areas or core

capabilities, nor are any of the subordinate formation’s

eorts focused on any ecic global region. erefore,

the distributed nature of the command across sixteen

states and nineteen instalations creates ineciencies

in the execution of mission command, impacts nega-

tively on readiness, and leads to ad hoc solutions when

considering how to best resource emergent contingen-

cies that cal for the simultaneous employment of EOD

and CBRN forces.

52 71 48

CCE

CARA

· Only changes task organization of four battalions

· Increased CBRNE capacity with no growth

· Tailorable to meet combatant commander’s operational requirements

GS-15

242

110

CCE

III

CBRNE

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, and Explosives

CBRNE Analytical &

Remediation Activity

Operational

Control

CMU

Consequence

Management Unit

Operational

Control

AML

Area Medical

Laboratory

CCE

CBRNE Coordination

Element

III

Army National

Guard

U.S. Army

Army National

Guard

111

415

Training Readiness Oversight

NDT

Nuclear

Disablement Team

(Graphic by Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army)

Figure 1. Proposed CBRNE Brigade

Task Force Organization



Does not require any modied

table of organization and

equipment changes and can be

achieved without any growth in

authorizations

Enables unity of command by

reducing disparate command

relationships across dispersed

formation

Provides unity of eort and

increases ability to project

integrated CBRNE capability

Enables projection of mission

command by echelon to assure

proper employment and

integration of CBRNE forces

Does not impact ongoing

defense support of civil

authorities or special operations

forces support missions

Enables regional alignment

consistent with Department of

the Army and U.S. Army Forces

Command directives

Achieves and ensures necessary

technical oversight requirements

· Three all-CBRNE-hazards-capable

CBRNE brigade task forces

· Each CBRNE brigade task force

regionally aligned with one of the

three CONUS-based Army corps

· Each CBRNE brigade task force

enabled with a CBRNE

coordination element

Proposed Task

Organization:

67MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2016

CBRNE

Reorganizing CBRNE Task Forces for

Improved Eciency

We oer that to operate eectively across the

CBRNE ectrum, the Army must broaden the histor-

icaly limiting view of the 20th CBRNE Command as

focused only on CWMD and counter-IED operations. It

must be availale for employment across the ful range of

CBRNE threats and hazards and across the ful range of

military operations. Rather than viewing the operational

environment through a narow CWMD lens, analyzing

prolems through a wider CBRNE perective beer

iluminates chalenges and oportunities, and it leverages

the ful capability of the command.

For example, recent deployment of the 20th

CBRNE Command’s area medical lab in suport of

Operation United Assistance, the response to the Ebola

crises in West Africa, ilustrates an example of CBRNE

force employment that would have been precluded

based on a strictly WMD employment mindset.

We propose that to meet similar future chalenges

emerging from the rapily changing strategic environ-

ment, as wel as the intent of the Quarennial Defense

Review and the directives of the Ary Strategic Planning

Guidance, by task-organizing the functionaly organized

command into three multifunctional CBRNE brigade

TFs.

Each TF would be enaled with robust CBRNE

planning and coordinating expertise and technical

reach-back capabilities provided by an aligned CBRNE

coordination element (see ure 1).

Estalishing unity of command, dening clear ob-

jectives, and employing maneuver to capitalize on the

exile aplication of power are bale proven remedies

III CORPS

Central Command, Africa

Command, & European

Command

XVIII CORPS

Global Response Force

I CORPS

Pacic

Command

Task Force 71

(CBRNE)

Task Force 48

(CBRNE)

Task Force 52

(CBRNE)

Fort Riley, Kansas

Fort Carson, Colorado

Kirtland Air Force Base,

New Mexico

Fort Irwin, California

Yakima Training Center,

Washington

Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

Fort Sill,

Oklahoma

Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri

Fort Bliss,

Texas

Fort Hood,

Texas

Fort Polk,

Louisiana

Redstone Arsenal,

Alabama

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Fort Belvoir,

Virginia

Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Fort Bragg,

North Carolina

Fort Stewart,

Georgia

Fort Benning,

Georgia

CCE

CBRNE

749

764

242

787

707

CARA

(West)

763

761

734

741

630

172

774

181

797

704

752

717

723

744

184

789

705

756

AML

767

722

192

754

760

Fort Drum, New York

AML—Area Medical Lab

CARA—CBRNE Analytical & Remediation Activity

CBRNE—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives

CCE—CBRNE Coordination Element

CMU—Consequence Management Unit

TE—Technical Escort

OD—Ordnance Disposal

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Chemical Corps

CCE—CBRNE Coordination Element

KEYS

20th CBRNE

71st OD (EOD) Group

52nd OD (EOD) Group

48th Chemical Brigade

CARA

110

AIRBORNE

CONTINENTAL

U.S. SUPPORT

CARA

CMU

U.S. ARMY

759

CBRNE

(Graphic by Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army)

