*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other

document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the

rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No.: 153879FL

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 2592

September Term, 2019

______________________________________

GAMAL HELAL

HEBA HELAL

______________________________________

Berger,

Friedman,

Gould,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Gould, J.

______________________________________

Filed: May 19, 2021

‒Unreported Opinion‒

*This is an unreported

This comes to us from two interlocutory orders in an ongoing divorce case. In one

of the orders, the court invalidated the prenuptial agreement between the parties at the

request of the wife. In the other order, the court awarded the wife attorneys’ fees pendente

lite. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm the order awarding fees to the wife, and

we dismiss the appeal as to the order invalidating the prenuptial agreement.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Gamal Helal (“Husband”) and appellee Heba Helal (“Wife”) have been

married since June 29, 2011. This is Wife’s second marriage and Husband’s third. Both

have children from their previous marriages. Husband is originally from Egypt but has

lived in the United States since 1977. At the time of their marriage, he was a wealthy and

successful Arabic interpreter.

Wife is an Egyptian journalist who met Husband in 2009 while in the United States

for a scholarship with the Woodrow Wilson Institute. She and her two daughters

permanently relocated to the United States and moved into Husband’s home shortly after

she and Husband became engaged in late 2009.

Six days prior to their wedding, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement (the

“Agreement”). Wife testified that Husband did not mention the Agreement until

approximately a week before the wedding. The Agreement was written in English by

Husband’s counsel. Wife was provided with an attorney suggested by Husband’s counsel.

Wife alleged that her attorney did not adequately explain the terms of the Agreement and

‒Unreported Opinion‒

that she was not provided with a translator.

As a result, she claimed that she signed the

Agreement without fully understanding it. Wife also discovered later that the financial

disclosure in the Agreement contained several errors and omissions for both parties.

THE PRENUP ORDER

Wife filed a complaint for absolute divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery

County in June 2018. Husband responded with a “Motion to Dismiss and for Order

Incorporating Prenuptial Agreement,” which Wife opposed. The court held a four-day

evidentiary hearing on the validity of the Agreement and heard testimony from Husband,

Wife, and several other witnesses.

The court invalidated the Agreement (the “Prenup Order”). In coming to its

decision, the court credited Wife’s version of events surrounding the Agreement’s

execution, finding:

the process by which the prenup was procured, including its drafting by

husband’s counsel, and review[ing] by a lawyer selected by husband’s

counsel, the missing assets in the disclosure, the total lack of any discussion

about [its] terms, the insisting that it be read and signed before the scheduled

dress fitting, and the overall picture of husband’s control of the family lead

to the conclusion that the prenup is invalid.

A full merits trial on the divorce was scheduled for April 2020.

Wife’s proficiency in English at the time she signed the Agreement is contested

by the parties.

The court found that the Agreement omitted approximately $332,000 worth of

Husband’s assets and overstated the value of Wife’s assets.

‒Unreported Opinion‒

THE PENDENTE LITE ORDER

After the court invalidated the prenuptial agreement, Wife filed a request for

pendente lite alimony and attorneys’ fees, and a hearing on that request was held before a

magistrate in October 2019. Following the hearing, the magistrate recommended that

Husband be required to pay $80,000 for the attorneys’ fees that Wife had incurred through

the hearing date.

Husband filed “Exceptions to the Magistrate’s Findings and Recommendations and

Request for a Hearing or in the Alternative Request for Reconsideration” (the “Exceptions

Motion”). He argued, among other things, that approximately $13,000 of the attorneys’

fees awarded were incurred in a separate civil matter between the parties and were therefore

not recoverable in the divorce case. Husband also asked the court to reconsider the Prenup

Order, asserting that certain “newly discovered evidence” impacted the credibility

assessment the circuit court gave to Wife and one of the witnesses who testified on her

behalf at the hearing.

The magistrate deferred Wife’s request for pendente lite alimony to the merits trial,

finding that the parties failed to provide sufficient evidence of income and expenses at the

hearing. The magistrate also deferred the issue of future attorneys’ fees for consideration

at trial.

This new evidence was approximately 80 YouTube videos depicting a romantic

relationship between Husband and his former assistant. Husband alleged that Wife

conspired to publish the videos online with an individual who testified as a witness on her

behalf at the hearing.