Figure 2. CBRNE Brigade Task Force Regional Alignment:

Unity of Command and Unity of Eort

July-August 2016 MILITARY REVIEW68

for complex chalenges. Reorganizing the 20th CBRNE

Command to create three multifunctional, regionaly

focused CBRNE brigade TFs wil ensure that the Army

has ready, reliale, and globaly responsive CBRNE

capabilities to meet the chalenges of the curent and

future strategic environments.

Reorganizing the command from its curent con-

uration of one CBRN brigade and two EOD groups

into three similarly organized CBRNE brigade forma-

tions would result in an immediate increase in national

capacity, with zero growth in personnel.

Whether for training or contingency operations, or

as enduring organizations, task-organizing into three

regionaly aligned multifunctional CBRNE brigade TFs

would ensure that these forces are properly organized,

focused, positioned, and prepared to respond globaly

to ever-evolving CBRNE threats.

is adjustment to mission command can be

achieved with no physical relocation of units, and it

would immediately deliver more exile and capale

regionaly focused CBRNE forces. Given the antici-

pated reductions of EOD force structure due to Total

Army Analysis 18-22, the proposal would mitigate the

chalenges of historical ad hoc solutions to similar and

anticipated future mission sets and it would overcome

the command’s curent unity of command and unity of

eort chalenges resulting from the widely distributed

basing construct and complex mission proles.

For the suported commanders, task-organizing

the command would resolve the issue of disparate

command and suport relationships of CBRNE forces

throughout the formation by assemling them under a

single O-6 commander and integrated sta.

Regional Alignment of CBRNE

Brigade Task Forces

e CBRNE brigade TF concept (henceforth refered

to as a CBRNE brigade) would enale the packaging of

trained and ready CBRNE forces under one commander.

is would increase mission command eectiveness and

reduce the impromptu relationships reminiscent of ad

hoc planning for Operation Eagle Claw.

Each CBRNE brigade would be regionaly aligned with

the Army service component commands, and in suport

of the three Army corps based in the continental United

States (CONUS) in accordance with the Army’s regional

I Corps

Task Force 71

(CBRNE)

PACOM

III Corps

Operational

Control

North, South, &

Central America

Global

Expeditionary

Capability

Africa, Europe, &

Southwest Asia

Pacic &

Southeast Asia

Direct

Support

Operational

Control

Direct

Support

Direct

Support

Direct

Support

CCE

U.S. Northern

Command & U.S.

Southern Command

U.S. Pacic

Command

Joint Task

Force-Civil Support

Africa Command,

Central Command, &

European Command

U.S Army Pacic

Command

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE)

Task Force 52

(CBRNE)

XVII Corps

Operational

Control

Special

Operations

Command

20th CBRNE

Task Force 48

(CBRNE)

U.S. Army Africa &

U.S. Army Central

(Graphic by Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army)

Figure 3. Regional Alignment Construct

69MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2016

CBRNE

alignment of forces concept (see ures 2 and 3).

TF 71

(CBRNE), positioned in the weern United States, would

align in general suport of I Corps with a focus on the U.S.

Pacic Command area of responsibility (AOR). TF 48

(CBRNE), positioned in the central United States in gen-

eral suport of III Corps, would focus on the U.S. Central

Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European

Command AORs. TF 52 (CBRNE), located in the eastern

United States, would align in general suport of XVIII

Airborne Corps and their global response force mission.

Task-organizing and regionaly aligning the 20th

CBRNE Command’s subordinate formations would

markely improve readiness through unity of command,

unity of eort, and increased “train as you intend to ght”

familiarity between 20th CBRNE and suported forces.

By focusing eorts regionaly and aligning in suport of

the Army service component commands through the

three CONUS-based corps, the command would be

beer prepared to full its expeditionary mission require-

ments without relying on traditional ad hoc solutions.

rough task organization, the leaders, soldiers, and

civilians of the 20th CBRNE Command would become

beer informed about their potential primary opera-

tional environment and beer ale to train habitualy

with their suported maneuver formations. is, in

turn, would increase interoperability and enhance

examination of ecic regional threats, from curent

combat operations to the entire range of threats found

across the combatant commands.

CBRNE Task Forces at the Combat

Training Centers

To test the CBRNE TF concept, the 20th CBRNE

Command organized and employed dierent cong-

urations of CBRNE baalion-task-force formations

in suport of brigade combat teams during nine CTC

rotations in scal years 14 and 15. Aditional rotations

are planned for scal years 16 and 17. Both CBRN

and EOD baalions have served as the integrating

headquarters under which CBRN, EOD, and CBRNE

response teams; nuclear disalement teams; and expe-

ditionary laboratories have been assemled.

CBRNE TFs can be scaled and tailored across a

range of possile contingency operations as shown in

CBRNE

EOD

LAB

CBRN

EOD CBRN

CRT

LAB

NDT

EOD EOD EOD

CRT

LAB

Counter Improvised Explosive Device Mission Package

Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Mission Package

EOD CBRN CBRN CBRN CBRN

LAB

Consequence Management Mission Package

Endemic Disease Mission Package

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Battalion Task Force is TAILORABLE and SCALABLE, providing

integrated CBRNE capability with a mission command element to the supported commander.

CBRNE

EOD

Explosive

Ordnance Disposal

LAB

Field Deployable

Laboratory

CRT

CBRNE Response

Team

CBRN

Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and

Nuclear Defense

NDT

Nuclear

Disablement Team

Key

(Graphic by Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army)

Figure 4. Potential Integrated CBRNE Mission Packages

July-August 2016 MILITARY REVIEW70

ure 4. ese mission-tailored CBRNE TFs provide the

suported commander a “single point of touch” to plan

and execute interelated CBRNE mission sets, alowing

for eective mission command of technical forces on

CBRNE target sites.

To increase training realism, the 20th CBRNE

Command colaborated with the National Training

Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the

Brigade Modernization Command at Fort Bliss, Texas, to

build an aray of new CBRNE target sites. With equip-

ment transfers from Oak Ridge National Laboratory and

other interagency partners, these targets replicated an

unprecedented degree of CBRNE training realism.

When mission sets and training objectives warant

the employment of CBRNE TFs, the training relation-

ships and lessons learned are invaluale to operation-

alizing the force. ey serve as a foundation for future

concept development.

Resourcing—Scientists in

the Foxhole and Advanced

Technology Demonstration

Given the 20th CBRNE Command’s multiple

proponents that oversee interelated CBRNE force

doctrine, training, and resourcing issues—including

the CBRN School, the EOD Directorate, and the

U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency

(USANCA)—a holistic enterprise solution is re-

quired. To facilitate that aproach, the 20th CBRNE

command, in colaboration with the Defense reat

Reduction Agency, organized a “Scientists in the

Foxhole” initiative.

is eort assemled senior

leaders throughout the CBRNE enterprise, to in-

clude representatives from the Oce of the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics; the Defense reat Reduction Agency; the

Joint Requirements Oversight Council; Headquarters,

Department of the Army G-8; U.S. Army Forces

Command; the Joint Program Executive Oce for

Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD);

Research and Development Command; the Edgewood

Chemical Biological Center; USANCA; and the EOD

Directorate. e program provides senior leaders and

scientists from the CBRNE enterprise an oportunity

to meet with and observe soldiers and civilians con-

ducting CBRNE taical operations in a live force-on-

force training environment.

ese type of engagements serve to assist CBRNE

enterprise leadership in recognizing and articulating ca-

pability gaps and dening potential materiel and nonma-

teriel solutions to enale the Nation’s CBRNE capabilities.

For example, JPEO-CBD, in partnership with the 20th

CBRNE Command and many of these same enterprise

partners, is leading an advanced technology demonstra-

tion to accelerate technology development and implemen-

tation and adress multiple operational issues while gain-

ing eciencies in materiel and nonmateriel solutions.

is enterprise aproach to holisticaly and more rap-

ily resource capability gaps and requirements alows the

Army and the joint force to beer resource an integrated,

combined arms aproach to combating CBRNE threats.

Impacts: e Way Forward

Organizing the functional subordinate formations of

the 20th CBRNE Command into three multifunctional,

regionaly aligned CBRNE brigades is an important step

in meeting the Army’s strategic planning uidance for this

one-of-a-kind formation. is reorganization provides

the Army and the Nation with an immediately improved

solution, with no growth and no physical relocation of

units, for delivering integrated CBRNE capacity to meet

expeditionary and campaign requirements.

e expanded denition of CBRNE threats and haz-

ards, with WMD and CWMD missions as a subset, facil-

itates a more expansive understanding of the operational

environment and beer informs the analysis of potential

geographic regions that would require the employment

of the command or its subordinate elements. Continued

training and validation of the multifunctional CBRNE TF

construct at CTCs, in concert with innovative enterprise

eorts such as the Scientists in the Foxhole and Advanced

Technology Demonstrations, ensure that the Nation’s

CBRNE forces are properly organized, trained, and re-

sourced for mission success, avoiding ad hoc organization-

al failures such as those seen in Operation Eagle Claw.