‒Unreported Opinion‒

THE EXCEPTIONS ORDER

In February 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on the Exceptions Motion. The

court stated that it would consider only Husband’s exceptions to the magistrate’s attorneys’

fees award. It repeatedly declined Husband’s request to revisit the Prenup Order, and

instead deferred Husband’s motion to reconsider to the merits trial. Following the hearing,

the court issued an order (the “Exceptions Order”) stating the following:

By way of background, the parties appeared before Magistrate Segal for a

Pendente Lite hearing on December 12, 2019. At that hearing, Magistrate

Segal awarded [Wife] $80,000 in attorney’s fees, incurred through October

30, 2019. The Magistrate analyzed the parties’ assets and liabilities,

including [Husband’s] substantial assets and low monthly expenses.

During the Exceptions Hearing on February 12th, [Husband] raised an issue

regarding the legal fees awarded to [Wife]. [Husband] claimed that, of the

$80,000 awarded to [Wife], $13,000 were related to [Husband’s] District

Court replevin action. Initially, the Court Ordered that $67,000 be paid to

[Wife’s] counsel. Upon further consideration, the Court has determined that

the entire $80,000 in fees shall be awarded to [Wife], $13,000 of which will

be held in [Wife’s] counsel’s escrow account, pending further proceedings.

[Husband] also requested that he be permitted to reopen and introduce

evidence related to the validity of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The

Court denied that request.

For the reasons stated herein, and on the record, it is this 13th day of

February, 2020, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County hereby

ORDERED, that [Husband’s] Exceptions . . . be, and are hereby, DENIED

in part and DEFERRED in part; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000) in attorney’s fees

shall be allocated as follows:

• Attorney’s fees in the amount of Sixty-Seven Thousand Dollars

($67,000) shall be reduced to judgment in favor of [Wife] and against

[Husband], to be paid not later than February 22, 2020; and

‒Unreported Opinion‒

• Fees in dispute in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000)

shall be held in in [Wife]’s Counsel’s escrow account, pending further

Order of Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that [Husband’s] Request for Reconsideration . . . be, and is hereby,

DEFERRED to the Merits Trial on April 13, 2020.

The merits trial has since been continued and is currently set for October 2021.

Husband then filed an interlocutory appeal to this Court and moved to stay

enforcement of the Exceptions Order pending the outcome of his appeal, which the circuit

court granted.

Husband now presents us with three questions, which we have reordered to

correspond to the structure of this opinion:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to reconsider the

validity of the prenuptial agreement prior to awarding attorneys[’] fees to

[Wife]?

2. Did the trial court err by awarding amounts for which there is no statutory

basis?

3. Did the trial court err in ruling the parties’ prenuptial agreement was

invalid?

DISCUSSION

THE EXCEPTIONS ORDER

Husband’s first and second questions, as re-ordered above, claim error in two

aspects of the Exceptions Order: (1) the court’s refusal to hear the motion for

reconsideration before ruling on the exceptions; and (2) the award of attorneys’ fees.

‒Unreported Opinion‒

Because the Exceptions Order is interlocutory, we must first decide whether and to what

extent the Exceptions Order is appealable.

JURISDICTION

In Maryland, “appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally authorized, is

determined entirely by statute[.]” Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Sup'rs of Elections, 345 Md.

477, 485 (1997). Generally, pursuant to Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial

Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Annotated Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), a

litigant may only appeal from a “final judgment.” URS Corp. v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp.,

452 Md. 48, 65 (2017). To be considered final, a judgment:

(1) . . . must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of

the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court properly acts pursuant to Md.

Rule 2–602(b), it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims

against all parties, and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of it in

accordance with Md. Rule 2–601.

Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 (1989).

There are three exceptions to this general rule that allow immediate appeals from

interlocutory orders. Specifically, an interlocutory appeal may be taken if it is permitted:

(1) by statute, (2) under Maryland Rule 2-602(b), or (3) under the common law collateral

order doctrine. Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 165 (1999). Unless an appeal is from a

final judgment or qualifies for one of these exceptions, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction

to hear the appeal. See Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546 (2002).