It is imperative that the 20th CBRNE Command

provide the Army and the Nation with ready, reliale, and

globaly responsive integrated CBRNE forces capale of

leading and executing CBRNE operations and aivities

anytime and anywhere. Task-organizing the command

beer enales that end state through unity of command,

unity of eort, and a regional focus accounting for al

CBRNE hazards, to beer inform our training and equip-

ping strategies.

71MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2016

CBRNE

Notes

1. James Holloway, e Holloway Report, report for the Joint

Chiefs of Sta, 23 August 1980, accessed 28 April 2016, hp://

www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc8.pdf.

2. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Pen-

guin Group, 28 January 2014), 330.

3. Walter Ham, “20th CBRNE to Participate in Army-Wide

Evaluation,” U.S. Army homepage, 24 September 2015, accessed

27 April 2016, hp://www.army.mil/article/156049/20th_CBR-

NE_to_participate_in_Army_wide_evaluation/.

4. Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Public Aairs, “ECBC

Scientists Gain Insight Directly from Warghters,” Edgewood

Chemical Biological Center website, 24 November 2015, accessed

28 April 2016, hp://www.ecbc.army.mil/news/2015/ecbc-scien-

tists-gain-insight-from-warghters-directly.html.

5. Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense

Review 2014 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing oce

[GPO], 4 March 2014), accessed 28 April 2016, hp://archive.

defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf;

Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014,

(Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2014), accessed 28 April 2016, hp://

www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/ASPG2014.pdf.

6. DOD, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, June

2014), accessed 28 April 2016, hp://archive.defense.gov/pubs/

DoD_Strategy_for_Countering_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction_

dated_June_2014.pdf.

7. Joint Publication 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruc-

tion (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 31 October 2014), I-1, accessed 28

April 2016, hp://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf.

8. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), “Countering

Weapons of Mass Destruction White Paper,” 22 April 2014, 9.

9. Ibid.

10. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pam-

phlet 525-7-19, e United States Army Concept Capability Plan for

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction for the Future Modular Force,

2015–2024 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 25 March 2009), 10–11.

11. “Mission Statement,” 20th CBRNE website, accessed 28

April 2016, hp://www.cbrne.army.mil/.

12. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014; Army Strategic Planning

Guidance 2014.

13. Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guid-

ance 2012, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 19 April 2012), 8.

14. Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, “ECBC Scientists

Gain Insight.”

15. Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, “ECBC Advanced

Technology Demonstration Branch,” Advanced Technology

Demonstration pamphlet, 2011, accessed 28 April 2016, hp://

www.ecbc.army.mil/ip/eng/ATD_brochure_revised.pdf.

Biographies

Big. Gen. Jaes B. Burton, U.S. Ary, retired, is the fore comanding general of the 20th CBRNE Comand,

Abedeen Proving Ground, Maryland. He has comanded at every ecelon, including comanding a mecanized

combined-ars tea duing Operations Desert Shield and Desert Stor; 2nd Baalion, 5th Caalry, in Kuwait

duing Operation Intinsic Action; and the 2nd Bigae Combat Tea of the 1st Infantry Diision in Baghda,

Iraq. He previously served as deuty comanding general fo maneuve of the 2nd Infantry Diision. He receied

an MMAS from the U.S. Ary Comand and General Sta Coege and an MA in national secuity and strategic

studies from the Naal Wa Coege.

Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Ary, is the deuty deartment hea fo the Deartment of Cheistry and Life Science at

the United States Military Acaey, West Point, New York, and the fore deuty comande fo transforation

in the 20th CBRNE Comand. He receied a ScD in bioengineeing from Masacuses Institute of Tecnology,

an MS in ceical engineeing from Stanfod Uniersity, and a BS in mecanical-aerospace engineeing from West

Point. He has served in airborne, aro, and Stryke units with humanitaian, peacekeeing, and combat operation-

al deloyments to Rwanda, Bosnia, and Iraq.

Capt. Kevin A. Gacia, U.S. Ary, is a caalry oce serving in Central Ameica engaged in counternacotic/counte

transnational organized cime eorts. He receied a BA from the Uniersity of Notre Dae and an MS in organi-

zational leaership from Columbus State Uniersity. He previously served as a platoon leae in Iraq with the 3d

Arored Caalry Regiment, and as an aide-de-cap in the 2nd Infantry Diision and in the 20th CBRNE Comand.