CJP § 12-303(3)(v) allows for an appeal of an interlocutory order in a civil case,

“[f]or the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of

‒Unreported Opinion‒

money, or the refusal to rescind or discharge such an order, unless the delivery or payment

is directed to be made to a receiver appointed by the court[.]” (Emphasis added). Maryland

courts have found that pendente lite awards for attorneys’ fees in divorce cases qualify as

orders “for the payment of money” under CJP § 12-303(3)(v) and are thereby generally

appealable. See Simmons v. Perkins, 302 Md. 232, 235 (1985) (“The types of orders

previously held by this Court to be orders for the ‘payment of money’ [under CJP § 12-

303(3)(v)] are orders for alimony, child support, and related counsel fees.”) (emphasis

added); see also Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 462 (1980); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81

Md. App. 575, 582 (1990); Knott v. Knott, 146 Md. App. 232, 245-46 (2002).

The Exceptions Order made two separate rulings on the pendente lite attorneys’ fees

award: one regarding $67,000 of the award and another pertaining to $13,000 of the award.

Both rulings require the “payment of money” under CJP § 12-303(3)(v) and thus, as to

these rulings, the Exceptions Order is an appealable interlocutory order.

Wife argues that neither of the awards in the Exceptions Order are appealable. She

reasons that the awards do not fall under CJP § 12-303(3)(v) because they are not

“equitable in nature,” as they did not make Husband directly answerable to the court for

noncompliance and imprisonment for contempt is not a possible remedy for violation of

the order. It’s a close call, but we disagree. See Anthony Plumbing of Maryland, Inc. v.

Att'y Gen. of Maryland, 298 Md. 11, 20 (1983) (holding that alimony, child support, and

related counsel fees are orders for the “payment of money” under § 12-303(3)(v)); Yamaner

v. Orkin, 310 Md. 321, 325 (1987) (stating that orders for the payment of money under CJP

§ 12-303(3)(v) are “equitable in nature[,]” “proceed directly to the person so as to make

one against whom it operates directly and personally answerable to the court for

noncompliance,” and include “imprisonment for contempt” as a sanction for their

violation); Rubin v. Rubin, 233 Md. 118, 125 (1963) (“[T]he nature of the wife’s allowance

for the expenses of a divorce suit is ‘in fact a sort of alimony[.]’”); Oles Envelope Corp. v.

Oles, 193 Md. 79, 92 (1949) (holding that the obligation to pay alimony “may be enforced

by attachment of the person for contempt, and the defendant may be imprisoned”).

‒Unreported Opinion‒

ANALYSIS

THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

At the outset, we note that the argument section in Husband’s brief regarding the

motion for reconsideration does not address the substance of the corresponding question

presented. In his question presented, Husband asks if circuit court erred by “refusing to

reconsider the validity of the prenuptial agreement prior to awarding attorneys[’] fees to

[Wife].” The unstated but inferable premise behind this question is that there was

something special or unique about the attorneys’ fee award that should have compelled the

court to resolve his motion for reconsideration first. The issue, as framed in the question

presented, implicates the rules applicable to motions for reconsideration and exceptions to

magistrate’s reports and the underlying policies and concerns with respect to both types of

filings. But that’s not how Husband argued the issue later in his brief.

In the argument portion of his brief, Husband doesn’t argue that the motion for

reconsideration should have been heard before the exceptions on the attorneys’ fees; he

argues instead that the motion should have been heard before the trial, contending that a:

hearing prior to the trial date was appropriate in order to conserve judicial

resources and the resource[s] of the parties. Much attorney time and much

money would be spent arguing trial-related motions regarding discovery, lay

and expert witnesses and the admissibility of certain exhibits, and preparing

for a trial that would not be necessary if Appellant prevailed on his motion

to reconsider.

‒Unreported Opinion‒

Thus, as argued, it wouldn’t have mattered to Husband if the motion for

reconsideration was heard after the exceptions, so long as it was heard before trial. We

generally don’t address an issue raised in an appeal unless it is adequately briefed. See

DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 56 (1999). Accordingly, we will only address the issue as

articulated in the argument section of Husband’s brief—which we view as a general

objection to the court’s discretionary decision to defer the motion for reconsideration to the

merits trial.

Turning to the merits of Husband’s argument, we note that any litigant who takes

issue with how a trial court manages its docket has a steep hill to climb. “The inherent

authority of a court to control its docket is widely recognized.” Heit v. Stansbury, 215 Md.

App. 550, 568 (2013) (quotation omitted). The circuit courts, with their crowded dockets,

must have flexibility to determine the most efficient and effective allocation of their

resources. See Volkman v. Hanover Invs., Inc., 225 Md. App. 602, 626 (2015), aff'd, 455

Md. 1 (2017); Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 716-17 (2000). Thus, courts

have broad discretion to manage their resources, and we will not second guess such

decisions “unless it clearly appear[s] that prejudice has resulted from the denial of a legal

right.” Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 27 (1990), aff'd in part, rev'd

in part on separate grounds, 326 Md. 179 (1992).

Here, the court devoted four days to an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the

Agreement and set aside another four days to hold a merits trial. Important though this

case is, so too are the thousands of other cases pending in the circuit court. Thus, Husband

was not entitled to yet a third evidentiary hearing, particularly on an issue that can be heard

‒Unreported Opinion‒

at the merits trial without causing any prejudice to Husband. We perceive no abuse of

discretion in the court’s deferral of Husband’s motion for reconsideration to the merits trial.

STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE ATTORNEYS’ FEES AWARD

Husband argues that in the Exceptions Order, the court abused its discretion by

awarding attorneys’ fees without an appropriate statutory basis. “Maryland law clearly

establishes that attorney’s fees may not be recovered absent an express contractual

provision, statutory authority, or the application of Md. Rule 1–341.” Smith v. Luber, 165

Md. App. 458, 471 (2005). Relevant provisions of the Family Law Article provide express

statutory authority that “[a]t any point in a proceeding under this title, the court may order

either party to pay to the other party an amount for the reasonable and necessary expense

of prosecuting or defending the proceeding.” Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (“FL”) § 7-107(b)

(1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.) (permitting attorneys’ fee awards in proceedings under the Divorce

title); see also FL § 8-214(b) (permitting attorneys’ fees awards for proceedings related to

the division of marital property); FL § 11-110(b) (permitting attorneys’ fees awards in

proceedings under the Alimony title).

Husband argues in his brief that there was no statutory basis for either the $67,000

or the $13,000 awards. In the Exception Motion, however, Husband limited his objections

to the $13,000 award, which he alleged was incurred in a separate district court case.

The relevant portions FL §§ 7-107, 8-214, and 11-110 contain identical language

and have been construed together as “one family law scheme” governing fee shifting in

domestic cases. Henriquez v. Henriquez, 413 Md. 287, 305 (2010).

‒Unreported Opinion‒

Accordingly, he failed to preserve his challenge to the $67,000 award in the Exceptions

Order. See Md. Rule 8-131 (a) (“Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other

issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial

court[.]”).

As for the $13,000 award, we fail to see the basis for a claim of error. The circuit

court has not yet determined whether Wife will be entitled to receive those funds, as the

funds will be held in Wife’s counsel’s escrow account “pending further proceedings.” To

the extent Husband claims error in the circuit court’s decision to preserve the funds in the

meantime, this strikes us as a discretionary decision with which we perceive no abuse.

II.

THE PRENUP ORDER

We now turn to Husband’s argument that the circuit court erred in invalidating the

Agreement. Again, the threshold issue is whether we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal

from this order. See Gruber, 369 Md. at 546. Husband argues that because CJP § 12-

303(3)(v) permits an appeal from the pendente lite attorneys’ fees awards, it permits by

extension an interlocutory appeal of the Prenup Order. For support, he cites to Frey v.

Frey, 298 Md. 552 (1984), and Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537 (2005), arguing that in

both cases, the court allowed interlocutory appeals from orders invalidating prenuptial

agreements because they were inextricably linked to appealable pendente lite monetary

awards.

This case is distinguishable from both Frey and Cannon. In Frey, because the order

for the payment of money was predicated on the trial court’s invalidation of the prenuptial

‒Unreported Opinion‒

order, the Court of Appeals could not review the former unless it reviewed the latter. 298

Md. at 556-557. Similarly, in Cannon, the Court found that it had appellate jurisdiction to

review an interlocutory order invalidating a prenuptial agreement only because pendente

lite alimony was awarded “as a consequence of the invalidation of the agreement.” 384

Md. at 567 n.1.

In contrast, here, our resolution of the appeal from the Exceptions Order did not

require us to determine whether the court erred by invalidating the Agreement. Thus, there

is no basis on which the Prenup Order can piggyback on the Exceptions Order for an

immediate appeal to this Court. Because Husband has not identified an exception to the

final judgment rule applicable to the Prenup Order, we must dismiss his appeal of that order

for lack of jurisdiction.

APPEAL OF PRENUP ORDER OF THE

CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY

COUNTY DISMISSED; EXCEPTIONS

ORDER OF SAID COURT AFFIRMED.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.